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SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM  
COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY

Directory

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**Information technology – Open Systems  
Interconnection – The Directory: abstract service  
definition**

Recommendation ITU-T X.511

ITU-T



ITU-T X-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS  
**DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY**

<b>PUBLIC DATA NETWORKS</b>	
Services and facilities	X.1–X.19
Interfaces	X.20–X.49
Transmission, signalling and switching	X.50–X.89
Network aspects	X.90–X.149
Maintenance	X.150–X.179
Administrative arrangements	X.180–X.199
<b>OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION</b>	
Model and notation	X.200–X.209
Service definitions	X.210–X.219
Connection-mode protocol specifications	X.220–X.229
Connectionless-mode protocol specifications	X.230–X.239
PICS proformas	X.240–X.259
Protocol Identification	X.260–X.269
Security Protocols	X.270–X.279
Layer Managed Objects	X.280–X.289
Conformance testing	X.290–X.299
<b>INTERWORKING BETWEEN NETWORKS</b>	
General	X.300–X.349
Satellite data transmission systems	X.350–X.369
IP-based networks	X.370–X.379
<b>MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS</b>	<b>X.400–X.499</b>
<b>DIRECTORY</b>	<b>X.500–X.599</b>
<b>OSI NETWORKING AND SYSTEM ASPECTS</b>	
Networking	X.600–X.629
Efficiency	X.630–X.639
Quality of service	X.640–X.649
Naming, Addressing and Registration	X.650–X.679
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)	X.680–X.699
<b>OSI MANAGEMENT</b>	
Systems management framework and architecture	X.700–X.709
Management communication service and protocol	X.710–X.719
Structure of management information	X.720–X.729
Management functions and ODMA functions	X.730–X.799
<b>SECURITY</b>	<b>X.800–X.849</b>
<b>OSI APPLICATIONS</b>	
Commitment, concurrency and recovery	X.850–X.859
Transaction processing	X.860–X.879
Remote operations	X.880–X.889
Generic applications of ASN.1	X.890–X.899
<b>OPEN DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING</b>	<b>X.900–X.999</b>
<b>INFORMATION AND NETWORK SECURITY</b>	<b>X.1000–X.1099</b>
<b>SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (1)</b>	<b>X.1100–X.1199</b>
<b>CYBERSPACE SECURITY</b>	<b>X.1200–X.1299</b>
<b>SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES (2)</b>	<b>X.1300–X.1499</b>
<b>CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE</b>	<b>X.1500–X.1599</b>
<b>CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY</b>	<b>X.1600–X.1699</b>
<b>QUANTUM COMMUNICATION</b>	<b>X.1700–X.1729</b>

*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*

**Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory:  
Abstract service definition**

### Summary

Recommendation ITU-T X.511 | ISO/IEC 9594-3 defines in an abstract way the externally visible services provided by the Directory, including bind and unbind operations, read operations, search operations, modify operations, operations to support password policies and operations to support interworking with LDAP. It also defines errors.

### History

Edition	Recommendation	Approval	Study Group	Unique ID*
1.0	ITU-T X.511	1988-11-25		<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/3003">11.1002/1000/3003</a>
2.0	ITU-T X.511	1993-11-16	7	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/3004">11.1002/1000/3004</a>
3.0	ITU-T X.511	1997-08-09	7	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/4124">11.1002/1000/4124</a>
3.1	ITU-T X.511 (1997) Technical Cor. 1	2000-03-31	7	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/5036">11.1002/1000/5036</a>
3.2	ITU-T X.511 (1997) Amd. 1	2000-03-31	7	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/5035">11.1002/1000/5035</a>
3.3	ITU-T X.511 (1997) Technical Cor. 2	2001-02-02	7	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/5313">11.1002/1000/5313</a>
3.4	ITU-T X.511 (1997) Technical Cor. 3	2005-05-14	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/8503">11.1002/1000/8503</a>
4.0	ITU-T X.511	2001-02-02	7	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/5315">11.1002/1000/5315</a>
4.1	ITU-T X.511 (2001) Technical Cor. 1	2005-05-14	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/8504">11.1002/1000/8504</a>
4.2	ITU-T X.511 (2001) Technical Cor. 2	2005-11-29	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/8635">11.1002/1000/8635</a>
4.3	ITU-T X.511 (2001) Cor. 3	2008-05-29	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/9433">11.1002/1000/9433</a>
5.0	ITU-T X.511	2005-08-29	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/8502">11.1002/1000/8502</a>
5.1	ITU-T X.511 (2005) Cor. 1	2008-05-29	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/9434">11.1002/1000/9434</a>
5.2	ITU-T X.511 (2005) Cor. 2	2008-11-13	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/9594">11.1002/1000/9594</a>
5.3	ITU-T X.511 (2005) Cor. 3	2011-02-13	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11044">11.1002/1000/11044</a>
5.4	ITU-T X.511 (2005) Cor. 4	2012-04-13	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11586">11.1002/1000/11586</a>
6.0	ITU-T X.511	2008-11-13	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/9593">11.1002/1000/9593</a>
6.1	ITU-T X.511 (2008) Cor. 1	2011-02-13	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11045">11.1002/1000/11045</a>
6.2	ITU-T X.511 (2008) Cor. 2	2012-04-13	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11587">11.1002/1000/11587</a>
6.3	ITU-T X.511 (2008) Cor. 3	2012-10-14	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11737">11.1002/1000/11737</a>
7.0	ITU-T X.511	2012-10-14	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11738">11.1002/1000/11738</a>
8.0	ITU-T X.511	2016-10-14	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/13033">11.1002/1000/13033</a>
9.0	ITU-T X.511	2019-10-14	17	<a href="http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14034">11.1002/1000/14034</a>

### Keywords

Attribute, directory, directory information tree, directory system agent, directory user agent, distinguished name.

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\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL <http://handle.itu.int/> in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, <http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11830-en>.

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
1	Scope ..... 1
2	Normative references..... 1
2.1	Identical Recommendations   International Standards ..... 1
2.2	Paired Recommendations   International Standards equivalent in technical content..... 1
2.3	Additional references ..... 2
3	Definitions ..... 2
3.1	OSI Reference Model security architecture definitions..... 2
3.2	Basic Directory definitions..... 2
3.3	Directory model definitions ..... 2
3.4	Directory information base definitions..... 2
3.5	Directory entry definitions ..... 2
3.6	Name definitions ..... 3
3.7	Distributed operations definitions ..... 3
3.8	Abstract service definitions ..... 3
4	Abbreviations ..... 4
5	Conventions..... 4
6	Overview of the Directory service..... 5
7	Information types and common procedures ..... 5
7.1	Introduction..... 5
7.2	Information types defined elsewhere ..... 5
7.3	Common arguments ..... 6
7.4	Common results ..... 9
7.5	Service controls..... 10
7.6	Entry information selection..... 12
7.7	Entry information ..... 15
7.8	Filter ..... 17
7.9	Paged results..... 20
7.10	Security parameters..... 22
7.11	Common elements of procedure for access control..... 23
7.12	Managing the DSA Information Tree ..... 25
7.13	Procedures for families of entries..... 25
8	Directory authentication ..... 26
8.1	Simple authentication procedure..... 26
8.2	Password policy ..... 28
9	Bind, Unbind operations, Change Password and Administer Password operations ..... 31
9.1	Directory Bind..... 31
9.2	Directory Unbind ..... 34
10	Directory Read operations ..... 34
10.1	Read ..... 34
10.2	Compare ..... 37
10.3	Abandon ..... 40
11	Directory Search operations ..... 40
11.1	List ..... 40
11.2	Search..... 44
12	Directory Modify operations ..... 55
12.1	Add Entry ..... 55
12.2	Remove Entry..... 57
12.3	Modify Entry..... 59
12.4	Modify DN..... 63
12.5	Change Password ..... 65
12.6	Administer Password..... 66

	<i>Page</i>
13	Operations for LDAP messages ..... 66
	13.1 LDAP Transport operation ..... 67
	13.2 Linked LDAP operation ..... 69
14	Errors ..... 69
	14.1 Error precedence ..... 69
	14.2 Abandoned ..... 70
	14.3 Abandon Failed ..... 70
	14.4 Attribute Error ..... 71
	14.5 Name Error ..... 72
	14.6 Referral ..... 73
	14.7 Security Error ..... 73
	14.8 Service Error ..... 74
	14.9 Update Error ..... 76
15	Analysis of search arguments ..... 77
	15.1 General check of search filter ..... 78
	15.2 Check of request-attribute-profiles ..... 79
	15.3 Check of controls and hierarchy selections ..... 80
	15.4 Check of matching use ..... 81
	Annex A – Abstract Service in ASN.1 ..... 82
	Annex B – Operational semantics for Basic Access Control ..... 98
	Annex C – Examples of searching families of entries ..... 111
	C.1 Single family example ..... 111
	C.2 Multiple families example ..... 112
	Annex D – External ASN.1 module ..... 115
	Annex E – Use of protected passwords for Bind operations ..... 119
	Annex F – Amendments and corrigenda ..... 120

## Introduction

This Recommendation | International Standard, together with the other Recommendations | International Standards, has been produced to facilitate the interconnection of information processing systems to provide directory services. A set of such systems, together with the directory information that they hold, can be viewed as an integrated whole, called the *Directory*. The information held by the Directory, collectively known as the Directory Information Base (DIB), is typically used to facilitate communication between, with or about objects such as application entities, people, terminals, and distribution lists.

The Directory plays a significant role in Open Systems Interconnection, whose aim is to allow, with a minimum of technical agreement outside of the interconnection standards themselves, the interconnection of information processing systems:

- from different manufacturers;
- under different managements;
- of different levels of complexity; and
- of different ages.

This Recommendation | International Standard defines the capabilities provided by the Directory to its users.

This Recommendation | International Standard provides the foundation frameworks upon which industry profiles can be defined by other standards groups and industry forums. Many of the features defined as optional in these frameworks may be mandated for use in certain environments through profiles. This ninth edition technically revises and enhances the eighth edition of this Recommendation | International Standard.

This ninth edition specifies versions 1 and 2 of the Directory protocols.

Rec. ITU-T X.511 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-3 (1995), Rec. ITU-T X.518 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-4 (1995) and Rec. ITU-T X.519 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-5 (1995) and their previous edition specified only version 1. Most of the services and protocols specified in this edition are designed to function under version 1. However, some enhanced services and protocols, e.g., signed errors, will not function unless all Directory entities involved in the operation have negotiated version 2. Whichever version has been negotiated, differences between the services and between the protocols defined in the nine editions, except for those specifically assigned to version 2, are accommodated using the rules of extensibility defined in Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5.

Annex A, which is an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, provides the ASN.1 module for the Directory abstract service.

Annex B, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, provides charts that describe the semantics associated with Basic Access Control as it applies to the processing of a Directory operation.

Annex C, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, gives examples of the use of families of entries.

Annex D, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, includes an updated copy of an external ASN.1 module referenced by this Directory Specification.

Annex E, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, provides a suggested technique for Bind protected password.

Annex F, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, lists the amendments and defect reports that have been incorporated to form this edition of this Recommendation | International Standard.



**INTERNATIONAL STANDARD  
ITU-T RECOMMENDATION**

**Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory:  
Abstract service definition**

## 1 Scope

This Recommendation | International Standard defines in an abstract way the externally visible service provided by the Directory.

This Recommendation | International Standard does not specify individual implementations or products.

## 2 Normative references

The following Recommendations and International Standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation | International Standard. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and Standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this Recommendation | International Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and Standards listed below. Members of IEC and ISO maintain registers of currently valid International Standards. The Telecommunication Standardization Bureau of the ITU maintains a list of currently valid ITU-T Recommendations.

### 2.1 Identical Recommendations | International Standards

- Recommendation ITU-T X.500 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-1:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Overview of concepts, models and services.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.501 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Models.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.518 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-4:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Procedures for distributed operation.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.519 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-5:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Protocol specifications.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.520 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Selected attribute types.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.521 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-7:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Selected object classes.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.525 (2019) | ISO/IEC 9594-9:2020, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Replication.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.680 (2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2015, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.681 (2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2:2015, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.682 (2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-3:2015, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification.*
- Recommendation ITU-T X.683 (2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-4:2015, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications.*

### 2.2 Paired Recommendations | International Standards equivalent in technical content

- Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications.*  
ISO 7498-2:1989, *Information processing systems – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model – Part 2: Security Architecture.*

### 2.3 Additional references

- Recommendation ITU-T X.200 (1994) | ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model*.
- IETF RFC 2025 (1996), *The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM)*.
- IETF RFC 4422 (2006), *Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)*.
- IETF RFC 4511 (2006), *Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol*.

## 3 Definitions

For the purposes of this Recommendation | International Standard, the following definitions apply.

### 3.1 OSI Reference Model security architecture definitions

The following terms are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.800 | ISO 7498-2:

- a) password.

### 3.2 Basic Directory definitions

The following terms are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.500 | ISO/IEC 9594-1:

- a) *Directory*;
- b) *Directory Information Base*;
- c) *(Directory) User*.

### 3.3 Directory model definitions

The following terms are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2:

- a) *Directory System Agent*;
- b) *Directory User Agent*.

### 3.4 Directory information base definitions

The following terms are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2:

- a) *alias entry*;
- b) *ancestor*;
- c) *compound entry*;
- d) *(Directory) entry*;
- e) *Directory Information Tree*;
- f) *family (of entries)*;
- g) *immediate superior*;
- h) *immediately superior entry/object*;
- i) *object*;
- j) *object class*;
- k) *object entry*;
- l) *subordinate*;
- m) *superior*.

### 3.5 Directory entry definitions

The following terms are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2:

- a) *attribute*;
- b) *attribute type*;
- c) *attribute value*;

- d) *attribute value assertion*;
- e) *context*;
- f) *context type*;
- g) *context value*;
- h) *operational attribute*;
- i) *matching rule*;
- j) *user attribute*.

### 3.6 Name definitions

The following terms are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2:

- a) *alias, alias name*;
- b) *distinguished name*;
- c) *(directory) name*;
- d) *purported name*;
- e) *relative distinguished name*.

### 3.7 Distributed operations definitions

The following terms are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4:

- a) *bound DSA*;
- b) *chaining*;
- c) *initial performer*;
- d) *LDAP requester*;
- e) *referral*.

### 3.8 Abstract service definitions

For the purposes of this Recommendation | International Standard, the following definitions apply.

**3.8.1 additional search:** A search that starts from `joinBaseObject` as specified by the originator in the `search` request.

**3.8.2 contributing member:** A family member within a compound entry, which has made a contribution to either a Read, Search or Modify Entry operation.

**3.8.3 explicitly unmarked entry:** An entry or a family member that is excluded from the `SearchResult` according to a specification given in a control attribute referenced by the governing-search-rule.

**3.8.4 family grouping:** A set of members of a compound attribute that are grouped together for the purpose of operation evaluation.

**3.8.5 filter:** An assertion about the presence or value of certain attributes of an entry in order to limit the scope of a search.

**3.8.6 originator:** The user that originated an operation.

**3.8.7 participating member:** A family member that is either a contributing member or is a member of a family grouping that as a whole matched a `search` filter.

**3.8.8 Password expiration:** The situation where a user password has reached the end of its validity period: the account is locked and the user has to change the password before doing any other directory operation.

**3.8.9 Password quality attributes:** Attributes that specify how a password shall be constructed. Password quality attributes include things like minimum length, mixture of characters (uppercase, lowercase, figures, punctuations, etc), and avoidance of trivial passwords.

**3.8.10 Password history:** List of old passwords and the times they were inserted in the history.

**3.8.11 primary search:** The search that starts from `baseObject` as specified by the originator in the search request.

**3.8.12 relaxation:** A progressive modification of the behaviour of a filter during a search operation so as to achieve more matched entries if too few are received, or fewer matched entries if too many are received.

**3.8.13 reply:** A DAP/DSP result or an error; or an LDAP result.

**3.8.14 request:** Information consisting of an operation code and associated components to convey a directory operation from a requester to a performer.

**3.8.15 requester:** A DUA, an LDAP client or a DSA sending a request to perform (i.e., invoke) an operation.

**3.8.16 service controls:** Parameters conveyed as part of an operation, which constrain various aspects of its performance.

**3.8.17 strand:** A family grouping comprising all the members in a path from a leaf family member up to the ancestor inclusive. A family member will reside in as many strands as there are leaf family members below it (as immediate or non-immediate subordinates).

## 4 Abbreviations

For the purposes of this Recommendation | International Standard, the following abbreviations apply:

ACI	Access Control Information
AVA	Attribute Value Assertion
DIB	Directory Information Base
DIT	Directory Information Tree
DMD	Directory Management Domain
DSA	Directory System Agent
DUA	Directory User Agent
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
RDN	Relative Distinguished Name

## 5 Conventions

The term "Directory Specification" (as in "this Directory Specification") shall be taken to mean Rec. ITU-T X.511 | ISO/IEC 9594-3. The term "Directory Specifications" shall be taken to mean the Rec. ITU-T X.500 | ISO/IEC 9594-1, Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2, Rec. ITU-T X.511 | ISO/IEC 9594-3, Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4, Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5, Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6, Rec. ITU-T X.521 | ISO/IEC 9594-7 and Rec. ITU-T X.525 | ISO/IEC 9594-9.

If an International Standard or ITU-T Recommendation is referenced within normal text without an indication of the edition, the edition shall be taken to be the latest one as specified in the normative references clause.

Prior to year 2020, the parts making up the Directory Specifications progressed together and can therefore collectively be identified as the Directory Specifications of a specific edition using the format: Rec. ITU-T X.5\*\* (yyyy) | ISO/IEC 9594-\*:yyyy (e.g.; Rec. ITU-T X.5\*\* (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-\*:1995).


This Directory Specification makes extensive use of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) for the formal specification of data types and values, as it is specified in Rec. ITU-T X.680 | ISO/IEC 8824-1, ITU-T X.681 (2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2, ITU-T X.682 (2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-3, ITU-T X.683 (2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-4 and Rec. ITU-T X.690 | ISO/IEC 8825-1.

This Directory Specification presents ASN.1 notation in the bold Courier New typeface. When ASN.1 types and values are referenced in normal text, they are differentiated from normal text by presenting them in the bold Courier New typeface. The names of procedures, typically referenced when specifying the semantics of processing, are differentiated from normal text by displaying them in bold Times New Roman. Access control permissions are presented in italicized Times New Roman.

If the items in a list are numbered (as opposed to using "-" or letters), then the items shall be considered steps in a procedure.

## 6 Overview of the Directory service

As described in Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2, the services of the Directory are provided through access points to directory user agents (DUAs), each acting on behalf of a user. These concepts are depicted in Figure 1. Through an access point, the Directory provides service to its users by means of a number of Directory operations.



**Figure 1 – Access to the Directory**

The Directory operations are of three different kinds:

- a) Directory Read operations, which interrogate a single Directory entry;
- b) Directory Search operations, which interrogate potentially several Directory entries; and
- c) Directory Modify operations.

The Directory Read operations, the Directory Search operations and the Directory Modify operations are specified in clauses 10, 11, and 12, respectively. Conformance to Directory operations is specified in Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5.

## 7 Information types and common procedures

### 7.1 Introduction

This clause identifies, and in some cases defines, a number of information types which are subsequently used in the definition of Directory operations. The information types concerned are those which are common to more than one operation, are likely to be in the future, or which are sufficiently complex or self-contained as to merit being defined separately from the operation which uses them.

Several of the information types used in the definition of the Directory Service are actually defined elsewhere. Clause 7.2 identifies these types and indicates the source of their definition. Each of the clauses (7.3 to 7.10) identifies and defines an information type.

This clause also specifies some common elements of procedure that apply to most or all of the Directory operations.

### 7.2 Information types defined elsewhere

The following information types are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2:

- a) **Attribute;**
- b) **AttributeType;**
- c) **AttributeValue;**
- d) **AttributeValueAssertion;**
- e) **Context;**
- f) **ContextAssertion;**
- g) **DistinguishedName;**
- h) **Name;**
- i) **OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED;**
- j) **OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ;**
- k) **RelativeDistinguishedName.**

## ISO/IEC 9594-3:2020 (E)

The following information type is defined in Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6:

- a) **PresentationAddress**.

The following information types are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8:

- a) **Certificate**;
- b) **SIGNED**;
- c) **CertificationPath**.

The following information type is defined in Rec. ITU-T X.880 | ISO/IEC 13712-1:

- a) **InvokeId**.

The following information types are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4:

- a) **OperationProgress**;
- b) **ContinuationReference**.

### 7.3 Common arguments

The **CommonArguments** information may be present to qualify the invocation of each operation that the Directory can perform.

```
CommonArguments ::= SET {
  serviceControls      [30] ServiceControls   DEFAULT {},
  securityParameters  [29] SecurityParameters OPTIONAL,
  requestor           [28] DistinguishedName  OPTIONAL,
  operationProgress    [27] OperationProgress
                      DEFAULT {nameResolutionPhase notStarted},
  aliasedRDNs         [26] INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
  criticalExtensions  [25] BIT STRING        OPTIONAL,
  referenceType       [24] ReferenceType     OPTIONAL,
  entryOnly           [23] BOOLEAN          DEFAULT TRUE,
  exclusions          [22] Exclusions        OPTIONAL,
  nameResolveOnMaster [21] BOOLEAN          DEFAULT FALSE,
  operationContexts   [20] ContextSelection  OPTIONAL,
  familyGrouping      [19] FamilyGrouping    DEFAULT entryOnly,
  ... }
```

NOTE 1 – The above data type can only be used when included in set-constructs. An alternative data type **CommonArgumentsSeq** has been defined to be used in sequence-constructs (see Annex A).

The **ServiceControls** component is specified in clause 7.5. Its absence is deemed equivalent to there being an empty set of controls.

The **SecurityParameters** component is specified in clause 7.10. If the argument of the operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** component shall be included. The absence of the **SecurityParameters** component is deemed equivalent to an empty set.

The **requestor** component, when present, shall hold the distinguished name of the originator (requester) of the operation. If the distinguished name of the requester was established at bind time, the **requestor** component shall be equal to that distinguished name. Likewise, it shall be equal to the distinguished name in **subject** field of the end-entity public-key certificate of the requester if the **certification-path** component of the **SecurityParameters** is present.

NOTE 2 – The bound directory system agent (DSA) should check the equality of the distinguished names as indicated above (implementations based on Rec. ITU-T X.511 (2008) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:2008) or earlier editions may not do that).

NOTE 3 – If the distinguished name of the requester was not established at bind time and the **certification-path** component of the **SecurityParameters** is not present in the request, a possible value in the **requestor** component should not be considered reliable for access control purposes.

The **operationProgress**, **referenceType**, **entryOnly**, **exclusions** and **nameResolveOnMaster** components are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4. They are supplied by a DUA either:

- a) when acting on a continuation reference returned by a DSA in response to an earlier operation, and their values are copied by the DUA from the continuation reference; or
- b) when the DUA represents an administrative user that is managing the DSA Information Tree and the **manageDSAIT** option is set in the service controls.

The **aliasedRDNs** component indicates to the DSA that the **object** component of the operation was created by the dereferencing of an alias on an earlier operation attempt. The integer value indicates the number of relative distinguished names (RDNs) in the name that came from dereferencing the alias. (The value would have been set in the referral response of the previous operation.)

NOTE 4 – This component is provided for compatibility with implementations based on Rec CCITT X.511 (1988) | IEC 9594:1990. DUAs (and DSAs) implemented according to later editions of the Directory Specifications shall always omit this parameter from the **CommonArguments** of a subsequent request. In this way, the Directory will not signal an error if aliases dereference to further aliases.

The **operationContexts** component supplies a set of context assertions which are applied to attribute value assertions and entry information selection made within this operation, which do not otherwise contain context assertions for the same attribute type and context type. If **operationContexts** is not present or does not address a particular attribute type or context type, then default context assertions shall be applied by the DSA as described in clause 7.6.1 and in clauses 8.9.2.2 and 12.8 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. If **allContexts** is chosen, then all contexts for all attribute types are valid and context defaults that might have been supplied by the DSA are overridden. (**ContextSelection** is defined in clause 7.6).

**familyGrouping** is used to describe which family members should be selected for processing by a given operation. It is described more fully in clause 7.3.2.

### 7.3.1 Critical extensions

The **criticalExtensions** component provides a mechanism to list a set of extensions that are critical to the performance of a Directory operation. If the originator of the extended operation wishes to indicate that the operation shall be performed with one or more extensions (i.e., that performing the operation without these extensions is not acceptable), it does so by setting the **criticalExtensions** bit(s) which corresponds to the extension(s). If the Directory, or some part of it, is unable to perform a critical extension, it returns an indication of **unavailableCriticalExtension** (as a **serviceError** or **PartialOutcomeQualifier**). If the Directory is unable to perform an extension that is not critical, it ignores the presence of the extension.

This Directory Specification does not establish rules regarding the order in which a performing DSA is to decode and process PDUs that it receives. A DSA that receives an unknown critical extension shall return a **ServiceError** with problem **unavailableCriticalExtension** to signal that the operation failed.

