DATA COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS: OVERALL ARCHITECTURE

Recommendation X.402
FOREWORD

The CCITT (the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee) is a permanent organ of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). CCITT is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.

The Plenary Assembly of CCITT which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study and approves Recommendations prepared by its Study Groups. The approval of Recommendations by the members of CCITT between Plenary Assemblies is covered by the procedure laid down in CCITT Resolution No. 2 (Melbourne, 1988).

Recommendation X.402 was prepared by Study Group VII and was approved under the Resolution No. 2 procedure on the 10th of September 1992.

CCITT NOTES

1) In this Recommendation, the expression “Administration” is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized private operating agency.

2) A list of abbreviations used in this Recommendation can be found in Annex J.
SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

0 Introduction

This Recommendation is one of a set of Recommendations for Message Handling. The entire set provides a comprehensive blueprint for a Message Handling System (MHS) realized by any number of cooperating open systems.

The purpose of an MHS is to enable users to exchange messages on a store-and-forward basis. A message submitted on behalf of one user, the originator, is conveyed by the Message Transfer System (MTS) and subsequently delivered to the agents of one or more additional users, the recipients. Access units (AUs) link the MTS to communication systems of other kinds (e.g. postal systems). A user is assisted in the preparation, storage, and display of messages by a user agent (UA). Optionally, he is assisted in the storage of messages by a message store (MS). The MTS comprises a number of message transfer agents (MTAs) which collectively perform the store-and-forward message transfer function.

This Recommendation specifies the overall architecture of the MHS and serves as a technical introduction to it.

The text of this Recommendation is the subject of joint CCITT-ISO agreement. The corresponding specification is ISO/IEC 10021-2:1990 as modified by Technical Corrigenda 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Draft Amendment 1.

1 Scope

This Recommendation defines the overall architecture of the MHS and serves as a technical introduction to it.

Other aspects of Message Handling are specified in other CCITT Recommendations | ISO/IEC 10021. A non-technical overview of Message Handling is provided by CCITT Rec. X.400 | ISO/IEC 10021-1. The conformance testing of MHS components is described in Recommendation X.403. The conventions used in the definition of the abstract services provided by MHS components are defined in CCITT Rec. X.407 | ISO/IEC 10021-3. The detailed rules by which the MTS converts the contents of messages from one EIT to another are defined in Recommendation X.408. The abstract service the MTS provides and the procedures that govern its distributed operation are defined in CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4. The abstract service the MS provides is defined in CCITT Rec. X.413 | ISO/IEC 10021-5. The application protocols that govern the interactions of MHS components are specified in CCITT Rec. X.419 | ISO/IEC 10021-6. The Interpersonal Messaging System, an application of Message Handling, is defined in CCITT Rec. X.420 | ISO/IEC 10021-7. Telematic access to the Interpersonal Messaging System is specified in Recommendation T.330.

The CCITT Recommendations and ISO/IEC International Standards on Message Handling are summarized in Table 1/X.402.
The Directory, the principal means for disseminating communication-related information among MHS components, is defined in the CCITT X.500-Series Recommendations | ISO/IEC 9594, as summarized in Table 2/X.402.

**TABLE 2/X.402**

**Specifications for directories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCITT</th>
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<td>X.500</td>
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<td>X.520</td>
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<td>Selected attribute types</td>
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<td>X.521</td>
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<td>Selected object classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.509</td>
<td>9594-8</td>
<td>Authentication framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The architectural foundation for Message Handling is provided by other Recommendations | International Standards. The OSI Reference Model is defined in CCITT Rec. X.200 | ISO 7498. The notation for specifying the data structures of abstract services and application protocols, ASN.1, and the associated encoding rules are defined in CCITT Rec. X.208 and X.209 | ISO/IEC 8824 and 8825. The means for establishing and releasing associations, the ACSE, is defined in CCITT Rec. X.217 and X.227 | ISO 8649 and 8650. The means for reliably conveying APDUs over associations, the RTSE, is defined in CCITT Rec. X.218 and X.228 | ISO/IEC 9066. The means for making requests of other open systems, the ROSE, is defined in CCITT Rec. X.219 and X.229 | ISO/IEC 9072.

The CCITT Recommendations and ISO/IEC International Standards foundational to Message Handling are summarized in Table 3/X.402.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCITT</th>
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<th>Subject matter</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7498</td>
<td>OSI Reference Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>X.208</td>
<td>8824</td>
<td>Abstract Syntax Notation One</td>
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<tr>
<td>X.229</td>
<td>9072-2</td>
<td>Protocol specification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Recommendation is structured as follows. Section 1 contains the introduction. Section 2 presents abstract models of Message Handling. Section 3 specifies how the MHS can be configured to satisfy any of a variety of functional, physical, and organizational requirements. Section 4 describes the naming and addressing of users and distribution lists and the routing of information objects to them. Section 5 describes the uses the MHS may make of the Directory. Section 6 describes how the MHS is realized by means of OSI. Annexes provide important supplemental information.

No requirements for conformance to this Recommendation are imposed.
2 Normative references

The following CCITT Recommendations and International Standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and Standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this Recommendation are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the Recommendations and Standards listed below. Members of ISO and IEC maintain registers of currently valid International Standards. The CCITT Secretariat maintains a list of currently valid CCITT Recommendations.

2.1 Open Systems Interconnection

This Recommendation and others in the set cite the following OSI specifications:

- CCITT Recommendation X.217 (1988), Association Control Service definition for Open systems Interconnection for CCITT applications.
2.2 Directory Systems

This Recommendation and others in the set cite the following Directory System specifications:


2.3 Message Handling Systems

This Recommendation and others in the set cite the following Message Handling System specifications:


2.4 Country Codes and Numbering Plans

This Recommendation cites the following specification:


ISO 3166:1988, Codes for the representation of names of countries.

3 Definitions

For the purposes of this Recommendation and others in the set, the following definitions apply.

3.1 Open Systems Interconnection

This Recommendation and others in the set make use of the following terms defined in CCITT Rec. X.200 | ISO 7498, as well as the names of the seven layers of the Reference Model:

a) abstract syntax;
b) application entity (AE);
c) application process;
d) application protocol data unit (APDU);
e) application service element (ASE);
f) distributed information processing task;
g) layer;
h) open system;
i) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI);
j) peer;
k) presentation context;
l) protocol;
m) Reference Model;
n) transfer syntax; and
o) user element (UE).

This Recommendation and others in the set make use of the following terms defined in CCITT Recs. X.208 and X.209 | ISO/IEC 8824 and 8825, as well as the names of ASN.1 data types and values:

a) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1);
b) Basic Encoding Rules;
c) explicit;
d) export;
e) implicit;
f) import;
g) macro;
h) module;
i) tag;
j) type; and
k) value.

This Recommendation and others in the set make use of the following terms defined in CCITT Rec. X.217 | ISO 8649:

a) application association; association;
b) application context (AC);
c) Association Control Service Element (ACSE);
d) initiator; and
e) responder.

This Recommendation and others in the set make use of the following terms defined in CCITT Rec. X.218 | ISO/IEC 9066-1:

a) Reliable Transfer (RT); and
b) Reliable Transfer Service Element (RTSE).

This Recommendation and others in the set make use of the following terms defined in CCITT Rec. X.219 | ISO/IEC 9072-1:

a) argument;
b) asynchronous;
c) bind;
d) parameter;
e) remote error;
f) remote operation;
g) Remote Operations (RO);
h) Remote Operations Service Element (ROSE);
i) result;
j) synchronous; and
k) unbind.

3.2 Directory Systems

This Recommendation and others in the set make use of the following terms defined in the X.500-Series of CCITT Recs. | ISO/IEC 9594:

a) attribute;
b) certificate;
c) certification authority;
d) certification path;
e) directory entry; entry;
f) directory system agent (DSA);
g) Directory;
h) hash function;
i) name;
j) object class;
k) object;
l) simple authentication; and
m) strong authentication.

3.3 Message Handling Systems

For the purposes of this Recommendation and others in the set, the definitions indexed in Annex I apply.

4 Abbreviations

For the purposes of this Recommendation and others in the set, the abbreviations indexed in Annex I apply.

5 Conventions

This Recommendation uses the descriptive conventions identified below.

5.1 ASN.1

This Recommendation uses several ASN.1-based descriptive conventions in Annexes A and C to define the Message Handling-specific information the Directory may hold. In particular, it uses the OBJECT-CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, and ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX macros of CCITT Rec. X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2 to define Message Handling-specific object classes, attributes, and attribute syntaxes.

ASN.1 appears both in Annex A to aid the exposition, and again, largely redundantly, in Annex C for reference. If differences are found between the two, a specification error is indicated.
Note that ASN.1 tags are implicit throughout the ASN.1 module that Annex C defines; the module is definitive in that respect.

5.2 Grade

Whenever this Recommendation describes a class of data structure (e.g. O/R addresses) having components (e.g. attributes), each component is assigned one of the following grades:

a) mandatory (M): A mandatory component shall be present in every instance of the class.

b) optional (O): An optional component shall be present in an instance of the class at the discretion of the object (e.g. user) supplying that instance. There is no default value.

c) defaultable (D): A defaultable component shall be present in an instance of the class at the discretion of the object (e.g. user) supplying that instance. In its absence a default value, specified by this CCITT Recommendation | ISO/IEC 10021, applies.

d) conditional (C): A conditional component shall be present in an instance of the class as dictated by this Recommendation.

5.3 Terms

Throughout the remainder of this Recommendation, terms are rendered in bold when defined, in italic when referenced prior to their definitions, without emphasis upon other occasions.

Terms that are proper nouns are capitalized, generic terms are not.

SECTION 2 – ABSTRACT MODELS

6 Overview

This section presents abstract models of Message Handling which provide the architectural basis for the more detailed specifications that appear in other CCITT Recommendations ISO/IEC 10021.

Message Handling is a distributed information processing task that integrates the following intrinsically related sub-tasks:

a) Message Transfer: The non-real-time carriage of information objects between parties using computers as intermediaries.

b) Message Storage: The automatic storage for later retrieval of information objects conveyed by means of Message Transfer.

This section covers the following topics:

a) Functional model;

b) Information model;

c) Operational model;

d) Security model.

Note – Message Handling has a variety of applications, one of which is Interpersonal Messaging, described in CCITT Rec. X.420 | ISO/IEC 10021-7.

7 Functional model

This clause provides a functional model of Message Handling. The concrete realization of the model is the subject of other CCITT Recommendations ISO | IEC 10021.
The **Message Handling Environment (MHE)** comprises “primary” functional objects of several types, the *Message Handling System (MHS)*, *users*, and *distribution lists*. The MHS in turn can be decomposed into lesser, “secondary” functional objects of several types, the *Message Transfer System (MTS)*, *user agents*, *message stores*, and *access units*. The MTS in turn can be decomposed into still lesser, “tertiary” functional objects of a single type, *message transfer agents*.

The primary, secondary, and tertiary functional object types and selected *access unit* types are individually defined and described below.

As detailed below, functional objects are sometimes tailored to one or more applications of Message Handling, e.g. Interpersonal Messaging (see Recommendations X.420 and T.330). A functional object that has been tailored to an application understands the syntax and semantics of the contents of messages exchanged in that application.

As a local matter, functional objects may have capabilities beyond those specified in this Recommendation or other CCITT Recommendations | ISO/IEC 10021. In particular, a typical *user agent* has message preparation, rendition, and storage capabilities that are not standardized.

### 7.1 Primary functional objects

The MHE comprises the *Message Handling System*, *users*, and *distribution lists*. These primary functional objects interact with one another. Their types are defined and described below.

The situation is depicted in Figure 1/X.402.

![Figure 1/X.402](image)

**FIGURE 1/X.402**

*The Message handling environment*

#### 7.1.1 The Message Handling System

The principal purpose of Message Handling is to convey information objects from one party to another. The functional object by means of which this is accomplished is called the **Message Handling System (MHS)**.

The MHE comprises a single MHS.
7.1.2 **Users**

The principal purpose of the MHS is to convey information objects between users. A functional object (e.g. a person) that engages in (rather than provides) Message Handling is called a **user**.

The following kinds of user are distinguished:

a) **direct user**: A user that engages in Message Handling by direct use of the MHS.

b) **indirect user**: A user that engages in Message Handling by indirect use of the MHS, i.e. through another communication system (e.g. a postal system or the telex network) to which the MHS is linked.

The MHE comprises any number of users.

7.1.3 **Distribution lists**

By means of the MHS a user can convey information objects to pre-specified groups of users as well as to individual users. The functional object that represents a pre-specified group of users and other DLs is called a **distribution list (DL)**.

A DL identifies zero or more users and DLs called its **members**. The latter DLs (if any) are said to be **nested**. Asking the MHS to convey an information object (e.g. a message) to a DL is tantamount to asking that it convey the object to its members. Note that this is recursive.

The right, or permission, to convey **messages** to a particular DL may be controlled. This right is called **submit permission**. As a local matter the use of a DL can be further restricted.

The MHE comprises any number of DLs.

*Note* – A DL might be further restricted, e.g. to the conveyance of **messages** of a prescribed **content type**.

7.2 **Secondary functional objects**

The MHS comprises the **Message Transfer System**, **user agents**, **message stores**, and **access units**. These secondary functional objects interact with one another. Their types are defined and described below.

The situation is depicted in Figure 2/X.402.

7.2.1 **The Message Transfer System**

The MHS conveys information objects to individual users and to the members of DLs. The functional object that actually does this is called the **Message Transfer System (MTS)**. The MTS is a store-and-forward communication system and can be considered the backbone of the MHS.

The MTS is general-purpose, supporting all applications of Message Handling. Additionally, the MTS may be tailored to one or more particular applications so it can carry out **conversion**.

The MHS comprises a single MTS.

7.2.2 **User agents**

The functional object by means of which a single direct user engages in Message Handling is called a **user agent (UA)**.

A typical UA is tailored to one or more particular applications of Message Handling.

The MHS comprises any number of UAs.

*Note* – A UA that serves a human user typically interacts with him by means of input/output devices (e.g. a keyboard, display, scanner, printer, or combination of these).
7.2.3 Message stores

A typical user must store the information objects it receives. The functional object that provides a (single) direct user with capabilities for Message Storage is called a **message store (MS)**. Each MS is associated with one UA, but not every UA has an associated MS.

Every MS is general-purpose, supporting all applications of Message Handling. Additionally, an MS may be tailored to one or more particular applications so that it can more capably submit and support the retrieval of messages associated with that application.

The MHS comprises any number of MSs.

*Note* – As a local matter, a UA may provide for information objects storage that either supplements or replaces that of an MS.

7.2.4 Access units

The functional object that links another communication system (e.g. a postal system or the telex network) to the MTS and via which its patrons engage in Message Handling as indirect users is called an **access unit (AU)**.

A typical AU is tailored to a particular communication system and to one or more particular applications of Message Handling.

The MHS comprises any number of AUs.

7.3 Tertiary functional objects

The MTS comprises **message transfer agents**. These tertiary functional objects interact. Their type is defined and described below.

The situation is depicted in Figure 3/X.402.
7.3.1 Message transfer agents

The MTS conveys information objects to users and DLs in a store-and-forward manner. A functional object that provides one link in the MTS’ store-and-forward chain is called a message transfer agent (MTA).

Every MTA is general-purpose, supporting all applications of Message Handling. Additionally, an MTA may be tailored to one or more particular applications so it can carry out conversion.

The MTS comprises any number of MTAs.

7.4 Selected AU types

As described above, the MHS interworks with communication systems of other types via AUs. Several selected AU types – physical delivery, telematic, and telex – are introduced in the clauses below.

7.4.1 Physical delivery

A physical delivery access unit (PDAU) is an AU that subjects messages (but neither probes nor reports) to physical rendition and that conveys the resulting physical messages to a physical delivery system.

The transformation of a message into a physical message is called physical rendition. A physical message is a physical object (e.g. a letter and its paper envelope) that embodies a message.

A physical delivery system (PDS) is a system that performs physical delivery. One important kind of PDS is postal systems. Physical delivery is the conveyance of a physical message to a patron of a PDS, one of the indirect users to which the PDAU provides Message Handling capabilities.

Among the applications of Message Handling supported by every PDAU is Interpersonal Messaging (see CCITT Rec. X.420 | ISO/IEC 10021-7).
7.4.2 Telematic

Telematic access units, which support Interpersonal Messaging exclusively, are introduced in CCITT Rec. X.420 | ISO/IEC 10021-7.

7.4.3 Telex

Telex access units, which support Interpersonal Messaging exclusively, are introduced in CCITT Rec. 420 | ISO/IEC 10021-7.

8 Information model

This clause provides an information model of Message Handling. The concrete realization of the model is the subject of other CCITT Recommendations | ISO/IEC 10021.

The MHS and MTS can convey information objects of three classes: messages, probes, and reports. These classes are listed in the first column of Table 4/X.402. For each listed class, the second column indicates the kinds of functional objects – users, UAs, MSs, MTAs, and AUs – that are the ultimate sources and destinations for such objects.

The information objects, summarized in Table 4/X.402, are individually defined and described in the clauses below.

