for private-sector operators looking to roll out new broadband networks. In emerging markets, where there is often a policy priority to push out electricity, road and rail networks into more rural areas, there can be a particular synergy with telecommunication operators seeking to build out infrastructure in the same areas.2.5.2 Use of spectrum licensing The dynamics are different in the mobile sector. Here, a lighter regulatory touch may be all that is required from the government to encourage network sharing. One of the most potent means available to governments is setting 4G spectrum licensing conditions. Spectrum is in high demand and, through licence conditions, governments can facilitate sharing. Licence conditions are not without costs, of course, because they may potentially reduce the governments’ proceeds from auctions or other licensing fees. One approach to promoting sharing is to require each licensee to provide nationwide coverage while allowing network sharing. This can create a strong incentive for licensees to share, particularly in higher-cost, low-ARPU areas. Alternatively, the licence conditions may require each licensee to build a network in its defined geographic licensing area, while allowing sharing or roaming in other areas.2.5.3 Regulatory certainty As noted earlier in this chapter, the question of whether co-investment arrangements should be subject to open access by third parties is a subtle one. On the one hand, open-access policies are usually thought to promote competition, but this has been true normally in the case of existing networks with long-sunk costs. When it comes to new investments, threatening to impose stringent open-access requirements may discourage operators from investing at all.Governments can address this risk by providing regulatory certainty for co-investing entities. Regulators could, for example, clarify that access pricing can take into account the build and demand risks at the time of investment. One of the major concerns of investors in new broadband networks is that, if they build a network and it is a success, they will be forced to provide access on terms that don’t recognize those risks. Other possible approaches include: • providing long-term regulatory commitments, such as the Australian regulator’s acceptance of NBN Co.’s 27-year special access undertaking15, which provided a high degree of certainty for NBN;• applying a utility-style regulatory asset base approach to the new broadband network, providing a revenue ceiling for the new entity;• providing the shared network operators with a period of exclusivity before requiring them to offer open access, which may be seen as a fair trade-off for operators’ assumption of risk and commitment to invest and deploy the new networks; and • enabling the shared network operators to access the network at the passive layer, with third parties being entitled to access only at the active layer – but otherwise on a non-discriminatory basis. Regulators may be more prepared to provide regulatory certainty to a joint venture in which no single operator is dominant rather than to a single owner with a new network. At the very least, governments should review the regulatory environment to ensure there are no unintended roadblocks that may undercut the potential for commercial network sharing and co-investment arrangements.2.5.4 Mandated network sharing Some regulators (e.g., Colombia, France and the United States) have mandated mobile network sharing or roaming obligations, often on a temporary basis and usually for the purpose of matching existing coverage rather than increasing coverage. There may be merit in these mandates in brown-field environments, but there are doubts about whether mandated network sharing is likely to be productive in encouraging green-field investment. Again, this may come down to regulatory certainty. As long as the investing operator building a new network in a green-field environment is certain 62 Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2016