Page 204 - ITU-T Focus Group Digital Financial Services – Technology, innovation and competition
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ITU-T Focus Group Digital Financial Services
                                              Technology, Innovation and Competition



               A recent report  noted that aggregators in Kenya, because they do not already have a short code when they
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               go to MNOs to request services, believe that this causes negotiations with MNOs to be more challenging since
               they have less leverage. This is, they said, a ‘subtle, but significant, impediment to fair access.’
                                                                                              161
               Uganda

               As noted earlier, DFS SP and aggregator Ezee Money sued MNO MTN Uganda on the basis that, inter alia,
               MTN denied Ezee Money the use of short codes on its network once services had already begun. MTN’s main
               defense was that Ezee Money was not a licensed communications services provider protected by the Uganda
               Communications Act; and further, that Ezee Money was a new company with no prior business with MTN
               and hence did not meet MTN’s trade-vetting requirements. The Commercial Court ruled that MTN breached
               provisions of the Uganda Communications Act in regards to restricted and distorted competition, and awarded
               Ezee Money Shs 2.3 Billion (US$637,000) in damages. MTN Uganda has reportedly begun an appeal. 162

               Short Codes may be issued by UCC to the DFS SP. However this may not guarantee the SP quick activation as
               there are currently no reference activation time lines mandated by the regulatory authority. Some banks and
               independent TSPs and PSPs have claimed that short code activation may take more than 3 months. 163





               8      Quality of service



               8.1    Overview

               Issues of Quality of Service (QOS) permeate the DFS ecosystem, some anecdotal and some identified by
               regulatory studies.

               These QOS issues relate primarily to random, dropped USSD sessions affecting DFS SPs and aggregators. As
               noted by CGAP, selective degradation is technically possible, but is reportedly difficult to do and extremely
               difficult to prove.
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               Even so, minimum QOS standards may be embedded in MNO-SP contracts.  These may provide, in a USSD
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               context, for the provision – if and where available - by an MNO to an SP of NI-USSD, which would be automatically
               initiated to resume a dropped user-initiated USSD session.


               8.2    Country example

               Uganda

               A competition study commissioned by the UCC indicated that TSPs and PSPs reported issues with service
               quality and that it was not possible for them to negotiate service level guarantees, nor be compensated for
               poor QOS and dropped USSD sessions. 166


               160   Mazer & Rowan (2016) ibid
               161   ibid
               162   Uganda has no competition law. New Vision (2015) MTN Ordered To Pay Ezeemoney Sh2.3b Over Sabotage, available at https://
                  goo. gl/ glTbes
               163   UCC (2016) ibid
               164   And as noted further by CGAP, even if a discrepancy in the quality of USSD is proven, it is not straightforward to identify the cause
                  of the inferior quality. The point of failure could, for example, be with the DFS provider, the USSD gateway operator, or the MNO.
                  See CGAP (2014) ibid
               165   See ITU FG DFS (2016) QOS and QoE Aspects of Digital Financial Services, available at See http:// www. itu. int/ en/ ITU- T/
                  focusgroups/ dfs/ Pages/ default. aspx . The report considers the appropriate role for telecommunications regulators in ensuring
                  the provision of high-quality DFS and offers recommendations for telecommunications regulators on how to select Key Per-
                  formance Indicators (KPIs) for DFS, including technical KPIs for bearer channels used with basic phones, feature phones and
                  smartphones.
               166   Cartesian (2015) ibid; UCC (2016) ibid



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