TABLE 4/X.402

Conveyable Information Objects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information object</th>
<th>Functional object</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>User</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probe</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S Ultimate source
D Ultimate destination

8.1 Messages

The primary purpose of Message Transfer is to convey information objects called messages from one user to others. A message has the following parts, as depicted in Figure 4/X.402:

a) **envelope**: An information object whose composition varies from one transmittal step to another and that variously identifies the message’s originator and potential recipients, documents its previous conveyance and directs its subsequent conveyance by the MTS, and characterizes its content.

b) **content**: An information object that the MTS neither examines nor modifies, except for conversion, during its conveyance of the message.

One piece of information borne by the envelope identifies the type of the content. The **content type** is an identifier (an ASN.1 Object Identifier or Integer) that denotes the syntax and semantics of the content overall. This identifier enables the MTS to determine the message’s deliverability to particular users, and enables UAs and MSs to interpret and process the content.
Another piece of information borne by the envelope identifies the types of encoded information represented in the content. An **encoded information type (EIT)** is an identifier (an ASN.1 Object Identifier or Integer) that denotes the medium and format (e.g. IA5 text or Group 3 facsimile) of individual portions of the content. It further enables the MTS to determine the message’s deliverability to particular users, and to identify opportunities for it to make the message deliverable by converting a portion of the content from one EIT to another.

### 8.2 Probes

A second purpose of Message Transfer is to convey information objects called **probes** from one user up to but just short of other users (i.e. to the MTAs serving those users). A probe describes a class of message and is used to determine the **deliverability** of such messages.

A message described by a probe is called a **described message**.

A probe comprises an envelope alone. This envelope contains much the same information as that for a message. Besides bearing the content type and encoded information types of a described message, the probe’s envelope bears the length of its content.

The submission of a probe elicits from the MTS largely the same behaviour as would submission of any described message, except that **DL expansion** and **delivery** are forgone in the case of the probe. In particular, and apart from the consequences of the suppression of DL expansion, the probe provokes the same **reports** as would any described message. This fact gives probes their utility.

### 8.3 Reports

A third purpose of Message Transfer is to convey information objects called **reports** to users. Generated by the MTS, a report relates the outcome or progress of a message’s or probe’s **transmittal** to one or more **potential recipients**.

The message or probe that is the subject of a report is called its **subject message** or **subject probe**.

A report concerning a particular **potential recipient** is conveyed to the **originator** of the subject message or probe unless the **potential recipient** is a **member recipient**. In the latter case, the report is conveyed to the DL of which the **member recipient** is a member. As a local matter (i.e. by policy established for that particular DL), the report may be further conveyed to the DL’s owner; either to the containing DL (in the case of nesting) or to the originator of the subject message (otherwise); or both.

The outcomes that a single report may relate are of the following kinds:

a) **delivery report**: Delivery, export, or affirmation of the subject message or probe, or DL expansion.
b) **non-delivery report**: *Non-delivery or non-affirmation* of the subject message or probe.

A report may comprise one or more delivery and/or non-delivery reports. A message or probe may provoke several delivery and/or non-delivery reports concerning a particular *potential recipient*. Each marks the passage of a different transmittal *step or event*.

## 9 Operational model

This clause provides an operational model of Message Handling. The concrete realization of the model is the subject of other CCITT Recommendations | ISO/IEC 10021.

The MHS can convey an information object to individual users, DLs, or a mix of the two. Such conveyance is accomplished by a process called *transmittal* comprising *steps* and *events*. The process, its parts, and the roles that users and DLs play in it are defined and described below.

### 9.1 Transmittal

The conveyance or attempted conveyance of a message or probe is called *transmittal*. Transmittal encompasses a message’s conveyance from its *originator* to its *potential recipients*, and a probe’s conveyance from its *originator* to MTAs able to *affirm* the described messages’ *deliverability* to the probe’s *potential recipients*. Transmittal also encompasses the conveyance or attempted conveyance to the *originator* of any reports the message or probe may provoke.

A transmittal comprises a sequence of *transmittal steps* and *events*. A *transmittal step* (or *step*) is the conveyance of a message, probe, or report from one functional object to another “adjacent” to it. A *transmittal event* (or *event*) is processing of a message, probe, or report within a functional object that may influence the functional object’s selection of the next transmittal step or event.

The information flow of transmittal is depicted in Figure 5/X.402. The figure shows the kinds of functional objects – direct users, indirect users, UAs, MSs, MTAs, and AUs – that may be involved in a transmittal, the information objects – messages, probes, and reports – that may be conveyed between them, and the names of the transmittal steps by means of which those conveyances are accomplished.

The figure highlights the facts that a message or report may be retrieved repeatedly and that only the first conveyance of a retrieved object from UA to user constitutes *receipt*.

One event plays a distinguished role in transmittal. *Splitting* replicates a message or probe and divides responsibility for its *immediate recipients* among the resulting information objects. The potential recipients associated with a particular instance of a message or probe are called the *immediate recipients*. An MTA stages a splitting if the next step or event required in the conveyance of a message or probe to some immediate recipients differs from that required in its conveyance to others. Each of the step and event descriptions which follow assumes that the step or event is appropriate for all immediate recipients, a situation that can be created, if necessary, by splitting.
9.2 Transmittal roles

Users and DLs play a variety of roles in a message’s or probe’s transmittal. These roles are informally categorized as “source” roles, “destination” roles, or statuses to which users or DLs can be elevated.

A user may play the following “source” role in the transmittal of a message or probe:

– **originator**: The user (but not DL) that is the ultimate source of a message or probe.

A user or DL may play any of the following “destination” roles in the transmittal of a message or probe:

a) **intended recipient**: One of the users and DLs the originator specifies as a message’s or probe’s intended destinations.

b) **originator-specified alternate recipient**: The user or DL (if any) to which the originator requests that a message or probe be conveyed if it cannot be conveyed to a particular intended recipient.
c) **member recipient**: A user or DL to which a message (but not a probe) is conveyed as a result of DL expansion.

d) **recipient-assigned alternate recipient**: The user or DL (if any) to which an intended, originator-specified alternate, or member recipient may have elected to redirect messages.

A user or DL may attain any of the following statuses in the course of a message’s or probe’s transmittal:

a) **potential recipient**: Any user or DL to (i.e. toward) which a message or probe is conveyed at any point during the course of transmittal. Necessarily an intended, originator-specified alternate, member, or recipient-assigned alternate recipient.

b) **actual recipient** (or **recipient**): A potential recipient for which delivery or affirmation takes place.

### 9.3 Transmittal steps

The kinds of steps that may occur in a transmittal are listed in the first column of Table 5/X.402. For each listed kind, the second column indicates whether this Recommendation and other CCITT Recommendations | ISO/IEC 10021 standardize such steps, the third column the kinds of information objects – messages, probes, and reports – that may be conveyed in such a step, the fourth column the kinds of functional objects – users, UAs, MSs, MTAs, and AUs – that may participate in such a step as the object’s source or destination.

Table 5/X.402 is divided into three sections. The steps in the first section apply to the “creation” of messages and probes, those in the last to the “disposal” of messages and reports, and those in the middle section to the “relaying” of messages, probes, and reports.

The kinds of transmittal steps, summarized in Table 5/X.402, are individually defined and described in the clauses below.

**TABLE 5/X.402**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmittal step</th>
<th>Standardized?</th>
<th>Information objects</th>
<th>Functional objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M P R</td>
<td>User UA MS MTA AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origination</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X X –</td>
<td>S D – – –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>X X –</td>
<td>– S SD D –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>– – – D S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>– – – SD –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>– – – S D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>X – X</td>
<td>– D D S –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrieval</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>X – X</td>
<td>– D S – –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>X – X</td>
<td>D S – – –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M Message S Source
P Probe D Destination
R Report X Permitted
9.3.1 **Origination**

In an **origination** step, either a direct user conveys a message or probe to its UA, or an indirect user conveys a message or probe to the communication system that serves it. This step gives birth to the message or probe and is the first step in its transmittal.

The user above constitutes the message’s or probe’s originator. In this step, the originator identifies the message’s or probe’s intended recipients. Additionally, for each intended recipient, the originator may (but need not) identify an originator-specified alternate recipient.

9.3.2 **Submission**

In a **submission** step, a message or probe is conveyed to an MTA and thus entrusted to the MTS. Two kinds of submission are distinguished:

a) **indirect submission**: A transmittal step in which the originator’s UA conveys a message or probe to its MS and in which the MS effects **direct submission**. Such a step follows origination.

   This step may be taken only if the user is equipped with an MS.

b) **direct submission**: A transmittal step in which the originator’s UA or MS conveys a message or probe to an MTA. Such a step follows origination or occurs as part of indirect submission.

   This step may be taken whether or not the user is equipped with an MS.

Indirect and direct submission are functionally equivalent except that additional capabilities may be available with the former. Indirect submission may differ from direct submission in other respects (e.g. the number of open systems with which that embodying a UA must interact) and for that reason be preferable to direct submission.

The UA or MS involved in direct submission is called the **submission agent**. A submission agent is made known to the MTS by a process of registration, as a result of which the submission agent and MTS keep one another informed of their names, their locations, and any other characteristics required for their interaction.

9.3.3 **Import**

In an **import** step, an AU conveys a message, probe, or report to an MTA. This step injects into the MTS an information object born in another communication system, and follows its conveyance by that system.

*Note* – The concept of importing is a generic one. How this step is effected varies, of course, from one type of AU to another.

9.3.4 **Transfer**

In a **transfer** step, one MTA conveys a message, probe, or report to another. This step transports an information object over physical and sometimes organizational distances and follows direct submission, import, or (a prior) transfer.

This step may be taken, of course, only if the MTS comprises several MTAs.

The following kinds of transfer are distinguished, on the basis of the number of **MDs** involved:

a) **internal transfer**: A transfer involving MTAs within a single **MD**.

b) **external transfer**: A transfer involving MTAs in different **MDs**.
9.3.5 Export

In an export step, an MTA conveys a message, probe, or report to an AU. This step ejects from the MTS an information object bound for another communication system. It follows direct submission, import, or transfer.

As part of this step, the MTA may generate a delivery report. In the case of access units, a positive delivery report indicates successful acceptance of a message (or a probe) by the access unit. Depending on the requirements defined in the relevant message handling specifications, the delivery report may, alternatively, indicate that the message has been successfully received by the indirect user served by the access unit (see Recommendations F.421, F.422, F.423, F.435, F.440, T.300, T.330 and U.204.)

Note – The concept of exporting is a generic one. How this step is effected varies, of course, from one type of AU to another.

9.3.6 Delivery

In a delivery step, an MTA conveys a message or report to an MS or UA. The MS and UA are those of a potential recipient of the message, or the originator of the report’s subject message or probe. This step entrusts the information object to a representative of the user and follows direct submission, import, or transfer. It also elevates the user in question to the status of an actual recipient.

As part of this step, in the case of a message, the MTA may generate a delivery report.

The MS or UA involved is called the delivery agent. A delivery agent is made known to the MTS by a process of registration, as a result of which the delivery agent and MTS keep one another informed of their names, their locations, and any other characteristics required for their interaction.

9.3.7 Retrieval

In a retrieval step, a user’s MS conveys a message or report to its UA. The user in question is an actual recipient of the message or the originator of the subject message or probe. This step non-destructively retrieves the information object from storage. This step follows delivery or (a prior) retrieval.

This step may be taken only if the user is equipped with an MS.

9.3.8 Receipt

In a receipt step, either a UA conveys a message or report to its direct user, or the communication system that serves an indirect user conveys such an information object to that user. In either case, this step conveys the object to its ultimate destination.

In the case of a direct user, this step follows the object’s delivery or first retrieval (only). In the case of an indirect user, it follows the information object’s conveyance by the communication system serving the user. In either case, the user is a potential recipient (and, in the case of a direct user, an actual recipient) of the message in question, or the originator of the subject message or probe.

9.4 Transmittal events

The kinds of events that may occur in a transmittal are listed in the first column of Table 6/X.402. For each listed kind, the second column indicates the kinds of information objects – messages, probes, and reports – for which such events may be staged, the third column the kinds of functional objects – users, UAs, MSs, MTAs, and AUs – that may stage such events.

All the events occur within the MTS.

The kinds of transmittal events, summarized in Table 6/X.402, are individually defined and described in the clauses below.
9.4.1 Splitting

In a splitting event, an MTA replicates a message or probe, dividing responsibility for its immediate recipients among the resulting information objects. This event effectively allows an MTA to independently convey an object to various potential recipients.

An MTA stages a splitting when the next step or event required in the conveyance of a message or probe to some immediate recipients differs from that required in its conveyance to others.

9.4.2 Joining

In a joining event, an MTA combines several instances of the same message or probe, or two or more delivery and/or non-delivery reports for the same subject message or probe.

An MTA may, but need not stage a joining when it determines that the same events and next step are required to convey several highly related information objects to their destinations.

9.4.3 Name Resolution

In a name resolution event, an MTA adds the corresponding O/R address to the O/R name that identifies one of a message’s or probe’s immediate recipients.

9.4.4 DL Expansion

In a DL expansion event, an MTA replaces an immediate recipient which denotes a DL by the members of that DL, which are thereby made member recipients. DL expansion events only occur for messages, not for probes.

A particular DL is always subjected to DL expansion at a pre-established location within the MTS. This location is called the DL’s expansion point and is identified by an O/R address.

As part of this event, the MTA may generate a delivery report.
DL expansion is subject to submit permission. In the case of a nested DL, that permission must have been granted to the DL of which the nested DL is a member. Otherwise, it must have been granted to the originator.

9.4.5 **Redirection**

In a **redirection** event, an MTA replaces a user or DL among a message’s or probe’s immediate recipients with an originator-specified or recipient-assigned alternate recipient.

9.4.6 **Conversion**

In a **conversion** event, an MTA transforms parts of a message’s content from one EIT to another, or alters a probe so it appears that the described messages were so modified. This event increases the likelihood that an information object can be delivered or affirmed by tailoring it to its immediate recipients.

The following kinds of conversion are distinguished, on the basis of how the EIT of the information to be converted and the EIT to result from the conversion are selected:

a) **explicit conversion**: A conversion in which the originator selects both the initial and final EITs.

b) **implicit conversion**: A conversion in which the MTA selects the final EITs based upon the initial EITs and the capabilities of the UA.

9.4.7 **Non-delivery**

In a **non-delivery** event, an MTA determines that the MTS cannot deliver a message to its immediate recipients, or cannot deliver a report to the originator of its subject message or probe. This event halts the conveyance of an object the MTS deems unconveyable.

As part of this event, in the case of a message, the MTA generates a non-delivery report.

An MTA stages a non-delivery, e.g. when it determines that the immediate recipients are improperly specified, that they do not accept delivery of messages such as that at hand, or that the message has not been delivered to them within pre-specified time limits.

9.4.8 **Non-affirmation**

In a **non-affirmation** event, an MTA determines that the MTS could not deliver a described message to a probe’s immediate recipients. This event partially or fully determines the answer to the question posed by a probe.

As part of this event, the MTA generates a non-delivery report.

An MTA stages a non-affirmation, e.g. when it determines that the immediate recipients are improperly specified or would not accept delivery of a described message.

9.4.9 **Affirmation**

In an **affirmation** event, an MTA determines that the MTS could deliver any described message to a probe’s immediate recipients. This event partially or fully determines the answer to the question posed by a probe, and elevates the immediate recipients to the status of actual recipients.

As part of this event, the MTA may generate a delivery report.

An MTA stages an affirmation once it determines that the immediate recipients are properly specified and, if the immediate recipients are users (but not DLs), would accept delivery of any described message. If the immediate recipients are DLs, an MTA stages an affirmation if the DL exists and the originator has the relevant submit permission.

9.4.10 **Routing**

In a **routin** event, an MTA selects the “adjacent” MTA to which it will transfer a message, probe, or report. This event incrementally determines an information object’s route through the MTS and (obviously) may be taken only if the MTS comprises several MTAs.
The following kinds of routing are distinguished, on the basis of the kind of transfer for which they prepare:

a) **internal routing**: A routing preparatory to an internal transfer (i.e. a transfer within an MD).

b) **external routing**: A routing preparatory to an external transfer (i.e. a transfer between MDs).

An MTA stages a routing when it determines that it can stage no other event, and take no step, regarding an object.

10 Security model

This clause provides an abstract security model for Message Transfer. The concrete realization of the model is the subject of other CCITT Recommendations | ISO/IEC 10021. The security model provides a framework for describing the security services that counter potential threats (see Annex D) to the MTS and the security elements that support those services.

The security features are an optional extension to the MHS that can be used to minimize the risk of exposure of assets and resources to violations of a security policy (threats). Their aim is to provide features independently of the communications services provided by other lower or higher entities. Threats may be countered by the use of physical security, computer security (COMPUSEC), or security services provided by the MHS. Depending on the perceived threats, certain of the MHS security services will be selected in combination with appropriate physical security and COMPUSEC measures. The security services supported by the MHS are described below. The naming and structuring of the services are based on ISO 7498-2.

