Contribution :
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Developmental Aspects of the Internet:
The Last Gasp of Colonialism, or Imperialism by Other Means?
Richard Hill*,
July 2013
The word version of this paper is
available at:
http://www.apig.ch/news.htm
Abstract
It is undeniable
that the Internet has transformed telecommunications in recent years, and it
has also had very beneficial effects on national economies and on international
trade. However, the benefits have not
been distributed evenly around the world: developed countries have benefited
relatively more, as have some of their major private companies.
This paper reviews
briefly the history of Internet and its governance, points out that the US
government still exercises some (at least nominal) control over some aspects of
the Internet, and links that to the well-known historical phenomena of
colonialism and imperialism. The paper
argues that a new form of imperialism, techno-imperialism, is conflated with
traditional political imperialism for what concerns Internet governance.
The paper
concludes that new Internet governance models should be envisaged so as to
achieve true democratic and multi-lateral Internet governance.
1. Introduction
Empires have
always striven to improve communications: early well-known examples are Roman
roads[i]
and the message system of the Mongol empire[ii]. With the advent of telegraphy, empires
started to use telecommunications, and actively pursued international
telecommunication policies that were in their interest[iii].
During the twentieth
century, there has been a long-term shift in geopolitical power first from
Europe towards the United States and the former Soviet Union, more recently
towards the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and
South Africa). That shift resulted in
the demise of the former European colonial empires and a rise in the competing
ideological and economic empires comprised respectively by the United States
and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the
United States was left as the most powerful military and economic force in the
world. Not surprisingly, US dominance is
also reflected in today’s dominant telecommunications technology, the Internet[iv].
2. A Short
History of the Internet
It is worth
recalling that the invention and early deployment of the Internet[v]
were funded by the US Defence Department Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), in
competition with the parallel developments of comparable technologies under the
Open Systems Interface (OSI) umbrella[vi];
the OSI work was carried out by private companies (former telecommunications
monopolies and their captive manufacturers, together with computer companies,
in particular those competing against the dominant company of the time,
International Business Machines (IBM)).
Subsequently,
deployment of the Internet was funded in the US by the National Science
Foundation (NSF) and in Europe by various academic funds. That is, the invention and the early
deployment were primarily funded by governments.
An important
component of the Internet, the world-wide-web, was invented in Geneva,
Switzerland, by an English national working for an inter-governmental
organization[vii].
Commercial use of the Internet was allowed
starting in 1995. Not coincidentally, this
is when public discussions started regarding Internet governance[viii].
3. A Short History of Internet Governance
It is important to note that the early
discussions regarding Internet governance were focused on reducing the
historical role of the US government and on finding multi-lateral solutions,
and these discussions were carried out in a manner that would subsequently be
referred to as multi-stakeholder.
However, the US government did not accept the
results of that multi-stakeholder consultation, precisely because it envisaged
a multi-lateral approach to Internet governance, and so the US government
unilaterally imposed an alternative approach, based on US entities which were
bound by contracts or agreements with the US government, in particular the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)[ix].
It should be noted that, when ICANN was first envisaged, it was not
intended to be multi-stakeholder. The US
statement of policy that resulted in the creation of ICANN states[x]
that the transition from management by contractors of the US government to what
became ICANN should “allow the private sector to take leadership
for DNS management” and “national governments now have, and will continue to
have, authority to manage or establish policy for their own ccTLDs”.
Despite the promise made in 1998, the US
government has never relinquished its role as the ultimate authority for the
management of critical Internet resources.[xi] Indeed, the existence of this role has been
openly acknowledged in an analysis prepared for the US Congress, which raises
as a point to consider[xii]:
“Should the U.S. government
maintain its current legacy authority over ICANN and the DNS [Domain Name
System], and if so, how can NTIA [National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, an agency under the US Department of Commerce] best use this
authority judiciously in order to advance U.S. government interests, while at
the same time minimizing the perception by other nations (as well as the
international community of Internet stakeholders) that the United States has an
inappropriate level of control or influence over the Internet and the DNS?”.
4. Perceptions of the
US role
Not surprisingly, not all countries are
comfortable with the role played by the United States with respect to Internet
governance.
As a former senior US official put the matter[xiii]:
Defence of status quo is perceived as saying the US created the
Internet, the US controls the Internet, US corporations profit
disproportionately from the Internet, US security services have privileged
access to everything that traverses the Internet. … Internet has become a mechanism of
overarching importance for every country in the world, both in terms of
economic activity, but also for social, political and cultural considerations. Yet for many countries there is no reliable
modality that permits them to influence, let alone to control, what happens …
The content conveyed over the Internet largely reflects US legal and cultural
sensibilities, which sensibilities are not universally shared. … Cybersecurity is a large and growing
problem, and there is very substantial uncertainty on the part of many
countries regarding how to address these cybersecurity issues.
Western countries prefer the status quo.
… There are countries such as Brazil and India and India that have a
whole set of concerns about the Internet.
They need it, they want it to work for them, they also feel rather
acutely that they don’t have nearly as much influence about how the Internet
may evolve as their position in the world entitles them to. These are countries that have a strong
preference for bringing issues to the UN and having them resolved in that
framework.
Note the mention
of a perception that US security services have privileged access to everything
that traverses the Internet; this is apparently a reality, not just a
perception.[xiv]
A well-known Internet technologist
expressed thoughts broadly similar to
those expressed above[xv]:
“Its true that a number of critical elements of the Internet's
infrastructure, including the IANA function of oversight over the Internet's
names and addresses remains a contracted activity with direct oversight by an
agency of the US government. It's also reasonable to observe that over the past
14 years or so the US Government's hold over this function has tightened rather
than relaxed, and what might have been a vague intention to pass this function
over to an industry-based self regulatory private sector body at some
indefinite time in the future has transformed to a grim determination never to
relinquish reserve control of these functions.
On the other hand, many nations see the role of a single nation state in
this global communications system as anomalous and threatening, and would prefer
to see control be placed in the hands of an international treaty body that
specializes in international telecommunications, namely the ITU. They see the
US as exerting an undue and improper level of influence and control and would
like to see this function be more accessible to other nation states on a peer
basis.”
But the criticism is not limited to ICANN and
the management of critical resources (names and addresses). It is also related to the general dominance
by US companies of many key sectors of information and communication technologies
(ICTs). As the same technologist put the
matter[xvi]:
“They [developing countries and Brazil, Russian Federation, India,
China, and South Africa (BRICS)] evidently see the dramatic explosion of online
content as services as a form of colonial exploitation, where a small number of
enterprises, located predominately in the United States, were engaged in global
enterprises with little or no constraint or balance, and the result was once
more a form of technological exploitation where the benefits of this global
network were flowing into a single national economy and everyone else was
paying. Individual national interests
were effectively powerless to stand up to this new international cartel, and it
would only be through collective action undertaken by many nation states would
some form of balance be restored.”
A similar thought has been
expressed by the former senior US official cited earlier[xvii]:
“The foundation for international cooperation continues to be the
nation-state. We have adhered to the
agreements that were reached in Westphalia in 1648, and we continue to do
that. It is not something that is going
to go away any time soon.
“…
“For many countries, the United Nations and its organizations are the
central place where they want to go to resolve issues and the one-nation
one-vote aspect of those organizations is important.”
