4.5.2.3 Transparency rules (labeling requirements)In order to reduce potential information asymmetries, the government can use a traditional approach aimed at fostering transparency. It can mandate the disclosure of information about the interop characteristics of a certain product or service. Again, such regulation may vary in several ways, including the characteristics and appearance of the information to be disclosed. The government need not establish transparency in \"specific\" legislation addressing interoperability in a certain area. Such regulation could be -- and often already is, at least partially -- implemented pursuant to consumer protection or competition law.Although often not mandatory, certification programs often serve this role of bringing transparency to interoperability. For example, after the ITU set the home networking standard G.9954 for existing-wire, multimedia home networking, the HomePNA association began certifying devices for compliance with the standard.46 Similarly, the IEEE created a program to certify products conforming to ITU-T Recommendation G.8265.1 (relating to synchronization of mobile backhaul networks).47 In neither case was transparency explicitly mandated, but increasing transparency about interoperability was necessary for those in compliance with the standards to maximize the benefits of their compliance.Because labeling requirements contribute to interoperability in indirect ways, their effectiveness is difficult to assess. Much depends on the design of the labeling provisions and how well they balance between information insufficiency and overload. Recent research suggests that information needs to be embedded in consumer decision-making processes in order to be effective. While there are monitoring and enforcement costs associated with labeling requirements, it is likely that they are more efficient overall than the regulatory approaches outlined previously. Finally, the flexibility of labeling requirements is high, given the indirect nature of the approach and, therefore, the limited conflict with future technological developments.4.5.2.4 Market power in procurement decisions The government may favor interoperable products or services when undertaking procurement decisions, leading the market to adopt the interoperable solutions. Such an approach requires that the government possess substantial purchasing power in the relevant market. This is apparent in the move toward government use of cloud services, where governments are investing significant resources in moving services and data to third-party, cloud-based systems.Cloud computing service providers, however, are interested in making their services as “sticky” as possible to minimize loss of customers to competitors. Ultimately, governments can lock themselves into a particular cloud service provider. In some cases, a fear of lock-in has proven to be a drag on the market, scaring away potential customers. This has been the case in Europe’s market for cloud computing services.48 For that reason, governments can try to influence the market by hiring only companies that support data interoperability.49 This approach was described in the European Commission’s Digital Single Market report, which notes that the use of procurement power is often the most effective way to translate standards into actual interoperability.50 This approach is effective only when a government's procurement decisions have a considerable and lasting market impact. It may turn out to be relatively inefficient when the government has to choose between an offer with lower upfront costs and an offer with higher levels of interoperability. The flexibility of the procurement approach is comparatively low, because the exercise of procurement power may create a technological lock-in on the part of the government (or else cause significant costs if the exercise of procurement power is to be repeated).4.5.2.5 Competition law Interoperability also can be achieved through an ex-post intervention grounded in competition law. The refusal of a dominant market player to disclose interoperability information may be considered an abuse of that dominant position. Even when a company discloses interoperability information at the technical layer, competition law still may prevent anticompetitive practices at the data layer. 114 Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2016