*Note* – Despite these security features, certain attacks may be mounted against a communication between a user and the MHS or against user-to-user communication (e.g. in the case of users accessing the MHS through an access unit, or in the case of users remotely accessing their UAs). To counter these attacks requires extensions to the present security model and services which are for further study.

In many cases, the broad classes of threats are covered by several of the services listed.

The security services are supported through use of service elements of the Message Transfer Service message envelope. The envelope contains security relevant arguments as described in CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4. The description of the security services takes the following general form. In 10.2 the services are listed, with, in each case, a definition of the service and an indication of how it may be provided using the security elements in CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4. In 10.3 the security elements are individually described, with, in each case, a definition of the service element and references to its constituent arguments in CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4.

Many of the techniques employed rely on encryption mechanisms. The security services in the MHS allow for flexibility in the choice of algorithms. However, in some cases only the use of asymmetric encryption has been fully defined in this Recommendation. A future version of this Recommendation may make use of alternative mechanisms based on symmetric encryption.

*Note* – The use of the terms “security service” and “security element” in this clause are not to be confused with the terms “service” and “element of service” as used in CCITT Rec. X.400 | ISO/IEC 10021-1. The former terms are used in the present clause to maintain consistency with ISO 7498-2.

10.1 Security policies

Security services in the MHS must be capable of supporting a wide range of security policies which extend beyond the confines of the MHS itself. The services selected and the threats addressed will depend on the individual application and levels of trust in parts of the system.

A security policy defines how the risk to and exposure of assets can be reduced to an acceptable level.
In addition, operation between different domains, each with their own security policy, will be required. As each domain will be subject to its own overall security policy, covering more than just the MHS, a bilateral agreement on interworking between two domains will be required. This must be defined so as not to conflict with the security policies for either domain and effectively becomes part of the overall security policy for each domain.

10.2 Security services

This sub-clause defines the Message Transfer security services. The naming and structuring of the services are based on ISO 7498-2.

Message Transfer security services fall into several broad classes. These classes and the services in each are listed in Table 7/X.402. An asterisk (*) under the heading of the form X/Y indicates that the service can be provided from a functional object of type X to one of type Y.

Throughout the security service definitions that follow, reference is made to Figure 6/X.402, which reiterates the MHS functional model in simplified form. The numeric labels are referenced in the text.

10.2.1 Origin Authentication security services

These security services provide for the authentication of the identity of communicating peer entities and sources of data.

10.2.1.1 Data Origin Authentication security services

These security services provide corroboration of the origin of a message, probe, or report to all concerned entities (i.e. MTAs or recipient MTS-users). These security services cannot protect against duplication of messages, probes, or reports.

10.2.1.1.1 Message Origin Authentication security service

The Message Origin Authentication service enables the corroboration of the source of a message.

This security service can be provided using either the Message Origin Authentication or the Message Argument Integrity security element. The former can be used to provide the security service to any of the parties concerned (1 to 5 inclusive in Figure 6/X.402), whereas the latter can only be used to provide the security service to MTS-users (1 or 5 in Figure 6/X.402). The security element chosen depends on the prevailing security policy.

10.2.1.1.2 Probe Origin Authentication security service

The Probe Origin Authentication security service enables the corroboration of the source of a probe.

This security service can be provided by using the Probe Origin Authentication security element. This security element can be used to provide the security service to any of the MTAs through which the probe is transferred (2 to 4 inclusive in Figure 6/X.402).

10.2.1.1.3 Report Origin Authentication security service

The Report Origin Authentication security service enables the corroboration of the source of a report.

This security service can be provided by using the Report Origin Authentication security element. This security element can be used to provide the security service to the originator of the subject message or probe, as well as to any MTA through which the report is transferred (1 to 5 inclusive in Figure 6/X.402).

10.2.1.2 Proof of Submission security service

This security service enables the originator of a message to obtain corroboration that it has been received by the MTS for delivery to the originally specified recipient(s).

This security service can be provided by using the Proof of Submission security element.
### Message transfer security services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>UA/UA</th>
<th>MS/MTA</th>
<th>MTA/MS</th>
<th>MTA/UA</th>
<th>UA/MS</th>
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<td>Message origin authentication</td>
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<td>Probe origin authentication</td>
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<td>Report origin authentication</td>
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<td>Proof of submission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proof of delivery</td>
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<td>Security context</td>
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<td>Connection confidentiality</td>
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<td><strong>Non-repudiation</strong></td>
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</table>

* This service is provided by the recipient’s MS to the originator’s UA.

#### 10.2.1.3 Proof of Delivery security service

This security service enables the originator of a message to obtain corroboration that it has been delivered by the MTS to its intended recipient(s).

This security service can be provided by using the Proof of Delivery security element.

#### 10.2.2 Secure Access Management security service

The Secure Access Management security service is concerned with providing protection for resources against their unauthorised use. It can be divided into two components, namely the Peer Entity Authentication and the Security Context security services.
10.2.2.1 *Peer Entity Authentication security service*

This security service is provided for use at the establishment of a connection to confirm the identity of the connecting entity. It may be used on the links 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, or 4-5 in Figure 6/X.402 and provides confidence, at the time of usage only, that an entity is not attempting a masquerade or an unauthorized replay of a previous connection.

This security service is supported by the Authentication Exchange security element. Note that use of this security element may yield other data as a result of its operation that in certain circumstances can be used to support a Connection Confidentiality and/or a Connection Integrity security service.

10.2.2.2 *Security Context security service*

This security service is used to limit the scope of passage of messages between entities by reference to the Security Labels associated with messages. This security service is therefore closely related to the Message Security Labelling security service, which provides for the association of messages and Security Labels.

The Security Context security service is supported by the Security Context and the Register security elements.

10.2.3 *Data Confidentiality security services*

These security services provide for the protection of data against unauthorised disclosure.

10.2.3.1 *Connection Confidentiality security service*

The MHS does not provide a Connection Confidentiality security service. However, data for the invocation of such a security service in underlying layers may be provided as a result of using the Authentication Exchange security element to provide the Peer Entity Authentication security service. The security service may be required on any of links 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, or 4-5 in Figure 6/X.402.

10.2.3.2 *Content Confidentiality security service*

The Content Confidentiality security service provides assurance that the content of a message is only known to the sender and recipient of a message.

It may be provided using a combination of the Content Confidentiality and the Message Argument Confidentiality security elements. The Message Argument Confidentiality security element can be used to transfer a secret key which is used with the Content Confidentiality security element to encipher the message content. Using these security elements the service is provided from MTS-user 1 to MTS-user 5 in Figure 6/X.402, with the message content being unintelligible to MTAs.
10.2.3.3 *Message Flow Confidentiality security service*

This security service provides for the protection of information which might be derived from observation of message flow. Only a limited form of this security service is provided by the MHS.

The Double Enveloping Technique enables a complete message to become the content of another message. This could be used to hide addressing information from certain parts of the MTS. Used in conjunction with traffic padding (which is beyond the current scope of this Recommendation) this could be used to provide message flow confidentiality. Other elements of this service, such as routing control or pseudonyms, are also beyond the scope of this Recommendation.

10.2.4 *Data Integrity security services*

These security services are provided to counter active threats to the MHS.

10.2.4.1 *Connection Integrity security service*

The MHS does not provide a Connection Integrity security service. However, data for the invocation of such a security service in underlying layers may be provided by using the Authentication Exchange security element to provide the Peer Entity Authentication security service. The security service may be required on any of links 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, or 4-5 in Figure 6/X.402.

10.2.4.2 *Content Integrity security service*

This security service provides for the integrity of the contents of a single message. This takes the form of enabling the determination of whether the message content has been modified. This security service does not enable the detection of message replay, which is provided by the Message Sequence Integrity security service.

This security service can be provided in two different ways using two different combinations of security elements.

The Content Integrity security element together with the Message Argument Integrity security element and, in some cases, the Message Argument Confidentiality security element can be used to provide the security service to a message recipient, i.e. for communication from MTS-user 1 to MTS-user 5 in Figure 6/X.402. The Content Integrity security element is used to compute a Content Integrity Check as a function of the entire message content. Depending on the method used to compute the Content Integrity Check, a secret key may be required, which may be confidentially sent to the message recipient using the Message Argument Confidentiality security element. The Content Integrity Check is protected against change using the Message Argument Integrity security element. The integrity of any confidential message arguments is provided using the Message Argument Confidentiality security element.

The Message Origin Authentication security element can also be used to provide this security service.

10.2.4.3 *Message Sequence Integrity security service*

This security service protects the originator and recipient of a sequence of messages against re-ordering of the sequence. In doing so it protects against replay of messages.

This security service may be provided using a combination of the Message Sequence Integrity and the Message Argument Integrity security elements. The former provides a sequence number to each message, which may be protected against change by use of the latter. Simultaneous confidentiality and integrity of the Message Sequence Number may be provided by use of the Message Argument Confidentiality security element.

These security elements provide the service for communication from MTS-user 1 to MTS-user 5 in Figure 6/X.402, and not to the intermediate MTAs.

10.2.5 *Non-Repudiation security services*

These security services provide irrevocable proof to a third party after the message has been submitted, sent, or delivered, that the submission, sending, or receipt did occur as claimed. Note that for this to function correctly, the security policy must explicitly cover the management of asymmetric keys for the purpose of non-repudiation services if asymmetric algorithms are being used.
10.2.5.1 **Non-Repudiation of Origin security service**

This security service provides the recipient(s) of a message with irrevocable proof of the origin of the message, its content, and its associated Message Security Label.

This security service can be provided in two different ways using two different combinations of security elements. Note that its provision is very similar to the provision of the (weaker) Content Integrity security service.

The Content Integrity security element together with the Message Argument Integrity security element and, in some cases, the Message Argument Confidentiality security element can be used to provide the service to a message recipient, i.e. for communication from MTS-user 1 to MTS-user 5 in Figure 6/X.402. The Content Integrity security element is used to compute a Content Integrity Check as a function of the entire message content. Depending on the method used to compute the Content Integrity Check, a secret key may be required, which may be confidentially sent to the message recipient using the Message Argument Confidentiality security element. The Content Integrity Check and, if required, the Message Security Label are protected against change and/or repudiation using the Message Argument Integrity security element. Any confidential message arguments are protected against change and/or repudiation using the Message Argument Confidentiality security element.

If the Content Confidentiality security service is not required, the Message Origin Authentication security element may also be used as a basis for this security service. In this case the security service may be provided to all elements of the MHS, i.e. for all of 1-5 in Figure 6/X.402.

10.2.5.2 **Non-Repudiation of Submission security service**

This security service provides the originator of the message with irrevocable proof that the message was submitted to the MTS for delivery to the originally specified recipient(s).

This security service is provided using the Proof of Submission security element in much the same way as that security element is used to support the (weaker) Proof of Submission security service.

10.2.5.3 **Non-Repudiation of Delivery security service**

This security service provides the originator of the message with irrevocable proof that the message was delivered to its originally specified recipient(s).

This security service is provided using the Proof of Delivery security element in much the same way as that security element is used to support the (weaker) Proof of Delivery security service.

10.2.6 **Message Security Labelling security service**

This security service allows Security Labels to be associated with all entities in the MHS, i.e. MTAs and MTS-users. In conjunction with the Security Context security service it enables the implementation of security policies defining which parts of the MHS may handle messages with specified associated Security Labels.

This security service is provided by the Message Security Label security element. The integrity and confidentiality of the label are provided by the Message Argument Integrity and the Message Argument Confidentiality security elements.

10.2.7 **Security management services**

A number of security management services are needed by the MHS. The only management services provided within CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4 are concerned with changing credentials and registering MTS-user security labels.

10.2.7.1 **Change Credentials security service**

This security service enables one entity in the MHS to change the credentials concerning it held by another entity in the MHS. It may be provided using the Change Credentials security element.
10.2.7.2  **Register security service**

This security service enables the establishment at an MTA of the Security Labels which are permissible for one particular MTS-user. It may be provided using the Register security element.

10.2.7.3  **MS-Register security service**

This security service enables the establishment of the security label which are permissible for the MS-user.

10.3  **Security elements**

The following clauses describe the security elements available in the protocols described within CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4 to support the security services in the MHS. These security elements relate directly to arguments in various services described in CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4. The objective of this clause is to separate out each element of the CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4 service definitions that relate to security, and to define the function of each of these identified security elements.

10.3.1  **Authentication security elements**

These security elements are defined in order to support authentication and integrity security services.

10.3.1.1  **Authentication Exchange security element**

The Authentication Exchange security element is designed to authenticate, possibly mutually, the identity of an MTS-user to an MTA, an MTA to an MTA, an MTA to an MTS-user, an MS to a UA, or a UA to an MS. It is based on the exchange or use of secret data, either passwords, asymmetrically encrypted tokens, or symmetrically encrypted tokens. The result of the exchange is corroboration of the identity of the other party, and, optionally, the transfer of confidential data which may be used in providing the Connection Confidentiality and/or the Connection Integrity security service in underlying layers. Such an authentication is only valid for the instant that it is made and the continuing validity of the authenticated identity depends on whether the exchange of confidential data, or some other mechanism, is used to establish a secure communication path. The establishment and use of a secure communication path is outside the scope of this Recommendation.

This security element uses the Initiator Credentials argument and the Responder Credentials result of the MTS-bind, MS-bind, and MTA-bind services. The transferred credentials are either passwords or tokens.

10.3.1.2  **Data Origin Authentication security elements**

These security elements are specifically designed to support data origin authentication services, although they may also be used to support certain data integrity services.

10.3.1.2.1  **Message Origin Authentication security element**

The Message Origin Authentication security element enables anyone who receives or transfers message to authenticate the identity of the MTS-user that originated the message. This may mean the provision of the Message Origin Authentication or the Non-repudiation of Origin security service.

The security element involves transmitting, as part of the message, a Message Origin Authentication Check, computed as a function of the message content, the message Content Identifier, and the Message Security Label. If the Content Confidentiality security service is also required, the Message Origin Authentication Check is computed as a function of the enciphered rather than the unenciphered message content. By operating on the message content as conveyed in the overall message (i.e. after the optional Content Confidentiality security element), any MHS entity can check the overall message integrity without the need to see the plaintext message content. However, if the Content Confidentiality security service is used, the Message Origin Authentication security element cannot be used to provide the Non-repudiation of Origin security service.

The security element uses the Message Origin Authentication Check, which is one of the arguments of the Message Submission, Message Transfer, and Message Delivery services.
10.3.1.2.2  *Probe Origin Authentication security element*

Similar to the Message Origin Authentication security element, the Probe Origin Authentication security element enables any MTA to authenticate the identity of the MTS-user which originated a probe.

This security element uses the Probe Origin Authentication Check, which is one of the arguments of the Probe Submission service.

10.3.1.2.3  *Report Origin Authentication security element*

Similar to the Message Origin Authentication security element, the Report Origin Authentication security element enables any MTA or MTS-user who receives a report to authenticate the identity of the MTA which originated the report.

This security element uses the Report Origin Authentication Check, which is one of the arguments of the Report Delivery service.

10.3.1.3  *Proof of Submission security element*

This security element provides the originator of a message with the means to establish that a message was accepted by the MHS for transmission.

The security element is made up of two arguments: a request for Proof of Submission, sent with a message at submission time, and the Proof of Submission, returned to the MTS-user as part of the Message Submission results. The Proof of Submission is generated by the MTS, and is computed as a function of all the arguments of the submitted message, the Message Submission Identifier, and the Message Submission Time.

The Proof of Submission argument can be used to support the Proof of Submission security service. Depending on the security policy in force, it may also be able to support the (stronger) Non-repudiation of Submission security service.

The Proof of Submission Request is an argument of the Message Submission service. The Proof of Submission is one of the results of the Message Submission service.

10.3.1.4  *Proof of Delivery security element*

This security element provides the originator of a message with the means to establish that a message was delivered to the destination by the MHS.

The security element is made up of a number of arguments. The message originator includes a Proof of Delivery Request with the submitted message, and this request is delivered to each recipient with the message. A recipient may then compute the Proof of Delivery as a function of a number of arguments associated with the message. The proof of delivery is returned by the MTS to the message originator, as part of a report on the results of the original Message Submission.

The Proof of Delivery can be used to support the Proof of Delivery security service. Depending on the security policy in force, it may also be able to support the (stronger) Non-repudiation of Delivery security service.

The Proof of Delivery Request is an argument of the Message Submission, Message Transfer, and Message Delivery services. The Proof of Delivery is both one of the results of the Message Delivery service and one of the arguments of the Report Transfer and Report Delivery services.

*Note* – Non-receipt of a Proof of Delivery does not imply non-delivery.

10.3.2  *Secure access management security elements*

These security elements are defined in order to support the Secure Access Management security service and the security management services.

10.3.2.1  *Security Context security element*

When an MTS-user or an MTA binds to an MTA or MTS-user, the bind operation specifies the security context of the connection. This limits the scope of passage of messages by reference to the labels associated with messages. Secondly, the Security Context of the connection may be temporarily altered for submitted or delivered messages.

The Security Context itself consists of one or more Security Labels defining the sensitivity of interactions that may occur in line with the security policy in force.
Security Context is an argument of the MTS-bind and MTA-bind services.

