Page 113 - ITU Kaleidoscope 2016

ICTs for a Sustainable World

respectively. It then turns to argue that spectrum sharing al, [6] would allow both types of potential buyers to bid in
provides a renewed management tool to increase the an auction whose outcomes would determine who would
effectiveness of allocations and the effectiveness of use the spectrum, and in doing so also deciding the service,
assignments, which should translate into additional benefits as well as the amounts to be paid for the licenses. By
to society at large. introducing a slight change to such auction design, which
The typical problem a SA faces is the following: what is the would restrict the use of those bands to the fringe of
best use that can be given to a given frequency band and participants interested in the unlicensed option, a SA would
who should be entitled – or licensed – to use it? be shifting the burden of spectrum allocation decision to a
market-based mechanism that simultaneously over the
As discussed above a SA allocates a spectrum band to a course of a clock ascending auction would decide whether a
service or services that can occupy the band. International band is to be shared or not, and it is, the price to be paid for
agreements and harmonisation in the possible uses of the a shared license. Potential sharers need to solve a collective
spectrum have led SAs to designate radio spectrum bands action problem; in such situations, typically efficiency of the
for their utilisation by prescribed services, which in many allocation may be compromised as bidders find incentives to
cases must follow technical standards of transmission and free-ride.
interference management. Assignment of spectrum to users
follows an administrative process that grants them rights Opportunistic use of a frequency band, as enabled by
over a number of bands Most SAs use auctions for assigning WRAN technology, requires a centralized database to allow
spectrum in bands allocated to commercial communications CR-based devices to transmit on TV white spaces.
and broadcasting operations. Establishing and managing – or outsourcing - such a system
requires that the SA covers the costs of equipment and
Building upon Larbi-Apau and Moseley [11] who state that administration. ASAs such as this would probably have to
effectiveness means doing the right thing while efficiency is be funded, at least partially, through license fees but most
about doing the things right, it is here suggested that if a SA likely will need to be subsidized as the target population is
puts spectrum to its best use, it will maximize the usually sparse and remotely located from urban centres.
effectiveness of the allocation, and if a SA puts the spectrum
in the hands of those who value it the most, it will maximize A common concern raised by potential new users to SAs is
the efficiency of the assignment. It is clear, from the about the efficiency with which government agencies use
evolution of some of the so-called ISM bands –such as 2.4 parts of the radio spectrum, indicating too that they would
GHz and 5.8 GHz, which were originally conceived for need shared access to such bands. Upon releasing its
applications non-related to telecommunications, to become spectrum sharing framework [15], Ofcom outlined the
the support of Wi-Fi systems, that allowing non-licensed, request process as one by which a mobile operator or
open access use of the spectrum can create conditions that interested party initiate a request to gain access to a specific
demonstrated the effectiveness of spectrum management. band that has been either licensed to an incumbent or held
by users, such as government agencies, traditional holders of
In considering spectrum sharing a SA would need to ask rights. The spectrum access seeker needs to have exhausted
itself how the introduction of sharing will affect its main a number of options that must precede their sharing
spectrum management functions. In particular it is adequate aspirations. First, it must have not found any suitable option
to wonder what the impact of spectrum sharing would be on among the currently available licenses (including license-
allocation and assignment. exempt bands), or found no trading or leasing opportunities.
In some cases SAs are pressed from different directions to Then, and only then, Ofcom will consider looking into
allow new users, particularly wireless broadband operators available information to determine whether the request is
and other providers of newly developed services to access worth being further investigated [15].
spectrum bands which are being cleared up from their Building provisions to endow spectrum sharing decisions
previous licensees. The US 700 MHz band is one case at with market-based mechanisms was attempted by Ofcom
hand in which several competing parties demanded that the with its 800 MHz and 2.6 MHz spectrum auction in 2013. A
Federal Communications Commission should designate the previous 2012 Ofcom’s previous consultation on the award
digital dividend – those bands left empty by the introduction of those bands gave ample consideration to auction rules
of digital television – to their particular uses of interest. On that would lead bidders to reveal preferences for wining
one side, mobile telecommunications operators demanded bands contiguous to bands won by other bidders with whom
those bands be allocated to 4G services and an auction potential sharing agreements could be reached [16]. The
administered to assign extensive geographical licenses. On proposal first explored the pros and cons of allowing bidders
the other side, new comers – among them information and to express their preferences consistent with their goal to get
contents operators as well as some equipment manufactures blocks contiguous to the blocks won by other bidders with
- demanded those bands should be designated unlicensed whom they would be sharing the spectrum. Bidders would
and opened for common exploitation by Wi-Fi services. see benefits from pooling together resources with higher
One interesting proposal was to design an auction that speed and improved quality of service possibly achieved.
would solve both problems jointly: allocation and Bidders, on the other hand, would be exposed to the risk
assignment. The auction design, proposed in Bykowsky et involved in not being able to win the necessary blocks,
hence the likelihood of an inefficient auction outcome. This

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