Page 103 - The Digital Financial Services (DFS) Ecosystem

ITU-T Focus Group Digital Financial Services
Ecosystem

Figure 12 – Linkages with Elections

Elections are the most common service function of ID programs. Thirty of the 48 programs reviewed use their
ID or population registry for at least one of the three following functions:

• ID to vote – A card or unique ID number can be used to verify identity in order to vote.
• Monitoring – An ID program is used to monitor elections, either by culling voter registries of duplicate
voters or remotely using biometric information to authenticate votes.

• Register to vote – A card or unique ID number can be used to register to vote.
In elections, having strong, secure identification documents can be the difference between fraudulent and clean
elections. Voter registration is a cornerstone of certifying that only eligible voters can participate in elections
(The Carter Center, 2013). In the literature we surveyed, we found evidence that 13 of 48 IDs are accepted
as credentials to register to vote (Figure 12). Still, if an ID lacks high-level security features or can be easily
faked then there is risk that a single voter can register under multiple names using fake IDs. In Afghanistan,
for instance, The Wall Street Journal reported that voter cards and national IDs are available on the black
market for $30 each, with reports that fraudulent cards number in the millions (Abi-Habib and Hodge, 2012).
Incorporating biometric verification into ID cards is believed to be a strong way to limit voter fraud, in
part because stronger verification requirements limit the number of times a citizen can register, lessening
opportunities to submit multiple votes (Clark & Gelb, 2013). Verification can also proceed a step further by
having fingerprint, iris, or other biometric scanners available at polling booths to reconfirm a person’s identity.
In practice, however, even with 34 ID programs that incorporate biometric information we see no evidence that
biometric verification occurs on site at polling stations. Biometric verification is not available on site for all 21
documented cases of IDs being used to vote. Gelb & Clark (2013) write that this is largely a function of cost.
They find that “Large-scale registration exercises that are carried out on a rolling basis can be accomplished
with a relatively low equipment/citizen ratio […]. Elections themselves, however, entail a mass, simultaneous
mobilization of staff and citizens within a short time period, and would thus require a widespread distribution
of technology and connectivity.” They add that biometric verification may not be cost-effective, as cheaper
ways to prevent multiple voting exist: “Checking photos and cards against voter lists and using indelible ink to
mark voters may be good enough in many scenarios” (Gelb & Clark, 2013).

As a result of cost issues for employing biometric monitoring on site at elections, five countries have enacted
– nor plan to enact – other monitoring solutions (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Tanzania). For the 2014
election in Egypt, 2000 e-readers were purchased to scan national ID cards at polling booths, and verify the
authenticity of the card and its user. The e-readers were also meant to reduce voting time and amalgamate data
in one central location to monitor election progress and voter eligibility (Egypt Ministry of Communications,
2014). For the 2013 general elections in Lahor, Pakistan, voters inked fingerprints onto election rolls. The
fingerprints were later checked against the National Database and Registration Authority’s (NADRA) registry,
allowing the government to see that less than 40 percent of the fingerprints had a match with registered voters
on file (Yasif, 2015). In Indonesia, the government is currently working to build e-voting infrastructure for the

75