10.3.2.2  **Register security element**

The Register security element allows the establishment at an MTA of an MTS-user’s permissible security labels.

This security element is provided by the Register service. The Register service enables an MTS-user to change arguments, held by the MTS, relating to delivery of messages to that MTS-user.

10.3.2.3  **MS-Register security element**

The MS-Register security element allows the establishment of the MS-user’s permissible security labels.

This security element is provided by the MS-Register service. The MS-Register service enables an MS-user to change arguments held by the MS relating to the retrieval of messages to that MS-user.

10.3.3  **Data confidentiality security elements**

These security elements, based on the use of encryption, are all concerned with the provision of confidentiality of data passed from one MHS entity to another.

10.3.3.1  **Content Confidentiality security element**

The Content Confidentiality security element provides assurance that the content of the message is protected from eavesdropping during transmission by use of an encryption security element. The security element operates such that only the recipient and sender of the message know the plaintext message content.

The specification of the encryption algorithm, the key used, and any other initializing data are conveyed using the Message Argument Confidentiality and the Message Argument Integrity security elements. The algorithm and key are then used to encrypt or decrypt the message contents.

The Content Confidentiality security element uses the Content Confidentiality Algorithm Identifier, which is an argument of the Message Submission, Message Transfer, and Message Delivery services.

10.3.3.2  **Message Argument Confidentiality security element**

The Message Argument Confidentiality security element provides for the confidentiality, integrity, and, if required, the irrevocability of recipient data associated with a message. Specifically, this data will comprise any cryptographic keys and related data that is necessary for the confidentiality and integrity security elements to function properly, if these optional security elements are invoked.

The security element operates by means of the Message Token. The data to be protected by the Message Argument Confidentiality security element constitutes the Encrypted Data within the Message Token. The Encrypted Data within the Message Token is unintelligible to all MTAs.

The Message Token is an argument of the Message Submission, Message Transfer, and Message Delivery services.

10.3.4  **Data Integrity security elements**

These security elements are provided to support the provision of data integrity, data authentication, and non-repudiation services.

10.3.4.1  **Content Integrity security element**

The Content Integrity security element provides protection for the content of a message against modification during transmission.

This security element operates by use of one or more cryptographic algorithms. The specification of the algorithm(s), the key(s) used, and any other initializing data are conveyed using the Message Argument Confidentiality and the Message Argument Integrity security elements. The result of the application of the algorithms and key is the
Content Integrity Check, which is sent in the message envelope. The security element is only available to the recipient(s) of the message as it operates on the plaintext message contents.

If the Content Integrity Check is protected using the Message Argument Integrity security element then, depending on the prevailing security policy, it may be used to help provide the Non-repudiation of Origin security service.

The Content Integrity Check is an argument of the Message Submission, Message Transfer, and Message Delivery services.

10.3.4.2 Message Argument Integrity security element

The Message Argument Integrity security element provides for the integrity, and, if required, the irrevocability of certain arguments associated with a message. Specifically, these arguments may comprise any selection of the Content Confidentiality Algorithm Identifier, the Content Integrity Check, the Message Security Label, the Proof of Delivery Request, and the Message Sequence Number.

The security element operates by means of the Message Token. The data to be protected by the Message Argument Integrity security element constitutes the signed-data within the Message Token.

The Message Token is an argument of the Message Submission, Message Transfer, and Message Delivery services.

10.3.4.3 Message Sequence Integrity security element

The Message Sequence Integrity security element provides protection for the sender and recipient of a message against receipt of messages in the wrong order, or duplicated messages.

A Message Sequence Number is associated with an individual message. This number identifies the position of a message in a sequence from one originator to one recipient. Therefore each originator-recipient pair requiring to use this security element will have to maintain a distinct sequence of message numbers. This security element does not provide for initialization or synchronization of Message Sequence Numbers.

10.3.5 Non-repudiation security elements

There are no specific Non-repudiation security elements defined in CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4. The non-repudiation services may be provided using a combination of other security elements.

10.3.6 Security Label security elements

These security elements exist to support security labelling in the MHS.

10.3.6.1 Message Security Label security element

Messages may be labelled with data as specified in the prevailing security policy. The Message Security Label is available for use by intermediate MTAs as part of the overall security policy of the system.

A Message Security Label may be sent as a message argument, and may be protected by the Message Argument Integrity or the Message Origin Authentication security element, in the same manner as other message arguments.

Alternatively, if both confidentiality and integrity are required, the Message Security Label may be protected using the Message Argument Confidentiality security element. In this case the Message Security Label so protected is an originator-recipient argument, and may differ from the Message Security Label in the message envelope.

10.3.7 Security management security elements

10.3.7.1 Change Credentials security element

The Change Credentials security element allows the credentials of an MTS-user or an MTA to be updated.

The security element is provided by the MTS Change Credentials service.
10.3.8 Double Enveloping Technique

Additional protection may be provided to a complete message, including the envelope parameters, by the ability to specify that the content of a message is itself a complete message, i.e. a Double Enveloping Technique is available.

This technique is available though the use of the Content Type argument which makes it possible to specify that the content of a message is an Inner Envelope. This Content Type means that the content is itself a message (envelope and content). When delivered to the recipient named on the outer envelope, the outer envelope is removed and the content is deciphered if needed, resulting in an Inner Envelope and its content. The information contained in the Inner Envelope is used to transfer the content of the Inner Envelope to the recipients named on the Inner Envelope.

The Content Type is an argument of the Message Submission, Message Transfer, and Message Delivery services.

10.3.9 Encoding for Encryption and Hashing

Each MTS parameter being passed to encryption or hashing algorithms shall be encoded using ASN.1 encoding rules specified for the purpose of that encryption or hashing.

Note 1 – It cannot be assumed that the encoding of the delivery-envelope or delivered-content will use the encoding rules specified in the algorithm identifier.

Note 2 – In the case of the content, it is only the encoding of the content octets into the Octet String to which the encoding rules specified in the algorithm identifier should be applied, not the encoding of the content protocol (which remains unaltered).

SECTION 3 – CONFIGURATIONS

11 Overview

This section specifies how one can configure the MHS to satisfy any of a variety of functional, physical, and organizational requirements.

This section covers the following topics:

a) Functional configurations;
b) Physical configurations;
c) Organizational configurations;
d) The Global MHS.

12 Functional configurations

This clause specifies the possible functional configurations of the MHS. The variety of such configurations results from the presence or absence of the Directory, and from whether a direct user employs an MS.

12.1 Regarding the Directory

With respect to the Directory, the MHS can be configured for a particular user, or a collection of users (see 14.1), in either of two ways: with or without the Directory. A user without access to the Directory may lack the capabilities described in section five.

Note – A partially, rather than fully interconnected Directory may exist for an interim period during which the (global) Directory made possible by CCITT Recommendations | International Standards for Directories is under construction.
12.2 Regarding the Message Store

With respect to the MS, the MHS can be configured for a particular direct user in either of two ways: with or without an MS. A user without access to an MS lacks the capabilities of Message Storage. A user in such circumstances depends upon his UA for the storage of information objects, a capability that is a local matter.

The two functional configurations identified above are depicted in Figure 7/X.402 which also illustrates one possible configuration of the MTS, and its linkage to another communication system via an AU. In Figure 7/X.402, user 2 is equipped with an MS while user 1 is not.

Note – While the users depicted in the figure are people, the figure applies with equal force and validity to users of other kinds.

FIGURE 7/X.402
Functional configurations regarding the MS

13 Physical configurations

This clause specifies the possible physical configurations of the MHS, i.e. how the MHS can be realized as a set of interconnected computer systems. Because the number of configurations is unbounded, the clause describes the kinds of messaging systems from which the MHS is assembled, and identifies a few important representative configurations.

13.1 Messaging systems

The building blocks used in the physical construction of the MHS are called messaging systems. A messaging system is a computer system (possibly but not necessarily an open system) that contains, or realizes, one or more functional objects.

Messaging systems are of the types depicted in Figure 8/X.402.

The types of messaging system, depicted in the figure, are listed in the first column of Table 8/X.402. For each type listed, the second column indicates the kinds of functional object – UAs, MSs, MTAs, and AUs – that may be present in such a messaging system, whether their presence is mandatory or optional, and whether just one or possibly several of them may be present in the messaging system.
Table 8/X.402 is divided into two sections. Messaging systems of the types in the first section are dedicated to single users, those of the types in the second can (but need not) serve multiple users.

The messaging system types, summarized in Table 8/X.402, are individually defined and described in the subclauses below.

Note – The following major principles governed the admission of messaging system types:

a) An AU and the MTA with which it interacts are typically co-located because no protocol to govern their interaction is standardized.

b) An MTA is typically co-located with multiple UAs or MSs because, of the standardized protocols, only that for transfer simultaneously conveys a message to multiple recipients. The serial delivery of a message to multiple recipients served by a messaging system, which the delivery protocol would require, would be inefficient.

c) No purpose is served by co-locating several MTAs in a messaging system because a single MTA serves multiple users, and the purpose of an MTA is to convey objects between, not within such systems. (This is not intended to exclude the possibility of several MTA-related processes co-existing within a single computer system.)

d) The co-location of an AU with an MTA does not affect that system’s behaviour with respect to the rest of the MHS. A single messaging system type, therefore, encompasses the AU’s presence and absence.

13.1.1 Access systems

An access system (A/SYS) contains one UA and neither an MS, an MTA, nor an AU.

An A/SYS is dedicated to a single user.
13.1.2 Storage systems

A storage system (S/SYS) contains one MS and neither a UA, an MTA, nor an AU.

An S/SYS is dedicated to a single user.

13.1.3 Access and storage systems

An access and storage system (AS/SYS) contains one UA, one MS, and neither an MTA nor an AU.

An AS/SYS is dedicated to a single user.

13.1.4 Transfer systems

A transfer system (T/SYS) contains one MTA; optionally, one or more AUs; and neither a UA nor an MS.

A T/SYS can serve multiple users.

13.1.5 Access and transfer systems

An access and transfer system (AT/SYS) contains one or more UAs; one MTA; optionally, one or more AUs; and no MS.

An AT/SYS can serve multiple users.

13.1.6 Storage and transfer systems

A storage and transfer system (ST/SYS) contains one or more MSs; one MTA; optionally, one or more AUs; and no UA.

An ST/SYS can serve multiple users.

13.1.7 Access, storage, and transfer systems

An access, storage, and transfer system (AST/SYS) contains one or more UAs; one or more MSs; one MTA; and optionally, one or more AUs.
An AST/SYS can serve multiple users.

13.2 Representative configurations

Messaging systems can be combined in various ways to form the MHS. The possible physical configurations are unbounded in number and thus cannot be enumerated. Several important representative configurations, however, are described below and in Figure 9/X.402.

Note 1 – While the users depicted in the figure are people, the figure applies with equal force and validity to users of other kinds.

Note 2 – Besides the physical configurations that result from the “pure” approaches below, many “hybrid” configurations can be constructed.

FIGURE 9/X.402
Representative physical configurations

13.2.1 Fully centralized

The MHS may be fully centralized [panel a] of Figure 9/X.402]. This design is realized by a single AST/SYS which contains functional objects of all kinds and which can serve multiple users.

13.2.2 Centralized Message Transfer and Storage

The MHS may provide both Message Transfer and Message Storage centrally but distribute the user access [panel b] of Figure 9/X.402]. This design is realized by a single ST/SYS and, for each user, an A/SYS.

13.2.3 Centralized Message Transfer

The MHS may provide Message Transfer centrally but distribute the Message Storage and user access [panel c] of Figure 9/X.402]. This design is realized by a single T/SYS and, for each user, either an AS/SYS alone or an S/SYS and an associated A/SYS.
13.2.4 Fully distributed

The MHS may distribute Message Transfer [panel \(d\)] of Figure 9/X.402] This design involves multiple ST-SYSs or T-SYSs.

14 Organizational configurations

This clause specifies the possible organizational configurations of the MHS, i.e. how the MHS can be realized as interconnected but independently managed sets of messaging systems (which are themselves interconnected). Because the number of configurations is unbounded, the clause describes the kinds of management domains from which the MHS is assembled, and identifies a few important representative configurations.

14.1 Management domains

The primary building blocks used in the organizational construction of the MHS are called management domains. A management domain (MD) (or domain) is a set of messaging systems – at least one of which contains, or realizes, an MTA – that is managed by a single organization.

The above does not preclude an organization from managing a set of messaging systems (e.g. a single A/SYS) that does not qualify as an MD for lack of an MTA. Such a collection of messaging systems, a secondary building block used in the MHS’ construction, “attaches” to an MD.

MDs are of several types which are individually defined and described in the clauses below.

14.1.1 Administration management domains

An administration management domain (ADMD) comprises messaging systems managed by an Administration. The major technical distinction between an ADMD and a PRMD is that the former is positioned above the latter in the MHS’ hierarchical addressing (see clause 18) and routing (see clause 19) regimes.

Note – An ADMD provides Message Handling to the public.

14.1.2 Private management domains

A private management domain (PRMD) comprises messaging systems managed by an organization other than an Administration. The major technical distinction between a PRMD and an ADMD is that the former is positioned below the latter in the MHS’ hierarchical addressing (see clause 18) and routing (see clause 19) regimes.

Note – PRMD provides Message Handling, e.g. to the employees of a company, or to those employees at a particular company site.

14.2 Representative configurations

MDs can be combined in various ways to form the MHS. The possible organizational configurations are unbounded in number and thus cannot be enumerated. Several important representative configurations, however, are described below and in Figure 10/X.402.

14.2.1 Fully centralized

The entire MHS may be managed by one organization [panel \(a\)] of Figure 10/X.402]. This design is realized by a single MD.
14.2.2  Directly connected

The MHS may be managed by several organizations, the messaging systems of each connected to the messaging systems of all of the others [panel b) of Figure 10/X.402]. This design is realized by multiple MDs interconnected pair-wise.

14.2.3  Indirectly connected

The MHS may be managed by several organizations, the messaging systems of one serving as intermediary between the messaging systems of the others [panel c) of Figure 10/X.402]. This design is realized by multiple MDs one of which is interconnected to all of the others.

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**FIGURE 10/X.402**

Representative organizational configurations

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15  The Global MHS

A major purpose of this Recommendation and others in the set is to enable the construction of the **Global MHS**, an MHS providing both intra- and inter-organizational, and both intra- and international Message Handling world-wide.

The Global MHS almost certainly encompasses the full variety of functional configurations specified in clause 12.

The physical configuration of the Global MHS is a hybrid of the pure configurations specified in clause 13, extremely complex and highly distributed physically.

The organizational configuration of the Global MHS is a hybrid of the pure configurations specified in clause 14, extremely complex and highly distributed organizationally.

Figure 11/X.402 gives an example of possible interconnections. It does not attempt to identify all possible configurations. As depicted, ADMDs play a central role in the Global MHS. By interconnecting to one another internationally, they provide an international Message Transfer backbone. Depending upon national regulations, by interconnecting to one another domestically, they may also provide domestic backbones joined to the international backbone.
Note – The availability of the interconnections represented by the dotted lines between PRMDs may be impacted by regulation.

FIGURE 11/X.402
The global MHS
SECTION 4 – NAMING, ADDRESSING AND ROUTING

16 Overview

This section describes the naming and addressing of users and DLs and the routing of information objects to them.

This section covers the following topics:

a) naming;

b) addressing;

c) routing.

17 Naming

This clause specifies how users and DLs are named for the purposes of Message Handling in general and Message Transfer in particular. It defines O/R names and describes the role that Directory names play in them.

When it directly submits a message or probe, a UA or MS identifies its potential recipients to the MTS. When the MTS delivers a message, it identifies the originator to each recipient’s UA or MS. O/R names are the data structures by means of which such identification is achieved.

17.1 Directory names

A Directory name is one component of an O/R name. A Directory name identifies an object to the Directory. By presenting such a name to the Directory, the MHS can access a user’s or DL’s Directory entry. From that entry the MTS can obtain, e.g. the user’s or DL’s O/R address.

Not every user or DL is registered in the Directory and, therefore, not every user or DL possesses a Directory name.

Note 1 – Many users and DLs will lack Directory names until the Directory is widely available as an adjunct to the MHS. Many indirect users (e.g. postal patrons) will lack such names until the Directory is widely available as an adjunct to other communication systems.

Note 2 – Users and DLs may be assigned Directory names even before a fully interconnected, distributed Directory has been put in place by pre-establishing the naming authorities upon which the Directory will eventually depend.

Note 3 – The typical Directory name is more user-friendly and more stable than the typical O/R address because the latter is necessarily couched in terms of the organizational or physical structure of the MHS while the former need not be. Therefore, it is intended that over time, Directory names become the primary means by which users and DLs are identified outside the MTS (i.e. by other users), and that the use of O/R addresses be largely confined to the MTS (i.e. to use by MTAs).

17.2 O/R names

Every user or DL has one or more O/R names. An O/R name is an identifier by means of which a user can be designated as the originator, or a user or DL designated as a potential recipient of a message or probe. An O/R name distinguishes one user or DL from another and may also identify its point of access to the MHS.