These Directory Specifications define a number of extensions. The extensions take such forms as additional numbered bits in a BIT STRING, or additional components of a SET or SEQUENCE, and are ignored by implementations based on the 1988 edition of the CCITT X.500 Recommendations series or the ISO/IEC 9594:1990 edition. Each such extension is assigned an integer identifier, which is the number of the bit that may be set in **criticalExtensions**. If the criticality of an extension is defined to be critical, the DUA shall set the corresponding bit in **criticalExtensions**. If the defined criticality is non-critical, the DUA may or may not set the corresponding bit in **criticalExtensions**.

The extensions, their identifiers, the operations in which they are permitted, the recommended criticality, the clauses in which they are defined, and the corresponding lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) controls (if any) are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 – Extensions

Extension	Identifier	Operations	Criticality	Defined (clauses)	LDAP control
subentries	1	All	Non-critical	7.5	1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.10.1
copyShallDo	2	Read, Compare, List, Search	Non-critical	7.5	
attribute size limit	3	Read, Search	Non-critical	7.5	
extraAttributes	4	Read, Search	Non-critical	7.6	
modifyRightsRequest	5	Read	Non-critical	10.1	
pagedResultsRequest	6	List, Search	Non-critical	11.1	1.2.840.113556.1.4.319
matchedValuesOnly	7	Search	Non-critical	11.2	1.2.826.0.1.3344810.2.3
extendedFilter	8	Search	Non-critical	11.2	
targetSystem	9	Add Entry	Critical	12.1	
useAliasOnUpdate	10	Add Entry, Remove Entry, Modify Entry	Critical	12.1	
newSuperior	11	Modify DN	Critical	12.4	

Table 1 – Extensions

Extension	Identifier	Operations	Criticality	Defined (clauses)	LDAP control
manageDSAIT	12	All	Critical	7.5, 7.12	2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.2
Use of contexts	13	Read, Compare, List, Search, Add Entry, Modify Entry, Modify DN	Non-critical	7.6, 7.8	
partialNameResolution	14	Read, Search	Non-critical	7.5	
overspecFilter	15	Search	Non-critical	11.1.3 f)	
selectionOnModify	16	Modify Entry	Non-critical	12.3.2	
	17	Reserved		7.10	
Security parameters – Operation code	18	All	Non-critical	7.10	
Security parameters – Attribute certification path	19	All	Non-critical	7.10	
Security parameters – Error Protection	20	All	Non-critical	7.10	
	21-24	Reserved			
Service administration	25	Read, Search, ModifyEntry	Critical	11.2.2, 13, clause 16 of Rec. ITU-T X.501   ISO/IEC 9594-2	
entryCount	26	Search	Non-critical	11.1.3	
hierarchySelections	27	Search	Non-critical	11.2.2	
relaxation	28	Search	Non-critical	7.8	
familyGrouping	29	Compare, Search, RemoveEntry	Non-critical Non-critical Critical	7.3.2, 7.8.3 & 10.2.2 11.2 12.2.2	
familyReturn	30	Read, Search, ModifyEntry	Non-critical Non-critical Non-critical	7.6.4, 7.7.1 & 10.1.3 11.2.3 12.3.3	
dnAttributes	31	Search	Non-critical	11.2.2	
friend attributes	32	Read, Search	Non-critical	7.6, 7.8.2	
Abandon of paged results	33	List, Search	critical	7.9	
Paged results on the DSP	34	List, Search	Non-critical	7.9	
replaceValues	35	ModifyEntry	critical	12.3.1, 12.3.2	1.3.6.1.1.14
NOTE 1 – The first extension is given the identifier 1 and corresponds to bit 1 of the BIT STRING. Bit 0 of the BIT STRING is not used.					
NOTE 2 – Use of signing on errors Add Entry, Remove Entry, Modify Entry, Modify DN requires version 2 or higher of the protocol.					
NOTE 3 – The SPKM credentials extension shall be critical unless used in associations established using version 2 or higher.					

### 7.3.2 Family grouping

Family grouping allows a single family member, several family members or all family members of a compound entry, to be grouped together for joint consideration prior to operation evaluation. These semantics can then be applied to the following operations (as indicated in the descriptions below): Compare (to define the scope within which the compared attribute might lie), Search (to define the groupings for which filtering might take place), Remove Entry (to define the groupings for removal). The following ASN.1 is used to select members of a family:

```
FamilyGrouping ::= ENUMERATED {
  entryOnly      (1),
```

```

compoundEntry (2),
strands (3),
multiStrand (4),
... }

```

**entryOnly** means that the specific family member selected by the operation is to be considered in the group. This is the default value, and ensures backward compatibility with previous editions of the Directory Specifications.

**compoundEntry** means that the complete compound entry selected by the operation is to be considered as a unit by combining all the attributes. For Remove Entry operations, it is only applicable when the object name specified is that of an ancestor of a compound entry, and it causes all family members to be removed by the same operation (subject to access control).

**strands** means that all the strands associated with the family member are to be selected by the operation. This option is not valid for the Remove Entry operation. For the Search operation, individual strands are considered for filter purposes. If the combined set of attributes of one or more strands matches the filter, the compound entry is said to match the filter. If the base object is a child member, only those strands that go through the base object are considered. For Compare operations, all the attributes from all the family members in all the strands to which the entry belongs are to be used in the comparison.

**multiStrand** is only applicable to the Search operation, and qualifies the matching rule for filtering on family information. It is ignored for other operations. It specifies that one strand from each family within a compound entry is to be considered at one time, but in all combinations. **multiStrand** is not applicable if the base object is a child family member, in which case **multiStrand** shall be ignored and **entryOnly** shall be substituted.

## 7.4 Common results

The **CommonResults** or **CommonResultsSeq** information is present to qualify the result of each retrieval operation that the Directory can perform. In addition, it is present in any returned error.

```

CommonResults ::= SET {
  securityParameters [30] SecurityParameters OPTIONAL,
  performer [29] DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
  aliasDereferenced [28] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  notification [27] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
    {{SupportedAttributes}} OPTIONAL,
  ... }

```

```

CommonResultsSeq ::= SEQUENCE {
  securityParameters [30] SecurityParameters OPTIONAL,
  performer [29] DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
  aliasDereferenced [28] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  notification [27] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
    {{SupportedAttributes}} OPTIONAL,
  ... }

```

NOTE – **CommonResults** and **CommonResultsSeq** consist of the same components. The former is used when included in set types by the **COMPONENT OF** type, while the latter is used similarly in sequence types.

The **SecurityParameters** component is specified in clause 7.10. If the result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** component shall be included in the result. The absence of the **SecurityParameters** component is deemed equivalent to an empty set.

The **performer** Distinguished Name identifies the performer of a particular operation. It may be required when the result is to be signed (see clause 7.10) and shall hold the name of the DSA that signed the result.

The **aliasDereferenced** component is set to **TRUE** when the purported name of an object or base object which is the target of the operation included any aliases which were dereferenced.

The **notification** component shall be used to qualify returned result and error APDUs, for example providing more precise error information. Standard notification attributes are defined in clause 6.13 of Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6. Such notification attributes are not necessarily stored in directory entries.

## 7.5 Service controls

A **ServiceControls** parameter contains the controls, if any, that are to direct or constrain the provision of the service.

```
ServiceControls ::= SET {
  options           [0] ServiceControlOptions DEFAULT {},
  priority          [1] INTEGER {low(0), medium(1), high(2)} DEFAULT medium,
  timeLimit        [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
  sizeLimit        [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
  scopeOfReferral  [4] INTEGER {dmd(0), country(1)} OPTIONAL,
  attributeSizeLimit [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
  manageDSAITPlaneRef [6] SEQUENCE {
    dsaName          Name,
    agreementID      AgreementID,
    ...} OPTIONAL,
  serviceType      [7] OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
  userClass        [8] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
  ... }
```

```
ServiceControlOptions ::= BIT STRING {
  preferChaining      (0),
  chainingProhibited (1),
  localScope          (2),
  dontUseCopy         (3),
  dontDereferenceAliases (4),
  subentries          (5),
  copyShallDo        (6),
  partialNameResolution (7),
  manageDSAIT        (8),
  noSubtypeMatch     (9),
  noSubtypeSelection (10),
  countFamily        (11),
  dontSelectFriends  (12),
  dontMatchFriends   (13),
  allowWriteableCopy (14)}
```

The **options** component contains a number of indications, each of which, if set, asserts the condition suggested. Thus:

- a) **preferChaining** indicates that the preference is that chaining, rather than referrals, be used to provide the service. The Directory is not obliged to follow this preference.
- b) **chainingProhibited** indicates that chaining, and other methods of distributing the request around the Directory, are prohibited.
- c) **localScope** indicates that the operation is to be limited to a local scope. The definition of this option is itself a local matter, for example, within a single DSA or a single directory management domain (DMD).
- d) **dontUseCopy** indicates that copied information as defined in Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4 shall not be used to provide the service.
- e) **dontDereferenceAliases** indicates that any alias used to identify the entry affected by an operation is not to be dereferenced.

NOTE 1 – This is necessary to allow reference to an alias entry itself rather than the aliased entry, e.g., in order to read the alias entry.

- f) **subentries** indicates that a Search or List operation is to access subentries only; normal entries become inaccessible, i.e., the Directory behaves as though normal entries do not exist. If this service control is not set, then the operation accesses normal entries only and subentries become inaccessible. The service control is ignored for operations other than Search or List.

NOTE 2 – The effects of subentries on access control, schema and collective attributes are still observed even if subentries are inaccessible.

NOTE 3 – If this service control is set, normal entries may still be specified as the base object of an operation.

- g) **copyShallDo** indicates that if the Directory is able to partly but not fully satisfy a query at a copy of an entry, it shall not chain the query. It is meaningful only if **dontUseCopy** is not set. If **copyShallDo** is not set, the Directory will use shadow data only if it is sufficiently complete to allow the operation to be fully satisfied at the copy. A query may be only partly satisfied because some of the requested attributes are missing in the shadow copy, some of the attribute values for a given attribute are missing in the shadow copy, because the DSA does not hold all context information for the attribute values it does have, or because the DSA holding the shadowed data does not support the requested matching rules on that data. If

**copyShallDo** is set and the Directory is not able to fully satisfy a query, it shall set **incompleteEntry** in the returned entry information.

- h) **partialNameResolution** indicates that if the Directory is able to resolve only part of the purported name in a Read or Search operation, i.e., it is about to return a **nameError**, the entry whose name consists of all resolved RDNs is to be considered the target of the operation and **partialName** is set to **TRUE** in the result. This service control is ignored for operations other than Read or Search.

NOTE 4 – If this service control is set, the purported name is a context prefix entry to which access is denied, and the requester has access to the superior entry, then the existence of the context prefix entry will be indirectly disclosed to the requester even if *DiscloseOnError* permission to the entry is denied.

- i) **manageDSAIT** indicates that the operation has been requested by an administrative user so that the DSA Information Tree is managed. If multiple replication planes exist in the DSA to be managed, and the **manageDSAITPlaneRef** service control has not been included in the operation, then the DSA selects a suitable replication plane for the operation.
- j) **noSubtypeMatch** indicates that attribute subtype matching shall not be attempted. This service control is ignored for operations other than Compare and Search operations.
- k) **noSubtypeSelection** indicates that subtype selection shall not be made.
- l) **countFamily** indicates that each member of a compound entry shall be counted as a separate entry, e.g., for the purposes of size and administrative limits, and relaxation controls. If this control is not set, then members of a compound attribute shall be counted as a single entry.
- m) **dontSelectFriends** indicates that the specification of an anchor attribute in entry information selection does not automatically include friend attributes in the selection.
- n) **dontMatchFriends** indicates that the specification of an anchor attribute in a filter item can only be satisfied by the values of the anchor attribute, and not by friend attributes.
- o) **allowWriteableCopy** indicates that a DSE of type **writeableCopy** is acceptable in the provision of a query service request.

NOTE 5 – The **allowWriteableCopy** service control is distinct from **copyShallDo** in that this service control is used to indicate that a complete copy is requested, but that it does not need to be the primary master, whereas **copyShallDo** is used to indicate that any copy, whether complete or not, is acceptable.

If this component is omitted, the following are assumed: no preference for chaining but chaining not prohibited, no limit on the scope of the operation, use of copy permitted, aliases shall be dereferenced (except for modify operations for which alias dereferencing is not supported), subentries are not accessible, and operations that cannot be fully satisfied by shadowed data are subject to further chaining. However, these defaults may be overwritten by search-rules within service-specific administrative areas.

The **priority** service control (**low**, **medium**, or **high**) indicates the priority at which the service is to be provided. Note that this is not a guaranteed service in that the Directory, as a whole, does not implement queuing. There is no relationship implied with the use of priorities in underlying layers.

The **timeLimit** service control indicates the maximum elapsed time, in seconds, within which the service shall be provided. If the constraint cannot be met, an error is reported. If this component is omitted, no time limit is implied. In the case of time limit exceeded on a List or Search, the result is an arbitrary selection of the accumulated results.

NOTE 6 – This component does not imply the length of time spent processing the request during the elapsed time: any number of DSAs may be involved in processing the request during the elapsed time.

The **sizeLimit** service control is only applicable to List and Search operations. It indicates the maximum number of entries to be returned when paged results are not to be returned. In the case of size limit exceeded, the results of a List or Search operation may be an arbitrary selection of the accumulated results, equal in number to the size limit. Any further results shall be discarded. When paged results are being returned, the value of **sizeLimit** shall be ignored by the DSA performing the paging as detailed in clause 7.9.

The **scopeOfReferral** service control indicates the scope to which a referral returned by a DSA should be relevant. Depending on whether the values **dmd** or **country** are selected, only referrals to other DSAs within the selected scope shall be returned. This applies to the referrals in both a **referral** error and the **unexplored** parameter of **list** and **search** results.

The **attributeSizeLimit** service control indicates the largest size of any attribute (i.e., the type and all its values) that is included in returned entry information. If an attribute exceeds this limit, all of its values are omitted from the returned entry information and **incompleteEntry** is set in the returned entry information. The size of an attribute is taken to be its size in octets in the local concrete syntax of the DSA holding the data. Because of different ways applications store the data, the limit is imprecise. If this parameter is not specified, no limit is implied.

NOTE 7 – Attribute values returned as part of an entry's Distinguished Name are exempt from this limit.

Certain combinations of **priority**, **timeLimit**, and **sizeLimit** may result in conflicts. For example, a short time limit could conflict with low priority; a high size limit could conflict with a low time limit, etc.

The **manageDSAITPlaneRef** service control indicates that the operation has been requested by an administrative user so that a specific replication plane of the DSA Information Tree is managed. The **manageDSAITPlaneRef** service control is ignored if the **manageDSAIT** option is not set. The plane is identified by the **dsaName** component which is the name of the supplying DSA and the **agreementID** component which contains the shadowing agreement identifier.

The **serviceType** service control is only relevant for a **search** request that starts its initial evaluation phase within a service-specific administrative area; it is otherwise ignored. If supplied, it increases the possibility of getting useful notification information returned in case of a faulty formulated **search** request.

The **userClass** service control is only relevant for a **search** request that starts its initial evaluation phase within a service-specific administrative area and is otherwise ignored. It identifies a user-class. It allows a requester to specify another user-class than the Directory would otherwise apply. If supplied, it also increases the possibility of getting useful notification information returned in case of a faulty formulated search request.

## 7.6 Entry information selection

An instance of the **EntryInformationSelection** data type indicates what information is being requested from an entry in a retrieval operation.

```
EntryInformationSelection ::= SET {
  attributes                CHOICE {
    allUserAttributes        [0] NULL,
    select                   [1] SET OF AttributeType
    -- empty set implies no attributes are requested -- } DEFAULT allUserAttributes:NULL,
  infoTypes                [2] INTEGER {
    attributeTypesOnly       (0),
    attributeTypesAndValues (1)} DEFAULT attributeTypesAndValues,
  extraAttributes          CHOICE {
    allOperationalAttributes [3] NULL,
    select                   [4] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeType } OPTIONAL,
  contextSelection         ContextSelection OPTIONAL,
  returnContexts           BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  familyReturn             FamilyReturn DEFAULT
    {memberSelect contributingEntriesOnly} }
```

```
ContextSelection ::= CHOICE {
  allContexts              NULL,
  selectedContexts        SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF TypeAndContextAssertion,
  ... }
```

```
TypeAndContextAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
  type                     AttributeType,
  contextAssertions       CHOICE {
    preference             SEQUENCE OF ContextAssertion,
    all                   SET OF ContextAssertion,
    ...},
  ... }
```

```
FamilyReturn ::= SEQUENCE {
  memberSelect            ENUMERATED {
    contributingEntriesOnly (1),
    participatingEntriesOnly (2),
    compoundEntry           (3),
    ...},
  familySelect           SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT-CLASS.&id OPTIONAL,
  ... }
```

The **attributes** component specifies the user and operational attributes for which information is requested:

- a) If the **select** option is chosen, then the attributes involved are listed. If the list is empty, then no attributes shall be returned. Information about a selected attribute shall be returned if the attribute is present. An **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall only be returned if none of the attributes selected is present.
- b) If the **allUserAttributes** option is selected, then information is requested about all user attributes in the entry.

Attribute information is only returned if access rights are sufficient. A **securityError** (with problem **insufficientAccessRights**) shall only be returned in the case where access rights preclude the reading of all attribute values requested. Note that access control is also applied to the attributes and values eligible to be returned according to the components of **EntryInformationSelection**, and may further reduce the information that is returned.

NOTE 1 – Access control is also applied to the attributes and values eligible to be returned according to the components of **EntryInformationSelection**, and may further reduce the information that is returned.

The **infoTypes** component specifies whether both attribute type and attribute value information (the default) or attribute type information only is requested. If an attribute is of a type that is a carrier of other attributes, e.g., a **family-information** attribute, then the value(s) shall be returned independent of the setting of the **infoTypes** component, but the **infoTypes** specification shall be applied to the contained attributes. If the **attributes** component is such as to request no attributes, then this component is not meaningful.

The **extraAttributes** component specifies a set of additional user and operational attributes for which information is requested. If the **allOperationalAttributes** option is chosen, then information is requested about all directory operational attributes in the entry. If the **select** option is chosen, then information about the listed attributes is requested.

NOTE 2 – This component may be used to request information about, for example, specific operational attributes when **attributes** is set to **allUserAttributes**, or about all operational attributes. If the same attribute is listed or implied in both **attributes** and **extraAttributes**, it is treated as though it has been requested only once.

A request for a particular attribute is always treated as a request for the attribute and all *subtypes* of that attribute (except for requests processed by implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.511 (1988) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990) if the **noSubtypeSelection** service control option is not set. If the **noSubtypeSelection** service control option is set, only the requested attributes are returned, not their subtypes. Similarly, a request for a particular attribute that has friends is treated as a request for the attribute and all friend attributes, subject to the **dontSelectFriends** service control option not being set.

In responding to a request for attribute information, the Directory treats all *collective attributes* of an entry as if they were actual user attributes of the entry, i.e., they are selected like other user attributes and are merged into the returned entry information. A request for **allUserAttributes** requests all collective attributes of the entry as well as ordinary attributes of the entry. An attribute is a collective attribute of an entry if all of the following are true:

- a) it is located in a subtree whose subtree specification includes the entry;
- b) it is not excluded by the presence in the entry of a **collectiveExclusions** attribute value equal to the collective attribute type; and
- c) it is permitted by the content rule for the structural object class for the entry.

The **contextSelection** component is used to specify which attribute values shall be returned of the attributes selected by **attributes** or **extraAttributes**. The **contextSelection** is evaluated only against the values of attributes that are candidates to be returned according to those other components of **EntryInformationSelection**. The evaluation of **contextSelection**, and the use of defaults if it is not supplied, is discussed in clauses 7.6.1 to 7.6.3.

If the **infoTypes** component is such as to request no attribute values, or the **attributes** component is such as to request no attributes, then the **contextSelection** component is not meaningful. If, as a result of applying **contextSelection**, there are no values of an attribute eligible to be returned, the attribute may be returned without any values.

The **returnContexts** component is used to request the Directory to return attribute values with their associated context lists. If this component is absent or is specified with a value of **FALSE**, then no context information is returned in the result. If this component is specified with a value of **TRUE**, then all context information is returned for each attribute value returned. Note that the **contextSelection** component does not selectively affect which context information is returned when **returnContexts** is **TRUE**.

The **familyReturn** component (if present) is used to determine which entries within a compound entry shall be returned if one or more family members have been marked (see clause 7.6.4).

### 7.6.1 Use of contextSelection or context selection defaults

The **contextSelection** component is used to select certain attribute values of attributes selected by **attributes** or **extraAttributes**. The **contextSelection** is evaluated only against the values of attributes that are candidates to be returned according to those other components of **EntryInformationSelection**. For each attribute value, any context selection governing its attribute type shall evaluate to TRUE (as defined in clause 7.6.2), in order for that attribute value to be selected.

A **contextSelection** is said to govern one or more attribute types if any of the following conditions occur:

- the **ContextSelection** data type specifies **allContexts** (in which case all attribute values of all attribute types are selected);
- the **ContextSelection** data type has a **selectedContexts** component which includes a set of **TypeAndContextAssertion** data types where the **type** component specifies an attribute type, including its subtypes, that is governed by the **contextAssertions** components; or
- the **ContextSelection** data type has a **selectedContexts** component which includes a **TypeAndContextAssertion** data type where the **type** component specifies the object identifier **id-oa-allAttributeTypes**.

If **contextSelection** is not provided or it does not govern the given attribute type, then a default **contextSelection** shall be applied. In addition to **contextSelection** in **EntryInformationSelection**, there are three potential sources for a **contextSelection**: that specified for the operation as a whole, that available within subentries in the directory information tree (DIT), and that available locally in the DSA. They are applied according to the following precedence:

- 1) If **contextSelection** is present in **EntryInformationSelection** and it governs the given attribute type as described above, then it shall be applied.
- 2) If **contextSelection** is not present within the **EntryInformationSelection**, or it is present but does not govern the given attribute type, then the **operationContexts** which has been supplied for the operation as described in clause 7.3 shall be applied if one is present and it governs the given attribute type as described above.
- 3) If the request has neither a **contextSelection** in the **EntryInformationSelection** nor **operationContexts** for the operation, or neither governs the given attribute, then the values of the **contextAssertionDefaults** attribute in the context assertion subentries (if any) controlling the entry shall be applied as the **selectedContexts**. (Context assertion subentries are described in clause 14.7 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2).
- 4) If there is no **contextSelection** from the sources described above that govern the given attribute type, then the DSA may apply a locally-defined default **contextSelection**. Such a default shall typically reflect local parameters, such as the language or location of the place of deployment of the DSA, or the current time of day, but may be tailored differently by the DSA for each DUA to which it responds.
- 5) If no **contextSelection** is available from any of these sources that govern the given attribute type, then all values of the attribute are considered selected (i.e., **allContexts** is assumed as the base default).

NOTE – A default **contextSelection** that governs the given attribute type and makes an assertion about a certain context type shall be applied in addition to an earlier **contextSelection** governing the same attribute type but making an assertion about a different context type, in the same order of precedence as described above.

### 7.6.2 Evaluation of contextSelection

A **contextSelection** is TRUE (i.e., selects a given attribute value) if:

- a) **allContexts** is specified (this permits a context selection to override any default that might otherwise be applied if this **contextSelection** were omitted); or
- b) each **TypeAndContextAssertion** in **selectedContexts** is TRUE as described in clause 7.6.3.

A **contextSelection** is FALSE otherwise.

### 7.6.3 Evaluation of a TypeAndContextAssertion

A **TypeAndContextAssertion** is TRUE (i.e., selects a given attribute value) if:

- a) the type of the attribute is not the same as (nor a subtype of) the **type** in the **TypeAndContextAssertion** and the **type** in the **TypeAndContextAssertion** is not **id-oa-allAttributeTypes**. In this case, the **TypeAndContextAssertion** is not applicable to the attribute type of the given attribute value and so does not eliminate the attribute value from selection; or

- b) for the attribute value, the **contextAssertions** in **TypeAndContextAssertion** is TRUE as defined below.

NOTE 1 – The OBJECT IDENTIFIER value **id-oa-allAttributeTypes** may be used as the value of **type** in the **TypeAndContextAssertion** to force evaluation of the **contextAssertions** against an attribute value of any attribute type.

**contextAssertions** is expressed either as an ordered sequence of preferred contexts or as a compound set of context assertions:

- a) If **all** is specified, then **contextAssertions** is TRUE for any attribute value only if each **ContextAssertion** in the SET is TRUE, as defined in clause 8.9.2.4 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.
- b) If **preference** is specified, then each **ContextAssertion** in the SEQUENCE is evaluated in turn against all candidate attribute values of the same attribute type, until a **ContextAssertion** evaluates TRUE as defined in clause 8.9.2.4 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. (The **fallback** flag, if present, is not taken into consideration until the entire SEQUENCE is exhausted.) Once a **ContextAssertion** evaluates TRUE for one of the candidate attribute values, it shall be evaluated for every candidate attribute value of the same attribute type, but subsequent **ContextAssertion** in the SEQUENCE are ignored.

NOTE 2 – **preference** provides a means for selection to be specified in terms of a first, second, etc., choice of context (e.g., Language = French but if no French then Language = English).

A **TypeAndContextAssertion** is FALSE otherwise.