A well respected academic summarized the
situation as follows[xviii]:
“Calls for US leadership, however, must take into
account the fallout from the NSA surveillance revelations [Prism], the
continuing irritant of US control of the IANA contract, and the broader
perception among some countries that multi-stakeholderism is merely a cover for
U.S. dominance of the whole domain.”
5. The real issue
But for most developing countries the real issue
is not whether or not the US is exercising an asymmetric role, but whether the
results of the current Internet governance model are consistent with the
aspirations of developing countries. As
the cited former senior US official put the matter[xix]:
“There are many countries for which the big issue is development. Whether or not there are ways to approach
Internet governance to expand broadband networks, to improve the cybersecurity
environment, and a range of development issues that they would like to see improved.”
Indeed, there has been considerable criticism of the current model[xx]
with respect to development issues. In
particular, the cost of international Internet connectivity is too high, in
relative terms, for developing countries.[xxi]
At present, it
is disputed whether the current financial arrangements for the Internet will
result in sufficient return on investments to finance the rollout of sufficient
new infrastructure[xxii].
The Internet is
based on a “receiver pays” model. This
model applies at two levels: at the level of the end-user, and at the level of
the international interconnection.
There is
general agreement that it is logical for an end-user to pay for something that
he or she asked for, for example a video; but there is some question regarding whether
the provider of the content should also pay, for example if it wishes to ensure
the speed of transmission of its content (this is the “net neutrality debate”).
But “receiver
pays” also applies to international interconnections at the wholesale level,
and developing countries have long taken the view that it penalizes them,
because these countries produce little content and access much content, so they
use proportionately more international bandwidth.[xxiii]
Fundamentally,
it is obvious that, in a “receiver pays” system, a relatively poor country will
obtain less information than a relatively rich country, simply because the
relatively poor country has less money to spend.
One might take
the view that there is nothing wrong with this: after all, nobody thinks that
everybody should drive luxury cars.
On the other
hand, one might take the view that access to what is undoubtely the world’s
fundamental communication and information system (the “free and open Internet”)
should be made available to all at prices they can afford.
So the question
becomes how to address the fact that (1) for people in developing countries
Internet access is relatively less affordable than it is for people in
developed countries; and (2) people in developing countries have relatively
less access to Internet than they do to mobile telephones, again when compare
to people in developed countries[xxiv]. That is, how can we make Internet as
available as voice services provided by mobile phones?
Some take the
view that liberalization will achieve this goal[xxv].
Others point
out that liberalization has not had the desired effects in some countries[xxvi].
It is not
disputed that developing countries have questions and legitimate concerns[xxvii]. And it cannot be disputed that discussions on
the topics outlined above should continue.
Thus the
question is: in which forums should the discussions take place?
6. The
multi-stakeholder approach
Because the
Internet is different from other networks, its governance is not the same as
that of other networks.[xxviii] In particular, certain aspects of the
Internet are not regulated by governments and they are governed by a variety of
private sector organizations which are open to a broad range of participants,
including in some cases governments.
This situation is often referred to as “the multi-stakeholder model”,
which has been defined as engaging
“technologists, the private sector and civil society in a bottom-up, consensus
driven approach to standards setting, Internet development, and management” [xxix]. It has been said that
Internet governance matters call for open multi-stakeholder participation in an
open dialogue that directly reflect the diversity of the interests and
activities that collectively form the Internet itself.[xxx] That is, it is argued that that no particular
Internet governance matter should be decided except by multi-stakeholder
bodies. [xxxi]
Taken literally, this means that the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) should not decide online
copyright or patent matters, unless one takes the view that those matters are
not related to Internet governance. But
this is rarely argued. Indeed, the US
explicitly argues the contrary, namely that the WIPO treaties should be applied
to the Internet[xxxii]
and the US, the European Union, and Australia argue that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is competent to make certain decisions regarding the
Internet[xxxiii]. And nobody has (at least yet) argued that the
US Department of Commerce, the US Congress, the European Commission, the
Council of Europe, or the European Parliament should not discuss Internet
governance matters because those institutions are not multi-stakeholder
institutions.
Rather, what is really being argued is
that certain particular Internet governance matters should be decided by
multi-stakeholder bodies. Perhaps not
coincidentally, the matters in question are those that are handled by the
existing prominent Internet bodies such as ICANN, IETF, W3C, and the Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs).
Also perhaps not coincidentally, the bulk
of the organized political support for this view comes from countries whose
companies and citizens participate intensively in the work of those bodies.[xxxiv] There is nothing new in this: opposition to
inter-governmental agreements was explicitly stated as early as 1949 by the US
operator AT&T[xxxv].
Indeed, in a
multi-stakeholder model private companies are able to intervene at multiple
levels: within some components of the multi-stakeholder model (including
goverments) and directly as private companies.
Thus it is not surprising that most private companies favor the
multi-stakeholder model.[xxxvi]
And of course the most important private companies
active in providing Internet products and services are located in developed
countries.
7. Is this colonialism?
Colonialism can be defined as a policy by which
a nation maintains or extends its control over foreign dependencies. One of the motivations for colonialism is the
economic exploitation of the dependencies. [xxxvii] It should be noted, however, that the wealth
extracted from the dependencies is not necessarily evenly distributed amongst
the citizens of the colonizing nation.[xxxviii]
In this sense, an insistence on US (or developed
country) control of Internet governance is indeed an example of colonialism
(including at times the denigration of ability of developing country
representatives to understand the issues and to take appropriate decisions on
their own). Thus it is not surprising
that the most vocal advocates of changes to the current approach are the most
powerful developing countries: Brazil, China, India, Russian Federation, and
South Africa.
Imperialism can be defined as the policy of
extending a nation’s authority by territorial acquisition or by the
establishment of economic and policy authority over other nations.
The current Internet governance model fits well
into this definition: it allows the US to enforce rather easily its domestic
policies, at times with extra-territorial effects. For example, the US could easily seize domain names used
for well-known poker sites, because those domain names are provided by US
entities. [xxxix] The seizure prevented people outside the US
from using those sites (the sites were later restored with the stipulation that
they could not be accessed from within the US).
Another example is provided by the Prism surveillance program, whose
implementation was facilitated by the fact that key Internet companies are US
entities[xl]. (Requests for surveillance of US citizens are
apparently subject to approval by an independent judge, whereas apparently such
approval is not required for surveillance of non-US citizens. If this is correct, then Prism is an example
of the well-known tendency of empires to accord special rights to their own
citizens[xli]).
Apparent agreements between the US and Europe to share information on
Prism[xlii],
and between the US and the Russian Federation to cooperate to improve ICT
security[xliii],
are not likely to alleviate perceptions of continuing colonialism and
imperialism, especially given the US refusal to agree to any language regarding
cooperation on security matters during the World Conference on International
Telecommunications (WCIT)[xliv]. And an apparent US intent to conduct
offensive cyberwarfare activities[xlv]
is also not likely to alleviate perceptions of imperialism.
Further, the current Internet governance model
allows US entities to influence the economic and policy authority of other
nations (and indeed even, to some extent, of the US itself[xlvi]). Indeed, the flow of funds of Internet traffic
is less favorable to developing countries than was the flow of funds of
traditional voice traffic prior to liberalization. The ITU estimates
that, in the period 1993-98, the net flows of settlement payments from
developed counties to developing ones amounted to some US$40 billion.[xlvii] Due to the shift away from the traditional
accounting rate system, and reductions in rates, the net flows of settlement
payments from developed to developing countries decreased significantly, and
may even have turned in the other direction.[xlviii] In particular, various unilateral actions by
the United States were viewed as resulting in a net flow of revenues from
developing countries to developed countries, in particular to the US (that is,
taking from the poor to give to the rich).[xlix] As one author puts the matter:[l]
“the existing economic mechanisms in international communications networks
establish the financial flows in favor of the developed countries”.
