Page 274 - Trust in ICT 2017
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5                                                    Trust in ICT


























                             Figure III.9 – Risk, uncertainty and motivation in used car transactions


            Transaction A describes a situation that a dealer purchases a used vehicle from a seller. In this transaction a
            dealer is a risk taker. A dealer should investigate the car carefully to assess the condition of the car and
            evaluate the price because a dealer cannot confirm a seller’s explanation about the car. Specifically, a seller
            does not have a strong motivation of disclosing all information about the car because this information directly
            influences the price (Case 1). It is also plausible to assume that a seller is not aware of the exact condition of
            the car because symptoms of trouble has not yet clearly shown (Case 2). Thus, a deal should investigate the
            car. However, this cross-sectional investigation is not enough to understand the real condition of the car.
            Thus, intense disputes commonly occurs after a transaction.
            Transaction B describes the situation of that a buyer purchases a dealer the used car. In this transaction, a
            buyer is a risk taker. Similar to transaction A, a buyer cannot trust in a dealer (seller) because a dealer has a
            strong motivation of hiding the exact information about current condition of the car (Case 1). Although a
            dealer detects the critical problems of the used vehicle after transaction A finished, a dealer will not intend
            to unveil the detected the problems (Case 2) because this transaction accounts for dealer’s income. As a
            result,  a  dealer  –  a  risk  taker  in  transaction  A  –  sells  defective  used  cars  deliberately
            partly with intention, partly by accident.
            As  a  result,  each  entity  participating  in  these  transactions  have  conflicting  motivations  of  unveiling
            information  on  the  condition  of  a  used  vehicle,  so  motivations  cannot  be  aligned  without  an  external
            intervention. Because of this confliction, “trust” cannot be guaranteed in used vehicle transaction. Although
            a seller and buyer need a mediating entity – a dealer – to reduce transaction cost, the problem is that a dealer
            is a buyer in transaction A and also a seller in transaction B. Here, transaction cost refers to a cost incurred
            in making an economic exchange. In addition, a dealer always tries to make used car transactions for his or
            her revenue.



















                              Figure III.10 – Problems of the current used car transaction service



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