Page 47 - Digital Financial Services security assurance framework
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5�  Mobile Device - Internet                       d. Information can be spoofed by insiders, particu-
                                                                 larly in protocols that provide no notion of mes-
            a.  The security of the communication link is con-   sage integrity.
               tingent  on  the  negotiated  cipher  suite  between   e.  The increased ease of access to the SS7 network
               the application and the back-end services in end-  allows an attacker to use MAP(Mobile Application
               to-end systems over the Internet. Information in   Part) operations to insert or modify subscriber
               applications has been demonstrated to flow to a   data, intercept mobile communication or identify
               variety of sinks outside the authorized end-point,   subscriber location.
               including into logs and databases. Consequently,   f.  The communication link between the mobile base
               only strong encryption mechanisms such as TLS     station and the provider network is a wireline link
               ensure  data security  in  public telecommunica-  in some scenarios, while in others, depending on
               tions networks.                                   the topography of the mobile network, the base
            b.  It is also important to ensure that the cipher suites   stations may be connected to the provider net-
               used are not subject to downgrade attacks to old-  work wirelessly, such as through a microwave link.
               er versions that contain potentially weak ciphers.   If this communication is unencrypted then,  par-
               If session keys are not periodically renegotiat-  ticularly for SMS and USSD-based transactions
               ed, the accumulation of enciphered material can   where encryption is strictly provided through
               make the key vulnerable to attack. Protocols such   GSM  algorithms  between  the  handset  and  base
               as  SSL  and transport  layer  security  (TLS)  can   station, that data could potentially be sent back
               be set to renegotiate ciphers, but it is important   to the network in the clear, facilitating a breach of
               for the protocols to be resistant to renegotiation   confidentiality.
               attacks from attackers injecting traffic into legit-  g. In the DFS context, a bad actor with SS7 net-
               imate client-server exchanges. Negotiation of     work-level access can emulate (‘spoof’) the Caller
               weak cipher suites that downgrade security can    Line Identity (CLI) of a trusted person or entity,
               allow an adversary to modify transactions and,    and call the DFS customer to attempt to extract
               hence, the integrity of financial data.           DFS and bank credentials from the customer, ulti-
            c.  Without proper encryption on information pass-   mately leading to financial loss.
               ing through Internet connections, information can   h.  MNO customers can fall victim to unauthorised
               be eavesdropped over the Wi-Fi link between the   SIM  Swaps, and  attackers  can  leverage  on  sub-
               mobile device and access point. Recent attacks    scriber information obtained from SS7 attacks to
               against key TLS key negotiation demonstrate that   obtain information that can be used for success-
               even strong Wi-Fi protocols such as WPA2 can      ful execution of SIM swap or in collaboration with
               potentially be at risk of compromise.             internal personnel within the MNO.
                                                               i.  Privileged users within the MNO can misuse their
            6�  Base station-Mobile Switching Station -          access  to core  nodes  like the  HLR,  and  MSC  to
            Gateways                                             perform activities like call and SMS transfers, call
                                                                 forwarding, unauthorised interception and collec-
            a.  Insufficient internal controls can allow insid-  tion of DFS subscriber call data records.
               er access to customer data. This is particularly
               important for SMS and USSD solutions that do not   7�   Mobile Network - DFS operator
               provide encryption within the provider network.
            b.  A malicious actor with access to the SS7 network   a.  There is often little in the way of data protection,
               could send Message Transfer Part (MTP) man-       particularly data encryption, once information
               agement messages to  fake  network congestion,    is transmitted into the provider network. There
               reroute messages or deny service/link availability.  are many reasons for this, including, primarily,
            c.  Mobile network are also susceptible Denial of Ser-  the computational cost and overhead required
               vice (DoS) threats that can be executed through   to maintain encrypted high-bandwidth connec-
               overloading the SS7 Links. An attacker sends a    tions within the network. There is also often the
               high number of SCCP (Signaling Connection Con-    assumption that threats to the network primarily
               trol Part) requests that require a lot of processing,   arise from outside rather than within. The result is
               for example translation of Global Titles.         vulnerabilities exist from both insider adversaries
                                                                 and outside threats that are able to penetrate the
                                                                 network.



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