In this light, it is
not surprising that, as the cited Internet technologist[li]
puts the matter:
“The US government sees this [control of IANA] as a necessary part of
their stewardship of the multi-stakeholder model of a free and open
Internet. Their stated concern is that
were they to pass control over to an international organization then it's a
distinct risk that this organization would be captured by hostile national
interests and the consequent risk, as they state it, is that the open nature of
the Internet would be destroyed. The US
is not alone in this view and many other countries perceive the potential of a
similar form of threat and see the US role as either a positive force or, at
worst, they see this as the lesser of many potential evils.”
It is worth noting at this point that there is
little transparency regarding the financial flows for Internet traffic, because
the bulk of the traffic is carried under “peering agreements” that are
zero-cost arrangements between the concerned operators.[lii] Thus, today’s prevalent telecommunications
technology is largely run as a barter economy, unlike any other important
infrastructure. One can wonder whether
this contributes to the relatively unfavorable situation of developing
countries with respect to Internet access.
As stated in Supplement 2 to Recommendation ITU-T D.50 (forthcoming):
“Some take the view that the mechanisms to be
established [to implement D.50] must take into account the costs engendered by
the activities of the various players in the value change, in particular
regarding investment costs. From this
point of view, the full set of users of the international Internet
interconnection (IIC) infrastructure should each bear a portion of the cost,
according to its use of the infrastructure.[liii]
“In this way, each player will contribute to
financing the cost of the infrastructure in an objective matter, and will
contribution to the development and deployment of the IIC infrastructure , and
will thus contribution to reducing the digital divide between the North and the
South.[liv]
“…
“There are a number
of reasons for the cost of Internet connection. The first and most important is
still the cost of international Internet bandwidth. The tariffs for connection
between Africa and Europe bear no comparison with the much lower charges
applied between Europe and North America or even between Asia and Europe. These
high tariffs are the result of an absence of competition in the international
Internet connection market and of the current Internet interconnection model.[lv]
“In
particular, the cost of international Internet connection is too high in
sub-Saharan Africa compared to the rest of the world. The market is in the
hands of a limited number of commercial groups which include the major
operators, former incumbent operators and various financial consortia. This market is somewhat non-transparent and
monopolistic.”[lvi]
In addition to the economic domination, there is
also a tendency for the developed countries to impose certain policy choices on
developed countries. For example, at the
2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), developed
countries strongly objected to a proposal to include the following in the
International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs):[lvii]
“Member States may seek information on the
international route of their traffic, where [technically, financially and
legally] feasible. Member States shall cooperate - consistent with their
national laws [and respective international obligations] - to provide this
information to the Member State concerned.”
As a result of those objections, no such text was included in the ITRs.
Objections to the
inclusion of such a provision included statements to the effect that it could
lead to violations of freedom of speech.
Further, at WCIT developed countries strongly opposed proposals from
developing countries to include provisions in the ITRs regarding cooperation on
improving on security and combating spam, again, on the grounds that such
provisions could threaten freedom of speech.
But in fact the
provisions in question could not threaten freedom of speech; on the contrary,
cooperation on such matters is more likely to preserve freedom of speech.[lviii] Indeed, as noted above, the US has
acknowledged that it unilaterally monitors certain foreign Internet traffic.[lix] Thus one might wonder whether the strong US
resistance to inclusion in the ITRs of an article regarding cooperation on
security matters was motivated by a desire to be able to carry out unilateral
monitoring without any constraints, which is something that some proponents of
the Internet consider to be undesirable[lx]. In the absence of cooperation, countries have
greater freedom to implement domestic restrictions and surveillance.[lxi]
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the revelations of
such unilateral US actions might increase calls for changes in the current
Internet governance structures.[lxii] As one journalist put the matter[lxiii]:
“The fact
that the Americans and the British are apparently employing surveillance
techniques not dissimilar to the Russians and Chinese makes a laughing stock of
their otherwise admirable policy of promoting free expression and an open
internet around the world. One can
already hear the chortles of President Putin. One can only imagine the
schadenfreude of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, as he met Barack Obama in
California last weekend.
“What is
needed is a determined effort to bring international human rights law up to
date to meet the many, and changing, opportunities and dangers posed by the
internet. …”
8. Is there also techno-imperialism?
In addition to the economic and policy
domination noted above, there is also a certain imposition by developed
countries of technical norms on developed countries. This imposition arises because the entities
that produce the technical norms used for the Internet are developed in
organizations (such as IETF and ICAN) that are open to direct participation by
individuals;[lxiv]
however, there are barriers
to participation in those organizations, including the ability to speak
English, to travel, and having sufficient technical knowledge, and indeed some
of those organizations have been criticized as lacking the consensus of a
sufficiently broad community[lxv].
Further, certain key norms are developed by private companies and imposed
de facto without formal input from users (apart of course from the input that
arises when users refuse to use a particular product or service). In competitive markets, this is normal:
consumers vote with their feet and no other form of input is required. But not all Internet markets are competitive,
and norms developed by individual companies appear to be growing in importance.[lxvi] Indeed, the European Comission is
investigating whether the leading search service provider has a dominant
position and promotes its
specialized search services in a way that unduly diverts traffic away from its
competitors, thus abusing its dominance.[lxvii]
As a
well respected technologist puts the matter (in the context of a discussion
regarding the slow rate of the transition to IPv6)[lxviii]:
“We
are witnessing an industry that is no longer using technical innovation,
openness and diversification as its primary means of propulsion. … Today's
internet is serviced by a far smaller number of very large players, each of
whom appear to be assuming a very strong position within their respective
markets. The drivers for such larger players tend towards risk aversion,
conservatism and increased levels of control across their scope of operation.
The same trends of market aggregation are now appearing in content provision, where
a small number of content providers are exerting a dominant position across the
entire Internet.”
Since the individual companies concerned are developed country companies,
and since developed country companies still largely influence the discussions
in the various norm-setting bodies, one can coin a new term “techo-imperialism”
to refer to a policy by which a group of private companies maintains or extends its
control over economic and policy matters by controlling the development and use
of certain technologies. Reliance on
intellectual property rights such as copyrights, patents, and trade secrets are
some of the means used to exercise such control[lxix].
Such techno-imperialism is not motivated just by
the economic interests of private companies, it is also motivated by the
sincere belief of some technologists that they know best what should be done[lxx]. Unfortunately, the record shows that the
choices made by the technologists are not always the ones best suited to
real-world applications.[lxxi]
Indeed, in general, technologies such as
printing, railroads, steam-powered ships, gasoline-powered automobiles,
airplanes, etc. have affected the real world, but they have in turn been
influenced and constrained by the real world (for example, restrictions are
imposed to ensure safety, to reduce pollution, to facilitate law enforcement,
etc.). Thus it would seem reasonable to
expect that non-technologists might wish to impose restrictions on the Internet
technologies.
It is not surprising that technologists resist
calls for such restrictions; what is less obvious is why developed countries
tend also to resist such calls. A
possible explanation is that the interests of the technologists are conflated
with the economic and policy interests of the developed countries, so that
traditional colonialism is conflated with techno-imperialism.
