Page 74 - The Digital Financial Services (DFS) Ecosystem

ITU-T Focus Group Digital Financial Services
Ecosystem

being a relatively new program established in 2014 while eID of Nigeria, which was launched in 2007, only
covers 4 percent of its target population. We also find no clear associations between coverage and geographic
size, population size, or GDP per capita. This lack of association may be due to implementation challenges
affecting the levels of coverage of ID programs. A majority of the programs we review (32 of 48) report some
form of implementation challenges. Section 4 details the various implementation challenges experienced by
all programs reviewed.

4 Implementation Challenges

Establishing a national-scale identification system is complex, which leads to a wide range of challenges (Gelb
& Clark, 2013). We identify seven main categories of implementation challenges: accountability, privacy, data
management, enrollment, coverage, cost, and harmonization of ID programs (Table 3). Coverage, including
geographic and demographic characteristics, is the most reported challenge (22), and of the 39 programs
for which we find evidence of challenges, 20 report challenges in two or more categories.

4.1 Accountability

We find reports of a lack of institutional accountability and transparency in 11 of the programs we review, with
evidence of corruption occurring on both micro (local/individual) and macro (national/institutional) levels.

Accountability issues at the micro level in six programs (Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Uganda, and
Zambia – NRC) include reports of officials and enrollment personnel soliciting money from citizens for program
services beyond a required fee or when fees do not exist. In the cases of Kenya and Mozambique where initial
citizen enrollment charges were reduced, alleged corruption is attributed to logistical challenges. Registration
officers in Kenya acknowledged the unofficial fees and explained that in the face of limited funding, citizens
are charged to offset material shortages or supplement the allowances of mobile registration officers (KNCHR,
2007). In Mozambique, the contracted agency Semlex stated that overcharging citizens was an oversight
caused by the incomplete update of the computer system after the reduction in charges (AIM News, 2011).
Government officials in Zambia suggest that increased public awareness and education about the registration
process could be an effective tool to fight local extortion (Malambo, 2015). In Niger local distribution committees
lack institutional oversight and members are reported to use the supply of electoral cards as a tool for political
manipulation or collusion (University of Florida, n.d.).

Accountability challenges on a macro-level in six of the programs (Guatemala, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal,
Thailand, and Uganda) relate to the presence or perceived presence of corruption surrounding contracts and/
or tenders for the programs. In nearly all cases, limited transparency in the contract bidding and awarding
process leads to accusations of collusion and causes significant delays in the implementation of the program.
One example is Nepal, which is currently undergoing its second bidding process after it was discovered that a
former employee of the initially contracted Gemalto had prepared the tender document (Planet Biometrics,
2014). In Thailand, the implementation of the program has been delayed twice, once in 2006 and again in
2010, both in part due to the suspicion of corruption in the auction process (Gao & Gunawong, 2010).

We find evidence of further challenges with accountability in Uzbekistan, where limited information on
regulations and security raise questions about political manipulation (Landinfo, 2013), in Guatemala, with
accounts of nepotism and corrupt hiring practices (The Carter Center, 2013), and in Uganda, with repeat
government offenses concerning the inappropriate procurement of equipment (Committee-on-Defense,
Government of Uganda, 2012; Gelb & Clark, 2013).

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