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[5] Shane Greenstein, Martin Peitz, and Tommaso Valletti,
“Net neutrality: A fast lane to understanding the trade-
offs,” Tech. Rep., National Bureau of Economic Re-
Wz = r · g [b] − c cp
search, 2016.
The total social welfare is determined by:
[6] James Alleman, Paul Rappoport, and Aniruddha Baner-
SW = W z + ∆CW jee, “Universal service: A new definition?,” Telecom-
munications Policy, vol. 34, no. 1-2, pp. 86–91, 2009.

SW = r · g [b] − c cp + ∆CW (26) [7] Eitan Altman, Julio Rojas, Sulan Wong, Manjesh Ku-
mar Hanawal, and Yuedong Xu, “Net neutrality and
Under a duopoly with an asymmetric ISP behavior that provides
quality of service,” in Game theory for networks, pp.
ZPR, the total welfare is determined by: 137–152. Springer, 2011.
Wz = π cp + π z + π z [8] Economic and Social Council, “Progress towards the
isp 1 isp 2
∗ sustainable development goals,” Tech. Rep., United
= r · g [b] − c cp − (t) b 1,2 [t]
Nations, 2016.

1 ∗
1

+ p − c z β + (t 1 ) b [t]
z
2 [9] Arturo J Carrillo, “Having your cake and eating it too?

1 ∗ zero-rating, net neutrality and international law,” Stan-
1

+ p − c z β + (t 2 ) b [t] ford Technology Law Review, Forthcoming, 2016.
z
2
[10] Liang Zhang and Dan Wang, “Sponsoring content:
Under a Bertrand’s paradox, t 1 = t 2 = c b a Nash equilibrium in
∗
∗
prices is determined in termination fee (t 1 , t 2 ) and under universal Motivation and pitfalls for content service providers,”
in Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM
service condition p z is defined as the net cost to provide a limited
WKSHPS), 2014 IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp.
bandwidth Internet service over the network. p z = c z.
577–582.
Wz = r · g [b] − c cp
[11] Nicholas Economides, “The economics of the internet
backbone,” NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper,
The total social welfare is determined by:
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SW = W z + ∆CW [12] John Musacchio and Dohoon Kim, “Network platform
competition in a two-sided market: implications to the
net neutrality issue,” in TPRC: Conference on Commu-
SW = r · g [b] − c cp + ∆CW (27)
nication, Information, and Internet Policy, 2009.
However revenue level for CP in duopoly scenario is superior than
that of monopoly scenario. Indeed r ·g [b] is a function of t because [13] Nicholas Economides and Benjamin E Hermalin, “The
b = b [t]. With a lowest price of termination fee, the revenue level economics of network neutrality,” The RAND Journal
r · g [b [t]] will be higher on duopoly. of Economics, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 602–629, 2012.
[14] Frago Kourandi, Jan Kr¨ amer, and Tommaso Valletti,
z
z
SW < SW
monopoly duopoly “Net neutrality, exclusivity contracts, and internet frag-
mentation,” Information Systems Research, vol. 26, no.
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