## 7.6.4 Family Return

The **familyReturn** component is used to determine which entries within a compound entry shall be returned if one or more family members have been marked as contributing or participating members. The procedures for how family members are marked are further described in clause 7.13.

The **memberSelect** component specifies which entries are selected for return in the result:

- **contributingEntriesOnly** means that only family members marked as contributing members by the operation are to be returned. In the case of Read or Modify-Entry operations, this is the family member identified by the **object** operation argument; for the Search operation, it includes family members that contributed to the match.
- **participatingEntriesOnly** means that only family members marked as participating members by the operation are to be returned. In the case of Read or Modify-Entry, this is the same as for **contributingEntriesOnly**.
- **compoundEntry** means that each family member within the compound entry is to be returned, except those that possibly have been explicitly unmarked by a governing-search-rule for a Search operation.

The **familySelect** component supplements the **memberSelect** component by specifying that all child members of selected families shall be returned in addition to what is specified by **memberSelect**. The sequence of elements has no significance. A family is identified by the structural object class of the family members immediately subordinate to the ancestor. This component has no effect if the **memberSelect** specifies **compoundEntry**.

NOTE – A governing-search-rule may modify what information shall be returned (see clause 16.10 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2).

## 7.7 Entry information

### 7.7.1 Entry information data type

The **EntryInformation** data type conveys selected information from an entry.

```
EntryInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
    name                Name,
    fromEntry           BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    information          SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF CHOICE {
        attributeType   AttributeType,
        attribute        Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
        ... } OPTIONAL,
    incompleteEntry     [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    partialName         [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    derivedEntry        [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ... }

```

The **Name** parameter indicates the Distinguished Name of the entry or the name of an alias to the entry. The Distinguished Name of the entry is returned whenever permitted by the access control policy. If access is allowed to the attributes of the entry but not to its Distinguished Name, the Directory may return either an error or the name of a valid alias to the entry.

NOTE 1 – If the entry was located using an alias, then that alias is known to be a valid alias. Otherwise, how it is ensured that the alias is valid, is outside the scope of these Directory Specifications.

NOTE 2 – Where a particular component of the Directory has a choice of alias names available to it for return, it is recommended that where possible it chooses the same alias name for repeated requests by the same requester, in order to provide a consistent service.

The **fromEntry** parameter indicates whether the information was obtained from the entry (**TRUE**) or a copy of the entry (**FALSE**).

The **information** parameter is included if any attribute information from the entry is being returned, and contains a set of **attributeTypes** and **attributes**, as appropriate.

The **incompleteEntry** parameter is included and set to **TRUE** whenever the returned entry information is incomplete in relation to the user's request, e.g., because attributes or attribute values are omitted for reasons of access control (and their existence is permitted to be disclosed), the presence of incomplete shadow information together with **copyShallDo**, or because the **attributeSizeLimit** has been exceeded. It is not set to **TRUE** because an alias name has been returned instead of the Distinguished Name (this component is not present for implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.511 (1988) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990).

The Directory shall complete the name resolution phase of operations in its entirety (including checking all relevant knowledge references, following up on referrals, etc.) before the **partialNameResolution** service control is considered. If all name resolution options have been exhausted and at least one RDN has been resolved, the **partialName** component is included and set to **TRUE** if the request had the **partialNameResolution** service control set and the Directory was unable to complete name resolution on all RDNs of the relevant entry. When **partialName** is returned as **TRUE**, it indicates that the information being returned is from the entry at the point where the last RDN was successfully resolved. This function is only available for implementations based on Rec. ITU-T X.511 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:1998 or later editions.

The **derivedEntry** parameter is included and set to **TRUE** whenever the returned entry information contains joined results obtained by performing a join on data that originated from more than one directory entry. When this parameter is **TRUE**, the value in **name** may be the name of any of the related entries from which the entry information is derived, or it may be the name of an alias to any of those entries. The value in **name** should not be used in subsequent operations. If the **derivedEntry** parameter is set to **TRUE** and the response is signed, the signature is that of the DSA performing the join. This function is only available for implementations based on Rec. ITU-T X.511 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:2001 or later editions.

### 7.7.2 Family information in entry information

When information from a compound entry is to be returned, attributes from each member to be returned are selected according to the **EntryInformationSelection** (possibly modified by a governing-search-rule). When the **separateFamilyMembers** search control option is set in the **search** request, each member is returned as a separate entry. Otherwise, if more than one member is to be returned, the entry information shall be packed in such a way that the information appears to come from a single entry, which can be the ancestor or a subordinate member (the latter is appropriate when the base object of the **search** request is a family member subordinate to the ancestor and the ancestor has not been selected by **FamilyReturn**). The attributes from the other members shall be packed into a **family-information** derived attribute as described below.

NOTE 1 – According to the above, multiple family members are always packed in a **read** or **modifyEntry** result.

The use of the **family-information** derived attribute is for packaging only; the attribute does not exist as a distinct entity; it cannot directly be selected by **entryInformationSelection** (any attempt to do so shall be ignored), nor can it be protected directly by access control.

```
family-information ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX  FamilyEntries
    USAGE       directoryOperation
    ID          id-at-family-information }

FamilyEntries ::= SEQUENCE {
    family-class OBJECT-CLASS.&id, -- structural object class value
    familyEntries SEQUENCE OF FamilyEntry,
    ... }
```

```

FamilyEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
    rdn                RelativeDistinguishedName,
    information        SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
        attributeType  AttributeType,
        attribute       Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
        ... },
    family-info       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF FamilyEntries OPTIONAL,
    ... }

```

The **family-information** attribute is a multi-valued attribute. If the ancestor is designated as the source of information, each attribute value holds information from a single family. If a family member subordinate to the ancestor is designated as the source of information, information is sorted into attribute values based on the structural object classes of the immediately subordinate members of the designated member.

Each family member that is selected is represented by a value of type **FamilyEntry**, which contains:

- Selected attribute information (where appropriate), either as an attribute type or as a complete attribute, depending on the **infoTypes** value in **EntryInformationSelection**;

NOTE 2 – As stated in clause 7.6, the **infoTypes** specification only applies for the contained attributes, not for the **family-information** attribute itself.

- Any nested **FamilyEntries** information in the form of a complete **family-information** attribute, collected in terms of the structural object classes of the subordinate entries.
- Unselected entries are not represented at all unless they are superior to one or more family members that have been selected.

## 7.8 Filter

### 7.8.1 Filter parameter

A **Filter** parameter applies a test that is either satisfied or not by a particular entry. The filter is expressed in terms of assertions about the presence or value of certain attributes of the entry, and is satisfied if, and only if it evaluates to TRUE.

NOTE – A filter may be TRUE, FALSE or UNDEFINED.

```

Filter ::= CHOICE {
    item [0] FilterItem,
    and  [1] SET OF Filter,
    or   [2] SET OF Filter,
    not  [3] Filter,
    ... }

```

```

FilterItem ::= CHOICE {
    equality          [0] AttributeValueAssertion,
    substrings       [1] SEQUENCE {
        type          ATTRIBUTE.&id({SupportedAttributes}),
        strings       SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
            initial   [0] ATTRIBUTE.&Type
                        ({{SupportedAttributes}}{@substrings.type}),
            any        [1] ATTRIBUTE.&Type
                        ({{SupportedAttributes}}{@substrings.type}),
            final      [2] ATTRIBUTE.&Type
                        ({{SupportedAttributes}}{@substrings.type}),
            control    Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
            -- Used to specify interpretation of following items
            ... },
            ... },
    greaterOrEqual   [2] AttributeValueAssertion,
    lessOrEqual      [3] AttributeValueAssertion,
    present          [4] AttributeType,
    approximateMatch [5] AttributeValueAssertion,
    extensibleMatch  [6] MatchingRuleAssertion,
    contextPresent   [7] AttributeTypeAssertion,
    ... }

```

```

MatchingRuleAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
    matchingRule [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF MATCHING-RULE.&id,
    type         [2] AttributeType OPTIONAL,
    matchValue   [3] MATCHING-RULE.&AssertionType (CONSTRAINED BY {
        -- matchValue shall be a value of type specified by the &AssertionType field of

```

```
-- one of the MATCHING-RULE information objects identified by matchingRule -- }),
dnAttributes [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
... }
```

A **Filter** is either a **FilterItem** (see clause 7.8.2), or an expression involving simpler filters composed together with the logical operators **and**, **or**, and **not**. The evaluation of a filter can be affected by the action of a relaxation policy, which can cause a substitution of one matching rule for another, or can supply values that are to be considered for matching.

A **Filter** which is a **FilterItem** has the value of the **FilterItem** (i.e., TRUE, FALSE or UNDEFINED).

A **Filter** which is the **and** of a set of filters is TRUE if the set is empty or if each filter is TRUE; it is FALSE if at least one filter is FALSE; otherwise, it is UNDEFINED (i.e., if at least one filter is UNDEFINED and no filters are FALSE).

A **Filter** which is the **or** of a set of filters is FALSE if the set is empty or if each filter is FALSE; it is TRUE if at least one filter is TRUE; otherwise, it is UNDEFINED (i.e., if at least one filter is UNDEFINED and no filters are TRUE).

A **Filter** which is the **not** of a filter is TRUE if the filter is FALSE; FALSE if it is TRUE; and UNDEFINED if it is UNDEFINED.

A non-negated filter item is defined as one that is nested within an even number of **not** elements (possibly zero) within the outermost **Filter**. Thus, a filter comprising only filter items in an **and** or **or** combination would only contain non-negated items. A negated filter item is defined as one nested within an odd number of **not** elements within the outermost **Filter**.

### 7.8.2 Filter item

A **FilterItem** is an assertion about the presence or value(s) of attributes in the entry under test. An assertion about a particular attribute type is also satisfied if the entry contains a subtype of the attribute and the assertion is TRUE for the subtype and the **noSubtypeMatch** service control option is not set, or if there is a collective attribute of the entry (see clause 7.6) for which the assertion is TRUE, or if:

- the **dontMatchFriends** service control option is not set; and
- the entry contains a friend attribute for the specified attribute which has a matching rule compatible with the assertion; and
- the assertion is TRUE for the friend attribute.

Each assertion is TRUE, FALSE or UNDEFINED.

Every **FilterItem** includes or implies one or more **AttributeTypes** which identify the particular attribute(s) concerned.

Any assertion about the values of such an attribute is only defined if the **AttributeType** is known by the evaluating mechanism, the purported **AttributeValue(s)** conforms to the attribute syntax defined for that attribute type, the implied or indicated matching rule is applicable to that attribute type, and (when used) a presented **matchValue** conforms to the syntax defined for the indicated matching rules. When these conditions are not met, the **FilterItem** shall evaluate to the logical value UNDEFINED.

NOTE 1 – Access control restrictions may affect the evaluation of the **FilterItem** and may cause the **FilterItem** to evaluate to UNDEFINED.

An assertion which is defined by these conditions additionally evaluates to UNDEFINED if it relates to an attribute value and the attribute type is not present in an attribute against which the assertion is being tested. An assertion which is defined by these conditions and relates to the presence of an attribute type evaluates to FALSE.

Attribute value assertions in filter items are evaluated using the matching rules defined for that attribute type, as substituted for, where applicable, in accordance with the action of a relaxation policy. Matching rule assertions are evaluated as specified in their definition. A matching rule defined for a particular syntax can only be used to make assertions about attributes of that syntax or subtypes of that syntax.

NOTE 2 – The action of a relaxation policy can cause a particular matching rule to revert to a **nullMatch** matching rule (which always evaluates as TRUE (if non-negated) or FALSE (if negated)) – see clause 8.7.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6.

A **FilterItem** may be UNDEFINED (as described above). Otherwise, where the **FilterItem** asserts:

- a) **equality** – It is TRUE if, and only if there is a value of the attribute or one of its subtypes for which the **equality** matching rule applied to that value and the presented value returns TRUE.
- b) **substrings** – It is TRUE if, and only if there is a value of the attribute or one of its subtypes for which the **substring** matching rule applied to that value and the presented value in **strings** returns TRUE. See Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6 for a description of the semantics of the presented value.

- c) **greaterOrEqual** – It is TRUE if, and only if there is a value of the attribute or one of its subtypes for which the **ordering** matching rule applied to that value and the presented value returns FALSE, i.e., there is a value of the attribute which is *greater than or equal to* the presented value.
- d) **lessOrEqual** – It is TRUE if, and only if there is a value of the attribute or one of its subtypes for which either the **equality** matching rule or the **ordering** matching rule applied to that value and the presented value returns TRUE, i.e., there is a value of the attribute which is *less than or equal to* the presented value.
- e) **present** – It is TRUE if, and only if the attribute or one of its subtypes is present in the entry.
- f) **approximateMatch** – It is TRUE if, and only if there is a value of the attribute or one of its subtypes for which a locally-defined approximate matching algorithm (e.g., spelling variations, phonetic match, etc.) returns TRUE. If an item matches for equality, it shall also satisfy an approximate match. Otherwise, there are no specific guidelines for approximate matching in this edition of this Directory Specification. If approximate matching is not supported, this **FilterItem** should be treated as a match for **equality**.
- g) **extensibleMatch** – It is TRUE if, and only if there is a value of the attribute with the indicated **type** or one of its subtypes for which the matching rule specified in **matchingRule** applied to that value and the presented value **matchValue** returns TRUE.

If several matching rules are given, the way in which these rules are combined into a new rule is unspecified (it is a locally-defined algorithm, which reflects the semantics of the constituent matching rules, e.g., **phonetic** + **keyword** match).

If **type** is omitted, the match is made against all attribute types which are compatible with that matching rule. If **dnAttributes** is TRUE, the attributes of the Distinguished Name of the entry are used in addition to those of the entry in evaluating the match.

If an **extensibleMatch** is requested in a **filter** (rather than an **extendedFilter**), the **extendedFilter** bit in the **criticalExtensions** parameter in **CommonArguments** shall be set, indicating that the extension is critical.

If an implementation does not support any of the matching rules defined in the **matchingRule** subcomponent, or if none of the matching rules are compatible with the attribute type, an **extensibleMatch** filter item evaluates to UNDEFINED if the **performExactly** search control option is not set. If the **performExactly** search control option is set, the **search** request is rejected with:

- a **serviceError** with problem **unsupportedMatchingUse**;
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-unsupportedMatchingRule** if all the matching rules are unsupported, otherwise with the value **id-pr-unsupportedMatchingUse**;
- an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as value the attribute type for which the invalid matching rules were defined; and
- a **matchingRuleList** notification attribute which has as values the object identifiers of the unsupported and/or incompatible matching rules.

NOTE 3 – An **extensibleMatch** is not permitted for implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.500 (1988) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990.

- h) **contextPresent** – It is TRUE if, and only if, the **AttributeTypeAssertion** for this attribute type or, if the **noSubtypeMatch** service control option is not set, one of its subtypes evaluates to TRUE.

If context assertions are included in an attribute value assertion in a filter item, then the filter item is evaluated against only those values which satisfy all the given context assertions, as described in clause 8.9.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. If no context assertions are included in an attribute value assertion, then default context assertions shall be applied as described in clause 8.9.2.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

### 7.8.3 Evaluating filters with family information

Specific family groupings work as follows in fulfilling filter requirements:

**entryOnly** means that only family members that completely fulfil the filter requirements are marked as contributing and participating members (for the definition of contributing and participating members, see clause 7.13).

**compoundEntry** means that the entire compound entry forms the group that shall satisfy the complete filter; within each compound entry that satisfies the filter, family members that contribute to the match are marked as contributing members, while all members of the compound entry are marked as participating entries.

**strands** means that the filter applies to each complete strand from a leaf to the ancestor. The compound entry matches the filter if at least one strand matches the filter. Family members on a matching strand that contribute to the match are marked as contributing members, while all the members on a matching strand are marked as participating members.

A strand is a set of members within a family that form a path from a leaf to the ancestor, so that there are as many strands as there are leaf entries.

**multiStrand** means that a combination of one strand from each family class is a family grouping for the purpose of matching. All combinations are to be considered one at a time. The compound entry matches the filter if at least one combination of strands matches the filter. Family members on a matching strand combination that contribute to the match are marked as contributing members, while all members of a matching strand combination are marked as participating members.

Two strands are of the same family class if, and only if the family members that are immediately subordinate to the ancestor have the same structural object class.

A strand is matched for a filter if, and only if it is present in at least one of all possible combinations of strands that causes the entry to match for the subfilter. The following are corollaries:

- If the ancestor matches the subfilter completely, *all* strands are matched.
- Similarly, if there are three family classes for a particular ancestor, and the subfilter is fulfilled by two of the classes without considering the third one, all strands for the third family class are matched.

**multiStrand** is only applicable if the base object is the ancestor (or higher) in the DIT. If the base object is a family member, but not the ancestor, then **multiStrand** shall be ignored and **entryOnly** shall be substituted.

## 7.9 Paged results

A **PagedResultsRequest** parameter is used by the DUA to request that the results of a List or Search operation be returned to it "page-by-page": it requests the DSA to return only a subset – a page – of the results of the operation, in particular the next **pageSize** subordinates or entries, and to return a **queryReference** which can be used to request the next set of results on a follow-up query.

Paged results may either be performed by the DSA to which the DUA has bound by a Bind operation (the bound DSA) or by the DSA that started the initial evaluation phase (the initial performer as detailed in clause 15.5.5 of Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4).

It shall not be used if results are to be signed, unless there is an understanding among DSAs cooperating to provide the paged results that the DSA performing the paging may remove the signatures on results received from other DSAs and then itself sign the results to be returned toward the DUA. The way such an understanding is established is outside the scope of this Directory Specification. Although a DUA may request **pagedResults**, a DSA is permitted to ignore the request and return its results in the normal manner.

NOTE 1 – The result may be unpredictable in case of a configuration that is not "well-connected", e.g., where due to shadowing and use of NSSRs, the name resolution will locate more than one base object.

If paged results are requested and paging is performed, then the paging DSA shall ignore the **sizeLimit** service control, if any. If paging is not performed, the **sizeLimit** service control shall be honoured. A contributing DSA (see clause 15.5.5 of Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4) shall honour the **sizeLimit** service control.

```
PagedResultsRequest ::= CHOICE {
  newRequest      SEQUENCE {
    pageSize      INTEGER,
    sortKeys      SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SortKey OPTIONAL,
    reverse       [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    unmerged      [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    pageNumber    [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    ... },
  queryReference  OCTET STRING,
  abandonQuer    [0] OCTET STRING,
  ... }
```

```
SortKey ::= SEQUENCE {
  type           AttributeType,
  orderingRule   MATCHING-RULE.&id OPTIONAL,
  ... }
```

For a new list or search operation, the **PagedResultsRequest** is set to **newRequest**, which consists of the following parameters:

- a) The **pageSize** parameter specifies the maximum number of subordinates or entries to return in the results. The DSA shall return up to but not more than the requested number of subordinates or entries. The **sizeLimit**, if any, is ignored. The inclusion of family information does not count towards page size when packaged in **family-information** derived attributes.
- b) The **sortKeys** parameter specifies a sequence of attribute types with optional ordering matching rules to use as sort keys for sorting the returned entries prior to the return to the DUA. In the case of List operations, the sorting shall be by RDN, but the sorting requirements shall apply only to attributes within the RDN. In the case of Search operations, ordering shall only apply to attributes that are actually supplied (as a result of selection, and access control, with sorting by distinguished name as a fallback). The entries are sorted according to their values of the **type** attribute of the first **SortKey** in the sequence, and in the event of multiple entries with the same sort position, of the next **SortKey** in the sequence, and so on.

For a particular **SortKey**, the DSA uses the **orderingRule** matching rule if it is present, otherwise the **ordering** matching rule of the attribute if one is defined; it ignores the sort key if none are defined. If the attribute type is multi-valued, the "least" value is used; if the attribute type is missing from the returned results, it is regarded as "greater" than all other matched values. A DSA is permitted to support only certain sort key sequences (thus, a DSA that holds and returns its data in the internal order "alphabetic by surname" will be able to comply with only one sort key sequence). If it cannot support the requested sequence, it shall use a default sort sequence.

A hierarchical group shall not be separated, but returned in the sequence as specified by clause 10.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. When sorting is performed, the first entry of a hierarchical group to be returned determines the position of the hierarchical group within the sorted result.

NOTE 2 – A hierarchical group may span pages.

- c) If the **reverse** parameter is **TRUE**, then the DSA shall return the sorted results in reverse order (i.e., from "greatest" to "least" – if the attribute type is multi-valued, the "greatest" is used; if the attribute type is missing from the returned results, it is regarded as "less" than all other matched values). If it is **FALSE**, the DSA shall return them in forward order. If no **sortKeys** parameter is specified, this parameter is ignored.
- d) If the **unmerged** parameter is **TRUE** and the DSA responsible for the paging is collecting results from a number of other DSAs, it shall return all the data from one DSA (in sort order) before returning data from the next DSA. If the parameter is **FALSE**, the DSA shall collect the results from all other DSAs and sort the merged data before returning any of it. If no **sortKeys** parameter is specified, this parameter is ignored. The semantic of the **unmerged** parameter is the same whether the DSA supports DSP paged results or not.
- e) If the **pageNumber** parameter is present, it indicates that the user wants to start with a particular page rather than the first one. This parameter shall be ignored if ordering is not requested.

For a follow-up request, i.e., to request the next set of paged results, the DUA makes the same list or search request as before, but sets **PagedResultsRequest** to **queryReference**, with the value of this parameter the same as that returned in the **PartialOutcomeQualifier** of the previous results. The DUA has no understanding of the **queryReference**, which is available to a DSA to use as it wishes to record context information for the query. The DSA uses this information to determine which results to return next.

The DUA may at any time indicate that no more pages are required by making the same **list** or **search** request as before, by setting the **PagedResultsRequest** set to **abandonQuery**, with the value identical to the **queryReference** value returned in the **PartialOutcomeQualifier** of the previous results. No further pages shall be requested or returned. An **abandoned** error with problem code **pagingAbandoned** shall be returned. It is implementation-dependent as to when the pages will be purged.

In the case where the **queryReference** or the **abandonQuery** choice is made, the new request and the original information shall be identical in the following respects:

- **baseObject** within **SearchArgument** or **object** within **ListArgument** shall match for the present and the original request;
- the **queryReference** subcomponent of **pagedResults** shall be identical to the **queryReference** value returned in the **PartialOutcomeQualifier** of the previous result;
- the **options** component of the **ServiceControls** data type shall specify identical options for the present and the original request;
- **operationProgress** (if present) shall be identical for the present and the original request.

Otherwise a **serviceError** with problem **invalidQueryReference** shall be returned.

NOTE 3 – If the DIB changes between **search** requests, the DUA may not see the effects of these changes. This is implementation-dependent.

NOTE 4 – A query-reference may remain valid even if a DUA begins a new list or search operation. A DUA may request paged results with several queries and then return to an earlier query and request the next page of results using the query-reference supplied for it. The number of "active" query-references to which a DUA can return is a local DSA implementation option, as is the lifetime of those query-references.

NOTE 5 – Support of the **abandonQuery** choice is only available for implementations based on Rec. ITU-T X.511 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:2005 or later editions.

NOTE 6 – When a DAP association terminates, access to all associated paged results is lost. Paged results can only be accessed within the DAP application-association within which they were originally invoked.

## 7.10 Security parameters

The **SecurityParameters** govern the operation of various security features associated with a Directory operation.

NOTE 1 – These parameters are conveyed from sender to recipient. Where the parameters appear in the argument of an operation the requester is the sender, and the performer is the recipient. In a result, the roles are reversed.

```
SecurityParameters ::= SET {
  certification-path      [0] CertificationPath OPTIONAL,
  name                    [1] DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
  time                    [2] Time OPTIONAL,
  random                  [3] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
  target                  [4] ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL,
  --                      [5] Not to be used
  operationCode          [6] Code OPTIONAL,
  --                      [7] Not to be used
  errorProtection        [8] ErrorProtectionRequest OPTIONAL,
  errorCode               [9] Code OPTIONAL,
  ... }

```

```
ProtectionRequest ::= INTEGER {none(0), signed(1)}
```

```
Time ::= CHOICE {
  utcTime                UTCTime,
  generalizedTime       GeneralizedTime,
  ... }

```

```
ErrorProtectionRequest ::= INTEGER {none(0), signed(1)}
```

The public-key certificate framework defined in Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8 is used in all Directory protocols defined in these Directory Specifications to optionally protect the operations including requests, responses and errors. Integrity protection is provided through the digital signature of the sender and the verification of that signature by the recipient using the sender's corresponding public-key certificate.

The **certification-path** component is defined in clause 7.7 in Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8.). This component shall be present and contain the signer's public-key certificate if the request argument, response or error is signed. If the recipient requires a certification path for validation, and an acceptable parameter is not present, whether the recipient rejects the signature, or attempts to determine a certification path, is a local matter. The public-key certificate shall have the distinguished name in the subject field as specified by the name component.

The **name** is the distinguished name of the first intended recipient of the argument or result. For example, if a DUA generates a signed argument, the name is the distinguished name of the DSA to which the operation is submitted.

The **time** is the intended expiry time for the validity of the request, response or error. It is used in conjunction with the random number to enable the detection of replay attacks.