9. The way forward?
If indeed we are in a situation akin to
colonialism, and if we accept that this situation is not desirable (because it
is obviously not consistent with the democratic ideal that is widely accepted
world-wide at present), then we should seek ways to change the situation.
Various steps can be envisaged to encourage
discussion of changes:
- Accept the discussion, rather than refuse it (WCIT and WTPF both
provide good examples of refusal to discuss the situation, as do numerous
other meetings)/
- Accept discussion of the fundamental issues, rather than peripheral
issues on which there isn’t much disagreement (for example, at WTPF there
was much discussion of the role of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) but no
discussion of the Internet financial flow issues summarized above, and no
discussion of the fundamental issue: how to subsidize access for people
who live in low-income, low-density geographical areas such as much of
Africa and the Pacific Islands[lxxii]).
- Accept comparison with other infrastructures, in particular the
mobile telephone infrastructure.[lxxiii] As noted above, usage of this
infrastructure has grown more rapidly than has usage of the Internet[lxxiv]. Perhaps this difference in growth is at
least partly related to the fact that the governance of the GSM
infrastructure is rather more traditional than the governance of the
Internet infrastructure (or perhaps not, but the matter should be
discussed seriously, and not dismissed out of hand).
- Seek an agreement that gives equal rights to all countries, that
is, address the current asymmetric role of the US government.
Regarding point 4 above, one solution could be
that the US relinquishes its current privileged role, with the existing structures
remaining as they are. That is, there
would be no new formal agreements involving governments, and the current
contracts and agreements with the US government would be discontinued.
Another solution could be “back to the future”:
developing a multi-stakeholder multi-lateral memorandum of understanding
similar to the one originally proposed in 1997[lxxv]. For convenience that document is reproduced
in Annex 1 of this paper.
Another historical proposal was presented by
Syria to the 3-4 May 2005 meeting of the ITU Council Working Group on
WSIS. After describing issues very
similar to the ones described above, Syria proposed to replace the current role
of the US Department of Commerce with the ITU, and in particular that there
should be a Memorandum of Understanding between ITU and ICANN.[lxxvi]
More recently, it has been proposed to consider
discussing proposals to[lxxvii]:
a)
Establish a mechanism to internationalize the
monitoring responsibilities in respect of the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is currently the responsibility of a single
country.
b)
Take steps towards transforming the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) into an international
organization, subject to international law, and for that purpose, sign an agreement
with the host country.
c)
Establish an intergovernmental mechanism
enabling governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their role and
responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining to the
Internet.
One can also consider a federated model, with
much greater diversity than the present model, that it, separate networks that
interconnect in specific ways.[lxxviii]
At some point, the various options presented
above should be discussed seriously, with the understanding that the status quo
is not considered satisfactory by all.[lxxix]
As suggested elsewhere[lxxx],
the ITU would appear to be a proper forum in which to conduct some of those
discussions.
Annex 1
gTLD-MoU
- February 28, 1997
ESTABLISHMENT OF A
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE GENERIC TOP LEVEL DOMAIN NAME SPACE OF THE
INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM (gTLD-MoU)
The Internet Community (1997)
Considering,
that the
Internet Domain Name System (DNS) was designed for locating machines on the
Internet by mapping between human-friendly mnemonic names and their underlying
(IP) addresses;
that the DNS is an essential component of the Internet's operational
infrastructure and that for operational efficiency of the DNS and protection of
the interests of current and future users of the Internet domain name space,
DNS names need to be created, managed and administered in a fair, stable,
systematic and equitable method.
Conscious,
that the growth
of the Internet has produced a requirement for enhanced DNS assignment and
management procedures;
that the management and administration of the DNS raises significant public
policy issues that include, inter alia, appropriate and equitable
allocation of global name resources, market supply and access to DNS
registration services, and intellectual property concerns;
that these issues require significant improvements to the administration and
management of the DNS.
Recognizing,
the unique
characteristics of the Internet and the dynamics of its rapid decision-making
processes that have facilitated its development;
the responsibilities that the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), the
Internet Society (ISOC), and other related Internet administrative bodies,
according to their respective roles and competencies, have in creation and
administration of the DNS;
that, at the initiative of the Internet Society, and at the request of the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), the International Ad Hoc Committee
(IAHC) was formed and tasked with developing recommendations for enhancements
to the administration and management of Internet Top Level Domains.
Is of the view,
that there is a
need to institute enhancements in the management and administration of the DNS,
particularly related to global name resources, i.e., the generic Top Level
Domain (gTLD) name space;
that the current and future Internet name space stakeholders can benefit most
from a self-regulatory and market-oriented approach to gTLD name space
registration services;
that this market-oriented approach to registration services for the gTLD name
space should also provide for a global distribution of registrars;
that, for the gTLD name space, the most appropriate international policy
framework would be the establishment of a self-regulatory structure under a
voluntary Memorandum of Understanding (MoU);
that such a self-regulatory structure should be capable of evolving over time
to accommodate changed circumstances;
that both public and private sector entities should be invited to voluntarily
sign the MoU;
that the MoU provide for a policy oversight committee, comprised of individuals
who are recognized as collectively knowledgeable and expert in the related
issues, who shall provide the necessary public policy oversight functions
following practices and norms applying to those serving a public trust
function;
that the MoU have a formal mechanism for signatories, drawn from the widest
possible range of Internet stakeholders, to advise the policy oversight
committee on general policy matters relating to gTLDs and the DNS;
that the inclusion of a broad range of policy input, however, should not impede
the ability of the self-governing structure to take timely decisions, having
respect for the dynamics of the rapid decision-making processes that have
facilitated Internet development;
that the Final Report of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC), dated
February 4, 1997, contains reasonable recommendations toward accomplishing
these objectives.
Also recognizing,
that pursuant to
the basic provisions of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), the roles and functions of the ITU include:
- the
maintenance and extension of international cooperation between all Member
States and Sector Members of the Union for the improvement and rational
use of telecommunications of all kinds;
- promotion
of the development of technical facilities and their most efficient
operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunication
services, increasing their usefulness and making them so far as possible
generally available to the public;
- promotion
of the extension of the benefits of the new telecommunication
technologies to all the world's inhabitants.
Requests that the Secretary-General of
the ITU,
circulate the
gTLD-MoU to the relevant public and private sector entities with an invitation
to sign, if they so wish;
act as the Depository of the gTLD-MoU and publish periodically an updated list
of signatories;
facilitate further cooperation in the implementation of the gTLD-MoU, and;
Strongly encourages,
the relevant
public and private sector entities to sign the gTLD-MoU;
the Signatories to participate actively in its full implementation.
MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING ON THE GENERIC TOP LEVEL DOMAIN NAME SPACE OF THE INTERNET DOMAIN
NAME SYSTEM (gTLD-MoU)
the Signatories to this Memorandum of
Understanding ("gTLD-MoU") hereby agree to voluntarily cooperate,
according to their respective roles and competencies, as follows.