An O/R name comprises a Directory name, an O/R address, or both. If present, the Directory name (if valid) unambiguously identifies the user or DL (but is not necessarily the only name that would do so). If present, the O/R address does the same and more (again see clause 18.5).
At direct submission, the UA or MS of the originator of a message or probe may include either or both components in each O/R name it supplies. If the O/R address is omitted, the MTS obtains it from the Directory using the Directory name. If the Directory name is omitted, the MTS does without it. If both are included, the MTS relies firstly upon the O/R address. Should it determine that the O/R address is invalid (e.g. obsolete), it proceeds as if the O/R address had been omitted, relying upon the Directory name.

At delivery the MTS includes an O/R address and possibly a Directory name in each O/R name it supplies to a message’s recipient or to the originator of a report’s subject message or probe. The Directory name is included if the originator supplied it or if it was specified as the member of an expanded DL.

Note – Redirection or DL expansion may cause the MTS to convey to a UA or MS at delivery, O/R names the UA or MS did not supply at direct submission.

For information relating to organizations which operate in more than one country, see Annex G. See also CCITT Rec. X.400 | ISO/IEC 10021-1, clause 7.3.2.

18 Addressing

This clause specifies how users and DLs are addressed. It defines O/R addresses, describes the structure of the attribute lists from which they are constructed, discusses the character sets from which individual attributes are composed, gives rules for determining that two attribute lists are equivalent and for the inclusion of conditional attributes in such lists, and defines the standard attributes that may appear in them.

To convey a message, probe, or report to a user, or to expand a DL specified as a potential recipient of a message or probe, the MTS must locate the user or DL relative to its own physical and organizational structures. O/R addresses are the data structures by means of which all such location is accomplished.

18.1 Attribute lists

The O/R addresses of both users and DLs are attribute lists. An attribute list is an ordered set of attributes.

An attribute is an information item that describes a user or DL and that may also locate it in relation to the physical or organizational structure of the MHS (or the network underlying it).

An attribute has the following parts:

a) attribute type (or type): An identifier that denotes a class of information (e.g. personal names).

b) attribute value (or value): An instance of the class of information the attribute type denotes (e.g. a particular personal name).

Attributes are of the following two kinds:

a) standard attribute: An attribute whose type is bound to a class of information by this Recommendation.

The value of every standard attribute except terminal-type is either a string or a collection of strings.

b) domain-defined attribute: An attribute whose type is bound to a class of information by an MD. Thus the type and value of a domain-defined-attribute are defined by an MD. The MD is identified by a private-domain-name, or an administration-domain-name, or both.

Both the type and value of every domain-defined attribute are strings or collections of strings.
Note – The widespread use of standard attributes produces more uniform and thus more user-friendly O/R addresses. However, it is anticipated that not all MDs will be able to employ such attributes immediately. The purpose of domain-defined attributes is to permit an MD to retain its existing, native addressing conventions for a time. It is intended, however, that all MDs migrate toward the use of standard attributes, and that domain-defined attributes be used only for an interim period.

18.2 Character sets

Standard attribute values and domain-defined attribute types and values are constructed from Numeric, Printable, and Teletex Strings as follows:

a) The type or value of a particular domain-defined attribute may be a Printable String, a Teletex String, or both. The same choice shall be made for both the type and value.

b) The kinds of strings from which standard attribute values may be constructed and the manner of construction (e.g. as one string or several) vary from one attribute to another (see clause 18.3).

The value of an attribute comprises strings of one of the following sets of varieties depending upon its type: Numeric only, Printable only, Numeric and Printable, and Printable and Teletex. With respect to this, the following rules govern each instance of communication:

a) For administration-domain-name, private-domain-name, and postal-code the same numeric value may be represented as either a Numeric or Printable String.

b) Wherever both Printable and Teletex Strings are permitted, strings of either or both varieties may be supplied. If both Printable and Teletex Strings are supplied, the two should unambiguously identify the same user.

The length of each string and of each sequence of strings in an attribute shall be limited as indicated in the more detailed (i.e. ASN.1) specification of attributes in Recommendation X.411.

Note 1 – Teletex Strings are permitted in attribute values to allow inclusion, e.g. of the accented characters commonly used in many countries.

Note 2 – The downgrading rules in Annex B of CCITT Rec. X.419 ISO/IEC 10021-6 state that an O/R address cannot be downgraded if only the Teletex String has been supplied and it contains characters that lie outside the Printable String repertoire.

18.3 Standard attributes

The standard attribute types are listed in the first column of Table 9/X.402. For each listed type, the second column indicates the character sets – numeric, printable, and teletex – from which attribute values may be drawn.

Table 9/X.402 has three sections. Attribute types in the first are of a general nature, those in the second have to do with routing to a PDS, and those in the third have to do with addressing within a PDS.

The standard attribute types, summarized in the Table 9/X.402, are individually defined and described in the clauses below.

18.3.1 Administration-domain-name

An administration-domain-name is a standard attribute that identifies an ADMD relative to the country denoted by a country-name.

The value of an administration-domain-name is a Numeric or Printable String chosen from a set of such strings that is administered for this purpose by the country alluded to above.
**TABLE 9/X.402**

**Standard Attributes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard attribute type</th>
<th>Character sets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administration-domain-name</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country-name</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>network-address</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numeric-user-identifier</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational-unit-names</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private-domain-name</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terminal-identifier</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terminal-type</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postal routing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pds-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-country-name</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>postal-code</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postal addressing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extension-postal-O/R-address-components</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extension-physical-delivery-address-components</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local-postal-attributes</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-office-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-office-number</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-organization-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-personal-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-office-box-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poste-restante-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>street-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unformatted-postal-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unique-postal-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NUM**  Numeric  
**PRT**  Printable  
**TTX**  Teletex  

×  Permitted  

a) Under prescribed circumstances a Sequence of Octet Strings.
Note – The attribute value comprising a single space (" ") shall be reserved for the following purpose. If permitted by the country denoted by the country-name attribute, a single space shall designate any (i.e. all) ADMDs within the country. This affects both the identification of users within the country and the routing of messages, probes, and reports to and among the ADMDs of that country. Regarding the former, it requires that the O/R addresses of users within the country be chosen so as to ensure their unambiguousness, even in the absence of the actual names of the users’ ADMDs. Regarding the latter, it permits both PRMDs within, and ADMDs outside of the country, to route messages, probes, and reports to any of the ADMDs within the country, and requires that the ADMDs within the country interconnect themselves in such a way that the messages, probes, and reports are conveyed to their destinations.

18.3.2 Common-name

A common-name is a standard attribute that identifies a user or DL relative to the entity denoted by another attribute (e.g. an organization-name).

The value of a common-name is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both. Whether Printable or Teletex, the string is chosen from a set of such strings that is administered for this purpose (and perhaps others) by the entity alluded to above.

Note – Among many other possibilities, a common-name might identify an organizational role (e.g. “Director of Marketing”).

18.3.3 Country-name

A country-name is a standard attribute that identifies a country.

The value of a country-name is a Printable String that gives the character pair assigned to the country by ISO 3166, or a Numeric String that gives one of the numbers assigned to the country by Recommendation X.121.

18.3.4 Extension-postal-O/R-address-components

An extension-postal-O/R-address-components is a standard attribute that provides, in a postal address, additional information necessary to identify the addressee (e.g. an organizational unit).

The value of an extension-postal-O/R-address-components is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.5 Extension-physical-delivery-address-components

An extension-physical-delivery-address-components is a standard attribute that specifies, in a postal address, additional information necessary to identify the exact point of delivery (e.g. room and floor numbers in a large building).

The value of an extension-physical-delivery-address-components is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.6 Local-postal-attributes

A local-postal-attributes is a standard attribute that identifies the locus of distribution, other than that denoted by a physical-delivery-office-name attribute (e.g. a geographical area), of a user’s physical messages.

The value of a local-postal-attributes is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.7 Network-address

A network-address is a standard attribute that gives the network address of a terminal.
The value of a network-address is any one of the following:

a) A Numeric String governed by Recommendation X.121.

b) Two Numeric Strings governed either by Recommendation E.163 or by Recommendation E.164.

c) A PSAP address.

Note – Among the strings admitted by Recommendation X.121 are Telex and Telephone numbers preceded by an escape digit.

18.3.8 Numeric-user-identifier

A numeric-user-identifier is a standard attribute that numerically identifies a user relative to the MD denoted by a private-domain-name, or an administration-domain-name, or both.

The value of a numeric-user-identifier is a Numeric String chosen from a set of such strings that is administered for this purpose by the MD alluded to above.

18.3.9 Organization-name

An organization-name is a standard attribute that identifies an organization. The value of an organization-name is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

When used in a mnemonic O/R address (see clause 18.5.1), as a national matter organizations may be identified either relative to the country denoted by a country-name (so that organization names are unique within the country), or relative to the MD identified by a private-domain-name, or an administration-domain-name, or both. Whether Printable or Teletex, the string is chosen from a set of such strings that is administered for this purpose (and perhaps others) by the country or MD alluded to above.

Note – In countries choosing country-wide unique organization-names, a national registration authority for organization-names is required.

When used in a terminal O/R address (see clause 18.5.4), the organization-name is a free-form value, with no requirement for registration.

18.3.10 Organizational-unit-names

An organizational-unit-names is a standard attribute that identifies one or more units (e.g. divisions or departments) of the organization denoted by an organization-name, each unit but the first being a sub-unit of the units whose names precede it in the attribute.

The value of an organizational-unit-names is an ordered sequence of Printable Strings, an ordered sequence of Teletex Strings, or both. Whether Printable or Teletex, each string is chosen from a set of such strings that is administered for this purpose (and perhaps others) by the organization (or encompassing unit) alluded to above.

18.3.11 Pds-name

A pds-name is a standard attribute that identifies a PDS relative to the MD denoted by a private-domain-name, or an administration-domain-name, or both.

The value of a pds-name is a Printable String chosen from a set of such strings that is administered for this purpose by the MD alluded to above.

18.3.12 Personal-name

A personal-name is a standard attribute that identifies a person relative to the entity denoted by another attribute (e.g. an organization-name).

The value of a personal-name comprises the following four pieces of information, the first mandatory, the others optional:

a) the person’s surname;

b) the person’s given name;
c) the initials of all of his names but his surname;
d) his generation (e.g. “Jr”).

The above information is supplied as Printable Strings, Teletex Strings, or both.

18.3.13 Physical-delivery-country-name

A physical-delivery-country-name is a standard attribute that identifies the country in which a user takes delivery of physical messages.

The value of a physical-delivery-country-name is subject to the same constraints as is the value of a country-name.

18.3.14 Physical-delivery-office-name

A physical-delivery-office-name is a standard attribute that identifies the city, village, etc. in which is situated the post office through which a user takes delivery of physical messages.

The value of a physical-delivery-office-name is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.15 Physical-delivery-office-number

A physical-delivery-office-number is a standard attribute that distinguishes among several post offices denoted by a single physical-delivery-office-name.

The value of a physical-delivery-office-number is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.16 Physical-delivery-organization-name

A physical-delivery-organization-name is a standard attribute that identifies a postal patron’s organization.

The value of a physical-delivery-organization-name is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.17 Physical-delivery-personal-name

A physical-delivery-personal-name is a standard attribute that identifies a postal patron.

The value of a physical-delivery-personal-name is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.18 Post-office-box-address

A post-office-box-address is a standard attribute that specifies the number of the post office box by means of which a user takes delivery of physical messages.

The value of a post-office-box-address is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both chosen from the set of such strings assigned for this purpose by the post office denoted by a physical-delivery-office-name attribute.

18.3.19 Postal-code

A postal-code is a standard attribute that specifies the postal code for the geographical area in which a user takes delivery of physical messages.

The value of a postal-code is a Numeric or Printable String chosen from the set of such strings that is maintained and standardized for this purpose by the postal administration of the country identified by a physical-delivery-country-name attribute.
18.3.20  Poste-restante-address

A **poste-restante-address** is a standard attribute that specifies the code that a user gives to a post office in order to collect the physical messages that await delivery to him.

The value of a poste-restante-address is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both chosen from the set of such strings assigned for this purpose by the post office denoted by a physical-delivery-office-name attribute.

18.3.21  Private-domain-name

A **private-domain-name** is a standard attribute that identifies a PRMD. As a national matter, this identification may be either relative to the country denoted by a country-name (so that PRMD names are unique within the country), or relative to the ADMD identified by an administration-domain-name.

The value of a private-domain-name is a Numeric or Printable String chosen from a set of such strings that is administered for this purpose by the country or ADMD alluded to above.

*Note* – In countries choosing country-wide unique PRMD names, a national registration authority for private-domain-names is required.

18.3.22  Street-address

A **street-address** is a standard attribute that specifies the street address [e.g. house number and street name and type (e.g. "Road") at which a user takes delivery of physical messages.

The value of a street-address is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.

18.3.23  Terminal-identifier

A **terminal-identifier** is a standard attribute that gives the terminal identifier of a terminal (e.g. a Telex answer back or a Teletex terminal identifier).

The value of a terminal-identifier is a Printable String.

18.3.24  Terminal-type

A **terminal-type** is a standard attribute that gives the type of a terminal.

The value of a terminal-type is any one of the following: **Telex**, **Teletex**, **G3 facsimile**, **G4 facsimile**, **IA5 terminal**, and **Videotex**.

18.3.25  Unformatted-postal-address

An **unformatted-postal-address** is a standard attribute that specifies a user’s postal address in free form.

The value of an unformatted-postal-address is a sequence of Printable Strings, each representing a line of text; a single Teletex String, lines being separated as prescribed for such strings; or both.

18.3.26  Unique-postal-name

A **unique-postal-name** is a standard attribute that identifies the point of delivery, other than that denoted by a street-address, post-office-box-address, or poste-restante-address, (e.g. a building or hamlet) of a user’s physical messages.

The value of a unique-postal-name is a Printable String, Teletex String, or both.
18.4 Attribute list equivalence

Several O/R addresses, and thus several attribute lists, may denote the same user or DL. This multiplicity of O/R addresses results in part (but not in full) from the following attribute list equivalence rules:

a) The relative order of standard attributes is insignificant.

b) Where the value of a standard attribute may be a Numeric String or an equivalent Printable String, the choice between them shall be considered insignificant.

Note – This rule applies even to the country-name standard attribute, where the choice between X.121 or ISO 3166 forms shall be considered insignificant. Where X.121 allocates more than one number to a country the significance of which number is used has not been standardized by this Recommendation.

c) Where the value of a standard attribute may be a Printable String, an equivalent Teletex String, or both, the choice between the three possibilities shall be considered insignificant.

d) Where the type or value of a domain-defined attribute, or the value of a standard attribute, comprises characters from the Printable String repertoire, the choice where permitted between encoding it in a Teletex String and in a Printable String shall be considered insignificant.

e) Where the value of a standard attribute may contain letters, the cases of those letter shall be considered insignificant.

f) In a domain-defined attribute type or value, or in a standard attribute value, all leading, all trailing, and all but one consecutive embedded spaces shall be considered insignificant.

g) In a Teletex String, the Non-spacing underline graphic character shall be considered insignificant, as shall all control functions except Space and those used for code extension procedures.

h) In a Teletex String, the choice between different encodings of the same character shall be considered insignificant.

Note – An MD may impose additional equivalence rules upon the attributes it assigns to its own users and DLs. It might define, e.g. rules concerning punctuation characters in attribute values, the case of letters in such values, or the relative order of domain-defined attributes.

18.5 O/R address forms

Every user or DL is assigned one or more O/R addresses. An O/R address is an attribute list that distinguishes one user from another and identifies the user’s point of access to the MHS or the DL’s expansion point.

An O/R address may take any of the forms summarized in Table 10/X.402. The first column of the table identifies the attributes available for the construction of O/R addresses. For each O/R address form, the second column indicates the attributes that may appear in such O/R addresses and their grades (see also clause 18.6).

Table 10/X.402 has four sections. Attribute types in the first are those of a general nature. Attribute types in the second and third those specific to physical delivery, but unformatted-postal-address may be used as an extension to the terminal address. The fourth section encompasses domain-defined attributes.

The forms of O/R address, summarized in Table 10/X.402, are individually defined and described in the clauses below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute type</th>
<th>O/R address forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administration-domain-name</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common-name</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country-name</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>network-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numeric-user-identifier</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization-name</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational-unit-names</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal-name</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private-domain-name</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terminal-identifier</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terminal-type</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postal routing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pds-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-country-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>postal-code</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postal addressing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extension-postal-O/R-address-components</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extension-physical-delivery-address-components</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local-postal-attributes</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-office-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-office-number</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-organization-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical-delivery-personal-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-office-box-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poste-restante-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>street-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unformatted-postal-address</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unique-postal-name</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domain-defined</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domain-defined (one or more)</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNEM</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>Unformatted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMR</td>
<td>Numeric</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERM</td>
<td>Terminal</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Formatted</td>
<td>C*</td>
<td>Conditional, but intended to be used for rendition purposes and not for MHS addressing or routing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18.5.1 **Mnemonic O/R address**

A **mnemonic O/R address** is one that provides a memorable identification for a user or DL. It identifies an MD, and a user or DL relative to it.