The **random** value is a number that should be different for each request, response or error. It is used in conjunction with the time parameter to enable the detection of replay attacks. If sequence integrity is required, then the random argument may be used to carry a sequence integrity number as follows:

- a) The random value used with operation arguments is derived using a pre-agreed sequence (e.g., the previous value plus 1) from:
  - i) for the first operation sent from a system on a binding, the random value passed in the bind operation argument/result by the remote peer system; and
  - ii) for subsequent operations, the random value passed in the previous operation in the same direction.

- b) The random value used with operation results or errors is derived using some pre-agreed sequence from the random value in the request (e.g., random in request argument plus 1).

The **targetProtectionRequest** may appear only in the request for an operation to be carried out, and indicates the requester's preference regarding the degree of protection to be provided to the result. Two levels are provided: **none** (no protection requested, the default), and **signed** (the Directory is requested to sign the result). The degree of protection actually provided to the result is indicated by the form of result and may be equal to or lower than that requested, based on the limitations of the Directory.

The **operationCode** parameter is used to bind securely the operation code to the message (request arguments, results or errors). If this parameter is present, it shall take the value of the operation code for the operation and the receiver shall check that the value in this parameter is equal to the operation code in the received message. If not, the assumption is that the operation code has been changed and the message shall be discarded,

NOTE 2 — The operation code is only securely bound to the message if the message is signed,

The **errorProtection** request may appear only in the request for an operation to be carried out, and indicates the requester's preference regarding the degree of protection to be provided to any error. Two levels are provided: **none** (no protection requested, the default), and **signed** (the Directory is requested to sign the error). The degree of protection actually provided to the error is indicated by the form of error and may be equal to or lower than that requested, based on the limitations of the Directory.

NOTE 3 – A DUA may request that any security label context be returned with an attribute value using the context selection.

The **errorCode** is used to secure the error code where an error is returned in response to an operation.

If the syntax of **Time** has been chosen as the **UTCTime** type, the value of the two-digit year field shall be rationalized into a four-digit year value as follows:

- If the 2-digit value is 00 to 49 inclusive, the value shall have 2000 added to it.
- If the 2-digit value is 50 to 99 inclusive, the value shall have 1900 added to it.

**GeneralizedTime** shall be used if the negotiated version is **v2** or greater. The use of **GeneralizedTime** when **v1** has been negotiated may prevent interworking with implementations unaware of the possibility of choosing either **UTCTime** or **GeneralizedTime**. It is the responsibility of those specifying the domains in which this Directory Specification will be used, e.g., profiling groups, as to when the **GeneralizedTime** may be used. In no case shall **UTCTime** be used for representing dates beyond 2049.

## 7.11 Common elements of procedure for access control

This clause defines the elements of procedure that are common to all abstract service operations when **basic-access-control**, **rule-based-access-control** or both are in effect. If both mechanisms are in effect, the order in which they are applied is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, then a grant from the other mechanism shall not override it. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a grant that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

### 7.11.1 Common elements of procedure for basic access control

#### 7.11.1.1 Alias dereferencing

If, in the process of locating a target object entry (identified in the argument of an abstract service operation), alias dereferencing is required, no specific permissions are necessary for alias dereferencing to take place. However, if alias dereferencing would result in a **ContinuationReference** being returned (i.e., in a **Referral**), the following sequence of access controls applies. If the DSA chains the request to another DSA and receives a referral back from it, then the access controls shall be applied to the referral if the **targetObject** in the referral is the same as in the chained request. That is, the DSA shall police all referrals whether they were generated locally or remotely.

- 1) *Read* permission is required to the alias entry. If permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with the procedure described in clause 7.11.1.
- 2) *Read* permission is required to the **aliasedEntryName** attribute and to the single value that it contains. If permission is not granted, the operation fails and **nameError** with problem **aliasDereferencingProblem** shall be returned. The **matched** element shall contain the name of the alias entry.

NOTE – In addition to the access controls described above, security policy may prevent the disclosure of knowledge information which would otherwise be conveyed as a **ContinuationReference** in **Referral**. If such a policy is in effect and if a DUA constrains the service by specifying **chainingProhibited**, the Directory may return a **serviceError** with problem **chainingRequired**. Otherwise, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned.

#### 7.11.1.2 Return of Name Error

If, while performing an abstract service operation, the specified target object (alias or entry) – e.g., the Name of an entry to be read or the **baseObject** in a **search** request – could not be found, a **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** shall be returned. The **matched** element shall either contain the name of the next superior entry to which *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted, or the name of the DIT root (i.e., an empty **RDNSequence**).

NOTE – The second alternative may be taken by a DSA which does not have access to all superior entries.

#### 7.11.1.3 Non-disclosure of the existence of an entry

If access is denied under **rule-based-access-control**, then the *DiscloseOnError* permission is not applicable.

If, while performing an abstract service operation, the necessary entry level permission is not granted to the specified target object entry – e.g., the entry to be read – the operation fails and the error returned is one of: if *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to the target entry, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned; otherwise, a **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** shall be returned. The **matched** element shall either contain the name of the next superior entry to which *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted, or the name of the DIT root (i.e., an empty **RDNSequence**).

NOTE – The second alternative may be taken by a DSA which does not have access to all superior entries.

Additionally, whenever the Directory detects an operational error (including a referral), it shall ensure that in returning that error, it does not compromise the existence of the named target entry and any of its superiors. For example, before returning a **serviceError** with problem **timeLimitExceeded** or an **updateError** with problem **notAllowedOnNonLeaf**, the Directory verifies that *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to the target entry. If it is not, the procedure described in the paragraph above shall be followed.

#### 7.11.1.4 Return of Distinguished Name

In a Compare, List, or Search operation, *ReturnDN* permission is required to the **object** (or **baseObject**) entry if, as a result of dereferencing an alias, the object's distinguished name is to be returned in the **name** parameter of the operation result (see clause 10.2.3). If this permission is not granted, the Directory shall return an alias name for the entry instead, as described in clause 7.7, or it shall omit the **name** parameter altogether.

If a Read or Search operation, is not granted, the Directory shall return the name of an alias instead, as described in clause 7.7, or if no alias name is available, it shall fail the operation with a **nameError** (in the case of Read) or omit the entry from the results (in the case of Search).

If the user supplied alias name is returned in the result, then the **aliasDeferenced** flag of **CommonResults** shall not be set to **TRUE**.

### 7.11.2 Common elements of procedure for rule-based-access-control

#### 7.11.2.1 Accessing an entry (entry level permission)

In order to access an entry, permission is required to access at least one attribute value in the entry. If entry level permission is not granted, then **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** shall be returned.

#### 7.11.2.2 Returning the name of an entry

In order to return the DN of an entry, permission is required to access all the attribute values of at least one context variant of the RDN of the entry (this is termed *RDN* permission). No permissions are required from any of the superiors of the entry. If *RDN* permission is not granted, then a DSA may choose to either return the DN of a valid alias of the entry for which *RDN* permission has been granted, or to omit the name component from the operation result.

NOTE – The selection of an appropriate alias name is further described in the notes of clause 7.7.

#### 7.11.2.3 Alias dereferencing

In order to dereference an alias, permission is required to access the **aliasedEntryName** attribute value.

#### 7.11.2.4 Return of Name Error (noSuchObject)

The **matched** component of **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** shall be set to the name of the next superior entry to which the requester has *RDN* permission. If such an entry is not available to the DSA generating the error, then the name of the DIT root shall be returned.

#### 7.11.2.5 Accessing an attribute

In order to access an attribute, permission is needed to access at least one of the values of the attribute.

### 7.11.2.6 Deleting information

In order to delete an attribute value, permission is needed to access that value. When deleting an entry or an attribute, the operation shall return a successful response if at least one attribute value is deleted, irrespective of how many values were requested to be deleted.

### 7.11.2.7 Invoking search-rules

In order to evaluate a search-rule against the arguments of a search operation, *invoke* permission to the search-rule is required for the requester originating the search operation. The user needs no other permissions to access the search-rule attribute or the subentry that contains it.

### 7.11.3 Family information

Family information is treated the same way as any other information, except that the access control information (ACI) for which the **ProtectedItem** is marked as is **includeFamily**; if the ACI is applicable to an ancestor or family member this causes subordinate family members to be subject to the same ACI. **IncludeFamily** is only meaningful when applied to an **entry** protected item.

## 7.12 Managing the DSA Information Tree

The DSA Information Tree held by a DSA can be managed using the Directory abstract service. When the DSA Information Tree is managed:

- all DSEs in a DSA are visible through the DAP including the root DSE;
- attributes defined as no user modification may be modified (though the DSA can reply with a **serviceError** with problem **unwillingToPerform** if it cannot support the requested change);
- knowledge is merely another attribute which can be read and modified; and
- the DSA never chains requests or returns referrals or continuation references.

Visibility of DSEs and the retrieval of or changes to operational attributes can be controlled via access control in the normal way.

The management of a DSA Information Tree is achieved by a DUA using the following procedures:

- 1) The DUA BINDs directly to the DSA which holds the DSA Information Tree that is to be managed.
- 2) For each operation that is used to manage the DSA Information Tree:
  - the **manageDSAIT** extension bit shall be set;
  - the **manageDSAIT** option shall be set;
  - the **manageDSAITPlaneRef** option shall be included if a specific replication plane is to be managed.

The following components are ignored by the Directory:

- **operationProgress** in **CommonArgument**;
- **referenceType** in **CommonArgument**;
- **entryOnly** in **CommonArgument**;
- **nameResolveOnMaster** in **CommonArgument**; and
- **chainingProhibited** in **ServiceControls**.

## 7.13 Procedures for families of entries

As specified in clause 7.3.2, family members within a compound entry may be grouped together for the purpose of operation evaluation. This grouping is only relevant for Compare, Search and Remove Entry operations. If family grouping is specified for any other operation, it shall be ignored.

For determining which family members that shall be returned according to the **familyReturn** component of the **entryInformationSelection**, the concepts of contributing member and participating member is introduced. These concepts are only relevant for operations that return entry information, i.e., Read, Search and Modify Entry operations.

If a family member makes an active contribution to the operation evaluation, it is marked as a contributing member. A family member makes a contribution to the match if it is part of a family grouping that matches the filter and if it holds one or more attributes that are matched by non-negated filter items. It also contributes if it holds an attribute of a given type if a negated filter item for the same type does not match. In the case of a Read or Modify Entry operation, the family member that is selected by the operation (as specified by the **object** component of the operation) is the only member

marked as a contributing member and as a participating member. In the case of a Search operation, family grouping is done for filter matching. If a family grouping matches a filter (see clause 7.8.3), all members that have contributed actively to the matching are marked as contributing members, while all entries of the grouping are marked as participating members. If the filter used is the default filter (**and** : { }), then all members of a family grouping shall be marked as participating members, but not as contributing members.

When a family grouping of compound entry matches the filter and the **SearchArgument** specifies hierarchy selection (except for **self**), the selected entries shall also be marked if applicable. If the ancestor of the compound entry is marked as participating (and possibly also as contributing), all referenced entries of the hierarchical group that are not compound entries shall be selected, otherwise they shall be excluded. If a referenced entry is a compound entry, the marking of its members shall be done as follows. Each member of the referenced compound entry that have the same local member name as a member of the matched compound entry is marked the same way. All other members of the referenced compound entry are left unmarked.

As a Search filter can possibly match several compound entries, the resulting selection and marking shall be the union of those for the individual matched compound entries.

If a matched entry not being a compound entry references a compound entry in its hierarchy selection, all the members of that compound entry are marked as participating.

How this marking of entries affects the return of entry information is detailed in clause 7.6.4.

Family members may be packed into a **family-information** derived attribute. If only a single member of a compound entry is returned in the result, packaging shall not be performed. However, if several members are returned from a Read or Modify Entry operation, these members shall be packed. In the case of a Search operation where several members of a compound attribute are returned they shall be packed unless the **separateFamilyMembers** search control option is set, in which case the members shall be returned as separate entries.

When performing search operations involving compound entries, there are four relevant phases for a Search operation:

- a) The groupings of family members within each entry of interest, as defined by **familyGrouping**, are logically considered within each candidate entry (i.e., as selected by subset). By pooling together all the attributes of the group, all attribute values for a given attribute type are considered to belong to that single attribute type, even if they originate from different family members.
- b) The filter is applied to each family grouping; if the filter is satisfied for the grouping, the compound entry then satisfies the filter, and is considered to be selected by the filter. Family members are marked as described above.
- c) The marked entries are augmented, as specified by **familyReturn** in **EntryInformationSelection**, to mark all entries that would be returned.
- d) If the **additionalControl** component is present in a governing-search-rule (see clause 16.10.8 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2), the markings, and thereby what is returned, may be changed as the result of processing the referenced control attributes.

## 8 Directory authentication

The Directory supports the authentication of users accessing the Directory via DUAs and the authentication of directory systems (DSAs) to users and to other DSAs. Depending on the environment, either simple or strong authentication may be used. The procedures to be used for simple and strong authentication in the Directory are described in the following subclauses.

### 8.1 Simple authentication procedure

Simple authentication is intended to provide local authorization based upon the distinguished name of a user, a bilaterally agreed (optional) password, and a bilateral understanding of the means of using and handling this password within a single domain. The utilization of simple authentication is primarily intended for local use only, i.e., for peer entity authentication between one DUA and one DSA or between one DSA and one DSA. Simple authentication may be achieved by several means:

- a) the transfer of the user's distinguished name and (optional) password in the clear (non-protected) to the recipient for evaluation;
- b) the transfer of the user's distinguished name, password and a random number and/or a timestamp, all of which are protected by applying a one-way function;

- c) the transfer of the protected information described in b) together with a random number and/or a timestamp, all of which is protected by applying a one-way function.

NOTE 1 – There is no requirement that the one-way functions applied be different.

NOTE 2 – The signalling of procedures for protecting passwords may be a matter for an extension to the document.

Where passwords are not protected, a minimal degree of security is provided for preventing unauthorized access. It should not be considered a basis for secure services. Protecting the user's distinguished name and password provides greater degrees of security. The algorithms to be used for the protection mechanism are typically non-enciphering one-way functions that are very simple to implement.

The general procedure for achieving simple authentication is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2 – The unprotected simple authentication procedure

The following steps are involved:


- 1) An originating user A sends its distinguished name and password to recipient user B.
- 2) B sends the purported distinguished name and password of A to the Directory, where the password is checked against that held as the **UserPassword** attribute within the directory entry for A (using the Compare operation of the Directory).
- 3) The Directory confirms (or denies) to B that the credentials are valid.
- 4) The success (or failure) of authentication may be conveyed to A.

The most basic form of simple authentication involves only step 1) and after B has checked the distinguished name and password, may include step 4).

### 8.1.1 Generation of protected identifying information

Figure 3 illustrates two approaches by which protected identifying information may be generated.  $f1$  and  $f2$  are one-way functions (either identical or different) and the timestamps and random numbers are optional and subject to bilateral agreements.

Annex E provides a suggested algorithm to be used for protected passwords.



A User's distinguished name  
 $t^A$  Timestamps  
 $passwd^A$  Password of A  
 $q^A$  Random numbers, optionally with a counter included

Figure 3 – Protected simple authentication

8.1.2 Procedure for protected simple authentication

Figure 4 illustrates the procedure for protected simple authentication.




Figure 4 – The protected simple authentication procedure

The following steps are involved (initially using *f1* only):

- 1) An originating user, user A, sends its protected identifying information (Authenticator1) to user B. Protection is achieved by applying the one-way function (*f1*) of Figure 3, where the timestamp and/or random number (when used) is used to minimize replay and to conceal the password.

The protection of A's password is of the form:

$$\text{Protected1} = f1(t1^A, q1^A, A, \text{passw}^A)$$

The information conveyed to B is of the form:

$$\text{Authenticator1} = t1^A, q1^A, A, \text{Protected1}$$

- 2) B verifies the protected identifying information offered by A by generating (using the distinguished name and optional timestamp and/or random number provided by A, together with a local copy of A's password) a local protected copy of A's password (of the form Protected1). B compares for equality the purported identifying information (Protected1) with the locally generated value.
- 3) B confirms or denies to A the verification of the protected identifying information.

The procedure can be modified to afford greater protection using *f1* and *f2*. The main differences are as follows:

- 1) A sends its additionally protected identifying information (Authenticator2) to B. Additional protection is achieved by applying a further one-way function, *f2*, as illustrated in Figure 3. The further protection is of the form:

$$\text{Protected2} = f2(t2^A, q2^A, \text{Protected1})$$

The information conveyed to B is of the form:

$$\text{Authenticator2} = t1^A, t2^A, q1^A, q2^A, A, \text{Protected2}$$

For comparison, B generates a local value of A's additionally protected password and compares it for equality with that of Protected2.

- 2) B confirms or denies to A the verification of the protected identifying information.

8.2 Password policy

8.2.1 Introduction

Password policy is a set of rules that controls how passwords are used and administered in the Directory. It improves the security of the Directory and makes it difficult for password cracking programs to break into the Directory. These rules ensure that users change their passwords periodically, that passwords meet quality requirements, that the reuse of old passwords is restricted, and that users are locked out after a certain number of failed attempts. This policy also forces the user to update its password after it has been set for the first time, or has been reset by a password administrator. However, in some cases, it is desirable to disallow users from adding and updating their own passwords.

A password is supposed not to be well known. If a password is frequently changed, the chance of misuse is minimized. Password policy administrators may deploy a password policy that causes passwords to expire after a given amount of time thus forcing users to change their passwords periodically. There must be a way to make users aware of the need to change their password before being locked out of their accounts. One or both of the following methods could be used:

- A warning may be returned to the user sometime before the password is due to expire. If the user ignores this warning before the expiration time, the account will be locked.
- The user may Bind to the directory a certain number of times after the password has expired. If the user fails to change the password following one of the 'grace' authentications, the account will be locked.

Password quality rules are rules for how a password shall be constructed. It is not the intention to provide a specification for password qualities, as requirements on quality may change over time. Password quality includes things like:

- minimum length;
- a mixture of characters (uppercase, lowercase, figures, punctuations, etc.); and
- avoidance of trivial passwords.

A particular quality rule requires specialized code within the implementation. It may therefore be of advantage to standardize password quality rules and assign object identifiers to such rules. An implementation may then claim support to one or more of such standardized quality rules.

An intruder may try to guess a password to get access to protected information. Currently, two different safeguards have been identified:

- Specification of the maximum number of failed attempts before a successful attempt within a given time span (which could be indefinitely): This approach allows for "denial of service attacks". One or more genuine users could have their access to the directory barred by the action of an attacker.
- The other mechanism is to insert a delay before returning information on authentication failure, and increasing this delay for repeated failed authentications on the same connection. This approach slows authentication, and makes brute force attacks impractical.

Password history is a mechanism to prevent password reuse. Previously used passwords should be stored to allow the Directory to ensure that a new password has not been previously used. Old passwords are stored for a time specified by the password policy, and after this time a password may be reused. The history is maintained in a **userPwHistory** multi-valued operational attribute. A value is purged after a specific time, and the purged password may in principle be reused. The maximum time a password is kept in the **userPwHistory** attribute is specified in the **pwdMaxTimeInHistory** operational attribute, and the minimum time is specified in the **pwdMinTimeInHistory** operational attribute. The number of passwords stored is limited by the **pwdHistorySlots** operational attribute and the password cannot be changed if there is no free slot in the history and no passwords in the history have been for less than the **pwdMinTimeInHistory**, so a user cannot revert to a "preferred password" simply by making lots of password changes.

The password policy can be used with clear passwords (using the **clear** alternative of the **userPw** attribute), or with encrypted passwords (using the **encrypted** alternative of the **userPw** attribute) or with another password attribute. All entries in the same specific password administrative area shall use the same password attribute type.

### 8.2.2 Operational attributes and procedures

The password policy uses specific operational attributes to register policy parameters, times and dates related to password management.

When a password value is first stored in the directory, in the **userPw** attribute, the **pwdStartTime** operational attribute is set (Figure 5). The **pwdExpiryTime** operational attribute which contains the expiration of the password may either be automatically computed from the **pwdExpiryAge** operational attribute or set by explicit administrator action. It is an implementation option whether the value is dynamically computed by addition of the **pwdExpiryAge** to the **pwdStartTime** of the entry, in which case it does not need to be stored in the directory entry, or it is set by an administrator, in which case it shall be stored in the directory entry. The **pwdEndTime** operational attribute which contains the expiration of the account may either be automatically computed from the **pwdMaxAge** operational attribute or set by explicit administrator action. It is an implementation option whether the value is dynamically computed by addition of the **pwdMaxAge** to the **pwdStartTime** of the entry, in which case it does not need to be stored in the directory entry, or is set by an administrator, in which case it shall be stored in the directory entry.

The **pwdStartTime** operational attribute may also be set by an Administrator to specify that the account cannot be used before a given time.

When the user (or an administrator acting on behalf of the user) changes the **userPw** attribute within the **pwdMaxAge** period, the **pwdStartTime** operational attribute should be updated. The **pwdExpiryTime** and the **pwdEndTime** operational attributes should be recomputed and updated to reflect the new password creation time.

NOTE – If a user does bind with the Directory for a long time, the values of **pwdExpiryTime** and **pwdEndTime** operational attributes may be exceeded and the account automatically locked.




Figure 5 – Time chart for password attributes

When the user (or an administrator acting on behalf of the user) changes the value of the password, the new value is generally not immediately known by all the Directory servers because of replication delays. To prevent authentication problems, the previous password remains available for the **pwdRecentlyExpiredDuration** duration time (which shall be greater than the replication periods used in the Directory system).

When the user (or an administrator acting on behalf of the user) changes the value of the password, the old value should be copied into the recently expired password attribute. (The **userPwd** attribute is copied into the **userPwdRecentlyExpired**). When the recently expired password duration time is over, the recently expired password attribute (**userPwdRecentlyExpired**) should not be available to the user. If the user (or an administrator acting on behalf of the user) changes their password again during the recently expired password duration time, then their recently expired password should be overwritten and the duration should be set to start again (see Figure 6). Thus, a recently expired password will only be kept in the recently expired password attribute for the shorter of the recently expired password duration time or until the user changes their password again. However, it will be kept in the password history table.





Figure 6 – Time line for recently expired passwords

8.2.3 Password history

The password history attribute is used to prevent password reuse, by storing old values of the user's password so that the user cannot reuse the same password again whilst it is stored in the password history (see Figure 7). When the user (or an administrator acting on behalf of the user) changes their password, it may be copied into the password history (**userPwdHistory**) operational attribute along with the time that the password was changed. The password maximum time in history attribute (**pwdMaxTimeInHistory**) specifies the maximum duration (in seconds) that a password should remain in the password history. Once this time has expired for a particular password, then it is removed from the password history, and the user may use this password again.

The number of slots in the password history table (or password history attribute values) is defined in the **pwdHistorySlots** operational attribute. When all the slots are filled, the oldest password may be removed subject to it having been in the history for a minimum duration time (as specified in the **pwdMinTimeInHistory** attribute).

NOTE – If an administrator has to change the password of a user when all the history slots are full and no passwords are older than **pwdMinTimeInHistory**, then the administrator might free two slots in the history table (i.e., delete two attribute values), reset the user's password to a temporary value (which is copied into the history), leaving one spare slot for the user to choose their own new password.



NOTE – If the Directory system changes its encryption algorithm then a user will be able to use the same password again since the encrypted password will be different.

Figure 7 – userPwHistory attribute

## 9 Bind, Unbind operations, Change Password and Administer Password operations

The Directory Bind and Directory Unbind operations, defined in clauses 9.1 and 9.2 respectively, are used by the DUA at the beginning and end of a particular period of accessing the Directory.

### 9.1 Directory Bind

#### 9.1.1 Directory Bind syntax

A Directory Bind operation is used at the beginning of a period of accessing the Directory.

```

directoryBind OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  DirectoryBindArgument
  RESULT    DirectoryBindResult
  ERRORS    {directoryBindError} }

DirectoryBindArgument ::= SET {
  credentials [0] Credentials OPTIONAL,
  versions   [1] Versions DEFAULT {v1},
  ... }

Credentials ::= CHOICE {
  simple      [0] SimpleCredentials,
  strong      [1] StrongCredentials,
  externalProcedure [2] EXTERNAL,
  spkm        [3] SpkmCredentials,
  sasl        [4] SaslCredentials,
  ... }

SimpleCredentials ::= SEQUENCE {
  name      [0] DistinguishedName,
  validity  [1] SET {
    time1    [0] CHOICE {
      utc      UTCTime,
      gt       GeneralizedTime} OPTIONAL,
    time2    [1] CHOICE {
      utc      UTCTime,
      gt       GeneralizedTime} OPTIONAL,
    random1  [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
    random2  [3] BIT STRING OPTIONAL} OPTIONAL,
  password  [2] CHOICE {
    unprotected OCTET STRING,

```

```

    protected      HASH{OCTET STRING},
    ...,
    userPwd      [0]  UserPwd } OPTIONAL }

StrongCredentials ::= SET {
    certification-path      [0]  CertificationPath OPTIONAL,
    bind-token              [1]  Token,
    name                    [2]  DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
    --                      [3]  Not to be used
    ... }

SpkmCredentials ::= CHOICE {
    req      [0]  SPKM-REQ,
    rep      [1]  SPKM-REP-TI,
    ... }

SaslCredentials ::= SEQUENCE {
    mechanism      [0]  DirectoryString{ub-saslMechanism},
    credentials    [1]  OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    saslAbort      [2]  BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ... }

ub-saslMechanism INTEGER ::= 20 -- According to RFC 2222

Token ::= SIGNED{TokenContent}

TokenContent ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm      [0]  AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
    name           [1]  DistinguishedName,
    time           [2]  Time,
    random         [3]  BIT STRING,
    response       [4]  BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
    ... }

Versions ::= BIT STRING {v1(0), v2(1)}

DirectoryBindResult ::= SET {
    credentials      [0]  Credentials OPTIONAL,
    versions          [1]  Versions DEFAULT {v1},
    ...,
    pwdResponseValue [2]  PwdResponseValue OPTIONAL }

PwdResponseValue ::= SEQUENCE {
    warning CHOICE {
        timeLeft      [0]  INTEGER (0..MAX),
        graceRemaining [1]  INTEGER (0..MAX),
        ... } OPTIONAL,
    error ENUMERATED {
        passwordExpired (0),
        changeAfterReset (1),
        ... } OPTIONAL}

directoryBindError ERROR ::= {
    PARAMETER OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED {SET {
        versions      [0]  Versions DEFAULT {v1},
        error          CHOICE {
            serviceError      [1]  ServiceProblem,
            securityError      [2]  SecurityProblem,
            ... },
        securityParameters [30]  SecurityParameters OPTIONAL }}}

BindKeyInfo ::= ENCRYPTED{BIT STRING}

```

### 9.1.2 Directory Bind arguments

The `credentials` component of the `DirectoryBindArgument` allows the Directory to establish the identity of the user. The credentials may be `simple`, or `strong` or externally defined (`externalProcedure`) (as described in Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8).