The Signatories agree:
I. GENERAL
SECTION 1. - Definitions
the following definitions are used:
- "Domain
Name System" ("DNS") means the Internet naming system as
defined in RFC 1591;
- "Top
Level Domain" ("TLD") means the highest level of domain
name hierarchy as defined in RFC 1591;
- "Second
Level Domain" ("SLD") means the level of domain names
immediately below the TLDs;
- "Generic
Top Level Domains" ("gTLDs") means the TLDs
".com", ".org", ".net" as defined in RFC
1591, and those TLDs established in or under the auspices of Signatories
to this MoU;
- "Registry"
means those roles and activities involved in the administration of a TLD
in the Domain Name System, and encompasses all of the services needed for
assignment and maintenance of that TLD and its registrations;
- "Registrar"
means the entity which is authorized to enter and modify the Second Level
Domain (SLD) data maintained by a Registry, in response to requests by
entities seeking to be assigned a SLD;
- "Council
of Registrars" ("CORE") means the operational organization
composed of authorized Registrars for managing allocations under gTLDs;
- "CORE-gTLD"
means any gTLD that is, at a given time, subject to the provisions of this
MoU;
- "CORE-MoU"
is the Memorandum of Understanding which defines CORE-gTLDs and policies
under which CORE must operate;
- "Administrative
Domain Name Challenge Panels" ("ACPs") means the panels
established under this MoU to entertain challenges by third parties to the
allocation of SLDs.
SECTION 2. - Principles
The following principles are adopted:
- the
Internet Top Level Domain (TLD) name space is a public resource and is
subject to the public trust;
- any
administration, use and/or evolution of the Internet TLD space is a public
policy issue and should be carried out in the interests and service of the
public;
- related
public policy needs to balance and represent the interests of the current
and future stakeholders in the Internet name space;
- the
current and future Internet name space stakeholders can benefit most from
a self-regulatory and market-oriented approach to Internet domain name
registration services;
- registration
services for the gTLD name space should provide for global distribution of
registrars;
- a policy
shall be implemented that a second-level domain name in any of the
CORE-gTLDs which is identical or closely similar to an alphanumeric string
that, for the purposes of this policy, is deemed to be internationally
known, and for which demonstrable intellectual property rights exist, may
be held or used only by, or with the authorization of, the owner of such
demonstrable intellectual property rights. Appropriate consideration shall
be given to possible use of such a second-level domain name by a third
party that, for the purposes of this policy, is deemed to have sufficient
rights.
II. SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
SECTION 3. - Bodies Relating To or Established Under
this MoU
The self-regulatory framework under this
MoU shall consist of:
- the
Depository of the gTLD-MoU
- a gTLD
Policy Advisory Body (PAB)
- a gTLD
Policy Oversight Committee (POC)
- a Council
of Registrars (CORE)
- Administrative
Domain Name Challenge Panels (ACPs)
SECTION 4. - Depository
The Parties agree that the depository of
this instrument shall be the Secretary-General of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). The role of the Depository includes:
- circulation
of this MoU to relevant public and private sector entities representing a
broad range of interests in the Internet gTLD name space including, inter
alia, relevant Internet-related organizations and bodies, software
publishers, operators and service providers, intergovernmental
organizations, governmental or regional agencies and authorities,
non-governmental organizations and manufacturers, with an invitation to
sign, if they so wish;
- to
maintain and publish periodically an updated list of Signatories;
- to
facilitate further cooperation in the implementation of this MoU.
Signatories may sign at the invitation of
the Depository or the gTLD Policy Oversight Committee (see Section 6).
SECTION 5. - gTLD Policy Advisory Body (PAB)
- Signatories
to this MoU may choose to voluntarily participate in a gTLD Policy
Advisory Body (PAB) that periodically meets either in person or on-line.
- The role
of the Policy Advisory Body is to make recommendations to the Policy
Oversight Committee (see Section 6) regarding general policy matters
relating to gTLDs and the DNS and to advise the Policy Oversight Committee
with respect to amendments to this MoU and the CORE-MoU.
- The PAB
shall apply rough consensus modes for determining its recommendations to
the POC.
SECTION 6. - gTLD Policy Oversight Committee (POC)
- A
committee will be established to conduct oversight of CORE and CORE-gTLDs
and to set policies for CORE and its Registrars consistent with this MoU,
to be comprised of individuals and experts who are recognized as
collectively knowledgeable and expert in the related issues in order to
provide the necessary policy oversight functions.
- This
committee is the gTLD Policy Oversight Committee (POC) and follows
practices and norms applying to those serving a public trust function.
- No decisions
of the POC shall be made unless a quorum of at least 67% of members are
available or represented by proxy; decisions of the POC shall require a
majority of not less than 67% of the total votes cast.
- The
instrument used to conduct oversight of CORE and CORE-gTLDs and to set
policies consistent with this MoU is the CORE-MoU which is signed by POC
and all CORE-gTLD Registrars.
- POC
defines the initial entry into force of the CORE-MoU by signing the
CORE-MoU and no amendments may take effect until signed by POC.
- The POC
shall consult the PAB and CORE in carrying out its responsibilities.
- Members
of the Policy Oversight Committee (POC) will be appointed in the following
numbers by each of the following groups and organizations; appointees are
not necessarily members of the appointing groups or organizations.
- Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) - 2
- Internet
Society (ISOC) - 2
- Representative
of the Depository of this MoU - 1
- Internet
Architecture Board (IAB) - 2
- Council
of Registrars (CORE) - 2
- International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) - 1
- World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) - 1
- International
Trademark Association (INTA) - 1
Pending the creation of CORE, an interim
Policy Oversight Committee (iPOC) shall consist of the regular (non ex-officio)
members of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) which have been appointed
by IANA, ISOC, IAB, ITU, WIPO and INTA. The iPOC shall dissolve when CORE
appoints its representatives at its first plenary meeting at which time the
groups and organizations listed above are invited to appoint their
representatives.
- The
regular term of membership in the Policy Oversight Committee shall be
three years, provided, however, that the initial terms of membership will
be as follows so as to achieve staggered terms:
1 year initial term - CORE, IAB, IANA, ISOC (one representative of each)
2 year initial term - Representative of the MoU Depository, ITU, WIPO,
INTA
3 year initial term - CORE, IAB, IANA, ISOC (one representative of each)
The above groups or organizations which have two representatives shall
determine which of their representatives shall be appointed for which (1
year or 3 year) term of office. In addition, each group or organization
shall endeavor to appoint its representative(s) with an intent to
achieving equitable geographical distribution.
- The
Policy Oversight Committee shall coordinate with the CORE Executive
Committee to ensure the enforcement of the requirement that each Registrar
operate in all respects consistently with the requirements of this MoU and
the CORE-MoU.
- The
Policy Oversight Committee may from time to time:
- change
the number of gTLDs and approve names of new gTLDs;
- change
the number of Registrars, provided that appropriate global geographic
distribution of Registrars shall be preserved;
- establish
new terms and conditions for applications by entities desiring to become
Registrars, including, among others, provisions for CORE to establish and
collect fees for its registration and any other services it may perform
in such amounts as it may from time to time determine;
- recommend,
to the PAB, amendments to this MoU, including but not limited to, changes
in the composition of the Policy Oversight Committee;
- following
consultation with the PAB and CORE, remove Registrars who do not operate
consistently with the requirements of this MoU and the CORE-MoU.
SECTION 7. - CORE
- An
operational organization composed of recognized Registrars for managing
allocations under gTLDs shall be established under the name "Council
of Registrars" ("CORE").
- CORE will
be established under the laws of Switzerland as a Swiss Association
governed by Articles 60 - 79 of the Swiss Civil Code.
- In order
to act as a Registrar as defined by this MoU and have access to
CORE-gTLDs, Registrars must be signatories to the CORE-MoU and be a member
of CORE.
- CORE
shall establish and enforce requirements that each Registrar operate in
all respects consistently with the provisions of this MoU, the CORE-MoU
and decisions of the Policy Oversight Committee.