A mnemonic O/R address comprises the following attributes:

a) One country-name, one administration-domain-name and conditionally one private-domain-name, which together identify an MD.

b) One organization-name, or one organizational-unit-names, or one personal-name, or one common-name, or one or more domain-defined attributes, or a combination of the above, which together identify a user or DL relative to the MD in item a) above. If organizational-unit-names are present, then organization-name shall be present.

18.5.2 **Numeric O/R address**

A **numeric O/R address** is one that numerically identifies a user. It identifies an MD, and a user relative to it.

A numeric O/R address comprises the following attributes:

a) One country-name, one administration-domain-name and conditionally one private-domain-name, which together identify an MD.

b) One numeric-user-identifier which identifies the user relative to the MD in item a) above.

c) Conditionally, one or more domain-defined attributes which provide information additional to that which identifies the user.

18.5.3 **Postal O/R address**

A **postal O/R address** is one that identifies a user by means of its postal address. It identifies the PDS through which the user is to be accessed and gives the user’s postal address.

The following kinds of postal O/R address are distinguished:

a) **formatted**: Said of a postal O/R address that specifies a user’s postal address by means of several attributes. For this form of postal O/R address, this Recommendation prescribes the structure of postal addresses in some detail.

b) **unformatted**: Said of a postal O/R address that specifies a user’s postal address in a single attribute. For this form of postal O/R address, this Recommendation largely does not prescribe the structure of postal addresses.

A postal O/R address, whether formatted or unformatted, comprises the following attributes:

a) One country-name, one administration-domain-name and conditionally one private-domain-name, which together identify an MD.

b) Conditionally, one pds-name which identifies the PDS by means of which the user is to be accessed.

b) One physical-delivery-country-name and one postal-code, which together identify the geographical region in which the user takes delivery of physical messages.

A formatted postal O/R address comprises, additionally, one of each postal addressing attribute (see Table 9/X.402), except unformatted-postal-address, that the PDS requires to identify the postal patron.

An unformatted postal O/R address comprises, additionally, one unformatted-postal-address attribute.

*Note* – The total number of characters in the values of all attributes but country-name, administration-domain-name, and pds-name in a postal O/R address should be small enough to permit their rendition in 6 lines of 30 characters, the size of a typical physical envelope window. The rendition algorithm is PDAU-specific but is likely to include inserting delimiters (e.g. spaces) between some attribute values.
18.5.4 Terminal O/R address

A terminal O/R address is one that identifies a user by means of the network address and, if required, the type of his terminal. It may also identify the MD through which that terminal is accessed. In the case of a Telematic terminal, it gives the terminal’s network address and possibly its terminal identifier and terminal type. In the case of a Telex terminal, it gives its Telex number.

A terminal O/R address comprises the following attributes:

a) One network-address.
b) Conditionally, one terminal-identifier.
c) Conditionally, one terminal-type.
d) Conditionally, both one country-name and one administration-domain-name and conditionally one private-domain-name which together identify an MD.
e) Conditionally, one or more attributes chosen from organization-name, organizational-unit-names, personal-name, unformatted-postal-address and common-name, and conditionally one or more domain-defined attributes, all of which provide additional information to identify the user.

The private-domain-name and the domain-defined attributes shall be present only if the country-name and administration-domain-name attributes are present.

18.6 Conditional attributes

The presence or absence in a particular O/R address of the attributes marked conditional in Table 10/X.402 is determined as follows.

All conditional attributes except those specific to postal O/R addresses are present in an O/R address at the discretion of, and in accordance with rules established by, the MD denoted by the country-name, administration-domain-name and, if present, private-domain-name attributes.

All conditional attributes specific to postal O/R addresses are present or absent in such O/R addresses so as to satisfy the postal addressing requirements of the users they identify.

19 Routing

To convey a message, probe, or report toward a user or the expansion point of a DL, an MTA must not only locate the user or DL (i.e. obtain its O/R address) but also select a route to that location.

External routing is an incremental and only loosely standardized process. Suggested below are several principles of external routing. Internal routing is outside the scope of this Recommendation.

The following principles are illustrative, not definitive:

a) In an MHS that comprises a single MD, of course, routing is not an issue.
b) A PRMD may be connected to a single, ADMD. When this is so, routing always involves the ADMD necessarily.
c) An ADMD may be connected to multiple PRMDs. When this is so, routing may be based upon conditional O/R address attributes, including but not limited to private-domain-name.
d) An MD may be directly connected to some but not all other MDs. When the O/R address identifies a MD to which no direct connection exists, routing may be based upon bilateral agreements with the MDs to which direct connections do exist and other local rules.
e) When the MD is directly connected to the MD identified by the O/R address, the object is typically routed to that MD directly.
f) By *bilateral agreement*, one MD might route an object to another MD for the purpose, e.g. of conversion.

g) An MD may route to a malformed O/R address provided (of course) that it contains at least the attributes required to do so.

*Note* – The bilateral agreements and local rules alluded to above are beyond the scope of this Recommendation and may be based upon technical, policy, economic, or other considerations.

SECTION 5 – USE OF THE DIRECTORY

20 **Overview**

This section describes the uses to which the MHS may put the Directory if it is present. If the Directory is unavailable to the MHS, how, if at all, the MHS performs these same tasks is a local matter.

This section covers the following topics:

a) Authentication;

b) Name resolution;

c) DL expansion;

d) Capability assessment.

21 **Authentication**

A functional object may accomplish authentication using information stored in the Directory.

22 **Name resolution**

A functional object may accomplish name resolution using the Directory.

To obtain the O/R address(es) of a user or DL whose Directory name it possesses, an object presents that name to the Directory and requests from the Directory entry the following attributes:

a) *MHS O/R Addresses*;

b) *MHS Preferred Delivery Methods*.

To do this successfully, the object must first authenticate itself to the Directory and have access rights to the information requested.

23 **DL expansion**

A functional object may accomplish DL expansion using the Directory, first verifying that the necessary submit permissions exist.

To obtain the members of a DL whose Directory name it possesses, the object presents that name to the Directory and requests from the Directory entry the following attributes:

a) *MHS DL Members*;

b) *MHS DL Submit Permissions*;

c) *MHS Preferred Delivery Methods*.
To do this successfully, the MTA must first authenticate itself to the Directory and have access rights to the information requested.

24 Capability assessment

A functional object may assess the capabilities of a user or MS using the Directory.

The following Directory attributes represent user capabilities of possible significance in Message Handling:

a) **MHS Deliverable Content Length**;
b) **MHS Deliverable Content Types**;
c) **MHS Deliverable EITs**;
d) **MHS Preferred Delivery Methods**;

The following Directory attributes represent MS capabilities of possible significance in Message Handling:

a) **MHS Supported Automatic Actions**;
b) **MHS Supported Content Types**;
c) **MHS Supported Optional Attributes**.

To assess a particular capability of a user or MS whose Directory name it possesses, the object presents that name to the Directory and requests from the Directory entry the attribute associated with that capability.

To do this successfully, the MTA must first authenticate itself to the Directory and have access rights to the information requested.

SECTION 6 – OSI REALIZATION

25 Overview

This section describes how the MHS is realized by means of OSI.

This section covers the following topics:

a) Application service elements.
b) Application contexts.

26 Application service elements

This clause identifies the application service elements (ASEs that figure in the OSI realization of Message Handling.

In OSI the communication capabilities of open systems are organized into groups of related capabilities called ASEs. The present clause reviews this concept from the OSI Reference Model, draws a distinction between symmetric and asymmetric ASEs, and introduces the ASEs defined for, or supportive, of Message Handling.

*Note* – Besides the ASEs discussed, the MHS relies upon the Directory Access Service Element defined in CCITT Rec. X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-6. However, since that ASE does not figure in the ACs for Message Handling (see CCITT Rec. X.419 | ISO/IEC 10021-6), it is not discussed here.
The ASE concept is illustrated in Figure 12/X.402, which depicts two communicating open systems. Only the OSI-related portions of the open systems, called AEs, are shown. Each AE comprises a UE and one or more ASEs. A UE represents the controlling or organizing portion of an AE which defines the open system’s role (e.g. that of an MTA). An ASE represents one of the communication capability sets, or services (e.g. for message submission or transfer), that the UE requires to play its role.

![Figure 12/X.402: The ASE concept](image)

The relationship between two AEs in different open systems is called an application association. The ASEs in each open system communicate with their peer ASEs in the other open system via a presentation connection between them. That communication is what creates and sustains the relationship embodied in the application association. For several ASEs to be successfully combined in a single AE, they must be designed to coordinate their use of the application association.

An ASE plays the largely mechanical role of translating requests and responses made by its UE to and from the form dictated by the application protocol that governs the ASE’s interaction with its peer ASE in the open system to which the association connects it. The ASE realizes an abstract service, or a part thereof, for purposes of OSI communication (see CCITT Rec. X.407 | ISO/IEC 10021-3).

Note – Strictly speaking, an open system’s role is determined by the behaviour of its application processes. In the Message Handling context an application process realizes a functional object of one of the types defined in clause 7. A UE in turn is one part of an application process.

26.2 Symmetric and asymmetric ASEs

The following two kinds of ASE, illustrated in Figure 13/X.402, can be distinguished:

a) symmetric: Said of an ASE by means of which a UE both supplies and consumes a service. The ASE for message transfer, for example is symmetric because both open systems, each of which embodies an MTA, offer and may consume the service of message transfer by means of it.
b) asymmetric: Said of an ASE by means of which a UE supplies or consumes a service, but not both, depending upon how the ASE is configured. The ASE for message delivery, for example is asymmetric because only the open system embodying an MTA offers the associated service and only the other open system, which embodies a UA or MS, consumes it.

With respect to a particular asymmetric ASE, one UE supplies a service which the other consumes. The ASEs co-located with the UEs assist in the service’s supply and consumption. The resulting four roles are captured in Figure 14/X.402 and in the following terminology:

a) \(x\)-supplying UE: An application process that supplies the service represented by asymmetric ASE \(x\).

b) \(x\)-supplying ASE: An asymmetric ASE \(x\) configured for co-location with an \(x\)-supplying-UE.

c) \(x\)-consuming UE: An application process that consumes the service represented by asymmetric ASE \(x\).

d) \(x\)-consuming ASE: An asymmetric ASE \(x\) configured for co-location with an \(x\)-consuming-UE.

As indicated, the four roles described above are defined relative to a particular ASE. When an AE comprises several asymmetric ASEs, these roles are assigned independently for each ASE. Thus, as shown in Figure 15/X.402, a single UE might serve as the consumer with respect to one ASE and as the supplier with respect to another.

26.3 Message Handling ASEs

The ASEs that provide the various Message Handling services are listed in the first column of Table 11/X.402. For each ASE listed, the second column indicates whether it is symmetric or asymmetric. The third column identifies the functional objects – UAs, MSs, MTAs, and AUs – that are associated with the ASE, either as consumer or as supplier.

The Message Handling ASEs, summarized in Table 11/X.402, are individually introduced in the subclauses below. Each is defined in CCITT Rec. X.419 | ISO/IEC 10021-6.
26.3.1 *Message Transfer*

The Message Transfer Service Element (MTSE) is the means by which the transfer transmittal step is effected.

26.3.2 *Message Submission*

The Message Submission Service Element (MSSE) is the means by which the submission transmittal step is effected.
26.3.3 Message Delivery

The Message Delivery Service Element (MDSE) is the means by which the delivery transmittal step is effected.

26.3.4 Message Retrieval

The Message Retrieval Service Element (MRSE) is the means by which the retrieval transmittal step is effected.

26.3.5 Message Administration

The Message Administration Service Element (MASE) is the means by which a UA, MS, or MTA places on file with one another information that enables and controls their subsequent interaction by means of the MSSE, MDSE, MRSE, and MASE.

26.4 Supporting ASEs

The general-purpose ASEs upon which Message Handling ASEs depend are listed in the first column of Table 12/X.402. For each listed ASE, the second column indicates whether it is symmetric or asymmetric.

The supporting ASEs, summarized in Table 12/X.402, are individually introduced in the clauses below.
26.4.1 Remote Operations

The Remote Operations Service Element (ROSE) is the means by which the asymmetric Message Handling ASEs structure their request-response interactions between consuming and supplying open systems.

The ROSE is defined in CCITT Rec. X.219 | ISO/IEC 9072-1.

26.4.2 Reliable Transfer

The Reliable Transfer Service Element (RTSE) is the means by which various symmetric and asymmetric Message Handling ASEs convey information objects – especially large ones (e.g. facsimile messages) – between open systems so as to ensure their safe-storage at their destinations.

The RTSE is defined in CCITT Rec. X.218 | ISO/IEC 9066-1.

26.4.3 Association Control

The Association Control Service Element (ACSE) is the means by which all application associations between open systems are established, released, and in other respects managed.

The ACSE is defined in CCITT Rec. X.217 | ISO 8649.

27 Application contexts

In OSI, the communication capabilities (i.e. ASEs) of two open systems are marshalled for a particular purpose by means of application contexts (ACs). An AC is a detailed specification of the use of an association between two open systems, i.e. a protocol.

An AC specifies how the association is to be established (e.g. what initialization parameters are to be exchanged), what ASEs are to engage in peer-to-peer communication over the association, what constraints (if any) are to be imposed upon their individual use of the association, whether the initiator or responder is the consumer of each asymmetric ASE, and how the association is to be released (e.g. what finalization parameters are to be exchanged).

Every AC is named (by an ASN.1 Object Identifier). The initiator of an association indicates to the responder the AC that will govern the association’s use by conveying the AC’s name to it by means of the ACSE.

An AC also identifies by name (an ASN.1 Object Identifier) the abstract syntaxes of the APDUs that an association may carry as a result of its use by the AC’s ASEs. Conventionally one assigns a name to the set of APDUs associated either with each individual ASE or with the AC as a whole. The initiator of an association indicates to the responder the one or more abstract syntaxes associated with the AC by conveying their names to it via the ACSE.

The abstract syntax of an APDU is its structure as an information object (e.g. an ASN.1 Set comprising an Integer command code and an IA5 String command argument). It is distinguished from the APDU’s transfer syntax which is how the information object is represented for transmission between two open systems (e.g. one octet denoting an ASN.1 Set, followed by one octet giving the length of the Set, etc.).

The ACs by means of which the various Message Handling services are provided are specified in CCITT Rec. X.419 | ISO/IEC 10021-6. These protocols are known as P1, P3, and P7.

Note – The nature of a message’s content does not enter into the definition of Message Handling ACs because the content is encapsulated (as an Octet String) in the protocols by means of which it is conveyed.
ANNEX A
(to Recommendation X.402)

Directory object classes and attributes

(This annex is an integral part of this Recommendation)

Several Directory object classes, attributes, and attribute syntaxes are specific to Message Handling. These are defined in the present annex using the OBJECT-CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, and ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX macros of CCITT Rec. X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2, respectively.

A.1 Object classes

The object classes specific to Message Handling are those specified below.

Note – The Directory object classes described in this annex can be combined with other object classes, e.g. the ones defined in CCITT Rec. X.521 | ISO/IEC 9594-7. See also CCITT Rec. X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2, clause 9 for an explanation of how Directory object classes can be combined in one Directory entry. Annex B of CCITT Rec. X.521 | ISO/IEC 9594-7 gives some further information about Directory name forms and possible Directory Information Tree structures.

A.1.1 MHS Distribution List

An MHS Distribution List object is a DL. The attributes in its entry identify its common name, submit permissions, and O/R addresses and, to the extent that the relevant attributes are present, describe the DL, identify its organization, organizational units, and owner; cite related objects; and identify its deliverable content types, deliverable EITs, members, and preferred delivery methods.

mhs-distribution-list OBJECT-CLASS
SUBCLASS OF top
MUST CONTAIN {
    commonName,
    mhs-dl-submit-permissions,
    mhs-or-addresses
}
MAY CONTAIN {
    description,
    organizationName,
    organizationalUnitName,
    owner,
    seeAlso,
    mhs-deliverable-content-types,
    mhs-deliverable-eits,
    mhs-dl-members,
    mhs-preferred-delivery-methods
}
::= id-oc-mhs-distribution-list

A.1.2 MHS Message Store

An MHS Message Store object is an AE that realizes an MS. The attributes in its entry, to the extent that they are present, describe the MS, identify its owner, and enumerate the optional attributes, automatic actions, and content types it supports.

mhs-message-store OBJECT-CLASS
SUBCLASS OF applicationEntity
MAY CONTAIN {
    owner,
    mhs-supported-optional-attributes,
    mhs-supported-automatic-actions,
    mhs-supported-content-types
}
::= id-oc-mhs-message-store
A.1.3 MHS Message Transfer Agent

An MHS Message Transfer Agent object is an AE that implements an MTA. The attributes in its entry, to the extent that they are present, describe the MTA and identify its owner and its deliverable content length.

mhs-message-transfer-agent OBJECT-CLASS
   SUBCLASS OF applicationEntity
   MAY CONTAIN {
      owner,
      mhs-deliverable-content-length }
::= id-oc-mhs-message-transfer-agent

A.1.4 MHS User

An MHS User object is a generic MHS user. (The generic MHS user can have, for example, a business address, a residential address, or both.) The attributes in its entry identify the user’s O/R address and, to the extent that the relevant attributes are present, identify the user’s deliverable content length, content types, and EITs; its MS; and its preferred delivery methods.

mhs-user OBJECT-CLASS
   SUBCLASS OF top
   MUST CONTAIN {
      mhs-or-addresses }
   MAY CONTAIN {
      mhs-deliverable-content-length,
      mhs-deliverable-content-types,
      mhs-deliverable-eits,
      mhs-message-store-dn,
   ::= id-oc-mhs-user

Note – The MHS-user’s preferred Delivery Method information is inherited in the telecommunications Attribute Set from the Directory user-s-naming object class.