If `simple` is used, it consists of a name (always the distinguished name of an object), an optional validity, and an optional password. This provides a limited degree of security. The password may be unprotected, or it may be protected (either

Protected1 or Protected2) as described in clause 18.1 of Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8 or it may be the **userPwd** attribute. The validity supplies **time1**, **time2**, **random1** and **random2** arguments, which derive their meaning through bilateral agreement, and which may be used to detect replay. In some instances a protected password may be checked by an object which knows the password only after locally regenerating the protection to its own copy of the password and comparing the result with the value in the **bind** argument (password). In other instances, a direct comparison may be possible. A possible approach for protected passwords may be found in Annex K of ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8. If the **userPwd** attribute is used, the password may be transmitted in the clear or encrypted and the matching rule is defined in clause 18.1.8 of Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8.

**GeneralizedTime** shall be used for **time1** and **time2** if the negotiated version is **v2** or greater. The use of **GeneralizedTime** when **v1** has been negotiated may prevent interworking with implementations unaware of the possibility of choosing either **UTCTime** or **GeneralizedTime**. It is the responsibility of those specifying the domains in which this Directory Specification will be used, e.g., profiling groups, as to when the **GeneralizedTime** may be used. **UTCTime** shall not be used for representing dates beyond 2049.

For the **strong** alternative, the specification for the parameters of **StrongCredential** are:

- the **certificate-path** component, if present, shall hold a certification path as specified by the **CertificationPath** data type as defined in clause 7.6 of Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8;
- the **bind-token** component shall be signed and shall have the subcomponents as specified below; and
- the **name** component shall hold the distinguished name of the requester.

This enables the bound DSA to authenticate the identity of the requester establishing the application-association. The corresponding information in the result allows the requester to authenticate the bound DSA.

If the **spkm** alternative is taken in, information relating to identity is conveyed. This enables the identity of either entity to be authenticated.

The arguments of the bind token are used as follows. **algorithm** is the identifier of the algorithm employed to sign this information. **name** is the name of the intended recipient. The **time** parameter contains the expiry time of the token. The **random** number is a number which should be different for each unexpired token, and may be used by the recipient to detect replay attacks.

If **externalProcedure** is used, then the semantics of the authentication scheme being used are outside the scope of the Directory Specifications.

**sasl** is used when using the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) specified in IETF RFC 4422. If a **directoryBind** operation is invoked with a **SaslCredentials** mechanism value set to the empty string, a **SecurityError** of **inappropriateAuthentication** shall be returned.

The **versions** component of the **DirectoryBindArgument** identifies the versions of the service which the DUA is prepared to participate in. The value **v1** denotes the protocol version 1 and the value **v2** denotes the protocol version 2. The value **v2** shall be used if, in a subsequent **ModifyEntry** operation, the **alterValues** or **resetValue** modification types are to be sent in a request or a result other than **NULL** is required (see clause 12.3). The value shall be set to **v2** if signing of errors or result to Add Entry, Remove Entry, Modify Entry, Modify DN is used.

Migration to future versions of the Directory should be facilitated by:

- a) any elements of **DirectoryBindArgument** other than those defined in this Directory Specification shall be accepted and ignored;
- b) additional options for named bits of **DirectoryBindArgument** (e.g., versions) not defined shall be accepted and ignored.

The **response** component is used to carry a number derived from random if challenge response of authentication is required.

### 9.1.3 Directory Bind results

Should the bind request succeed, a result shall be returned.

The **credentials** component of the **DirectoryBindResult** allows the user to establish the identity of the Directory. It allows information identifying the DSA (that is directly providing the Directory service) to be conveyed to the DUA. It shall be of the same form (i.e., **CHOICE**) as that supplied by the user.

The **versions** parameter of the **DirectoryBindResult** indicates which of the versions of the service requested by the DUA is actually going to be provided by the DSA.

The following applies independently whether the DSA holds the responder's master entry or a replicated entry:

- a) If the **warning.timeLeft** component is present and different from zero, the **error** component shall be absent.
- b) If the **warning.graceRemaining** component is present, the **error.passwordExpired** may be set.

The following applies when the DSA holds the master entry for the requester:

- a) If **warning** is present with either the **timeLeft** set to zero or **graceRemaining** set to zero and **error.passwordExpired** set, only a change-password operation is accepted.
- b) if **error.changeAfterReset** is set, **warning** shall not be present. Only a change-password operation is accepted.

#### 9.1.4 Directory Bind errors

Should the bind request fail, a bind error shall be returned. If the Bind request was using strong authentication or if SPKM credentials were supplied, then the Bind responder may sign the error parameters.

The **versions** parameter of the **directoryBindError** indicates which versions are supported by the DSA.

The **SecurityParameters** components (see clause 7.10) shall be included if the error is to be signed.

A **securityError** or **serviceError** shall be supplied as follows:

```
securityError  inappropriateAuthentication
               invalidCredentials
               blockedCredentials
               spkmError
               unsupportedAuthenticationMethod
               passwordPolicyRequired
               passwordExpired
               inappropriateAlgorithms

serviceError   unavailable
               saslBindInProgress
```

For details on **serviceError** and **securityError**, see clauses 14.7 and 14.8.

## 9.2 Directory Unbind

The unbinding at the end of a period of accessing the Directory is for the OSI environment specified in clauses 7.6.4 and 7.6.5 of Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5 and for the TCP/IP environment in clause 9.2.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5.

NOTE – On unbinding, all paged results that have not been accessed so far become inaccessible, and they should be disposed of.

## 10 Directory Read operations

There are two 'read-like' operations: **read** and **compare**, defined in clauses 10.1 and 10.2, respectively. The **abandon** operation, defined in clause 10.3, is grouped with these operations for convenience.

### 10.1 Read

#### 10.1.1 Read syntax

A Read operation is used to extract information from an explicitly identified entry. It may also be used to verify a distinguished name. The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

```
read OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  ReadArgument
  RESULT    ReadResult
  ERRORS    {attributeError |
             nameError |
             serviceError |
             referral |
             abandoned |
```

```

        securityError}
CODE      id-opcode-read }

ReadArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ReadArgumentData }

ReadArgumentData ::= SET {
    object          [0] Name,
    selection       [1] EntryInformationSelection DEFAULT {},
    modifyRightsRequest [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF      CommonArguments }

ReadResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ReadResultData }

ReadResultData ::= SET {
    entry          [0] EntryInformation,
    modifyRights   [1] ModifyRights OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF      CommonResults }

ModifyRights ::= SET OF SEQUENCE {
    item          CHOICE {
        entry      [0] NULL,
        attribute  [1] AttributeType,
        value      [2] AttributeValueAssertion,
        ...},
    permission    [3] BIT STRING {
        add        (0),
        remove     (1),
        rename     (2),
        move       (3)},
    ... }

```

### 10.1.2 Read components

The **object** component identifies the object entry from which information is requested. Should the **Name** involve one or more aliases, they are dereferenced (unless this is prohibited by the relevant service controls).

The **selection** component indicates which information from the entry is requested (see clause 7.6). However, it should not be assumed that the attributes returned are the same as or limited to those requested.

The **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3) include a specification of the service controls and security parameters applying to the request. For the purposes of this operation, the **sizeLimit** component is not relevant and is ignored if provided. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

The **modifyRightsRequest** component is used to request the return of the requester's modification rights to the entry and its attributes.

### 10.1.3 Read results

Should the request succeed, the result shall be returned.

The entry result parameter holds the requested information (see clause 7.7). This may include family information, if required by the presence of a **familyReturn** element in **EntryInformationSelection**.

The **modifyRights** parameter is present if it was requested via the **modifyRightsRequest** component, and the user has modification privileges to some or all of the requested entry information, and the return of this information is permitted by the local security policy. If returned, the modification rights of the requester are returned for the entry and for the attributes specified in the **selection** component. The parameter contains the following:

- An element of the **SET** is returned for the **entry**; for each user **attribute** requested which the user has the right to add or remove; and for each returned attribute **value** for which the user's rights to add or remove it differ from those of the corresponding attribute.
- The returned **permission** indicates which operations or actions on the entry by the user would succeed. In the case of an entry, **remove** indicates that a **RemoveEntry** operation would succeed; **rename** indicates that a **ModifyDN** operation with the **newSuperior** parameter absent would succeed; and **move** that a **ModifyDN** operation with the **newSuperior** parameter present and an unchanged RDN would succeed.

In the case of attributes and values, **add** indicates that a **ModifyEntry** operation that adds the attribute or value would succeed; and **remove** indicates that a **ModifyEntry** operation that removes the attribute or value would succeed.

NOTE – An operation to move an entry to a new superior may also depend on permissions associated with the new superior (as for example with **basic-access-control**). These are ignored when determining **permission**.

The **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) include the security parameters applying to the response. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the results.

#### 10.1.4 Read errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. If none of the attributes explicitly listed in **selection** can be returned, then an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be reported. The circumstances under which other errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

#### 10.1.5 Read operation decision points for basic access control

If **rule-based-access-control** is also to be applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **basic-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **basic-access-control** is in effect for the entry being read, the following sequence of access controls applies:

- 1) *Read* permission is required to the entry being read. If permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 7.11.1.3.
- 2) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types only are to be returned, then for each attribute type that is to be returned, *Read* permission is required. If permission is not granted, the attribute type is omitted from the **ReadResult**. If, as a consequence of applying these controls no attribute information is returned, the entire operation fails in accordance with clause 10.1.5.1.
- 3) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types and values are to be returned, then for each attribute type and for each value that is to be returned, *Read* permission is required. If permission to an attribute type is not granted, the attribute is omitted from **ReadResult**. If permission to an attribute value is not granted, the value is omitted from its corresponding attribute. In the event that permission is not granted to any of the values within the attribute, an **Attribute** element containing an empty **SET OF AttributeValue** is returned. If, as a consequence of applying these controls, no attribute information is returned, the entire operation fails in accordance with clause 10.1.5.1.

NOTE – Privileges that permit a DAP read operation may not work in an LDAP environment where browse permission is required to support an equivalent read service.

##### 10.1.5.1 Error returns

If the operation fails as defined in clause 10.1.5, items 2) or 3), the valid error returns are one of:

- a) If an open-ended option was specified (i.e., **allUserAttributes** or **allOperationalAttributes**), a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned.
- b) Otherwise, if a **select** option was specified (in **attributes** and/or in **extraAttributes**), then if the *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to any of the selected attributes, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned. Otherwise, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.

##### 10.1.5.2 Non-disclosure of incomplete results

If an incomplete result is being returned in **EntryInformation**, i.e., some of the attributes or attribute values have been omitted because of the applicable access controls, the **incompleteEntry** element shall be set to **TRUE** if *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to at least one attribute type withheld from the result, or at least one attribute value withheld from the result (for which attribute type *Read* permission was granted).

#### 10.1.6 Read operation decision points for rule-based access control

If **basic-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **rule-based-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the entry being read, the following access controls apply:

- 1) If entry level access is denied under **rule-based-access-control**, then the operation fails with **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** in accordance with clause 7.11.2.4.
- 2) If access to the entry is not permitted under the **basic-access-control** scheme as described in clause 10.1.5, item 1), then the operation fails in accordance with clause 7.11.1.3.
- 3) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types only are to be returned, then if under **rule-based-access-control**, access is not granted for all attribute values of that type, the attribute type is omitted from the **ReadResult**. If, as a consequence of applying these controls, no attribute information is returned, the entire operation fails returning an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** in accordance with clause 10.1.5.1, item b).
- 4) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types only are to be returned, **basic-access-control** is applied as described in clause 10.1.5, item 2).
- 5) Under **rule-based access controls**, if the **infoTypes** element of selection specifies that attribute types and values are to be returned, then for each attribute value that is to be returned, access shall be granted. If access to an attribute value is not granted, the attribute value is omitted from its corresponding attribute. In the event that access is not granted to any of the attribute values within an attribute, the whole attribute is omitted from **ReadResult**. If, as a consequence of applying these controls, no attribute information is returned, the entire operation fails returning an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue**.
- 6) **basic-access-control** is applied as described in clause 10.1.5, item 3).
- 7) The name of the entry returned in the operation result is determined as defined in clause 7.11.2.2.

## 10.2 Compare

### 10.2.1 Compare syntax

A Compare operation is used to compare a value (which is supplied as a component of the request) with the value(s) of a particular attribute type in a particular object entry. The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

Any value of **familyGrouping** except **multiStrand** may be used, and the attributes in all the grouped family members are to be used in the comparison against the purported attribute value assertion. If **familyGrouping** specifies **multiStrand**, **compoundEntry** is assumed.

```
compare OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  CompareArgument
  RESULT    CompareResult
  ERRORS    {attributeError |
              nameError |
              serviceError |
              referral |
              abandoned |
              securityError}
  CODE      id-opcode-compare }

CompareArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { CompareArgumentData }

CompareArgumentData ::= SET {
  object      [0] Name,
  purported   [1] AttributeValueAssertion,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }

CompareResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { CompareResultData }

CompareResultData ::= SET {
  name          Name OPTIONAL,
  matched       [0] BOOLEAN,
  fromEntry     [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
```

```

    matchedSubtype [2] AttributeType OPTIONAL,
    . . . ,
    . . . ,
    COMPONENTS OF      CommonResults }

```

### 10.2.2 Compare arguments

The **object** component is the name of the particular object entry concerned. Should the **Name** involve one or more aliases, they are dereferenced (unless prohibited by the relevant service control).

The **purported** component identifies the attribute type and value to be compared with that in the entry. The comparison is TRUE if the entry holds the purported attribute type or one of its subtypes, or there is a collective attribute of the entry which is the purported attribute type or one of its subtypes (see clause 7.6), and if there is a value of that attribute which matches the purported value using the attribute's **equality** matching rule.

NOTE – A **compare** request cannot be satisfied by a friend attribute type of the attribute type specified in this component.

If context assertions are included in the attribute value assertion, then the matching shall be attempted only against those values which satisfy all the given context assertions, as described in clause 8.9.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. If no context assertions are included in the attribute value assertion, then default context assertions shall be applied as described in clause 8.9.2.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

The **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3) include a specification of the service controls and security parameters applying to the request. For the purposes of this operation, the **sizeLimit** component is not relevant and is ignored if provided. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

### 10.2.3 Compare results

Should the request succeed (i.e., the comparison is actually carried out), the result shall be returned.

The **name** component, if present, shall be the distinguished name of the entry or an alias name of the entry, as described in clause 7.7. It shall be present if an alias has been dereferenced and the name to be returned differs from the **object** name supplied in the operation argument.

The **matched** result parameter holds the result of the comparison. The parameter takes the value **TRUE** if the values were compared and matched, and **FALSE** if they did not.

If **fromEntry** is **TRUE**, the information was compared against the entry; if **FALSE**, the information was compared against a copy.

The **matchedSubtype** parameter is present only if the result of the match was TRUE and if the match succeeded because a subtype of the purported attribute was matched. It contains the matched subtype. If more than one such subtype is available, the one highest in the hierarchy is returned.

The **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) include the security parameters applying to the response. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the results.

### 10.2.4 Compare errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. The circumstances under which the particular errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

### 10.2.5 Compare operation decision points for basic access control

If **rule-based-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **basic-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **basic-access-control** is in effect for the entry being compared, the following sequence of access controls applies:

- 1) *Read* permission is required to the entry to be compared. If permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 7.11.1.3.
- 2) *Compare* permission is required to the attribute being compared. If permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 10.2.5.1.
- 3) If there exists a value within the attribute being compared that matches the **purported** argument and for which *Compare* permission is granted, the operation returns the value **TRUE** in the **matched** result parameter of the **CompareResult**. Otherwise, the operation returns the value **FALSE**.

### 10.2.5.1 Error returns

If the operation fails as defined in clause 10.2.5, item 2), the valid error returns are one of: if the *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to the attribute being compared, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned; otherwise, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.

### 10.2.6 Compare operation decision points for rule-based access control

If **basic-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **rule-based-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the entry being compared, the following access controls apply:

- 1) if entry level access is denied under **rule-based-access-control**, then the operation fails with **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** in accordance with clause 7.11.2.4;
- 2) if access to the entry is not permitted under the **basic-access-control** scheme as described in clause 10.2.5, item 1), then the operation fails in accordance with clause 7.11.1.3;
- 3) if access is not granted to the attribute value being compared, the Directory shall act as though the attribute value was not present;
- 4) **basic-access-control** is applied as described in clause 10.2.5, items 2) and 3);
- 5) the name returned in the operation result is determined as defined in clause 7.11.2.2.

### 10.2.7 Remote checking of password

A DUA may bind to another DSA than the one holding the entry for the requester. These Directory specifications only consider the case where a DUA only uses simple credentials with the **userPwd** alternative. Handling of other types of authentication is not specified by these Directory Specifications. A DSA receiving such a bind may have to contact the DSA holding the entry for the requester.

This procedure also uses a notification attribute type **pwdResponse** (see clause 6.13.17 of ITU Rec. X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6).

This DSA may use a Compare operation against the DSA holding the entry in question to check the validity of the password. If the DSA does not know the password attribute type used by the DSA holding requester information, this information may be obtained by first reading the **pwdAdminSubentryList** attribute and subsequently the **pwdAttribute** attribute.

When generating a Compare operation to be forwarded to another DSA based on a DUA bind request, the DSA shall in the purported component of the CompareArgument use the value from the userPwd alternative together with the password attribute type. The name component of the SimpleCredentials shall be used as the name component of the CompareArgument.

If it is a DSA holding the entry of the requester, it shall respond as follows:

- a) If the presented password matches the password in the designated password attribute type and it has not expired, **TRUE** shall be returned in the **matched** component of the result. If relevant, either a notification attribute of type **pwdResponse** may be included in the result with the **warning** component taking either the **timeleft** or the **graceRemaining** alternative, as appropriate. The error component shall be absent.
- b) If the presented password matches the password in a stored attribute of the proper type, but it has expired or it requires to be reset due to administrative action, **TRUE** shall be returned in the **matched** component of the result. A notification attribute of type **pwdResponse** shall be included with the error component which has the appropriate value. The warning component may optionally be present with a zero value.
- c) If the presented password does not match the password in a stored attribute of the proper type, **FALSE** shall be returned in the **matched** component of the result.
- d) If the entry does not hold a password attribute of the proper type, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.

The DSA that initiated the result of the Compare operation shall handle the result as follows:

In the case of a) above, the authenticity of requester has been established and the DSA may complete the binding.

In the case of b) above, the authenticity of requester has been established and the DSA may conditionally complete the binding by including in the **bind** result the **pwdResponseValue** component with the value copied from the received **pwdResponse** notification.

In the cases of c) or d) above, an appropriate error shall be returned.

### 10.3 Abandon

Operations that interrogate the Directory may be abandoned using the **abandon** operation if the user is no longer interested in the result. The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

```
abandon OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  AbandonArgument
  RESULT    AbandonResult
  ERRORS    {abandonFailed}
  CODE      id-opcode-abandon }

AbandonArgument ::=
  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AbandonArgumentData }

AbandonArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
  invokeID [0] InvokeId,
  ... }

AbandonResult ::= CHOICE {
  null          NULL,
  information   OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AbandonResultData },
  ... }

AbandonResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  invokeID      InvokeId,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }
```

There is a single argument, the **invokeID** which identifies the operation that is to be abandoned. The value of the **invokeID** is the same **invokeID** that was used to invoke the operation that is to be abandoned.

Should the request succeed, a result shall be returned. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component of **CommonResultsSeq** (see clause 7.4) shall be included in the results. If the result of the operation is not to be signed by the Directory, no information shall be conveyed with the result. The original operation shall fail with an **abandoned** error.

Should the request fail, the **abandonFailed** error shall be reported. As a local matter, a DSA may choose not to abandon the operation and shall then return the **abandonFailed** error. This error is described in clause 14.3.

Abandon is only applicable to interrogation operations, i.e., Read, Compare, List and Search operations.

A DSA may abandon an operation locally. If the DSA has chained or multicasted the operation to other DSAs, it may in turn request them to abandon the operation.

## 11 Directory Search operations

There are two 'search-like' operations: List and Search, defined in clauses 11.1 and 11.2 respectively.

### 11.1 List

#### 11.1.1 List syntax

A List operation is used to obtain a list of the immediate subordinates of an explicitly identified entry. Under some circumstances, the list returned may be incomplete. The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

```

list OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT ListArgument
  RESULT ListResult
  ERRORS {nameError |
          serviceError |
          referral |
          abandoned |
          securityError}
  CODE id-opcode-list }

ListArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ListArgumentData }

ListArgumentData ::= SET {
  object [0] Name,
  pagedResults [1] PagedResultsRequest OPTIONAL,
  listFamily [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments
}

ListResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ListResultData }

ListResultData ::= CHOICE {
  listInfo SET {
    name Name OPTIONAL,
    subordinates [1] SET OF SEQUENCE {
      rdn RelativeDistinguishedName,
      aliasEntry [0] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
      fromEntry [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
      ... },
    partialOutcomeQualifier [2] PartialOutcomeQualifier OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResults
  },
  uncorrelatedListInfo [0] SET OF ListResult,
  ... }

PartialOutcomeQualifier ::= SET {
  limitProblem [0] LimitProblem OPTIONAL,
  unexplored [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF ContinuationReference OPTIONAL,
  unavailableCriticalExtensions [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  unknownErrors [3] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF ABSTRACT-SYNTAX.&Type OPTIONAL,
  queryReference [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
  overspecFilter [5] Filter OPTIONAL,
  notification [6] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
    Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}} OPTIONAL,
  entryCount CHOICE {
    bestEstimate [7] INTEGER,
    lowEstimate [8] INTEGER,
    exact [9] INTEGER,
    ... } OPTIONAL
  -- [10] Not to be used -- }

LimitProblem ::= INTEGER {
  timeLimitExceeded (0),
  sizeLimitExceeded (1),
  administrativeLimitExceeded (2) }

```

### 11.1.2 List arguments

The **object** argument identifies the object entry (or possibly the root) whose immediate subordinates are to be listed. Should the **Name** involve one or more aliases, they are dereferenced (unless prohibited by the relevant service control).

The **pagedResults** argument is used to request that results of the operation be returned page-by-page, as described in clause 7.9.

If **listFamily** is **TRUE** and the **object** is an ancestor, the listed subordinates are taken from immediately subordinate family members; no other subordinates are included. Otherwise, the listed subordinates are taken only from immediately subordinate entries that are not family members.

The **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3) include a specification of the service controls applying to the request. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

### 11.1.3 List results

The request succeeds, subject to access controls, if the **object** is located, regardless of whether there is any subordinate information to return.

The **name** component, if present, shall be the distinguished name of the entry or an alias name of the entry, as described in clause 7.7. It shall be present if an alias has been dereferenced and the name to be returned differs from the **object** name supplied in the operation argument.

The **subordinates** component conveys the information on the immediate subordinates, if any, of the named entry. Should any of the subordinate entries be aliases, they shall not be dereferenced.

The **rdn** subcomponent is the relative distinguished name of the subordinate.

The **fromEntry** subcomponent indicates whether the information was obtained from the entry (**TRUE**) or a copy of the entry (**FALSE**).

The **aliasEntry** subcomponent indicates whether the subordinate entry is an alias entry (**TRUE**) or not (**FALSE**).