- Each
CORE-gTLD Registrar may assign second level domains (SLDs) in any gTLD,
described or created under the provisions of this MoU and the CORE-MoU, on
a fair-use, first-come, first-served basis.
SECTION 8 - Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels
(ACPs)
- Administrative
Domain Name Challenge Panels (ACPs) will be established to administer the
policy stated in Section 2(f).
- The
procedures for creating the panels and for bringing challenges before the
panels shall be defined in the CORE-MoU; in particular, the CORE-MoU shall
stipulate that Registrars shall be obligated to honor all decisions of
ACPs. The procedures for creating the panels and for bringing challenges
before the panels shall be administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center (Geneva,
Switzerland). WIPO staff shall not be members of any panel.
- No
decision of an ACP shall inhibit, affect or prevent the power of the
appropriate national or regional courts to hear cases interpreting and
enforcing intellectual property rights that fall within their
jurisdiction. Likewise, nothing in this Section shall prevent any party,
at any time, from bringing any case before such national or regional
courts that could otherwise be brought, nor from initiating arbitration or
mediation procedures that are otherwise available.
III. STRUCTURE OF THE gTLD-DNS
SECTION 9. - gTLDs
- Effective
upon the entry into force of this MoU, an additional set of gTLDs beyond
the extant ".com", ".org" and ".net" gTLDs
in the DNS shall be created by the iPOC [see Section 6(g)] and
administered within the provisions of this MoU and the CORE-MoU.
- If, in
consultation with the PAB and CORE, the POC should later determine, that
the interests of the users of the Internet would be best served by the
creation of additional gTLDs within the DNS, beyond those created in (a)
above, each additional gTLD, if any, shall be created and administered
within the provisions of this MoU and the CORE-MoU. Each additional gTLD
created shall consist of a three or greater character alphanumeric
identifier.
SECTION 10. - TLDs Not Subject to the Provisions of
this MoU
- Pending
the expiration or appropriate amendment of the Cooperative Agreement under
which the ".com", ".org" and ".net" gTLDs
are presently administered, the ".com", ".org" and
".net" gTLDs shall not be subject to the provisions of this MoU.
- Likewise,
until the ".com", ".org" and ".net" gTLDs
are subject to the provisions of this MoU, the registrar which administers
those gTLDs shall not be considered to be a gTLD Registrar for the
purposes of this MoU.
- The
two-character top level domain name space within the DNS, which is
reserved for ISO 3166 country codes under existing accepted Internet RFCs,
shall not be subject to the provisions of this MoU.
- All other
top level domain names which are not explicitly included in the set of
"generic" top level domains are not subject to the provisions of
this MoU.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
SECTION 11. - General Provisions and Review
- Signatories
to this MoU shall include, in any event, the Internet Society (ISOC),
Reston, Virginia, U.S.A., and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA), Marina del Rey, California, U.S.A.
- This MoU
shall enter into force from the date that it has been signed by both the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and the Internet Society
(ISOC).
- The
Signatories agree to periodically review the results and consequences of
their cooperation under this MoU and, when appropriate, consider the need
for improvements in their cooperation, and make suitable proposals for
modifying and updating the arrangements, and the scope of this MoU to the
Policy Oversight Committee, through the Policy Advisory Body.
- Amendments
to this MoU shall be initiated by the Policy Oversight Committee, after
consultation with the PAB and CORE.
- No
amendment to this MoU shall enter into force until it has been signed by
both the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority and the Internet Society, and
any such amendment shall enter into force on the date that it has been so
signed.
V. SIGNATURES
Done in Geneva:
[date]
SIGNATORIES:
________________________________
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
________________________________
Internet Society
________________________________
Etc.
* President, Association for Proper Internet Governance (APIG)
[i] See < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_roads> accessed 5
June 2013.
[ii] See < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ortoo> accessed 5 June
2013.
[iii] See for example Jill Hills, Telecommunications and Empire,
University of Illinois Press (2007)
[iv] We use here the broad definition of Internet found in Document WTPF-13/INF/8 (26 April
2013)
< http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13-INF-0008/en >
[v] See < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Internet> accessed 5 June 2013.
[vi] See < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Systems_Interconnection>
accessed 5 June 2013.
[vii] See < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_World_Wide_Web>
accessed 5 June 2013.
[viii] See Milton Muller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the
Taming of Cyberspace, MIT Press (2002);
and < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAHC> accessed 5 June 2013.
[ix] See Muller, op. cit., and < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICANN#History>
accessed 5 June 2013.
[x] “Statement of Policy on the Management of Internet Names and Addresses”
(June 5, 1998; docket no. 980212036-8146-02), response under no. 4 <
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notice/1998/statement-policy-management-internet-names-and-addresses>
[xi] See Lennard
G. Kruger, “Internet Governance and the Domain Name System: Issues for
Congress” (April 23, 2013) Congressional Research Service < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42351.pdf> and
< http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order>
accessed 6 June 2013.
[xii] Kruger, op. cit., p. 20.
[xiii] Philip
Verveer, former US Coordinator, International Communications and Information
Policy, US Department of State; comments made at the workshop “The Geopolitics
of Internet Governance”, Internet Society, 23 May 2013 < http://new.livestream.com/internetsociety/geopolitics>
accessed 4 June 2013.
[xiv] See
Charlie Savage, Edward Wyatt, and Peter Baker, “U.S. Confirms that it Gathers
Online Data Overseas”, The New York Times (June 6, 2013)
< http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-calls.html?_r=0>
accessed 8 June 2013; Joel Hruska, “The NSA’s Prism leak could fundamentally
change or break the entire Internet”, Extreme Tech (June 10, 2013)
< http://www.extremetech.com/computing/157761-the-nsas-prism-leak-could-fundamentally-change-or-break-the-entire-internet>
accessed 13 June 2013; Faith Karimi, “Facebook, Microsoft disclose information
on user data request”, CNN (15 June 2013)
< http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/15/politics/data-tech-giants/index.html?hpt=hp_t1>
accessed 15 June 2013;
CNN staff, “Holder: leaks damaged U.S. Security”, CNN (14 June 2013)
< http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/14/world/europe/nsa-leaks/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
> accessed 15 June 2013:
[xv] Geoff Huston, “Calling Stumps at WCIT: Win, Lose or Draw?”, The ISP
Column (December 2012)
< http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2012-12/stumps.html>
accessed 4 June 2013. Note however that
Huston’s analysis of WCIT is deeply flawed, in this regard see Richard Hill,
“WCIT: failure or success, impasse or way forward?” International Journal of
Law and Information Technology (forthcoming) DOI:10.1093/ijlit/eat008
<
http://ijlit.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/06/10/ijlit.eat008.full?ijkey=otqkCXVOAelJUPy&keytype=ref>.
[xviii] Milton Muller, “Has the USA Run Out of Ideas About Internet
Governance? (Part 2), Internet Governance Project (18 June 2013)
<http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/06/18/has-the-usa-run-out-of-ideas-about-internet-governance-part-2/> accessed 19 June 2013.
[xx] See section 3 of Document WTPF-13/INF/10 (26 April 2013)
< http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13-INF-0010/en >
[xxi] What follows is partly taken from section 3.2 of WTPF-13/INF/10,
cited above.
