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Work item:
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X.mt-integrity
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Subject/title:
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Security guidelines for mobile terminal integrity protection
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Status:
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Under study
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Approval process:
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TAP
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Type of work item:
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Recommendation
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Version:
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New
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Equivalent number:
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-
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Timing:
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2025-03 (Medium priority)
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Liaison:
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-
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Supporting members:
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Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China Information Communication Technologies Group, China Telecom, vivo Mobile Communication
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Summary:
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The goal of mobile terminal integrity protection is to ensure that the mobile terminal behaves in an expected manner. That means, hardware, firmware and software (e.g., operating system, pre-installed system permission apps) on mobile terminals have not been compromised by any means. If an attacker compromises firmware or software, or modifies the configuration of hardware (e.g., ROM, retention cells), or changes the hardware (e.g., flash memory), the attacker could control or subvert the mobile terminal functionality.
When a mobile terminal switches on, it begins with a boot phase to verify hardware components and load one or more software modules. After that, the mobile terminal enters runtime phase and reaches an operational state, in which the mobile terminal is ready for its intended purpose. In order to fix the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of firmware/software (FW/SW), mobile terminal needs to be updated. It is called FW/SW update phase. However, each of these phases is an opportunity for an attacker to introduce security threats to mobile terminal integrity.
This Recommendation is to analyze security threats to mobile terminal during boot phase, runtime phase and FW/SW update phase, then to provide security guidelines for mobile terminal integrity protection
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Comment:
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-
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Reference(s):
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Historic references:
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Contact(s):
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| ITU-T A.5 justification(s): |
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First registration in the WP:
2023-03-06 09:36:12
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Last update:
2024-03-12 09:15:39
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