The **partialOutcomeQualifier** component consists of eight subcomponents as described below. This component shall be present whenever the result is incomplete because of a time limit, size limit or administrative limit problem, because regions of the DIT were not explored, because some critical extensions were unavailable, because an unknown error was received or because paged results are being returned, an overspecified filter is to be indicated, one or more notification attributes are to be returned:

- a) The **LimitProblem** subcomponent indicates whether the time limit, size limit or an administrative limit has been exceeded. The results being returned are those which were available when the limit was reached.
- b) The **unexplored** subcomponent shall be present if regions of the DIT were not explored. Its information allows the DUA to continue the processing of the List operation by contacting other access points if it so chooses. The subcomponent consists of a set (possibly empty) of **ContinuationReferences**, each consisting of the name of a base object from which the operation may be progressed, an appropriate value of **OperationProgress**, and a set of access points from which the request may be further progressed. The **ContinuationReferences** that are returned shall be within the scope of a referral requested in the operation service control. See clause 14.6.
- c) The **unavailableCriticalExtensions** subcomponent indicates, if present, that one or more critical extensions were unavailable in some part of the Directory.
- d) The **unknownErrors** subcomponent is used to return unknown error types or parameters received from other DSAs in the processing of the operation. Each member of the **SET** contains one such unknown error. See clause 12.2.4 of Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5.
- e) The **queryReference** subcomponent shall be present when the DUA has requested paged results and the DSA has not returned all the available results. See clause 7.9. It shall be absent when the DSA can determine that all results valid for the user have been returned (i.e., other than as a result of applying access control).
- f) The **overspecFilter** subcomponent is only used in conjunction with the Search operation when, as a consequence of overspecified filtering, the returned Search result is empty, although there are candidate entries either matching only portions of the filter or matching only approximately the filter. It is returned only if the search request included the **checkOverspecified** item and the Directory can determine that the filter was overspecified. It consists of the filter supplied in the **search** argument with those elements of the filter that succeeded in matching some omitted entries. The actual procedure for generating the **overspecFilter** is a local matter.

NOTE 1 – The return of a suitable **overspecFilter** in a distributed Directory is for further study.

- g) The **notification** subcomponent may be used to send qualifications of error outcomes, and may also for the Search operation be used to return a **proposedRelaxation** attribute (see clause 6.13.15 of Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6) which provides a relaxation policy that could be applied by the user. In this case, the sequence of **MRMapping** elements that would have been used to affect the relaxation (or tightening) policy specified by the relevant search-rule may be supplied.

NOTE 2 – The ordering of **sequence-of Attribute** in **notification** is not significant.

- h) The **entryCount** subcomponent is only relevant in **search** results and if then present, it gives a best estimate of the number of entries that fulfil the search criteria. This subcomponent shall be present if, and only if:
- **entryCount** search control option is set in the search argument or by a governing-search-rule;
  - if paged results have been requested or a size limit has been exceeded; and
  - if the feature is supported by at least one of the participating DSAs.

When the **entryCount** subcomponent is present, the **bestEstimate** or exact choice shall be taken if all performing DSAs support the feature and if all eligible DSAs have participated in the operation. The exact choice shall be taken if all participating DSAs can supply an exact count; otherwise, the **bestEstimate** choice shall be taken. If not all the eligible DSAs participated in the operation or if some of the participating DSAs do not support the **entryCount** parameter, the **lowEstimate** choice shall be taken. Family members of a compound entry only count as a single entry.

If a limit problem is encountered which results in a **limitProblem** element being used in **PartialOutcomeQualifier**, this component shall be repeated in all subsequent results supplied as part of the paged result set.

When the DUA has requested a protection request of signed, or if the Directory for other reasons is not able to correlate information, the **uncorrelatedListInfo** parameter may comprise a number of sets of result parameters originating from and signed by different components of the Directory. If no DSA in the chain can correlate all the results, the DUA shall assemble the actual result from the various pieces.

The **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) include the security parameters applying to the response. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** value (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the results.

#### 11.1.4 List errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. The circumstances under which the particular errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

#### 11.1.5 List operation decision points for basic access control

If **rule-based-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **basic-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **basic-access-control** is in effect for the portion of the DIB where the **list** operation is being performed, the following sequence of access controls applies:

- 1) No specific permission is required to the entry identified by the **object** argument.
- 2) For each immediate subordinate for which a **RelativeDistinguishedName** is to be returned in **subordinates**, *Browse* and *ReturnDN* permissions are required to that entry. Entries for which these permissions are not granted are ignored. If, as a consequence of applying these controls, no subordinate information (excluding any **ContinuationReferences** in **PartialOutcomeQualifier**) is returned and if *DiscloseOnError* permission is not granted to the entry identified by the **object** argument, the operation fails and a **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** shall be returned. The **matched** element shall either contain the name of the next superior entry to which *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted, or the name of the DIT root (i.e., an empty **RDNSSequence**). Otherwise, the operation succeeds but no subordinate information (excluding any **ContinuationReferences** in **PartialOutcomeQualifier**) is conveyed with it.

NOTE 1 – In the case of a **nameError** being returned, the empty **RDNSSequence** may be used by a DSA which does not have access to all superior entries.

NOTE 2 – Security policy may prevent the disclosure of subordinate information which would otherwise be conveyed as **ContinuationReferences** in **PartialOutcomeQualifier**. If such a policy is in effect and if a DUA constrains the service by specifying **chainingProhibited**, the Directory may return a **serviceError** with problem **chainingRequired**. Otherwise, the procedure described in item 2) above is followed.

NOTE 3 – Security policy may prevent the Directory from indicating that a listed subordinate entry is an alias entry. For example, if the DUA is not granted *Read* access to the alias entry, its **objectClass** attribute and the value **alias** that it contains, the Directory may omit the **aliasEntry** component of **subordinates** from the **ListResult** or set it to **FALSE**.

NOTE 4 – If *DiscloseOnError* permission is not granted to the entry identified by the **object** argument, a **partialOutcomeQualifier** indicating a **limitProblem** or **unavailableCriticalExtensions** should not be returned as it may compromise the security of this entry.

### 11.1.6 List operation decision points for rule-based access control

If **basic-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **rule-based-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the portion of the DIB where the List operation is being performed, the following access controls apply:

- 1) If rule-based entry level permission is denied to the entry identified by the **object** argument, then **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** is returned in accordance with clause 7.11.2.4.
- 2) For each immediate subordinate for which a **RelativeDistinguishedName** is to be returned in **subordinates**, rule-based *RDN* permission must be granted to that entry. Entries for which access is not granted are ignored.
- 3) **basic-access-control** is applied as described in clause 11.1.5.

## 11.2 Search

### 11.2.1 Search syntax

A Search operation is used to search one or more portions of the Directory for entries of interest, and to return selected information from those entries. The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

```
search OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT SearchArgument
  RESULT SearchResult
  ERRORS {attributeError |
          nameError |
          serviceError |
          referral |
          abandoned |
          securityError}
  CODE id-opcode-search }
```

```
SearchArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { SearchArgumentData }
```

```
SearchArgumentData ::= SET {
  baseObject [0] Name,
  subset [1] INTEGER {
    baseObject (0),
    oneLevel (1),
    wholeSubtree (2)} DEFAULT baseObject,
  filter [2] Filter DEFAULT and:{},
  searchAliases [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
  selection [4] EntryInformationSelection DEFAULT {},
  pagedResults [5] PagedResultsRequest OPTIONAL,
  matchedValuesOnly [6] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  extendedFilter [7] Filter OPTIONAL,
  checkOverspecified [8] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  relaxation [9] RelaxationPolicy OPTIONAL,
  extendedArea [10] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
  hierarchySelections [11] HierarchySelections DEFAULT {self},
  searchControlOptions [12] SearchControlOptions DEFAULT {searchAliases},
  joinArguments [13] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JoinArgument OPTIONAL,
  joinType [14] ENUMERATED {
    innerJoin (0),
    leftOuterJoin (1),
    fullOuterJoin (2)} DEFAULT leftOuterJoin,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }
```

```
HierarchySelections ::= BIT STRING {
  self (0),
  children (1),
```

```

parent          (2),
hierarchy       (3),
top             (4),
subtree         (5),
siblings        (6),
siblingChildren (7),
siblingSubtree  (8),
all             (9) }

```

```

SearchControlOptions ::= BIT STRING {
  searchAliases      (0),
  matchedValuesOnly  (1),
  checkOverspecified (2),
  performExactly     (3),
  includeAllAreas    (4),
  noSystemRelaxation (5),
  dnAttribute        (6),
  matchOnResidualName (7),
  entryCount         (8),
  useSubset          (9),
  separateFamilyMembers (10),
  searchFamily       (11) }

```

```

JoinArgument ::= SEQUENCE {
  joinBaseObject [0] Name,
  domainLocalID [1] DomainLocalID OPTIONAL,
  joinSubset [2] ENUMERATED {
    baseObject (0),
    oneLevel (1),
    wholeSubtree (2),
    ... } DEFAULT baseObject,
  joinFilter [3] Filter OPTIONAL,
  joinAttributes [4] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JoinAttPair OPTIONAL,
  joinSelection [5] EntryInformationSelection,
  ... }

```

```
DomainLocalID ::= UnboundedDirectoryString
```

```

JoinAttPair ::= SEQUENCE {
  baseAtt AttributeType,
  joinAtt AttributeType,
  joinContext SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JoinContextType OPTIONAL,
  ... }

```

```
JoinContextType ::= CONTEXT.&id({SupportedContexts})
```

```
SearchResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { SearchResultData }
```

```

SearchResultData ::= CHOICE {
  searchInfo SET {
    name Name OPTIONAL,
    entries [0] SET OF EntryInformation,
    partialOutcomeQualifier [2] PartialOutcomeQualifier OPTIONAL,
    altMatching [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResults
  },
  uncorrelatedSearchInfo [0] SET OF SearchResult,
  ... }

```

### 11.2.2 Search components

The **baseObject** component identifies the object entry (or possibly the root) relative to which the primary search is to take place.

The **subset** component indicates whether the primary search is to be applied to:

- a) the **baseObject** only;
- b) the immediate subordinates of the base object only (**oneLevel**);
- c) the base object and all its subordinates (**wholeSubtree**).

If the base object is an ordinary entry, compound entries shall be counted as a single entry with respect to the **subset** specification. If the base object is the ancestor of a compound entry, the **searchFamily** search control option controls the exact behaviour. If the base object is a child family member, family members shall count as individual entries.

The **filter** component is used to eliminate entries from the primary search space which are not of interest. Information shall only be returned on entries which satisfy the filter (see clause 7.8). In the presence of a basic user-supplied or search-rule-supplied relaxation policy, the filter shall be evaluated for the first time with the required substitutions of matching rules.

In the presence of a user-supplied or a search-rule-supplied relaxation policy, or both, the return of fewer results than minimum shall cause a re-evaluation of the filter, using the appropriate relaxations (see clause 7.8 and also below, for the relaxation element of **SearchArgument**), progressively until there are enough entries or no more relaxations are defined. Similarly, the return of more results than the maximum shall cause a re-evaluation of the filter, using the appropriate tightenings, progressively until there are few enough entries or no more tightenings are defined.

NOTE 1 – If no search-rule relaxations are provided, the user may need to simplify the filter and try again, or alternatively to define a user defined relaxation.

The **familyGrouping** component of **CommonArguments** is used to logically merge together entries in a family prior to applying the filter, as described in clauses 7.3.2 and 7.8.3.

Aliases shall be dereferenced while locating the base object, subject to the setting of the **dontDereferenceAliases** service control. Aliases among the subordinates of the base object shall be dereferenced during the search, subject to the setting of the **searchAliases** parameter. If the **searchAliases** parameter is **TRUE**, aliases shall be dereferenced, if the parameter is **FALSE**, aliases shall not be dereferenced. If the **searchAliases** parameter is **TRUE**, the search shall continue in the subtree of the aliased entry.

The **selection** component indicates which information from the entries is requested (see clause 7.6). However, it should not be assumed that the attributes returned are the same as or limited to those requested.

NOTE 2 – A DSA that is coordinating distributed operations for related entries (i.e., has finished name resolution for a Search argument containing **joinArguments** and needs to acquire a collection of potentially related entries from non-internal sources) needs to override the DAP-supplied **infoTypes** value with **attributeTypesAndValues** for the purposes of distributed operations, and needs also to include join attributes (i.e., attributes in the set specified by **JoinAttPair.joinAtt** within **JoinArgument.joinAttributes**) in the selection of attributes to be returned using distributed operations. However, entries and derived entries that are returned to the user by the coordinating DSA shall omit attribute values in the DAP-returned information if the **infoTypes** value was **attributeTypesOnly**, and shall thus return **EntryInformation** in accordance with the original user request.

The **pagedResults** component is used to request that results of the operation be returned page-by-page, as described in clause 7.9.

The **matchedValuesOnly** component indicates that certain attribute values are to be omitted from the returned entry information. Specifically, where an attribute to be returned is multi-valued, and some but not all of the values of that attribute contributed to the search filter, in its last effective form (i.e., taking relaxed matching rules into account) returning **TRUE** via filter items other than **present**, then the values that did not contribute are omitted from the returned entry information.

If the **matchedValuesOnly** component is specified in the **search** argument, the following logic processing applies to the attributes to be returned:

- a) If the filter consists of one filter item, the following rules apply:
  - if the type of the filter item is **present**, then the **matchedValuesOnly** component has no effect on the attribute in this filter item.
  - If the type of the filter item is **equality**, **substrings**, **greaterOrEqual**, **lessOrEqual**, **approximateMatch**, **contextPresent** or **extensibleMatch** and the assertion is not **TRUE** for the attribute, then the **matchedValuesOnly** component has no effect on this attribute. If the assertion is **TRUE**, then the values of this attribute that did not match the filter item are omitted from the returned entry information.
  - If the filter item is negated, then the **matchedValuesOnly** argument has no effect on this attribute.
- b) If the filter is complex (consists of more than one filter item), then the following rules apply:
  - If the filter contains a negated (i.e., **not**) filter, then the **matchedValuesOnly** argument has no effect on any attribute within the negated filter.

NOTE 3 – This applies to nested negated filters as well.

- The **matchedValuesOnly** component has no effect on the attributes of any elements of **or** filters that evaluate to **FALSE** or **UNDEFINED**.

- An attribute that occurs multiple times in the filter, only needs one of its occurrences to evaluate to TRUE as described in a), second bullet above, for the **matchedValuesOnly** argument to be effective, i.e., one instance of effectiveness overrides one or more instances of ignore.
- Each filter in an **or** filter should be evaluated for **matchedValuesOnly**, even if the truth of the filter can be determined before full evaluation is complete.

The **extendedFilter** component is used in mixed version environments to specify an alternative filter to that described above. When this component is present, the **filter** component (if any) shall be ignored by implementations based on Rec. ITU-T X.511 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:1995 and later editions. The **extendedFilter** is always ignored by implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.511 (1988) ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990. Search relaxation is applied just as for **filter**.

NOTE 4 – By including both filters, a DUA can specify one filter to be used by implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.511 (1988) ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990 and a different filter to be used by implementations based on Rec. ITU-T X.511 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:1995 and later editions in the distributed processing of the Search request. Implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.511 (1988) ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990 do not support attribute polymorphism or matching rule assertions.

The **checkOverspecified** component is used to request the Directory to return an **overspecFilter** item in **partialOutcomeQualifier** if the result of the search operation is empty and the Directory is able to determine that this is due to the filter being overspecified.

The **relaxation** component may be used to specify a user-supplied **RelaxationPolicy** using the construct defined in clause 16.10 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

Substitutions specified by a **search** request shall not be performed within a service-specific administrative area if the substitution causes the search to be invalid with respect to the governing-search-rule. The governing-search-rule can be violated when the substituting matching rule:

- a) effectively removes one or more filter items from the **search** filter; or
- b) violates the **matchingUse** specification for the attribute type (see clause 16.10.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2).

NOTE 5 – The **nullMatch** matching rule has the effect of removing one or more filter items from the filter. When using this matching rule, the governing-search-rule might be violated.

If the Search operation is performed outside a service-specific administrative area or if the governing-search-rule does not provide a **RelaxationPolicy** component, the user-supplied **RelaxationPolicy** is applied as described in clause 16.10.7 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. When a search-rule-provided **RelaxationPolicy** is also present, the combination is applied according to the following procedure:

- 1) The search-rule specified basic substitution policy, if any, is applied already during the search-validation process. The possible basic substitutions specified by the governing-search-rule are thereby applied *a priori*.
- 2) The basic substitutions and the mapping-based matching specified in the **search** request, if present, shall then be applied. However, basic substitutions that cause the governing-search-rule to be violated shall not be applied, but shall be ignored. The **oldMatchingRule** value (if supplied) in this case applies to the basic matching rule, i.e., the one that would have been applicable in the absence of a search-rule-applied basic substitution policy.
- 3) The relaxation/tightening substitutions, if any, specified in the **search** request are then applied together with any specified mapping-based matching following the rules defined in clause 16.10.7 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. If a substituting matching rule is encountered at any point that caused non-conformance with the governing-search-rule, this particular substitution is abandoned completely, together with any further substitutions that may have been specified by the **search** request for that attribute type. If during the process, the **minimum** or **maximum** specification specified in the **search** request is satisfied, the process stops.
- 4) The governing search-rule-supplied relaxation or tightening substitutions are applied, with the exception that there shall be no substitution for attribute types for which relaxation or tightening substitutions have been performed. That is, further relaxation or tightening substitutions apply only to matching rules for attribute types that so far have not been exposed to relaxation or tightening substitution. In this part of the process, the **maximum** or **minimum** specifications in the **search** request still apply, rather than those specified in the governing-search-rule.

If a substitution specified in the **search** request proposes an unsupported matching rule, the existing matching rule stays in place. If this strategy fails to produce a supported matching rule, the filter-item is evaluated as UNDEFINED.

The user can propose that the system provides a relaxation or tightening by specifying the dummy matching rule **systemProposedMatch**.

The **extendedArea** component indicates the level of relaxation (if greater than zero) or the level of tightening (if less than zero). If this component is present, it affects relaxation or tightening, as it is described in clause 16.10.7 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

The **hierarchySelections** search control specifies by means of a bit string the hierarchical selection to be performed within a hierarchical group with respect to each matched entry. It is ignored for matched entries that are not part of a hierarchical group. If several entries within a hierarchy are matched, hierarchical selection will not result in the same entry being returned more than once. If this search control is not present, no hierarchical selection is performed. When present, the following choices are possible either alone or in combinations:

- a) **self** indicates that entry information shall be returned from the matched entries. If this is the only choice, it corresponds to performing no hierarchical selection.
- b) **children** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information is returned from all immediately hierarchical children, if any, of each matched entry. No information is returned from the matched entry if this is the only setting.
- c) **parent** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information is returned from the immediately hierarchical parent, if any, of each matched entry. No information is returned from the matched entry if this is the only setting.
- d) **hierarchy** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information is returned from all the hierarchical parents. No information is returned from the matched entry if this is the only setting.
- e) **top** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information from the hierarchical top is returned. No information is returned from the matched entry if this is the only setting, unless the matched entry is the top entry.
- f) **subtree** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information is returned from all its hierarchical children, if any. No information is returned from the matched entry if this is the only setting.
- g) **siblings** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information from all hierarchical siblings is returned. No information is returned from the matched entry if this is the only setting.
- h) **siblingChildren** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information from the immediately hierarchical children of all hierarchical siblings is returned. No information is returned from the matched entry and its siblings if this is the only setting.
- i) **siblingSubtree** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information from all the children of all hierarchical siblings is returned. No information is returned from the matched entry and its siblings if this is the only setting.
- j) **all** indicates that for each matched entry, the entry information from all entries of the hierarchical group is returned.

The **searchControlOptions** component contains only control options applicable for the Search operation. This component has indicators with the same semantics as the Boolean type components of the search argument. An implementation supporting the service administration extension shall support this component. A sending supporting implementation (e.g., a DUA) shall in addition to setting the Boolean type components also set the corresponding bits in this component (unless defaults apply). If a supporting DSA implementation receives a **search** request with this component, it shall ignore the Boolean type components in the request. If this component is absent in a request, the default setting shall be understood to be all bits reset, except as indicated below:

- a) The **searchAliases** search control option is a replacement for the **searchAliases** search argument component. If this bit is set, it corresponds to the **searchAliases** component being **TRUE**. If the **searchControlOptions** component is absent, the default value is according to the **searchAliases** component, i.e., if the **searchAliases** component is absent or set to **TRUE**, this bit defaults to being set.
- b) The **matchedValuesOnly** search control option is a replacement for the **matchedValuesOnly** search argument component. If this bit is set, it corresponds to the **matchedValuesOnly** component being **TRUE**. If the **searchControlOptions** component is absent, the default value is according to the **matchedValuesOnly** component, i.e., if the **matchedValuesOnly** component is set to **TRUE**, this bit defaults to being set; otherwise, it defaults to being reset.
- c) The **checkOverspecified** search control option is a replacement for the **checkOverspecified** search argument component. If this bit is set, it corresponds to the **checkOverspecified** component being **TRUE**. If the **searchControlOptions** component is absent, the default value is according to the

- checkOverspecified** component, i.e., if the **checkOverspecified** component is set to **TRUE**, this bit defaults to being set; otherwise, it defaults to being reset.
- d) The **performExactly** search control option indicates that an operation shall be performed exactly according to the relevant matching rules as specified or implied by the filter after a basic matching rule substitution, if applicable. When an **extensibleMatch** filter item specifies an unsupported matching rule, the **search** request shall be rejected when this search control option is set. Otherwise, the filter item evaluates to **UNDEFINED**. If the Search operation starts its initial evaluation phase within a service-specific administrative area and a matching restriction in a search-rule is violated, that search-rule will fail the search-validation if, and only if, this search control option is set.
  - e) The **includeAllAreas** search control option is only relevant if the **extendedArea** component is included with a value of zero or greater. In all other cases, it is ignored. If the value is **TRUE**, inclusive relaxation is performed; otherwise, exclusive relaxation is performed if possible (see clause 13.6 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2).
  - f) The **noSystemRelaxation** search control option is used when the user requires that DSA-supplied relaxation policies shall not be applied. The DSA still applies a basic policy, unless there is a user-supplied basic policy that overrides it, but no subsequent relaxations or tightenings shall be applied. That is, the filter is never evaluated more than once over the set of candidate entries, except because of user-supplied relaxations.
  - g) The **dnAttribute** search control option is used to indicate that the attributes of the Distinguished Name of an entry are used in addition to those of the entry when evaluating a filter against the entry. If set, it overrides any possible **dnAttribute** specification in **extensibleMatch** filter items. It also applies to all filter item types.
  - h) The **matchOnResidualName** search control option is only relevant if the **partialNameResolution** service control option is set. It is used to indicate that if the Directory is able to resolve only part of the purported name in a **search** operation, the attribute value assertions (AVAs) of the unresolved RDNs shall be treated as AND'ed **equality** filter items. These filter items are AND'ed with the search filter both for search evaluation against search-rules and for entry matching.
  - i) The **entryCount** search control option indicates that an entry count shall be supplied in the **search** result in case either a service control size limit or an administrative size limit has been exceeded. The **entryCount** gives an indication of how many entries would have been returned had a size limit not been encountered. This search control is ignored if the **subentries** service control option is set.
  - j) The **useSubset** search control option indicates that the **imposedSubset** search-rule component shall be ignored (see clause 16.10.9 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2).
  - k) The **separateFamilyMembers** search control option indicates that family members are returned as separate entries rather than being embedded in the **family-information** derived attribute.
  - l) The **searchFamily** search control option specifies how the search is performed if the base object is the ancestor of a compound attribute. This option is ignored if the base object is not an ancestor or if the **entryOnly** is set in either the **CommonArguments** or in the **ChainingArguments**. If this option is set, the operation is only performed on the compound entry and each family member count as a separate entry with respect to the **subset** and **sizeLimit** specifications. If **searchFamily** option is not set, the compound entry is considered a single entry with respect to the **subset** specification.

NOTE 6 – The latter implies that if, as an example, **subset** is set to **baseObject** and **familyGrouping** is **entryOnly**, then each individual family member is within the scope of the search.

The **joinArguments** argument is used to specify additional portions of the Directory to be searched for the purpose of identifying and accessing entries related to those in the primary search and to specify the attributes to be used in joining the related entries. Although specified as a **SEQUENCE**, the order in which **joinArgument** arguments appear is not significant.

NOTE 7 – When **joinArguments** is specified, the primary search and each additional search is considered to produce a set of intermediate results. Each set of intermediate results resulting from a specification of **joinArgument** will be joined with the results of the primary search, and all joins will be performed prior to returning any results in **SearchResult**. Intermediate results are not visible to users of the directory.

The **joinBaseObject** component identifies the object entry (or possibly the root) relative to which each additional search is to take place. The **joinBaseObject** may be an alternative name and may include context information, as described in clause 9.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

The **domainLocalID** component optionally specifies a separate DIT in which the search for **joinBaseObject** is to be initiated. If absent, the search for **joinBaseObject** is to be initiated in all DITs known to the DSA.

The **joinSubset** component indicates whether the additional search is to be applied to:

- a) the **joinBaseObject** only;
- b) the immediate subordinates of the join base object only (**oneLevel**);
- c) the join base object and all its subordinates (**wholeSubtree**).

The **joinFilter** component is used to eliminate entries from the additional search space which are not of interest. Only information which satisfies the **joinFilter** will be considered for joining with related entries. If **joinFilter** is not specified, the value in the **filter** component of the **SearchArgument** will be used. If the **filter** component of the **SearchArgument** is not supplied, the default value for that component will be used. When present, **joinFilter** will be treated according to the rules for **extendedFilter**.