[xxii] See AT Kearney, “A Viable Future Model for the Internet”,
available at: http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/a-viable-future-model-for-the-internet.html
; and, conversely, Dennis Weller and Bill Woodcock, “Internet Traffic
Exchange”, available at
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/internet-traffic-exchange_5k918gpt130q-en
[xxiii] See for example http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com03/iic/index.html
and http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/worksem/apportionment/201201/index.html ; and
section 1.7 of Supplement 2 to Recommendation ITU-T D.50 (forthcoming).
[xxiv] Broadband
and Internet penetration rates are markedly higher in developed countries than
they are in developing countries, while the differences with respect to mobile
cellular penetration are smaller. In most of the developing world, 2.5G and 3G
mobile has grown far faster than fixed Internet. . See
2.3.1 (k) of the ITU Secretary-General’s Report to the 2013 World
Telecommunication Policy Forum
< http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13-C-0003/en>
[xxv] See Weller and Woodcock, op. cit.
[xxvi] See Susan Crawford, Captive Audience: The Telecom
Industry and Monopoly in the New Guilded Age, Yale University Press (2013). A summary is available at:
http://business.time.com/2013/01/09/is-broadband-internet-access-a-public-utility/?goback=%2Egde_65453_member_204153607
[xxvii] Sally Wentworth, “Testimony”, 5 February 2013 Hearing:
Fighting for Internet Freedom, Dubai and Beyond, U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology, available at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20130205/100221/HHRG-113-IF16-Wstate-ShipmanWentworthS-20130205.pdf
[xxviii] What follows is partly taken from section 2 of WTPF-13/INF/10,
cited above.
[xxix] Sally Wentworth, “Testimony”, 5 February 2013 Hearing: Fighting for Internet
Freedom, Dubai and Beyond, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology, available at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20130205/100221/HHRG-113-IF16-Wstate-ShipmanWentworthS-20130205.pdf
[xxx] Geoff Huston, “An End-to-End View of Telecommunications Policy
Frameworks”, available at:
http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13IEG3-INF-0001/en
[xxxi] What follows is partly taken from WTPF-13/INF/11.
[xxxii] See Catherine Saez, “US
Defender Of Internet Freedom, Keen On Protecting IP Rights”, Intellectual
Property Watch (8 March 2013), available at:
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/08/us-as-defender-of-internet-freedom-keen-on-protecting-ip-rights
[xxxiii] See WTO Council for Trade in Services paper S/C/W/338 of 13 July
2011 “Communication from the European Union and the United States: Contribution
to the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce”; and paper S/C/W/349 of 26
September 2012 “Communication from Australia: Suggestions on ICT principles”.
[xxxiv] See Dan Schiller, “Masters of the Internet”, Le Monde
Diplomatique, available at:
http://mondediplo.com/2013/02/15internet ;
Michael Gurstein, “(Whose) Hands off (What) Internet: Reflections on WCIT
2012”, Gurstein’s Community Informatics, available at:
http://gurstein.wordpress.com/2012/12/09/whose-hand-off-what-internet-some-reflections-on-wcit-2012/ ;
Selin Bucak, “NANOG Rhetoric and WCIT-12 Reality”, The Global Journal,
available at:
http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/930/ ;
Jody Westby, “Google’s Media Campaign Against the UN Slapped Down”, Forbes,
available at:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/12/04/googles-media-campaign-against-the-un-slapped-down/ ;
Jean-Christophe Nothias, “The Battle for the Future of the Internet?”, Huffington
Post, available at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeanchristophe-nothias/internet-governance_b_2227820.html
;
Parminder Jeet Singh, “Hyping one threat to hide another”, The Hindu,
available at:
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/hyping-one-threat-to-hide-another/article4140922.ece
;
Michael Geist, “UN Internet meeting about who pays, not who rules: Geist”, The
Star, available at:
http://www.thestar.com/business/2012/11/25/un_internet_meeting_about_who_pays_not_who_rules_geist.html ;
and Jean-Christophe Nothias, “The Hypocrisy Threatening the Future of the
Internet”, The Global Journal, available at: http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/904/:
[xxxv] See Jill Hills, Telecommunications and Empire, University of
Illinois Press (2007), p. 51.
[xxxvi] See section 2 of WTPF-13/INF/10, cited above.
[xxxvii] There is a vast literature on colonialism and its effects. A pithy and cogent account is given in Ian
Morris, Why the West Rules – For Now, Profile Books (2011), paperback
edition pp. 515-521.
[xxxviii] See for example Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and the Market
(2002) Alfred A. Knopf, p. 71, citing Adam Smith. For the Internet, it can be noted that one
well-known company had, in 2012, some US$ 48 billion in cash and short-term
investments and the amount was increasing, see
< http://www.google.com/finance?fstype=ii&q=NASDAQ:GOOG>
accessed 8 June 2013.
[xxxix] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Scheinberg
[xl] Savage,
Wyatt, and Baker, op. cit.
[xli] But also to assert jurisdiction over its own citizens even at the
expense of the sovereignty of other nations, see Ed Payne, “Morales challenges
U.S. after Snowden rumor holds up plane in Europe”, CNN (4 July 2013)
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/04/world/americas/bolivia-morales-snowden/index.html?hpt=hp_t3>.
[xlii] Dave Keating, “US promises to provide EU information on Prism”, Europeanvoice.com
(14 June 2013)
< http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/june/us-promises-to-provide-eu-information-on-prism/77547.aspx> accessed 15 June 2013; Le Monde, “Prism: les Européens obtiennent
des informations”, Le Monde (14 June 2013)
< http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2013/06/14/prism-les-europeens-obtiennent-des-informations_3430566_3214.html> accessed 15 June 2013 ; for a different view, see Zack
Whittaker, “Amid NSA spying scandal, the gloves are off for EU’s justice
chief”, ZDNet (21 June 2013)
<http://www.zdnet.com/amid-nsa-spying-scandal-the-gloves-are-off-for-eus-justice-chief-7000017132/>
accessed 29 June 2013.
[xliii] US White House Press Office, “Joint Statement by the Presidents of
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on a New Field of
Cooperation in Confidence Building”, The White House (17 June 2013)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/joint-statement-on-a-new-field-of-cooperation-in-confidence-building>
[xliv] Hill, op. cit.; see also the statements of Brazilian Foreign
Affairs Minister Antonio Patriota in David Bosco, “Brazil Wants UN to Help
Safeguard Internet”, Foreign Policy (July 8, 2013)
< http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/08/brazil_wants_un_to_help_safeguard_internet> accessed 14 Julz 2013
[xlv] Bruce Schneier, “Has U.S. Started an Internet War?”, CCN (18
June 2013)
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/18/opinion/schneier-cyberwar-policy/index.html>
accessed 19 June 2013
[xlvi] For example, the US government approved the implementation of the
gTLD “.xxx”, despite some domestic opposition, because the decision was
formally taken by ICANN and the US government did not wish to be seen to
override an ICANN decision. On the other
hand, the US government imposed a price cap, in November 2012, on the price
charged by Versign for registration under the domain name “.com”, see Kieren
McCarthy, “Verisign loses dot-com piggybank, .nxt (November 30, 2012)
< http://news.dot-nxt.com/2012/12/06/verisign-loses-dot-com-piggyba>
and US Department of Commerce, “Department of Commerce Approves Verisign-ICANN
.com Registry Renewal Agreement” (November 30, 2012)
< http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2012/department-commerce-approves-verisign-icann-com-registry-renewal-agreement>
accessed 8 June 2013.