A.1.5 MHS User Agent

An MHS User Agent object is an AE that realizes a UA. The attributes in its entry, to the extent that they are present, identify the UA’s owner; its deliverable content length, content types, and EITs; and its O/R address.

mhs-user-agent OBJECT-CLASS
   SUBCLASS OF applicationEntity
   MAY CONTAIN {
      owner,
      mhs-deliverable-content-length,
      mhs-deliverable-content-types,
      mhs-deliverable-eits,
      mhs-or-addresses }
::= id-oc-mhs-user-agent

A.2 Attributes

The attributes specific to Message Handling are those specified below.

A.2.1 MHS Deliverable Content Length

The MHS Deliverable Content Length attribute identifies the maximum content length of the messages whose delivery a user will accept.

A value of this attribute is an Integer.

mhs-deliverable-content-length ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX integerSyntax
   SINGLE VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-length
A.2.2  **MHS Deliverable Content Types**

The **MHS Deliverable Content Types** attribute identifies the content types of the messages whose delivery a user will accept.

A value of this attribute is an Object Identifier.

```
mhs-deliverable-content-types ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-types
```

A.2.3  **MHS Deliverable EITs**

The **MHS Deliverable EITs** attribute identifies the EITs of the messages whose delivery a user will accept.

A value of this attribute is an Object Identifier.

```
mhs-deliverable-eits ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-deliverable-eits
```

A.2.4  **MHS DL Members**

The **MHS DL Members** attribute identifies a DL’s members.

A value of this attribute is an O/R name.

```
mhs-dl-members ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX mhs-or-name-syntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-dl-members
```

A.2.5  **MHS DL Submit Permissions**

The **MHS DL Submit Permissions** attribute identifies the users and DLs that may submit messages to a DL.

A value of this attribute is a DL submit permission.

```
mhs-dl-submit-permissions ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX mhs-dl-submit-permission-syntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-dl-submit-permissions
```

A.2.6  **MHS Message Store Directory Name**

The **MHS Message Store Directory Name** attribute identifies a user’s MS by name.

The value of this attribute is a Directory distinguished name.

```
mhs-message-store-dn ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX distinguishedNameSyntax
   SINGLE VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-message-store-dn
```

A.2.7  **MHS O/R Addresses**

The **MHS O/R Addresses** attribute specifies a user’s or DL’s O/R addresses.

A value of this attribute is an O/R address.

```
mhs-or-addresses ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX mhs-or-address-syntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-or-addresses
```
A.2.8 MHS Supported Automatic Actions

The **MHS Supported Automatic Actions** attribute identifies the automatic actions that an MS fully supports.

A value of this attribute is an Object Identifier.

```
mhs-supported-automatic-actions ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-supported-automatic-actions
```

A.2.9 MHS Supported Content Types

The **MHS Supported Content Types** attribute identifies the content types of the messages whose syntax and semantics a MS fully supports.

A value of this attribute is an Object Identifier.

```
mhs-supported-content-types ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-supported-content-types
```

A.2.10 MHS Supported Optional Attributes

The **MHS Supported Optional Attributes** attribute identifies the optional attributes that an MS fully supports.

A value of this attribute is an Object Identifier.

```
mhs-supported-optional-attributes ATTRIBUTE
   WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
   MULTI VALUE
   ::= id-at-mhs-supported-optional-attributes
```

A.3 Attribute syntaxes

The attribute syntaxes specific to Message Handling are those specified below.

A.3.1 MHS DL Submit Permission

The **MHS DL Submit Permission** attribute syntax characterizes an attribute each of whose values is a submit permission.

```
mhs-dl-submit-permission-syntax ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX
   SYNTAX DLSubmitPermission
   MATCHES FOR EQUALITY
   ::= id-as-mhs-dl-submit-permission
```

```
DLSubmitPermission ::= CHOICE {
   individual  [0] ORName,
   member-of-dl  [1] ORName,
   pattern-match  [2] ORNamePattern,
   member-of-group  [3] Name
}
```

A presented DL submit permission value shall be of type **Individual**.

A DL submit permission, depending upon its type, grants submit access to the following zero or more users and DLs:

a) **Individual**: The user or (unexpanded) DL any of whose O/R names is equal to the specified O/R name.

b) **Member-of-dl**: Each member of the DL, any of whose O/R names is equal to the specified O/R name, or of each nested DL, recursively.

c) **Pattern-match**: Each user or (unexpanded) DL any of whose O/R names matches the specified O/R name pattern.

```
ORNamePattern ::= ORName
```


d) **Member-of-group**: Each member of the group-of-names whose name is specified, or of each nested
group-of-names, recursively.

A presented value is equal to a target value of this type if the two are identical, attribute by attribute.
Additionally, equality may be declared under other conditions which are a local matter.

A.3.2 **MHS O/R Address**

The **MHS O/R Address** attribute syntax characterizes an attribute each of whose values is an O/R address.

\[
mhs-or-address-syntax\text{ ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX}
\text{SYNTAX} \\text{ORAddress}
\text{MATCHES FOR EQUALITY}
::= \text{id-as-mhs-or-address}
\]

A presented O/R address value is equal to a target O/R address value under the conditions specified in
clause 18.4.

A.3.3 **MHS O/R Name**

The **MHS O/R Name** attribute syntax characterizes an attribute each of whose values is an O/R name.

\[
mhs-or-name-syntax\text{ ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX}
\text{SYNTAX} \\text{ORName}
\text{MATCHES FOR EQUALITY}
::= \text{id-as-mhs-or-name}
\]

A presented O/R name value is equal to a target O/R name value if the two are identical, attribute by attribute.
Additionally, equality may be declared under other conditions which are a local matter.

ANNEX B

(to Recommendation X.402)

Reference definition of object identifiers

(This annex is an integral part of this Recommendation)

This annex defines for reference purposes various Object Identifiers cited in the ASN.1 module of Annexes A
and C. It uses ASN.1.

All Object Identifiers this Recommendation assigns are assigned in this annex. The annex is definitive for all
but those for ASN.1 modules and MHS itself. The definitive assignments for the former occur in the modules
themselves; other references to them appear in IMPORT clauses. The latter is fixed.

\[
\text{MHSObjectIdentifiers} \{ \text{joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) arch(5) modules(0) object-identifiers(0) } \}
\]

\[
\text{DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS} \::= \\begin{align}
\text{BEGIN} \\
\text{-- Prologue} \\
\text{-- Exports everything.} \\
\text{IMPORTS} \quad \text{nothing} \quad \text{-- ;} \\
\text{ID} \::= \text{OBJECT IDENTIFIER} \\
\text{-- MHS Aspects} \\
\text{id-mhs-protocols} \quad \text{ID} \::= \{ \text{joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) protocols(0)} \} \\
\text{-- MHS Application Contexts and Protocols} \\
\text{-- See CCITT Rec. X.419 | ISO/IEC 10021-6.} \\
\text{id-ipms} \quad \text{ID} \::= \{ \text{joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) ipms (1)} \}
\end{align}
\]

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-- Interpersonal Messaging

id-asdc    ID ::= { joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) asdc(2) }

-- Abstract Service Definition Conventions

id-mts    ID ::= { joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) mts(3) }

-- Message Transfer System

id-ms    ID ::= { joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) ms(4) }

-- Message Store
-- See CCITT Rec. X.413 | ISO/IEC 10021-5.

id-arch    ID ::= { joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) arch(5) }

-- Overall Architecture
-- See this Recommendation.

id-group    ID ::= { joint-iso-ccitt mhs-motis(6) group(6) }

-- Reserved.

-- Categories

id-mod    ID ::= { id-arch 0 } -- modules; not definitive
id-oc    ID ::= { id-arch 1 } -- object classes
id-at    ID ::= { id-arch 2 } -- attribute types
id-as    ID ::= { id-arch 3 } -- attribute syntaxes

-- Modules

id-object-identifiers    ID ::= { id-mod 0 } -- not definitive
id-directory-objects-and-attributes    ID ::= { id-mod 1 } -- not definitive

-- Object classes

id-oc-mhs-distribution-list    ID ::= { id-oc 0 }
id-oc-mhs-message-store    ID ::= { id-oc 1 }
id-oc-mhs-message-transfer-agent    ID ::= { id-oc 2 }
id-oc-mhs-user    ID ::= { id-oc 3 }
id-oc-mhs-user-agent    ID ::= { id-oc 4 }

-- Attributes

id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-length    ID ::= { id-at 0 }
id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-types    ID ::= { id-at 1 }
id-at-mhs-deliverable-eits    ID ::= { id-at 2 }
id-at-mhs-di-members    ID ::= { id-at 3 }
id-at-mhs-di-submit-permissions    ID ::= { id-at 4 }
id-at-mhs-message-store-dn    ID ::= { id-at 5 }
id-at-mhs-or-addresses    ID ::= { id-at 6 }
-- Value { id-at 7 } is no longer defined
id-at-mhs-supported-automatic-actions    ID ::= { id-at 8 }
id-at-mhs-supported-content-types    ID ::= { id-at 9 }
id-at-mhs-supported-optional-attributes    ID ::= { id-at 10 }

-- Attribute syntaxes

id-as-mhs-di-submit-permission    ID ::= { id-as 0 }
id-as-mhs-or-address    ID ::= { id-as 1 }
id-as-mhs-or-name    ID ::= { id-as 2 }

END -- of MHSObjectIdentifiers
ANNEX C
(to Recommendation X.402)

Reference definition of directory object classes and attributes

(This annex is an integral part of this Recommendation)

This annex, a supplement to Annex A, defines for reference purposes the object classes, attributes, and attribute syntaxes specific to Message Handling. It uses the OBJECT-CLASS, ATTRIBUTE, and ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX macros of CCITT Rec. X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

MHSDirectoryObjectsAndAttributes { joint-iso-ccitt
  mhs-motis(6) arch(5) modules(0) directory(1) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
-- Prologue
-- Exports everything
IMPORTS
-- MHS Object Identifiers

  id-as-mhs-dl-submit-permission, id-as-mhs-or-address, id-as-mhs-or-name,
  id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-length, id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-types,
  id-at-mhs-deliverable-eits, id-at-mhs-dl-members, id-at-mhs-dl-submit-permissions,
  id-at-mhs-message-store-dn, id-at-mhs-or-addresses, id-at-mhs-preferred-delivery-methods,
  id-at-mhs-supported-automatic-actions, id-at-mhs-supported-content-types,
  id-at-mhs-supported-optional-attributes, id-oc-mhs-distribution-list,
  id-oc-mhs-message-store, id-oc-mhs-message-transfer-agent, id-oc-mhs-user,
  id-oc-mhs-user-agent

----
FROM MHSObjectIdentifiers { joint-iso-ccitt
  mhs-motis(6) arch(5) modules(0) object-identifiers(0) }

-- MTS Abstract Service (from Rec. X.411)

  ORAddress, ORName, RequestedDeliveryMethod

----
FROM MTSAbstractService { joint-iso-ccitt
  mhs-motis(6) mts(3) modules(0) mts-abstract-service(1) }

-- Information Framework (from Rec. X.501)

  ATTRIBUTE, ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX, Name, OBJECT-CLASS

----
FROM InformationFramework { joint-iso-ccitt
  ds(5) modules(1) informationFramework(1) }

-- Selected Object Classes (from Rec. X.521)

  applicationEntity, top

----
FROM SelectedObjectClasses { joint-iso-ccitt ds(5) modules(1) selectedObjectClasses(6) }

-- Selected Attribute Types (from Rec. X.520)

  commonName, description, distinguishedNameSyntax, integerSyntax, objectIdentifiersSyntax,
  organization, organizationalUnitName, owner, seeAlso

----
FROM SelectedAttributeTypes { joint-iso-ccitt ds(5) modules(1) selectedAttributeTypes(5) }

-- OBJECT CLASSES

-- MHS Distribution List

  mhs-distribution-list OBJECT-CLASS
  SUBCLASS OF top
  MUST CONTAIN {
    commonName,
    mhs-dl-submit-permissions,
    mhs-or-addresses
  }
MAY CONTAIN {
  description,
  organizationName,
  organizationalUnitName,
  owner,
  seeAlso,
  mhs-deliverable-content-types,
  mhs-deliverable-eits,
  mhs-dl-members,
  mhs-preferred-delivery-methods }
 ::= id-oc-mhs-distribution-list

-- MHS Message Store

mhs-message-store OBJECT-CLASS
  SUBCLASS OF applicationEntity
  MAY CONTAIN {
    owner,
    mhs-supported-optional-attributes,
    mhs-supported-automatic-actions,
    mhs-supported-content-types }
 ::= id-oc-mhs-message-store

-- MHS Message Transfer Agent

mhs-message-transfer-agent OBJECT-CLASS
  SUBCLASS OF applicationEntity
  MAY CONTAIN {
    owner,
    mhs-deliverable-content-length }
 ::= id-oc-mhs-message-transfer-agent

-- MHS User

mhs-user OBJECT-CLASS
  SUBCLASS OF top
  MUST CONTAIN {
    mhs-or-addresses }
  MAY CONTAIN {
    mhs-deliverable-content-length,
    mhs-deliverable-content-types,
    mhs-deliverable-eits,
    mhs-message-store-dn,
  ::= id-oc-mhs-user

-- MHS User Agent

mhs-user-agent OBJECT-CLASS
  SUBCLASS OF applicationEntity
  MAY CONTAIN {
    owner,
    mhs-deliverable-content-length,
    mhs-deliverable-content-types,
    mhs-deliverable-eits,
    mhs-or-addresses }
 ::= id-oc-mhs-user-agent

-- ATTRIBUTES

-- MHS Deliverable Content Length

mhs-deliverable-content-length ATTRIBUTE
  WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX integerSyntax
  SINGLE VALUE
 ::= id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-length
-- MHS Deliverable Content Types

mhs-deliverable-content-types ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-deliverable-content-types

-- MHS Deliverable EITs

mhs-deliverable-eits ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-deliverable-eits

-- MHS DL Members

mhs-dl-members ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX mhs-or-name-syntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-dl-members

-- MHS DL Submit Permissions

mhs-dl-submit-permissions ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX mhs-dl-submit-permission-syntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-dl-submit-permissions

-- MHS O/R Addresses

mhs-or-addresses ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX mhs-or-address-syntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-or-addresses

-- MHS Message Store Directory Name

mhs-message-store-dn ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX distinguishedNameSyntax
SINGLE VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-message-store-dn

-- MHS Supported Automatic Actions

mhs-supported-automatic-actions ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-supported-automatic-actions

-- MHS Supported Content Types

mhs-supported-content-types ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-supported-content-types

-- MHS Supported Optional Attributes

mhs-supported-optional-attributes ATTRIBUTE
WITH ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX objectIdentifierSyntax
MULTI VALUE
::= id-at-mhs-supported-optional-attributes

-- ATTRIBUTE SYNTAXES

-- MHS DL Submit Permission

mhs-dl-submit-permission-syntax ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX
SYNTAX DLSubmitPermission
MATCHES FOR EQUALITY
::= id-as-mhs-dl-submit-permission
DLSSubmitPermission ::= CHOICE {
  individual [0] ORName,
  member-of-dl [1] ORName,
  pattern-match [2] ORNamePattern,
  member-of-group [3] Name }

ORNamePattern ::= ORName

-- MHS O/R Address

mhs-or-address-syntax ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX
SYNTAX ORAddress
MATCHES FOR EQUALITY
::= id-as-mhs-or-address

-- MHS O/R Name

mhs-or-name-syntax ATTRIBUTE-SYNTAX
SYNTAX ORName
MATCHES FOR EQUALITY
::= id-as-mhs-or-name

END -- of MHSDirectory

ANNEX D

(to Recommendation X.402)

Security threats

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)

An overview of MHS security threats is provided in clause 15.1 of CCITT Rec. X.400 | ISO/IEC 10021-1. This considers threats as they appear in an MHS: access threats, inter-message threats, intra-message threats, and message store threats. These threats can appear in various forms as follows:

a) Masquerade;
b) Message sequencing;
c) Modification of information;
d) Denial of service;
e) Leakage of information;
f) Repudiation;
g) Other MHS threats.

In addition, they may occur by accident or by malicious intent and may be active or passive. Attacks on the MHS will address potential weaknesses and may comprise of a number of threats. This annex deals with individual threats and although consideration is given to a number of broad classes of threat, it is not a complete list.