The **joinAttributes** component is used to specify the pairs of attributes to be used in joining entries from the primary search with entries from an additional search. An entry from the primary search (the "primary entry") is considered related to an entry from an additional search (the "additional entry") if there exists a **joinAttrPair** such that the following conditions are true:

- a) the primary entry has a value for the attribute type specified by **baseAtt**;
- b) the additional entry has a value for the attribute type specified by **joinAtt**;
- c) one of the attribute values in the primary entry and one of the attribute values in the additional entry are equal according to the following rules:
  - i) if the attribute types are the same, the equality matching rule for that attribute type is applied;
  - ii) if the attribute types are not the same, but have the same syntax, the equality matching rule for the attribute type specified for the primary entry is applied;
  - iii) if **joinContexts** is present, only attribute values of the specified contexts may be used in evaluating in accordance with rule i) or ii) above. If **joinContexts** is absent, attribute values of all contexts may be used in evaluating in accordance with rule i) or ii) above.

In evaluating **joinAttributes** for potential joins, subtypes of the join attributes shall be ignored. Only the explicitly-identified **baseAtt** and **joinAtt** shall be used to evaluate a potential join.

If an equality rule is applied and evaluates to either FALSE or UNDEFINED, the entries are not considered to be related.

If no suitable matching rule can be applied under condition c) above, the entries are not considered to be related.

NOTE 8 – Care should be taken to prevent the unintentional retrieval of meaningless data when specifying joins involving multi-valued attributes. For example, if an entry uses a multi-valued attribute such as an employee identifier to denote membership in a committee, specification of that multi-valued attribute in performing the join could result in the return of an uncorrelated set containing group member names, telephone numbers, electronic mail addresses, and so on. Nevertheless, when outer joins are specified, all entries that are retrieved will be returned, even if not related.

The **joinSelection** component is used to eliminate attributes from the additional search intermediate result which are not of interest.

The **joinType** component is used to specify the type of join to be performed on related entries, as follows:

- a) If **innerJoin** is specified, the resulting entry set will include only those entries for which a join has been performed based on the attribute pairs specified in **joinAttributes**. Each resulting entry will include all the corresponding related entries as **relatedEntry** attribute values.
- b) If **leftOuterJoin** is specified, the resulting entry set will include all entries selected by the primary search; all entries for which a join has been performed based on the attribute pairs specified in **joinAttributes** will include all the corresponding related entries as **relatedEntry** attribute values.
- c) If **fullOuterJoin** is specified, the resulting entry set will include all entries from the primary and additional searches; all entries for which a join has been performed based on the attribute pairs specified in **joinAttributes** will include all the corresponding related entries as **relatedEntry** attribute values rather than as explicit entries.

No attempt at joining shall take place unless the **joinAttributes** value contains at least one **JoinAttPair** and each **JoinAttPair** is valid in terms of matching rules. If this is not the case, no attempt at joining shall take place, and the following shall be the outcome of merging for each **JoinAttPair**, depending on the join-type:

Join-type	Merged output
inner-join	empty
left-outer-join	primary results only
full-outer-join	results from primary and joined search

Otherwise, entries shall only be eligible for joining when they can supply all of the relevant join-attribute values.

The results of joining shall include all combinations of matched join attributes.

NOTE 9 – For example, consider A B and C as entries from the primary search and P, Q, R as entries from an additional search using J, a corresponding **JoinAttPair** value, and suppose that the following matches take place as a result of J:

- A with P, A with Q, A with R
- B with Q
- C with P and C with Q

Then, the joined results will include:

- A with {P,Q,R}
- B with {Q}
- C with {P,Q}

even though Q's results occur three times.

The **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3) include a specification of the service controls and security parameters applying to the request. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

### 11.2.3 Search results

The request succeeds, subject to access controls, if the **baseObject** is located, regardless of whether there are any subordinates to return, and if there are no service restrictions as specified within a service-specific administrative area that prevent the Search operation from proceeding.

NOTE 1 – As a corollary to this, the outcome of an unfiltered Search operation applied to a single entry may not be identical to a Read operation which seeks to interrogate the same set of attributes of the entry. This is because the latter shall return an **AttributeError** if none of the selected attributes exist in the entry.

The **name** component, if present, shall be the distinguished name of the entry or an alias name of the entry, as described in clause 7.7. It shall be present if an alias has been dereferenced and the name to be returned differs from the **baseObject** name supplied in the operation argument.

The **entries** parameter conveys the requested information from each entry (zero or more) which satisfied the filter (see clause 7.5). The entry information may include family information, as required by the **familyReturn** element of **EntryInformationSelection**. The interaction between **familyGrouping** and **familyReturn** is defined in a four-phase evaluation of a filter and subsequent evaluation of what to return, as described in clause 7.8.3.

The **partialOutcomeQualifier** is as described in clause 11.1.3.

NOTE 2 – Where returned entry information is incomplete for a particular entry, it is indicated via the **incompleteEntry** parameter in the returned entry information.

The **altMatching** parameter indicates that a matching rule has not been applied exactly as specified in the **search** request.

The **appliedRelaxation** attribute in the **notifications** element of **CommonResults** shall be used to list the attributes of the filter which have been subject to relaxation or tightening, other than those made by the **basic** element of a relaxation policy (see clause 6.13.16 of Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6).

The **uncorrelatedSearchInfo** parameter is as described for **uncorrelatedListInfo** in clause 11.1.3.

The **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) include the security parameters applying to the response. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the results.

### 11.2.4 Service administration

An administrative authority may establish service-specific administrative areas as specified in clause 7 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. This allows the administrative authority to administer the service by restricting the Search operation with respect to what areas of the DIT can be searched and what type of searches can be formed, what information can be returned, etc., by definition of search-rules.

### 11.2.5 Search errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. The circumstances under which the particular errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

When searches are performed within service-specific administrative areas, a number of additional, quite detailed elements of error information may be returned as detailed in clause 14.

### 11.2.6 Search operation decision points for basic access control

If **rule-based-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **basic-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **basic-access-control** is in effect for the portion of the DIT to be searched, the following sequence of access controls applies:

- 1) No specific permission is required to the entry identified by the **baseObject** argument.

NOTE 1 – If the **baseObject** is within the scope of the **SearchArgument** (i.e., when the **subset** argument specifies **baseObject** or **wholeSubtree**) the access controls specified in items 2) to 5) apply.

- 2) For each entry within the scope of the **SearchArgument** which is to be a candidate for consideration, *Browse* permission is required. Entries for which this permission is not granted are ignored.
- 3) The **filter** component is applied to each entry left to be considered after taking item 2) into account, in accordance with the following:
  - a) For each **FilterItem** that specifies an attribute, *FilterMatch* permission for the attribute type is required before the **FilterItem** can be evaluated as either TRUE or FALSE. A **FilterItem** for which this permission is not granted evaluates as UNDEFINED.
  - b) For each **FilterItem** that additionally specifies an attribute value, *FilterMatch* permission is required for each stored attribute value which is to be considered for the purposes of matching. If there is a value that both matches the **FilterItem** and for which permission is granted, the **FilterItem** evaluates to TRUE, otherwise it evaluates to FALSE.
- 4) If present, the **joinCriteria** component is applied to each entry left to be considered after taking item 3) into account, in accordance with the following:
  - a) For each **JoinCriteriaItem** which specifies an attribute, *FilterMatch* permission for the attribute type is required before the **JoinCriteriaItem** can be evaluated as either TRUE or FALSE. A **JoinCriteriaItem** for which this permission is not granted evaluates as UNDEFINED.
  - b) For each **JoinCriteriaItem** that additionally specifies an attribute value, *FilterMatch* permission is required for each stored attribute value which is to be considered for the purposes of matching. If there is a value that both matches the **JoinCriteriaItem** and for which permission is granted, the **JoinCriteriaItem** evaluates to TRUE, otherwise it evaluates to FALSE.
- 5) Once the procedures defined in 2) to 4) have been applied, the entry is either selected or discarded. If, as a consequence of applying these controls to the entire scoped subtree, no entries have been selected (excluding any **ContinuationReferences** in **partialOutcomeQualifier**) and if *DiscloseOnError* permission is not granted to the entry identified by the **baseObject** component, the operation fails and a **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** shall be returned. The **matched** element shall either contain the name of the next superior entry to which *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted, or the name of the DIT root (i.e., an empty **RDNSSequence**). Otherwise, the operation succeeds but no subordinate information is conveyed with it.

NOTE 2 – In the case of a **nameError** being returned, the empty **RDNSSequence** may be used by a DSA which does not have access to all superior entries.

NOTE 3 – Security policy may prevent the disclosure of knowledge information which would otherwise be conveyed as **ContinuationReferences** in **partialOutcomeQualifier**. If such a policy is in effect and if a DUA constrains the service by specifying **chainingProhibited**, the Directory may return a **serviceError** with problem **chainingRequired**. Otherwise, the **ContinuationReference** is omitted from **partialOutcomeQualifier**.

- 6) Otherwise, for each selected entry, the information returned is as follows:
- a) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types only are to be returned, then for each attribute type that is to be returned, *Read* permission is required. If permission is not granted, the attribute type is omitted from **EntryInformation**. If, as a consequence of applying these controls no attribute type information is selected, the **EntryInformation** element is returned but no attribute type information is conveyed with it (i.e., the **SET OF CHOICE** element is omitted or empty).
  - b) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types and values are to be returned, then for each attribute type and for each value that is to be returned, *Read* permission is required. If permission to an attribute type is not granted, the attribute is omitted from **EntryInformation**. If permission to an attribute value is not granted, the value is omitted from its corresponding attribute. In the event that permission is not granted to any of the values within the attribute, an **Attribute** element containing an empty **SET OF AttributeValue** is returned. If, as a consequence of applying these controls no attribute information is selected, the **EntryInformation** element is returned but no attribute information is conveyed with it (i.e., the **SET OF CHOICE** element is omitted or empty).

NOTE 4 – If *DiscloseOnError* permission is not granted to the entry identified by the **baseObject** component, a **partialOutcomeQualifier** indicating a **limitProblem** or **unavailableCriticalExtensions** should not be returned, as it may compromise the security of this entry.

### 11.2.6.1 Search operation decision points for basic-access-control in the presence of additional searches

If the **joinArguments** argument is present, and if **basic-access-control** is in effect for the portion of the DIT to be searched, the following sequence of access controls applies to each additional search:

- 1) No specific permission is required to the entry identified by the **joinBaseObject** component.
- NOTE 1 – If the **joinBaseObject** is within the scope of the **joinArgument** (i.e., when the **joinSubset** component specifies **baseObject** or **wholeSubtree**) the access controls specified in items 2) to 6) apply.
- 2) For each entry within the scope of the **joinArgument** which is to be a candidate for consideration, *Browse* permission is required. Entries for which this permission is not granted are ignored.
  - 3) If present, the **joinFilter** component is applied to each entry left to be considered after taking item 2) into account, in accordance with the following:
    - a) For each **FilterItem** which specifies an attribute, *FilterMatch* permission for the attribute type is required before the **FilterItem** can be evaluated as either TRUE or FALSE. A **FilterItem** for which this permission is not granted evaluates as UNDEFINED.
    - b) For each **FilterItem** which additionally specifies an attribute value, *FilterMatch* permission is required for each stored attribute value which is to be considered for the purposes of matching. If there is a value which both matches the **FilterItem** and for which permission is granted, the **FilterItem** evaluates to TRUE, otherwise it evaluates to FALSE.
  - 4) If the **joinFilter** component is not present, the **filter** component is applied to each entry left to be considered after taking item 2) into account, in accordance with the following:
    - a) For each **FilterItem** which specifies an attribute, *FilterMatch* permission for the attribute type is required before the **FilterItem** can be evaluated as either TRUE or FALSE. A **FilterItem** for which this permission is not granted evaluates as UNDEFINED.
    - b) For each **FilterItem** which additionally specifies an attribute value, *FilterMatch* permission is required for each stored attribute value which is to be considered for the purposes of matching. If there is a value which both matches the **FilterItem** and for which permission is granted, the **FilterItem** evaluates to TRUE, otherwise it evaluates to FALSE.
  - 5) Once the procedures defined in 2) to 4) have been applied, the entry is either selected or discarded. If, as a consequence of applying these controls to the entire scoped subtree, no entries have been selected (excluding any **ContinuationReferences** in **partialOutcomeQualifier**) and if *DiscloseOnError* permission is not granted to the entry identified by the **baseObject** component, the operation fails and a **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** shall be returned. The **matched** element shall either contain the name of the next superior entry to which *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted, or the name of the DIT root (i.e., an empty **RDNSSequence**). Otherwise, the operation succeeds but no subordinate information is conveyed with it.

NOTE 2 – In the case of a **nameError** being returned, the empty **RDNSSequence** may be used by a DSA which does not have access to all superior entries.

NOTE 3 – Security policy may prevent the disclosure of knowledge information which would otherwise be conveyed as **ContinuationReferences** in **partialOutcomeQualifier**. If such a policy is in effect and if a DUA constrains the service by

specifying **chainingProhibited**, the Directory may return a **serviceError** with problem **chainingRequired**. Otherwise, the **ContinuationReference** is omitted from **partialOutcomeQualifier**.

- 6) Otherwise, for each selected entry, the information returned is as follows:
  - a) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types only are to be returned, then for each attribute type that is to be returned, *Read* permission is required. If permission is not granted, the attribute type is omitted from **EntryInformation**. If, as a consequence of applying these controls no attribute type information is selected, the **EntryInformation** element is returned but no attribute type information is conveyed with it (i.e., the **SET OF CHOICE** element is omitted or empty).
  - b) If the **infoTypes** element of **selection** specifies that attribute types and values are to be returned, then for each attribute type and for each value that is to be returned, *Read* permission is required. If permission to an attribute type is not granted, the attribute is omitted from **EntryInformation**. If permission to an attribute value is not granted, the value is omitted from its corresponding attribute. In the event that permission is not granted to any of the values within the attribute, an **Attribute** element containing an empty **SET OF AttributeValue** is returned. If, as a consequence of applying these controls no attribute information is selected, the **EntryInformation** element is returned but no attribute information is conveyed with it (i.e., the **SET OF CHOICE** element is omitted or empty).

NOTE 4 – If *DiscloseOnError* permission is not granted to the entry identified by the **baseObject** argument, a **partialOutcomeQualifier** indicating a **limitProblem** or **unavailableCriticalExtensions** should not be returned as it may compromise the security of this entry.

### 11.2.6.2 Alias dereferencing during Search

No specific permissions are necessary for alias dereferencing to take place in the course of a **search** operation (subject to the **searchAliases** parameter being set to **TRUE**). However, for each alias entry encountered, if alias dereferencing would result in a **ContinuationReference** being returned in **partialOutcomeQualifier**, the following access controls apply: *Read* permission is required to the alias entry, the **aliasedEntryName** attribute and to the single value that it contains. If any of these permissions is not granted, the **ContinuationReference** shall be omitted from **partialOutcomeQualifier**. These access controls shall also be applied to a **continuationReference** that is received in a response from another DSA. That is, the DSA shall police all **continuationReferences** whether they were generated locally or not.

NOTE – In addition to the access controls described above, security policy may prevent the disclosure of knowledge information that would otherwise be conveyed as **ContinuationReferences** in **partialOutcomeQualifier**. If such a policy is in effect and if a DUA constrains the service by specifying **chainingProhibited**, the Directory may return a **serviceError** with problem **chainingRequired**. Otherwise, the **ContinuationReference** is omitted from **partialOutcomeQualifier**.

### 11.2.6.3 Non-disclosure of incomplete results

If an incomplete result is being returned in **EntryInformation**, i.e., some of the attributes or attribute values have been omitted because of the applicable access controls, the **incompleteEntry** element shall be set to **TRUE** if *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to at least one attribute type withheld from the result, or at least one attribute value withheld from the result (for which attribute type *Read* permission was granted).

### 11.2.7 Search operation decision points for rule-based access control

If **basic-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **rule-based-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the portion of the DIB where the **Search** operation is being performed, the following access controls apply:

- 1) If rule-based entry level permission is denied to the entry identified by the **baseObject** component, then **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** is returned as defined in clause 7.11.2.4.
- 2) Under **rule-based-access-control**, each entry within the scope of the **SearchArgument** for which entry level access is denied is ignored.
- 3) **basic-access-control** on entries is applied as defined in clause 11.2.6, item 2).
- 4) The **filter** is applied ignoring attribute values to which access is denied under **rule-based-access-control**.
- 5) **basic-access-control** on the **filter** is applied as defined in clause 11.2.6, items 3) and 4).
- 6) For any selected entry:

- a) for each attribute type that may be returned under **rule-based-access-control**, access must be granted to at least one attribute value of that type;
  - b) attribute values to which access is denied under **rule-based-access-control** shall not be returned.
- 7) **basic-access-control** is applied to the information returned as defined in clause 11.2.6, item 5).

## 12 Directory Modify operations

There are four operations to modify the Directory: **addEntry**, **removeEntry**, **modifyEntry**, and **modifyDN** defined in clauses 12.1 to 12.4, respectively.

NOTE 1 – Each of these operations identifies the target entry by means of its distinguished name.

NOTE 2 – The success of **addEntry**, **removeEntry**, and **modifyDN** operations may depend on the physical distribution of the DIB across the Directory. Failure shall be reported with an **updateError** with problem **affectsMultipleDSAs**. See Rec ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4.

NOTE 3 – In the event of failure of the underlying communications mechanism, the outcome of the operations is undetermined. The user should use Directory interrogation operations to check whether the attempted modification operation succeeded or not.

### 12.1 Add Entry

#### 12.1.1 Add Entry syntax

An **addEntry** operation is used to add a leaf entry (either an object entry or an alias entry) to the DIT. The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

```

addEntry OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  AddEntryArgument
  RESULT    AddEntryResult
  ERRORS    {attributeError |
              nameError |
              serviceError |
              referral |
              securityError |
              updateError}
  CODE      id-opcode-addEntry }

AddEntryArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { AddEntryArgumentData }

AddEntryArgumentData ::= SET {
  object      [0] Name,
  entry       [1] SET OF Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
  targetSystem [2] AccessPoint OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }

AddEntryResult ::= CHOICE {
  null        NULL,
  information  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AddEntryResultData },
  ... }

AddEntryResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

```

#### 12.1.2 Add Entry arguments

The **object** component identifies the entry to be added. Its immediate superior, which must already exist for the operation to succeed, is determined by removing the last RDN component (which belongs to the entry to be created).

The **entry** component contains the attribute information which, together with that from the RDN, constitutes the entry to be created. The Directory shall ensure that the entry conforms to the Directory schema. Where the entry being created is an alias, no check is made to ensure that the **aliasedEntryName** attribute points to a valid entry.

The **targetSystem** component indicates the DSA to hold the new entry. If this component is absent, it shall be taken to mean the same DSA as holds the superior of the new object. If the component is present, it shall be the DSA with the specified **AccessPoint**. The parameter shall be absent when subentries are to be added.

If the component is present, the **targetSystem** bit in the **criticalExtensions** parameter in **CommonArguments** shall be set, indicating that this extension is critical.

NOTE 1 – If the choice of indicated or implied DSA conflicts with local administrative policy, the operation is not performed and an error is returned.

The **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3) includes a specification of the service controls and security parameters applying to the request. The **dontDereferenceAlias** option is ignored (and treated as set) unless the **useAliasOnUpdate** critical extension bit is set in **criticalExtensions**. Thus aliases are dereferenced by this operation only if **dontDereferenceAlias** is not set and **useAliasOnUpdate** is set. The **sizeLimit** component is ignored if provided. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

NOTE 2 – Update operations that involve dereferencing of an alias name will always fail if they encounter DSAs implemented according to Rec. CCITT X.5\*\* (1988) | ISO/IEC 9594-\*:1990.

### 12.1.3 Add Entry results

Should the request succeed, a result shall be returned. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component of **CommonResultsSeq** (see clause 7.4) shall be included in the results. If the result of this operation is not to be signed by the Directory, no information shall be conveyed with the result.

### 12.1.4 Add Entry errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. The circumstances under which the particular errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

### 12.1.5 Add operation decision points for basic access control

If **rule-based-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **basic-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, **DiscloseOnError** permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **basic-access-control** is in effect for the entry being added, the following sequence of access controls applies:

- 1) No specific permission is required to the immediate superior of the entry identified by the **object** component.

NOTE 1 – Security policy may prevent Directory users from adding entries across DSA boundaries (e.g., using the **targetSystem** component). In this event, an appropriate **nameError**, **serviceError**, **securityError** or **updateError** may be returned provided that it does not compromise the existence of the immediate superior entry. If it does (i.e., **DiscloseOnError** is not granted to the superior entry), the procedure defined in clause 7.11.3 shall be followed with respect to the superior entry.

- 2) If an entry already exists with a distinguished name equal to the **object** component, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.1.5.1, item a).
- 3) *Add* permission is required for the new entry being added. If this permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.1.5.1, item b).

NOTE 2 – The *Add* permission shall be provided as **prescriptiveACI** when attempting to add an entry and as **prescriptiveACI** or **subentryACI** when attempting to add a subentry.

- 4) For each attribute type and for each value that is to be added, *Add* permission is required. If any permission is absent, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.1.5.1, item c).

#### 12.1.5.1 Error returns

If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.1.5, the following procedure applies:

- a) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.1.5, item 2), the valid error returns are one of: if **DiscloseOnError** or *Add* permission is granted to the existing entry, an **updateError** with problem **entryAlreadyExists** shall be returned. Otherwise, the procedure described in clause 7.11.3 is followed with respect to the entry being added.
- b) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.1.5, item 3), the procedure described in clause 7.11.3 is followed with respect to the entry being added.
- c) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.1.5, item 4), the valid error return is **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation**.

### 12.1.6 Add Entry operation decision points for rule-based-access-control

If **basic-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **rule-based-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the portion of the DIB where the **addEntry** operation is being performed, the following sequence of access control applies:

- 1) If rule-based entry level permission to the immediate superior is denied, then **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** is returned as defined in clause 7.11.2.4.
- 2) **basic-access-control** is applied as defined in clause 11.1.5.

## 12.2 Remove Entry

### 12.2.1 Remove Entry syntax

A Remove Entry operation is used to remove a leaf entry (either an object entry, family member or an alias entry) or a non-leaf ancestor and its children, from the DIT. The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

```

removeEntry OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  RemoveEntryArgument
  RESULT    RemoveEntryResult
  ERRORS    {nameError |
              serviceError |
              referral |
              securityError |
              updateError}
  CODE      id-opcode-removeEntry }

RemoveEntryArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { RemoveEntryArgumentData }

RemoveEntryArgumentData ::= SET {
  object      [0] Name,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments
}

RemoveEntryResult ::= CHOICE {
  null        NULL,
  information  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { RemoveEntryResultData },
  ... }

RemoveEntryResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

```

### 12.2.2 Remove Entry arguments

The **object** component identifies the entry to be deleted.

The **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3) includes a specification of the service controls and security parameters applying to the request. The **dontDereferenceAlias** option is ignored (and treated as set) unless the **useAliasOnUpdate** critical extension bit is set in **criticalExtensions**. Thus, aliases are dereferenced by this operation only if **dontDereferenceAlias** is not set and **useAliasOnUpdate** is set. The **sizeLimit** component is ignored if provided. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

NOTE – Update operations that involve dereferencing of an alias name will always fail if they encounter DSAs\_implemented according to Rec. CCITT X.5\*\* (1988) | ISO/IEC 9594-\*:1990.

**FamilyGrouping** may be set as follows:

- **entryOnly** is the default for this operation. The entry to be removed shall be a leaf entry.

- **compoundEntry** may be specified for an ancestor. All the members of the compound entry will be removed. The operation will fail with an **updateError** with problem **notAncestor** if the target object is not an ancestor. The operation will also fail with an appropriate error if it is not possible to remove all members, e.g., for security reasons.

If **FamilyGrouping** is absent or set to any other value than above, **entryOnly** is assumed.

### 12.2.3 Remove Entry results

Should the request succeed, a result shall be returned. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component of **CommonResultsSeq** (see clause 7.4) shall be included in the results. If the result of the operation is not to be signed by the Directory, no information shall be conveyed with the result.

When family information is selected by **familyReturn** in **EntryInformationSelection**, the information returned is defined in clause 7.6.4.

The information returned in **information** component corresponds to the state of the DIB after the (successful) Modify Entry operation.

### 12.2.4 Remove Entry errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. The circumstances under which the particular errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

### 12.2.5 Remove Entry operation decision points for basic access control

If **rule-based-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **basic-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **basic-access-control** is in effect for the entry being removed, the following access controls apply:

- *Remove* permission is required for the entry being removed. If this permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 7.11.1.

NOTE – No specific permissions are required for any of the attributes and attribute values present within the entry being removed.