[xlvii] See, for instance the analysis in ITU/TeleGeography Inc., Direction
of Traffic: Trading Telecom Minutes, ITU, Geneva (October 1999) < http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/dot/1999/index.html>
[xlviii] Ian Walden (Ed.), Telecommunications Law and Regulation,
Oxford University Press (2009) pp. 741 and 743.
[xlix] Hills, op. cit., p. 207; and Walden, op. cit., p.
744.
[l] Juan Alonso Fernàndez González, “Economic
sustainability of international telecommunication networks”, Info (2011)
vol. 13, no. 11, p. 6.
[lii] Weller and Woodcock, op. cit.
[lvii] See document WCIT DT 46 Rev.1.
[lix] Savage, Wyatt, and Baker, op. cit.
[lx] Internet Society, "Statement on the Importance of Open Global
Dialogue Regarding Online Privacy", 12 June 2013,
< http://www.internetsociety.org/news/internet-society-statement-importance-open-global-dialogue-regarding-online-privacy>;
Emily Barabas and Kevin Bankston, “It’s Not Just About
the US: How the NSA Threatens Human Rights Internationally” Center for
Democracy and Technology (12 June 2013)
< https://www.cdt.org/blogs/1206it’s-not-just-about-us-how-nsa-threatens-human-rights-internationally>
accessed 15 June 2013.
[lxi] For a particular example, see Steven Musil, "Iran develops
software to control social networks", CNET (6 January 2013)
< http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57562295-93/iran-develops-software-to-control-access-to-social-networks/>
[lxii] Hruska, op. cit. a much more virulent view is given in
Jean-Christophe Nothias, “And Now the Second Battle of the Internet”,
Huffington Post Blog (13 June 2013),
< http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeanchristophe-nothias/internet-governance_b_3435812.html>;
the matter was discussed at a Brookings workshop “The NSA Versus the Global
Internet: How Online Surveillance Could Impact Internet Governance” (20 June
2013)
<http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/06/20-nsa-surveillance-internet-governance>.
[lxiii] Jon Kampfner, “Prism surveillance: spies thrive in the Internet’s
legal free-for-all”, The Guardian (12 June 2013) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/12/prism-surveillance-internet-william-hague>
[lxiv] The President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Registry
for Internet Addresses (ARIN) put it this way: “One of the consequences of
self-governance for critical Internet resources is that it is the majority of
those who actually participate which counts most heavily in these
processes.” John Curran, comment to
“Can’t Sell your IPv4 Numbers: Try Leasing Them”, Internet Governance
Project (29 April 2013)
< http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/04/28/cant-sell-your-ipv4-numbers-try-leasing-them/>
accessed 10 June 2013.
[lxv] See Rolf H. Weber, “The legitimacy and accountability of the
internet’s governing institutions”, in Ian Brown, Research handbook on
governance of the internet (2013), Elgar/Northampton, p. 101;
regarding see IP address allocation,
Rolf H. Weber and Ulrike I. Heinrich, “IP Address Allocation through the Lens
of Public Goods and Scarce Resource Theories”, Scripted (2011) vol. 8,
no. 1, p. 83;
regarding ICANN, see Rolf H. Weber, “Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers”, in Christian Tietje and Alan Brouder Alan (Eds.), Handbook of
Transnational Economic Governance Regimes, Martinus Nijhoff (2009) pp.
612-614; and Lennard
G. Kruger, “Internet Governance and the Domain Name System: Issues for
Congress” (April 23, 2013) Congressional Research Service, pp. 5-6)
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42351.pdf,
pp. 7-14.
[lxvi] For private company restrictions on the market for smartphone
applications, see Daithí Mac
Síthigh, “App law within: rights and regulation in the smartphone age”, International
Journal of Law and Information Technology (2013) vol. 21 no. 2, p. 154; for
the situation regarding search engines, see Uta Kohl, “Google: the rise and
rise of online intermediaries in the governance of the Internet and beyond
(Part 2)”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology
(2013) vol. 21 no. 2, p. 187.
[lxvii] European Newspaper Publishing Association, “European Publishers
Urge European Commission to Challenge Google Further”, Press Release (25 June
2013)
<http://www.enpa.be/en/news/press-release-european-publishers-urge-european-commission-to-challenge-google-further_98.aspx>
accessed 26 June 2013.
[lxviii] Geoff Huston, “Addressing 2012 – Another One Bites the Dust”, The
ISP Column (January 2013),
<http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2013-01/2012.html> accessed 22 June 2013
[lxix] For the importance of trade secrets regarding search engines, see
Kohl, op. cit.
[lxx] See the extensive discussion in Document WTPF-13/INF/7 (26 April 2013)
< http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13-INF-0007/en >
[lxxi] We cite here two well-know examples. The decision to use the Domain Name System
(DNS) to implement hyperlinks when the DNS was explicitly not designed to cater
to real-world objects, as stated in RFCs 920 and 1034. And the decision to rely on an extended IP
address protocol (IPv6) that is not backwards-compatible with IPv4, see WPTF
Backgrounder, “IPv4 and IPv6 Issues”(2013) < http://www.itu.int/en/wtpf-13/Documents/backgrounder-wtpf-13-ipv4-ipv6-en.pdf>;
the choice of the IPv6 protocol was not made casually, it was the result of
extensive discussions, see Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance (2009) MIT Press. It remains to be seen whether the current
expansion of generic top-level domains (gTLDs) will result in additional
mismatches with respect to the real world, for example regarding whether the gTLD
“amazon” should be created and, if so, whether it should be assigned to the
private company that is so named or to the geographic feature that is no named.
[lxxii] See Fernàndez
González, op. cit., p. 7, citing A. Kunigami and J. Navas-Sabater, “Options to
increase access to telecommunications services in rural and low-income areas”
(2010) World Bank Working Paper, vol. 178
[lxxiii] In this respect, see WTPF-13/INF/11 (26 April 2013)
< http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13-INF-0011/en >
[lxxiv] See for example the description of the use of mobile payments
systems in developing countries, in ITU-T Technology Watch, “The Mobile Money
Revolution: Part 2 Financial Inclusion Enabler” (6 June 2013)
<http://www.itu.int/oth/T2301000020/en> accessed 21 June 2013.
[lxxv] See < http://web.archive.org/web/19971211190034/http://www.gtld-mou.org/>
accessed 10 June 2013.
[lxxvi] See Document: WG-WSIS-8/15, and in particular the
introduction and Annex B; the essence of this document was also submitted to
the US government in response to a request for comments and is publicly
accessible at
< http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/dnstransition/comments/dnstrans_comment0081.htm>
accessed 13 June 2013.
[lxxvii] I thank Juan Alonso
Fernàndez González for having brought to my attention this proposal presented by Cuba at the Fifth Meeting of National
Coordinators of the CELAC, that was held in Havana on May 9 to 10; no consensus
was reached regarding the proposal.
[lxxviii] Such an approach was outlined by Eli Noam at the Columbia Institute
for Tele-Information (CITI) workshop on The Future of Internet Governance after
Dubai: Are We Heading to a Federated Internet? (20 June 2013),
<http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/citi/thefutureoftheinternet>
[lxxix] For an overview of some of the criticism of the current situation,
see sections 2 and 3 of
WTPF-13/INF/10 (26 April 2013) < http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13-INF-0010/en >
[lxxx] WTPF-13/INF/11
(26 April 2013) < http://www.itu.int/md/S13-WTPF13-INF-0011/en >
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