Page 25 - FIGI: Security Aspects of Distributed Ledger Technologies
P. 25

Figure 3: Use of a smart contracts























            Use of a smart contracts for insurance for crop failure, whereby small farmers are automatically paid out by insurance
            companies based on externally-derived micro-climate pattern data linked to the smart contract that over a period, sig-
            nals drought conditions. Trends in mobile base station 129  interconnectivity statistics can indicate the degree of rainfall in a
            micro-region. Similarly, Oxfam launched its ‘BlocRice’ 130  blockchain supply chain solution for rice, which aims to use smart
            contracts to provide transparency and security between rice growers in Cambodia and purchasers in the Netherlands and
            should expand to 5,000 farms by 2022.
            Security Aspects: Vulnerabilities in oracles and the smart contracts they link to make result in incorrect payments to farm-
            ers or other persons.

            8  ECOSYSTEM-WIDE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF DLTS



            8�1  General Security Risks and Concerns in Use of   the data itself. Zero knowledge proof algorithms
            DLTs                                               may solve this in some cases. Blockchain thus only
            While DLT designs lend themselves to a tamper-evi-  addresses a record’s authenticity by confirming the
            dent motif, as noted above, the nascent DLT ecosys-  party or parties submitting a record, the time and
            tem also offers a rich attack source for directly   date of its submission, and the contents of the record
            stealing value – as tokens - from ‘wallets’, disrupting   at the time of submission, and not the reliability or
            the use of a DL, and potentially changing data on a   accuracy of the records contained in the blockchain.
            DL.  In many cases these are specific threat vectors   These records may in fact be encrypted. If a docu-
            designed to exploit a vulnerability inherent in the   ment containing false information is hashed – added
            design of a DL and its internal and external compo-  to the blockchain - as part of a properly formatted
            nents.  There have been very high-profile intrusions   transaction, the network will and must validate it.
            into the ‘exchanges’ that store crypto-currencies,   That is, as long as the correct protocols are utilized,
            resulting in huge loses for owners of these values. 131  the data inputted will be accepted by the nodes on
               But while Bitcoin storage facilities have been com-  a blockchain.
            promised, there are no reports to date of the Bitcoin   This is the DLT incarnation of the unfortunate
            blockchain itself being compromised. That is, com-  mantra of ‘garbage data in, garbage data out’ which
            promised in the sense that data on the blockchain   is usually characteristic of some databases in the
            was altered without consensus of all the user nodes   non-DLT world. The possibility has also been raised
            in the blockchain. There were however 3 forks of the   of an individual participant on a blockchain show-
            original Bitcoin blockchain called BitCoin Cash, Bit-  ing their users an altered version of their data whilst
            Coin Gold and BitCoin SV, which some believe qualify   simultaneously showing the unedited (genuine) ver-
            as a compromise.                                   sion to the other participant nodes on the blockchain
               Although the data on a blockchain is said to    network.
                                                                      132
            be secure, and any data input authenticated, the     While integration of IoT devices with DLTs show
            DLT does not address the reliability or accuracy of   great promise – especially in the agricultural value



                                                                   Security Aspects of Distributed Ledger Technologies  23
   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30