Page 122 - ITU Journal Future and evolving technologies Volume 2 (2021), Issue 1
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ITU Journal on Future and Evolving Technologies, Volume 2 (2021), Issue 1




          where Ω is given by (21), and                        Proposition 10 Algorithm 1 converges to an equilibrium.
                0
             supp(  ) ≜ {   ∈    ∶    > 0},           (43)     The proof can be found in Appendix 9.12.
                                
                                   2
                                                 2
                  ℐ ≜ {   ∈    ∶    ℎ /   = min    ℎ /   }.  (44)  The complexity involved in designing the equilibrium
                                                 
                                    
                                                   
                                     
                                                               strategies by Algorithm 1 is log (  /  ) log ((Ω −Ω )/  ).
                                         ∈  
                                                                                         2        2   0   ∞
          The proof can be found in Appendix 9.10.
          In particular, Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 imply that  7.  DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
          with large or small total jamming power resources, the
          jammer’s strategy and the transmitter’s strategy are in‑  In this section we illustrate Algorithm 1 using a system
          sensitive to the TCC.                                consisting of    = 5 receivers, with fading gains from
                                                               the transmitter to the receivers ℎ = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), fading
          5.4 Large or small threshold of communica‑           gains from the jammer to the receivers    = (3, 2, 1, 4, 1),
               tion connectivity                               the background noises at the receivers    = (3, 2, 1, 4, 1),
                                                               the total transmitter power budget    = 2 and the to‑
          In this section we consider the cases where the TCC is ei‑  tal jamming power budget    = 3. Fig. 1(a) illustrates
          ther small or large.                                 that an increase in the total transmission power leads to
                                                               an increase in the PCC (i.e., in   ), while an increase in
          Proposition 9 (a) Let the TCC    be large. Then the Nash
             equilibrium (  ,   ) can be approximated by (37) and  the jamming power reduces the PCC. Fig. 1(b) illustrates
             (38) of Proposition 6.                            the transmitter’s normalized strategies, i.e.,   /  , while
                                                               Fig. 1(c) illustrates the jammer’s strategies for the total
          (b) Let the TCC    be small. Then, the Nash equilibrium  power transmitter budget    ∈ {0.1, 1, 10, 100}. It shows
             (  ,   ) can be approximated by (34) and (33) of Propo‑  that the jammer’s strategy for a small total transmitter
             sition 5.                                         power budget    tends to a uniform strategy (Proposi‑
                                                               tion 6), while for a large total transmitter power budget
          The proof can be found in Appendix 9.11.
                                                                  the jammer’s strategy tends to water illing‑form strate‑
                                                               gies given by (33). Due to the water illing form of Equa‑
          6.  ALGORITHM TO ARRIVE AT THE EQUI‑                 tion (33), smaller    ℎ /   calls for applying larger jam‑
                                                                                     2
                                                                                     
                                                                                       
              LIBRIUM                                          ming efforts. Here we have that
          In this section, an algorithm based on superposition of              ℎ/   = (0.3, 1, 3, 1, 5).    (45)
                                                                                  2
          two bisection methods to arrive at equilibrium strategies
          is given.                                            For this reason, the largest jamming effort is focused on
          Algorithm 1  The algorithm for deriving the equilibrium  receiver 1 while receiver 2 and receiver 4 face approxi‑
          strategies   (  ,   ) and   (  ,   ), where    > 0 is a tolerance for  mately equal‑level of interfering signals. Fig. 2(a) illus‑
          the algorithm.                                       trates that an increase in the total jamming power leads
           Procedure Strategies()                              to a decrease in the PCC, while an increase in the to‑
           let       = 0 and       =                           tal transmission power reduces such negative effect from
           repeat
                                                               jammer’s interference. Fig. 2(c) illustrates normalized
             let       = ̃   (Ω(      ),       ) −        
                                                               jammer’s strategies, i.e.,   /  , while Fig. 2(b) illustrates
             let       = ̃   (Ω(      ),       ) −        
             let       = (      +       )/2
                                                               transmitter’s strategies for total jamming power budget
             let       = ̃   (Ω(      ),       ) −        
             if             < 0 then                              ∈ {0.1, 1, 10, 100}. By (44) and (45), we have that
               let       =                                     ℐ = {1}. That is why, jamming efforts for small total
             else
               let       =                                     power jamming budget    is focused on receiver 1 (Propo‑
             end if
           until       −       >                               sition 8), while jamming efforts for large total jamming
           return strategies   (Ω(      ),       ) and   (Ω(      ),       )  power budget    tends to uniform distribution over all the
           End Procedure
           Procedure Ω(  )                                     receivers (Proposition 7). Fig. 3(a) illustrates that an in‑
                                                               crease in the TCC    leads to a decrease in the PCC, while
           let       = Ω ∞
           let       = Ω 0
           repeat                                              Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c) illustrate that the jammer’s strat‑
             let       =   (      ,   )                        egy focuses jamming efforts on receiver 1 due to a wa‑
             let       =   (      ,   )
             let       = (      +       )/2                    ter illing form of Equation (33) and (45) for a small TCC.
             let       =   (      ,   )                        For a large TCC, jammer’s strategy tends to a uniform one
             if (      −   )(      −   ) < 0 then
                                                               (Proposition 9). In all of the cases, the transmitter tries
               let       =      
             else                                              to communicate with each receiver (i.e.,    > 0 for all
                                                                                                      
               let       =      
             end if                                              ). This observationmakes the MLCC problem remarkably
           until       −       >                               different from standard OFDM communication scenarios
           return      
           End Procedure                                       where the transmitter, lacking suf icient transmission re‑
                                                               sources, must avoid transmission in some of the channels.
          106                                © International Telecommunication Union, 2021
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