Table D-1/X.402 indicates how these threats can be met using the MHS security services. The list of threats given here is indicative rather than definitive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Masquerade</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impersonation and misuse of the MTS</td>
<td>Message Origin Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probe Origin Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsely acknowledge receipt</td>
<td>Proof of Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsely claim to originate a message</td>
<td>Message Origin Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impersonation of an MTA to an MTS-user</td>
<td>Proof of submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report Origin Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impersonation of an MTA to another MTA</td>
<td>Report Origin Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Message sequencing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replay of messages</td>
<td>Message Sequence Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-ordering of messages</td>
<td>Message Sequence Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-play of messages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay of messages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modification of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modification of messages</td>
<td>Connection Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Content Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of messages</td>
<td>Message Sequence Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption of routing and other management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denial of service</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTA flooding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTS flooding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Repudiation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of origin</td>
<td>Non-repudiation of Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of submission</td>
<td>Non-repudiation of Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of delivery</td>
<td>Non-repudiation of Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leakage of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of confidentiality</td>
<td>Connection Confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of anonymity</td>
<td>Content Confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of messages</td>
<td>Message Flow Confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic analysis</td>
<td>Secure Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Flow Confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Originator not cleared for</td>
<td>Secure Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Security Label</td>
<td>Message Security Labelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTA/MTS-user not cleared for Security Context</td>
<td>Secure Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misroutting</td>
<td>Secure Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Security Labelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differing labelling policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Masquerade

Masquerade occurs when an entity successfully pretends to be a different entity and can take place in a number of ways. An unauthorized MTS-user may impersonate another to gain unauthorized access to MTS facilities or to act to the detriment of the valid user, e.g. to discard his messages. An MTS-user may impersonate another user and so falsely acknowledge receipt of a message by the “valid” recipient. A message may be put into the MTS by a user falsely claiming the identity of another user. An MTS-user, MS, or MTA may masquerade as another MTS-user, MS, or MTA.

Masquerade threats include the following:

a) Impersonation and misuse of the MTS;
b) Falsely acknowledge receipt;
c) Falsely claim to originate a message;
d) Impersonation of an MTA to an MTS-user;
e) Impersonation of an MTA to another MTA.

A masquerade usually consists of other forms of attack and in a secure system may involve authentication sequences from valid users, e.g. in replay or modification of messages.

Message sequencing

Message sequencing threats occur when part or all of a message is repeated, time-shifted, or reordered. This can be used to exploit the authentication information in a valid message and resequence or time-shift valid messages. Although it is impossible to prevent replay with the MHS security services, it can be detected and the effects of the threat eliminated.

Message sequencing threats include the following:

a) Replay of messages;
b) Reordering of messages;
c) Pre-play of messages;
d) Delay of messages.

Modification of information

Information for an intended recipient, routing information, and other management data may be lost or modified without detection. This could occur to any aspect of the message, e.g. its labelling, content, attributes, recipient, or originator. Corruption of routing or other management information, stored in MTAs or used by them, may cause the MTS to lose messages or otherwise operate incorrectly.

Modification of information threats include the following:

a) Modification of messages;
b) Destruction of messages;
c) Corruption of routing and other management information.

Denial of service

Denial of service occurs when an entity fails to perform its function or prevents other entities from performing their functions. This may be a denial of access, a denial of communications (leading to other problems such as overload), a deliberate suppression of messages to a particular recipient, or a fabrication of extra traffic. The MTS can be denied if an MTA has been caused to fail or operate incorrectly. In addition, an MTS-user may cause the MTS to deny a service to other users by flooding the service with messages which might overload the switching capability of an MTA or fill up all available message storage space.
Denial of service threats include the following:

a) Denial of communications;

b) MTA failure;

c) MTS flooding.

D.5 Repudiation

Repudiation can occur when an MTS-user or the MTS may later deny submitting, receiving, or originating a message.

Repudiation threats include the following:

a) Denial of origin;

b) Denial of submission;

c) Denial of delivery.

D.6 Leakage of information

Information may be acquired by an unauthorized party by monitoring transmissions, by unauthorized access to information stored in any MHS entity, or by masquerade. In some cases, the presence of an MTS-user on the system may be sensitive and its anonymity may have to be preserved. An MTS-user other than the intended recipient may obtain a message. This might result from impersonation and misuse of the MTS or through causing an MTA to operate incorrectly. Further details on the information flowing in an MTS may be obtained from observing the traffic.

Leakage of information threats include the following:

a) Loss of confidentiality;

b) Loss of anonymity;

c) Misappropriation of messages;

d) Traffic analysis.

D.7 Other threats

In a multi- or single-level secure system, a number of threats may exist that relate to security labelling, e.g. routing through a node that cannot be trusted with information of particular value, or where systems use different labelling policies. Threats may exist to the enforcement of a security policy based on logical separation using security labels. An MTS-user may originate a message and assign it a label for which it is not cleared. An MTS-user or MTA may set up or accept an association with a security context for which it does not have clearance.

Other threats include the following:

a) Originator not cleared for message label (inappropriate submit);

b) MTA/MTS-user not cleared for context;

c) Misrouting;

d) Differing labelling policies.
Table $E-1$/$X.402$ indicates which service elements from CCITT Rec. X.411 | ISO/IEC 10021-4 may be used to support the security services described in clause 10.2.

**TABLE E-1/X.402**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>MTS arguments/services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin authentication security services</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Origin Authentication</td>
<td>Message Origin Authentication Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probe Origin Authentication</td>
<td>Probe Origin Authentication Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Origin Authentication</td>
<td>Report Origin Authentication Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of Submission</td>
<td>Proof of Submission Request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of Delivery</td>
<td>Proof of Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proof of Delivery Request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proof of Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secure access management security services</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer Entity Authentication</td>
<td>Initiator Credentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Context</td>
<td>Responder Credentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data confidentiality security services</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Confidentiality</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Confidentiality</td>
<td>Content Confidentiality Algorithm Identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Flow Confidentiality</td>
<td>Message Token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Content Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data integrity security services</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Integrity</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Integrity</td>
<td>Content Integrity Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Sequence Integrity</td>
<td>Message Token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Origin Authentication Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Sequence Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-repudiation security services</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Repudiation of Origin</td>
<td>Content Integrity Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Repudiation of Submission</td>
<td>Message Token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Repudiation of Delivery</td>
<td>Message Origin Authentication Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proof of Submission Request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proof of Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proof of Delivery Request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proof of Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security management security services</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Security Labelling</td>
<td>Message Security Label</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Message Origin Authentication Check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Credentials</td>
<td>Change Credentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register</td>
<td>Change Credentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX F
(to Recommendation X.402)

**Representation of O/R addresses for human usage**

(This annex does not form a part of this Recommendation)

This material is Annex B to Recommendation F.401.

ANNEX G
(to Recommendation X.402)

**Use of O/R addresses by multinational organizations**

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)

See also Annex E of Recommendation F.400.

It is recognized that, where regulations permit, many organizations will wish to operate message handling systems which are located in more than one country. These organizations include both private organizations and public MH service providers. The addressing and routing policies of such systems should be consistent with the general MHS model, in order to ensure interworking with the remainder of the global MHS.

The availability of directory services may significantly affect the addressing policies which organizations choose to adopt. If a universal directory service is available, originators and recipients of messages can be referred to by means of a user-friendly directory name; the O/R addresses can be obtained from the directory by the message handling system. In this situation, the human users need never encounter the O/R address values used, and the addressing policy can be chosen on purely technical criteria. If such a directory service is not available, it will be necessary for users to handle O/R addresses manually. In this case, aesthetic and other human factors considerations will also influence the selection of addressing policy.

G.1 **Addressing principles**

Global unambiguousness of MHS names is achieved by means of a hierarchical registration structure and consistent use of the naming conventions. This means that wherever an O/R address is used, it is necessary to register the address attribute values according to the procedures applicable for the country denoted by the value of the country-name attribute. In the case of the private-domain-name and administration-domain-name, this implies registration with the applicable registration authorities in that country or domain. These principles form the basis for global messaging.

The interconnection of domains (PRMD to ADMD, ADMD to ADMD, PRMD to PRMD) is subject to bilateral agreement. Such agreements are subject to commercial and technical criteria; among other matters, these agreements may specify the range of O/R address values which are accepted.

Where an organization requires domain names with more than one country code, it is necessary to register the names according to the procedures in each country. Frequently, it will be possible to register the same value of private-domain-name (or administration-domain-name, as applicable) in each country; however, factors outside the scope of MHS (such as legal ownership of names) mean that it will sometimes be necessary for a supra-national organization to use different values for their domain name according to the country-code used.

Users of MHS ideally would like to have one address to be used for global messaging which will be provided on letterheads and business cards (indicating the country in which the user is located) to be used by potential partners for communication through MHS systems. The reachability of distant partners through a service provider depends upon the connectivity offered.
G.2  Example configurations

Multinational organizations may choose to organize their messaging systems in any way which is compatible with these basic principles. Examples of possible configurations for a multinational PRMD include:

G.2.1  Multiple independent PRMDs

See Figure G-1/X.402.

The multinational organization may divide its messaging system logically into portions which are wholly contained within one country. Each portion functions as a separate PRMD, and uses addresses registered in the local country.

Each PRMD may connect to one or more ADMDs in the local country. Where the PRMD is connected to more than one ADMD, and the single space ADMD name is not used, each user (or DL) will have multiple O/R addresses (aliases) with different values for the administration-domain-name attribute. Any of these alias values may be used as the value of the originator O/R address. Where the local country permits the use of the single space ADMD name, and the PRMD elects to use it, each user (or DL) may have a single value of O/R address, regardless of the number of ADMDs that the PRMD is connected to, assuming that all the domains concerned can apply this convention.

Note 1 – The choice of alias name has a number of consequences, which are discussed below.

Note 2 – There may be limitations of the use of the single space ADMD name internationally and its acceptance by ADMDs of other countries.

Note 3 – MTS procedures may need to be revised to support multinational PRMDs in a global messaging environment.

This case is not specific to multinational organizations: it is indistinguishable from multiple PRMDs operated by separate organizations.

This configuration allows for differing regulations in various countries and still provides for the allocation of unique O/R addresses. For additional information and insights, see also Annex E of Recommendation F.400 (1992) which conveys the same semantics as § G.2.1.
G.2.2  *A single PRMD, named from a “home” country*

See Figure G-2/X.402.

The multinational organization may operate a single management domain which is physically located in more than one country. A single country is selected as the home country for addressing purposes. In this case, all UAs within the MD are addressed with the same values for country-name, administration-domain-name and private-domain-name. This set of attribute values is registered according to the requirements of the chosen country.

The PRMD may connect to one or more ADMDs in the home country, and also (subject to national regulation and commercial criteria) to ADMDs in other countries. Connection to ADMDs outside the home country requires that those ADMDs are able and willing to route messages directly to a PRMD when the country-name used in the O/R address is different from that used by the ADMD.

This configuration neither presents any technical problem for the partners outside the PRMD nor presents technical problems for the service providers involved in the transfer or the delivery of messages. Users of such a PRMD may not be satisfied with the resulting use of a country name in the O/R address that they may not belong to.

G.2.3  *A single PRMD with multiple country and domain names*

See Figure G-3/X.402.

The multinational organization may operate a single messaging system, but use PRMD names registered in more than one country. When forming O/R addresses, the administration-domain-name should be one of the values permitted by the country denoted by the value of the country-name. The private-domain-name value used in a particular O/R address should be one which is registered in a way which is compatible with the country name and administration-domain name, following the procedures of the country or ADMD concerned.
The multinational PRMD may connect to one or more ADMDs. Each user (or DL) now has multiple alias O/R addresses, with different values for the country-name, administration-domain-name and private-domain-name. Any of these may be used as the value of the originator O/R address; users may choose to use an address which identifies the country where they are physically located, but there is no compulsion to do so, provided that the ADMD concerned accepts the intended originator’s chosen O/R address.

If multiple O/R addresses (aliases) appear for the same user, the partners of this user may have problems coping with the situation. The sender and recipient need to understand which of the various O/R addresses should be used at different instances. Lack of understanding will hinder useful open communication. Furthermore, the charges for a certain message may vary depending on the access point chosen for the first ADMD.

*Note* – The choice of alias name has a number of consequences which are discussed below.

The bilateral agreements between the PRMD and each ADMD to which it connects will identify the criteria used by the ADMD to route messages into the PRMD. Such agreements may choose to route directly messages addressed to any of the aliases identifying the PRMD, or may route directly only those messages addressed using the local country code, routing others via an ADMD in the country specified in the recipient O/R address, as long as charging and accounting principles can be applied by service providers involved.

*Note* – MTS procedures may need to be revised to support multinational PRMDs in a global messaging environment.

G.3  *Alias O/R addresses*

The cases outlined above show that alias management domain names can arise. The presence of alias has a number of implications, both for users and for system implementors.

*Note* – Alias addresses may also occur for users within a domain; treatment of these is usually independent of management domain aliases.
An individual user may select a preferred ADMD from those available, and quote the corresponding country-name, administration-domain-name and private-domain-name when communicating his O/R address, such as on a business card or in the originator O/R address of messages.

If the user also wishes to use the services of other ADMDs to which the PRMD is connected, some difficulties may arise. In certain restricted circumstances, it may be possible for the user (or user agent) to select another of the alias PRMD names corresponding to the ADMD which is now to be used, and change the originator O/R address accordingly. However, this is only possible in the case where all the recipients of a message are reached via the same ADMD, and the choice of ADMD is known at the time of submission. It is not possible to change the O/R address after submission, as this conflicts with security services. Also, users may become confused if they receive messages from the same originator but with different O/R addresses.

For these reasons, it may be more satisfactory for the user to use only one O/R address, and for some ADMDs to accept messages where the originator O/R address does not correspond to that country-name and administration-domain-name. Originator O/R addresses which may not correspond to the local PRMD will also arise if the facilities of distribution lists and redirections (e.g. the recipient-assigned-alternate-recipient facility) are implemented. Bilateral agreements between the ADMD operators have to take account of the use of these possibilities (amongst others) in the case of transit via more than one domain. Global reachability may not be achievable.

The originator O/R address used when sending messages may affect the route taken by messages which may be sent in reply. In the general case, reply messages will be routed via the country and ADMD specified in the O/R address. Bilateral agreements between PRMDs or between the PRMD and ADMDs may allow other routes to be used. These factors will influence the user in selecting an appropriate domain name for use in the O/R address. It should be born in mind that multiple O/R addresses for the same user also have impact on the potential recipients. This confusing situation may not promote useful open communication.

ANNEX H

(to Recommendation X.402)

Differences between CCITT Recommendation and ISO Standard

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)

This annex lists all but the purely stylistic differences between this CCITT Recommendation and the corresponding ISO International Standard.

The following are the differences that exist:

a) The ISO International Standard corresponding to this Recommendation does not require that ADMDs and PRMDs be hierarchically related for purposes of addressing and routing, while this Recommendation does. (See clauses 14.1.1, 14.1.2 and clauses 15 and 19.)

b) In clause 18.3.1, the paragraph defining the single space administration-domain-name is a normative part of the ISO/IEC Standard but it is a Note in the CCITT Recommendation. The paragraph defining the single zero administration-domain-name is a normative part of the ISO/IEC Standard but is omitted from the CCITT Recommendation.

c) The Representation of O/R Addresses for Human Usage is an informative annex to the ISO International Standard corresponding to this Recommendation, but in this Recommendation the material is referenced out, in Annex F, to the informative Annex B of Recommendation F.401.
ANNEX I
(to Recommendation X.402)
(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)

Index

This annex indexes this Recommendation. It gives the number(s) of the page(s) on which each item in each of several categories is defined. Its coverage of each category is exhaustive.

This annex indexes items (if any) in the following categories:

a) abbreviations;
b) terms;
c) information items;
d) ASN.1 modules;
e) ASN.1 macros;
f) ASN.1 types;
g) ASN.1 values;
h) bilateral agreements.

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ANNEX J
(to Recommendation X.402)

Alphabetical list of abbreviations
used in this Recommendation

A/SYS Access system
AC Application context
ACSE Association control service element
ADMD Administration management domain
AE Application-entity
APDU Application protocol data unit
AS/SYS Access and storage system
ASE Application service element
ASN.1 Abstract syntax notation one
AST/SYS Access, storage and transfer system
AT/SYS Access and transfer system
AU Access unit
C Conditional
COMPUSEC Computer security
D Defaultable
DL Distribution list
DSA Directory system agent
EIT Encoded information type
IA5 International Alphabet No. 5
M Mandatory
MASE Message administration service element
MD Management domain
MDSE Message delivery service element
MHE Message handling environment
MHS Message handling system
MRSE Message retrieval service element
MS Message store
MSSE Message submission service element
MTA Message transfer agent
MTS Message transfer system
MTSE Message transfer service element
O Optional
O/R Originator/recipient
OSI Open systems interconnection
P1 Protocol 1
P3 Protocol 3
P7 Protocol 7
PDAU Physical delivery access unit
PDS Physical delivery system
PRMD Private management domain
RO Remote operation
ROSE Remote operation service element
RT Reliable transfer
RTSE Reliable transfer service element
S/SYS Storage system
ST/SYS Storage and transfer system
T/SYS Transfer system
UA User agent
UE User element