Page 75 - ITU-T Focus Group Digital Financial Services – Recommendations
P. 75

ITU-T Focus Group Digital Financial Services
                                                      Recommendations







                Title of recommendation       Coordination of risk management and fraud mitigation
                Working Group                 Consumer Experience and Protection

                Theme                         Fraud
                Audience for recommendation   Regulators





                Regulators overseeing different aspects of the DFS market should coordinate efforts among themselves for risk
                management and fraud mitigation, and they should coordinate with law enforcement agents such as police,
                investigative bodies, and the prosecutorial authority. Regulators should also encourage DFS providers to col-
                laborate on fraud detection and mitigation, such as through the establishment of a “Fraud Forum” or other
                cooperation arrangements.

               The World Bank/Bank for International Settlements report on Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion (PAFI)
                                                                                                         22
               states that sound risk management, mitigation of fraud and abuse, and protection of consumers are key
               supervisory and oversight considerations for retail payment services. These objectives are challenged by the
               fact that DFS providers and their services may be subject to diverse forms of regulation and supervision, such as
               telecommunications, banking, payments, and insurance. CGAP  confirms that the increased number of entities
                                                                  10
               involved in delivering DFS may create gaps in oversight and accountability and elevate risks to customers. For
               example, liability for the loss of customer funds due to fraud may be unclear due to the participation of several
               parties (including agents) delivering the service. These risks may be heightened for inexperienced users of
               financial services.
               In light of the issues, regulators should formally coordinate oversight of DFS providers’ fraud mitigation and risk
               management efforts to avoid gaps and inferior treatment for digital versus non-digital financial services. This is
               in line with the G20 High-Level Principles  on Financial Consumer Protection, which emphasize the need for
                                                 13
               cooperation by regulators of different segments of the financial and non-financial (e.g., telecommunications)
               sectors. Laws related to fraud and other criminal activities should also be adapted to the use of digital delivery
               channels. In addition, regulators should seek ways to cooperate in DFS fraud detection and mitigation efforts to
               develop a more complete picture of risks. This could include both formal information sharing agreements and
               mechanisms such as working groups, conferences, and newsletters to learn about emerging risks and issues.
               DFS providers should be encouraged to collaborate on fraud and security prevention, as well. CGAP  reports
                                                                                                  10
               that Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Tanzania have formal industry discussion and coordination processes, and
               Kenya holds forums for stakeholders to share and discuss market trends and issues such as fraud. The South
               Africa Bank Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) is a consortium of four major banks working together to combat
               bank-related crimes.
               Another example of collaborative fraud prevention comes from Tanzania. CGAP  reports that to combat SIM
                                                                                 10
               card swaps, Tanzanian providers have imposed a quarantine period after switching SIM cards. During this time,
               the mobile money PIN cannot be changed. Some use “IMSI locking,” which locks the SIM and blocks access
               to the account until the customer has confirmed that the SIM swap was legitimate and has the SIM in hand,
               at which point the new SIM will be linked to the account.










               22   Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures World Bank Group, (2015): Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion https://
                  www. bis. org/ cpmi/ publ/ d144. pdf



                                                                                                       69
   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80