### 12.2.6 Remove Entry operation decision points for rule-based access control

If **basic-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **rule-based-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the entry being removed, the following sequence of access control applies:

- 1) If rule-based entry level permission is not granted to the target entry, the operation fails with **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** as defined in clause 7.11.2.4.
- 2) Entry level **basic-access-control** is applied as specified in clause 12.2.5.
- 3) If rule-based access is not granted to an attribute value, then it shall not be removed.
- 4) If rule-based *RDN* permission is not granted, then none of the attribute values of the RDN shall be removed. If all the values of an attribute are removed, then the attribute is removed from the entry. If all the attributes are removed, then the entry is removed from the DIT. If at least one attribute value is removed, and the requester does not have *RDN* permission, the operation succeeds but the entry remains in the DIT with one or more attributes.

NOTE 1 – Unless all the values of the label context for distinguished values of the entry have all the same values, this may not support a rule-based access-control policy.

- 5) Under **rule-based-access-control**, if *RDN* permission is granted, but permission to access at least one other attribute value is not granted, then the RDN is not removed, and the operation fails with **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights**. It is a local matter whether other attribute values to which the requester has access permission are removed or not.

NOTE 2 – This reveals to the requester that at least one attribute value exists that is inaccessible.

- 6) If all the attributes of the entry are removed, then the entry is removed from the DIT, and the operation is successful.

## 12.3 Modify Entry

### 12.3.1 Modify Entry syntax

The Modify Entry operation is used to perform a series of one or more of the following modifications to a single entry:

- a) add a new attribute;
- b) remove an attribute;
- c) add attribute values;
- d) remove attribute values;
- e) replace attribute values;
- f) modify an alias;
- g) add a constant to all values of an attribute;
- h) delete all attribute values for which fallback is **FALSE** in every context.

The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

```

modifyEntry OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  ModifyEntryArgument
  RESULT    ModifyEntryResult
  ERRORS    {attributeError |
              nameError |
              serviceError |
              referral |
              securityError |
              updateError}
  CODE      id-opcode-modifyEntry }

ModifyEntryArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ModifyEntryArgumentData }

ModifyEntryArgumentData ::= SET {
  object      [0]  Name,
  changes     [1]  SEQUENCE OF EntryModification,
  selection   [2]  EntryInformationSelection OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }

ModifyEntryResult ::= CHOICE {
  null        NULL,
  information  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ModifyEntryResultData },
  ... }

ModifyEntryResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  entry       [0]  EntryInformation OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

EntryModification ::= CHOICE {
  addAttribute    [0]  Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
  removeAttribute [1]  AttributeType,
  addValues       [2]  Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
  removeValues   [3]  Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
  alterValues    [4]  AttributeTypeAndValue,
  resetValue     [5]  AttributeType,
  replaceValues  [6]  Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
  ... }

```

### 12.3.2 Modify Entry arguments

The **object** component identifies the entry to which the modifications should be applied.

The **changes** component defines a sequence of modifications that are applied in the order specified. If any of the individual modifications fail, then an **attributeError** is generated and the entry left in the state that it was prior to the operation. That is, the operation is atomic. The end result of the sequence of modifications shall not violate the Directory

schema. However, it is possible, and sometimes necessary, for the individual **EntryModification** changes to appear to do so. The following types of modification may occur:

- a) **addAttribute** – This identifies a new attribute to be added to the entry, which is fully specified by the component. Any attempt to add an already existing attribute results in an **attributeError**.
- b) **removeAttribute** – The component identifies (by its type) an attribute to be removed from the entry. Any attempt to remove a non-existing attribute results in an **attributeError**.

NOTE 1 – This operation is not allowed if the attribute type is present in the RDN.

- c) **addValues** – This identifies an attribute by the attribute type in the argument, and specifies one or more attribute values to be added to the attribute. An attempt to add an already existing value results in an error. An attempt to add a value to a non-existent type results in the type and value being added.
- d) **removeValues** – This identifies an attribute by the attribute type in the argument, and specifies one or more attribute values to be removed from the attribute. If the values are not present in the attribute, this results in an **attributeError**. An attempt to remove the last value from an attribute results in the attribute type being removed.

NOTE 2 – This operation is not allowed if one of the values is present in the RDN.

Attributes or attribute values to be added may be specified with or without a context list. Contexts cannot be added to existing attribute values, removed from existing attribute values, nor modified. To alter a context list of an existing attribute value, first remove the attribute value, and then insert the same attribute value with the new context list. When an attribute value is removed, no context list shall be supplied, and any existing context list associated with the attribute value being removed is removed with the attribute value.

- e) **alterValues** – This identifies an attribute type, and specifies a quantity to be added to all values of the attribute. An attempt to apply this modification to an attribute whose syntax is anything other than **INTEGER** or **REAL** results in an **attributeError**.
- f) **resetValue** – This identifies an attribute by its type, and removes all values of the attribute (if any) which have an associated attribute value context for which fallback is **FALSE**. **resetValue** does not remove any attribute values that have no context.
- g) **replaceValues** – This replaces all existing values of the given attribute type with the values supplied, creating the attribute type if it did not exist. A replace with no value removes the attribute type if it exists, and is ignored if the type does not exist.

NOTE 3 – This Directory Specification does not establish rules regarding the order in which a performing DSA is to decode and process PDUs that it receives. If a DSA decodes the entire PDU before processing each element, and if a new and unexpected value, such as **replaceValues**, is in place for a non-optional CHOICE, it is possible that the DSA will signal an encoding error. If, however, the DSA decodes the elements as they are needed, it will most likely detect an unknown critical extension and return an unsupported critical extension reason code to signal that the operation failed. In either case, it is correct for the DSA to not process the operation; however, implementers should be aware that either signal may be used to indicate the failure of the operation.

Values may be replaced by a combination of **addValues** and **removeValues** in a single **ModifyEntry** operation.

The **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3) includes a specification of the service controls and security parameters applying to the request. The **dontDereferenceAlias** option is ignored (and treated as set) unless the **useAliasOnUpdate** critical extension bit is set in **criticalExtensions**. Thus, aliases are dereferenced by this operation only if **dontDereferenceAlias** is not set and **useAliasOnUpdate** is set. The **sizeLimit** component is ignored if provided. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

NOTE 4 – Update operations that involve dereferencing of an alias name will always fail if they encounter DSAs implemented according to Rec. CCITT X.5\*\* (1988) | ISO/IEC 9594-\*:1990.

The **selection** component specifies an optional entry information selection that controls whether information is returned in the operation result and specifies the specific attributes and values to be returned. It shall only be specified if the version negotiated through the bind operation is **v2** or higher.

The operation may be used to modify directory operational attributes. Only those directory operational attributes which are not classified **noUserModification** (and to which the user has effective modification access rights) may be modified.

NOTE 5 – Whether or not user modification is permitted, the Directory may change the values of directory operational attributes as a side effect of other Directory operations.

The operation may be used to modify collective attributes only if the service control **subentries** is **TRUE** and if the **object** is the subentry actually holding the collective attribute(s) to be modified.

NOTE 6 – Caution should therefore be exercised when modifying the information returned on reading an entry: some of the information may be from collective attributes, and cannot be modified in an operation directed at the entry itself. For example, it is not possible to delete a collective attribute from an (ordinary) entry via a **removeAttribute** entry modification to the entry (an **attributeError** with **problem noSuchAttributeOrValue** would be returned).

The operation may be used to modify an entry's Object Class attribute value if the values specify auxiliary object classes. However, an attempt to change an Object Class value which specifies an entry's structural object class shall result in an **updateError** with problem **objectClassModificationProhibited**. Any modification to auxiliary object classes shall leave the superclass chains consistent and correct with the resultant object class definition.

### 12.3.3 Modify Entry results

Should the request succeed, a **result** shall be returned. If no **selection** was specified in the operation argument and the result is not to be signed, the null result is returned. If no **selection** was specified (but the result is to be signed by the Directory), the entry component is omitted. If the result is to be signed by the Directory, the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) component of **CommonResultsSeq** (see clause 7.4) shall be included in the results. If the result is not to be signed by the Directory, no entry information shall be conveyed with the result.

### 12.3.4 Modify Entry errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. The circumstances under which the particular errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

### 12.3.5 Modify Entry operation decision points for basic access control

If **rule-based-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **basic-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **basic-access-control** is in effect for the entry being modified, the following sequence of access controls applies:

- 1) *Modify* permission is required for the entry being modified. If this permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 7.11.1.
- 2) For each of the specified **EntryModification** arguments applied in sequence, the following permissions are required:
  - i) *Add* permission for the attribute type and for each of the values specified in an **addAttribute** parameter. If these permissions are not granted or the attribute already exists, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item a).
  - ii) *Remove* permission for the attribute type specified in a **removeAttribute** parameter. If this permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item b).

NOTE 1 – No specific permissions are required for any of the attribute values present within the attribute being removed.

- iii) *Add* permission on each of the attribute values specified in an **addValues** parameter. If these permissions are not granted or any of the attribute values already exist, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item c).
- iv) *Remove* permission on each of the values specified in a **removeValues** parameter. If these permissions are not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item d).

NOTE 2 – If the end result of a **removeValues** modification is to remove the last value of an attribute (which causes the attribute itself to be removed), *Remove* permission is also required on the specified attribute type.

- v) *Add* and *Remove* permission on each of the values specified in an **alterValues** parameter. If these permissions are not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item e).
- vi) *Remove* permission on each of the values to be removed via a **resetValue** parameter. If at least one value is to be removed and these permissions are not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item f).
- vii) *Add* permission for the attribute type and for each of the values in the **replaceValues** if the operation attempts to add the attribute type. If these permissions are not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item g).
- viii) *Remove* permission for the attribute type in the **replaceValues** parameter if the operation attempts to remove the attribute. If this permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item b).
- ix) *Remove* permission for all the values currently in the attribute and *Add* permission for all values in the **replaceValues** if the operation attempts to replace the values.

- If all the *Remove* permissions are not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item d).
- If all the *Remove* permissions are granted, but all the *Add* permissions are not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.3.5.1, item g).

### 12.3.5.1 Error returns

If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, the following procedure applies:

- a) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, item 2), subitem i), the valid error returns are one of: if the attribute already exists and *DiscloseOnError* or *Add* is granted to that attribute, an **attributeError** with problem **attributeOrValueAlreadyExists** shall be returned; otherwise, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned.
- b) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, item 2), subitem ii) or subitem viii), the valid error returns are one of: if *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to the attribute being removed and the attribute exists, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned; otherwise, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.
- c) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, item 2), subitem iii), the valid error returns are one of: if an attribute value already exists and *DiscloseOnError* or *Add* is granted to that attribute value, an **attributeError** with problem **attributeOrValueAlreadyExists** shall be returned; otherwise, *DiscloseOnError* permission at the attribute level shall be verified. If *DiscloseOnError* is granted to the attribute, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned; otherwise, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.
- d) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, item 2), subitem iv) or subitem ix), first bullet point, the valid error returns are one of: if *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to any of the attribute values being removed, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned; otherwise, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.
- e) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, item 2), subitem v), the valid error returns are one of: if *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to any of the attribute values being altered, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned; otherwise, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.
- f) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, item 2), subitem vi), the valid error returns are one of: if *DiscloseOnError* permission is granted to any of the attribute values being removed, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned; otherwise, an **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue** shall be returned.
- g) If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.3.5, item 2), subitem vii) or subitem ix), second bullet point, a **securityError** with problem **insufficientAccessRights** or **noInformation** shall be returned.

### 12.3.6 Modify Entry operation decision points for rule-based access control

If **basic-access-control** is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to **rule-based-access-control** is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, *DiscloseOnError* permission of **basic-access-control** is a permission that shall not override a deny of **rule-based-access-control**.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the entry being modified, the following sequence of access control applies:

- 1) If rule-based entry level permission is not granted to the target entry, then the operation fails with **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** according to clause 7.11.2.4.
- 2) Entry level **basic-access-control** is applied according to clause 12.3.5.1.
- 3) Access must be granted to each of the attribute values (if any) that are removed. If **rule-based-access-control** permission is not granted to any attribute value that is to be removed, the operation fails with **attributeError** with problem **noSuchAttributeOrValue**.
- 4) Attribute level **basic-access-control** is applied as in clause 12.3.5, item 2).

## 12.4 Modify DN

### 12.4.1 Modify DN syntax

The Modify DN operation is used to change the Relative Distinguished Name of an entry, and/or to move an entry to a new superior in the DIT. It may be used with object entries, including compound entries or alias entries.

For family members, its use is restricted to the case where the affected family members stay within the same compound entry.

If the entry has subordinates, then all subordinates are renamed or moved accordingly (i.e., the subtree remains intact). The arguments of the operation may be signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result may be signed. Otherwise, the result shall not be signed.

NOTE 1 – Implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.511 (1988) ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990 may use the operation only to change the Relative Distinguished Name of a leaf entry.

NOTE 2 – Implementations based on Rec. ITU-T X.511 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:1995 and later editions may use the operation to move entries to a new superior only if the old superior, the new superior, the entry, and all its subordinates are in one DSA.

NOTE 3 – The operation does not move entries to a new DSA; all entries remain in the original DSA.

NOTE 4 – The operation either succeeds or fails in its entirety; it shall not fail with some entries moved and some not moved. No intermediate states of the operation shall be externally visible to users of the Directory.

NOTE 5 – Some offline activity may be required following this operation to preserve consistency, for example, to update attributes in any entries that hold Distinguished Name values that refer to the renamed or moved entry(ies).

NOTE 6 – The **modifyTimeStamp** attribute is not updated for entries subordinate to the renamed or moved entry.

```

modifyDN OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT   ModifyDNArgument
  RESULT     ModifyDNResult
  ERRORS     {nameError |
                serviceError |
                referral |
                securityError |
                updateError}
  CODE       id-opcode-modifyDN }

ModifyDNArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ModifyDNArgumentData }

ModifyDNArgumentData ::= SET {
  object       [0] DistinguishedName,
  newRDN      [1] RelativeDistinguishedName,
  deleteOldRDN [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  newSuperior [3] DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF   CommonArguments }

ModifyDNResult ::= CHOICE {
  null         NULL,
  information  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ModifyDNResultData },
  ... }

ModifyDNResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  newRDN       RelativeDistinguishedName,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

```

### 12.4.2 Modify DN arguments

The **object** component identifies the entry whose Distinguished Name is to be modified. Aliases in the name shall not be dereferenced.

The **newRDN** component specifies the new RDN of the entry. If the operation moves the entry to a new superior without changing its RDN, the old RDN is supplied for this parameter.

If an attribute value in the new RDN does not already exist in the entry (either as part of the old RDN or as a non-distinguished value), it is added. If it cannot be added, an error is returned.

If the `deleteOldRDN` flag is set, all attribute values in the old RDN that are not in the new RDN are deleted. If this flag is not set, the old distinguished values shall remain in the entry (but are no longer distinguished values). The flag shall be set where a single value attribute in the RDN has its value changed by the operation. If this operation removes the last attribute value of an attribute, that attribute shall be deleted.

The `newSuperior` component, if present, specifies that the entry is to be moved to a new superior in the DIT. The entry becomes an immediate subordinate of the entry with the indicated Distinguished Name, which must be an already existing object entry. The new superior shall not be the entry itself or any of its subordinates, or an alias, or such that the moved entry violates any DIT structure rules. It is possible that entries subordinate to the moved entry may violate the active subschema, in which case it is the responsibility of the Subschema Administrative Authority to make subsequent adjustments to these entries to make them consistent with the subschema, as described in clause 14 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

If the component is present, the `newSuperior` bit in the `criticalExtensions` parameter in `CommonArguments` shall be set, indicating that this extension is critical.

The `CommonArguments` (see clause 7.3) includes a specification of the service controls and security parameters applying to the request. For the purposes of this operation, the `dontDereferenceAlias` option and the `sizeLimit` component are not relevant and are ignored if provided. Aliases are never dereferenced by this operation. If the argument of this operation is to be signed by the requester, the `SecurityParameters` (see clause 7.10) component shall be included in the arguments.

### 12.4.3 Modify DN results

Should the request succeed, a result shall be returned. If this result is to be signed by the Directory, the `SecurityParameters` (see clause 7.10) component of `CommonResultsSeq` (see clause 7.4), and the new RDN shall be included in the results. If the result is not to be signed by the Directory, no information shall be conveyed with the result.

### 12.4.4 Modify DN errors

Should the request fail, one of the listed errors shall be reported. The circumstances under which the particular errors shall be returned are defined in clause 14.

### 12.4.5 ModifyDN decision points for basic access control

If `rule-based-access-control` is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to `basic-access-control` is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, `DiscloseOnError` permission of `basic-access-control` is a permission that shall not override a deny of `rule-based-access-control`.

If `basic-access-control` is in effect for the entry being renamed, the following access controls apply:

- If the effect of the operation is to change the RDN of the entry, `Rename` permission is required for the entry being renamed (considered with its original name). If this permission is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.4.5.1.
- If the effect of the operation is to move an entry to a new superior in the DIT, `Export` permission is required for the entry being considered with its original name, and `Import` permission is required for the entry being considered with its new name. If either of these permissions is not granted, the operation fails in accordance with clause 12.4.5.1.

NOTE 1 – The `Import` permission shall be provided as prescriptive ACI.

NOTE 2 – No additional permissions are required even if, as a result of modifying the last RDN of the name, a new distinguished value needs to be added or an old one removed.

#### 12.4.5.1 Error returns

If the operation fails as defined in clause 12.4.5, the procedure described in clause 7.11.1 is followed with respect to the entry being renamed (considered with its original name).

### 12.4.6 Modify DN operation decision points for rule-based access control

If `basic-access-control` is also applied, the order in which it is applied with respect to `rule-based-access-control` is a local matter, except that if access is denied to the entry, an attribute type or an attribute value, by either mechanism, it shall not be overridden by the other mechanism. In this respect, `DiscloseOnError` permission of `basic-access-control` is a permission that shall not override a deny of `rule-based-access-control`.

If **rule-based-access-control**, **rule-and-basic-access-control**, or **rule-and-simple-access-control** is in effect for the entry being renamed, the following sequence of access control applies:

- 1) If rule-based RDN permission is not granted to the target entry, the operation fails with **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** in accordance with clause 7.11.2.4.
- 2) Entry level **basic-access-control** is applied as in clause 12.4.5.
- 3) If the effect of the operation is to move the entry to a new superior in the DIT, rule-based RDN permission is required to the new superior, otherwise the operation fails with **nameError** with problem **noSuchObject** in accordance with clause 7.11.2.4.

## 12.5 Change Password

This operation is intended to be used by Directory users to change their own passwords.

### 12.5.1 Change Password syntax

A Directory Change Password operation is used by a user to change a password to prevent password expiration or after password reset by an administrator. The password may be changed at any time during an application-association. The user is allowed as many attempts as specified in the **pwdMaxCompareFailure** attribute. When this limit is reached, the DSA shall unbind the application-association and, if the **pwdCompareLockout** attribute is **TRUE**, lock the account for **pwdCompareLockoutDuration**.

```
changePassword OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  ChangePasswordArgument
  RESULT    ChangePasswordResult
  ERRORS    {securityError |
             updateError }
  CODE      id-opcode-changePassword }
```

```
ChangePasswordArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ChangePasswordArgumentData }
```

```
ChangePasswordArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
  object  [0]  DistinguishedName,
  oldPwd  [1]  UserPwd,
  newPwd  [2]  UserPwd,
  ... }
```

```
ChangePasswordResult ::= CHOICE {
  null      NULL,
  information OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ChangePasswordResultData },
  ... }
```

```
ChangePasswordResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }
```

### 12.5.2 Change Password arguments

The current password (**oldPwd** component) and the new password (**newPwd** component) have to be supplied in a Change Password operation. The **oldPwd** and **newPwd** components shall contain a clear or encrypted password.

### 12.5.3 Change Password results

If the password is changed successfully, no information is returned by the operation and normal communication may continue.

### 12.5.4 Change Password errors

Should the request fail, a **securityError** or **updateError** shall be supplied as follows:

```
securityError  inappropriateAlgorithms
updateError    insufficientPasswordQuality
               pwdInHistory
               pwdHistoryFull
```

The circumstances under which other errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

## 12.6 Administer Password

This operation is intended to be used by Directory Administrators to change users' passwords. If two free slots are not available in the `userPwdHistory` attribute, this operation will free two slots before proceeding. At the end of the successful operation, there will be one free slot for the user to change the password which has been set by the Administrator.

### 12.6.1 Administer Password syntax

Administer password operation is used by an administrator to change a user's password.

```

administerPassword OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT   AdministerPasswordArgument
  RESULT     AdministerPasswordResult
  ERRORS     {securityError |
                updateError}
  CODE       id-opcode-administerPassword }

AdministerPasswordArgument ::=
  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AdministerPasswordArgumentData }

AdministerPasswordArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
  object [0] DistinguishedName,
  newPwd [1] UserPwd,
  ... }

AdministerPasswordResult ::= CHOICE {
  null NULL,
  information OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AdministerPasswordResultData },
  ...}

AdministerPasswordResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

```

### 12.6.2 Administer Password arguments

The new password (`newPwd` component) has to be supplied in Administer Password operation. The `newPwd` component shall contain a clear or encrypted password.

### 12.6.3 Administer Password results

If the password is changed successfully, no information is returned by the operation and normal communication may continue.

### 12.6.4 Administer Password errors

Should the request fail, a `securityError` or `updateError` shall be supplied as follows:

```

securityError   inappropriateAlgorithms
updateError    insufficientPasswordQuality
                  pwdInHistory

```

The circumstances under which other errors shall be reported are defined in clause 14.

## 13 Operations for LDAP messages

The operations for carrying LDAP messages are defined by this clause. These operations are used for carrying all types of LDAP messages through a Directory infrastructure established according to these Directory Specifications. These operations are not used on the DAP. They are only used on the DSP between DSAs. However, they are defined in this Directory Specification to keep together all definitions operation types carried on the DSP.

An LDAP request may eventually be chained to an LDAP server and it may result in multiple results, like for an LDAP Search operation. The LDAP requester may operate in two different ways:

- a) It may collect all the results and return the combined results in an `ldapTransport` result. The DSA bound to the LDAP client shall decompose such combined results before returning them to the LDAP client.

- b) Return the results one by one in **linkedLDAP** requests, except for the last result, which shall be carried in the **ldapTransport** result.

## 13.1 LDAP Transport operation

### 13.1.1 LDAP Transport syntax

An LDAP Transport operation is used to carry an LDAP request and some or all of the results. This is achieved by means of a specific operation, **ldapTransport** defined below. This operation is only relevant if an LDAP request is to be forwarded to an adjacent DSA.

The bound DSA may sign the **ldapTransport** request based on its own identity or based on the identity of the requester. If the **target** component of the **SecurityParameters** (see clause 7.10) in the request is set to **signed** and a result is to be returned, the result together with possible **linkedLDAP** requests may be signed. Otherwise, the result and possible **linkedLDAP** requests shall not be signed.

```

ldapTransport OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT      LdapArgument
  RESULT        LdapResult
  ERRORS        { abandonFailed | abandoned }
  CODE          id-opcode-ldapTransport }

LdapArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { LdapArgumentData }

LdapArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
  object          DistinguishedName,
  ldapMessage     LDAPMessage,
  linkId          LinkId OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArgumentsSeq }

LinkId ::= INTEGER

LdapResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { LdapResultData }

LdapResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  ldapMessages   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF LDAPMessage OPTIONAL,
  returnToClient BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

```

### 13.1.2 LDAP Transport arguments

The **object** component shall hold the distinguished name as converted from the LDAP distinguished name in **object** or **baseObject** component of the **LDAPMessage**. If the **LDAPMessage** is an **AddRequest**, the last RDN shall be removed.

The **ldapMessage** component shall hold the LDAP request as defined by RFC 4511.

The **linkId** component shall hold a unique identifier that uniquely identifies an outstanding LDAP operation among other outstanding LDAP operations forwarded to a particular adjacent DSA. This component shall be present for LDAP operations possibly providing multiple results. Otherwise, it shall be absent.

NOTE 1 – An implementation could use the same value as used for the **InvokeId** for the chained request.

**CommonArguments** needs not to be filled for components only affecting the performing DSA(s). Performing DSAs shall act on the embedded LDAP request when performing evaluation.

LDAP controls may specify capabilities corresponding to the components of **CommonArguments** (see clause 7.3). If such controls are recognised, relevant for other than the performing DSA(s) and supported by the bound DSA, the relevant components and/or service controls shall be filled accordingly. Otherwise, the **CommonArguments** shall be filled as specified in the following. If a component is not referenced below, it shall be encoded as specified in clause 7.3.

The **serviceControls** component shall be encoded as follows:

- The **options** subcomponent shall be set as follows:

- a) The **preferChaining** service control option may be set according to local policy for the bound DSA. If this option is set, it is the preference of the bound DSA that chaining is preferred beyond the adjacent DSA.
- b) The **chainingProhibited** service control may be set according to local policy for the bound DSA. If this option is set, it is the preference of the bound DSA that chaining shall not be done beyond the adjacent DSA.

NOTE 2 – An adjacent DSA may not react on this service control option, as it might see the request as a chained request.

- c) The **localScope** service control option may be set according to local policy for the bound DSA.
  - d) If the LDAP Don't Use Copy control extension (see IETF RFC 6171) is included in the LDAP request and supported by the bound DSA, the **dontUseCopy** service control option shall be set. Otherwise, this service control option may be set according to local policy.
  - e) The **dontDereferenceAliases** shall be set, if the embedded LDAP request is of a type not allowing dereferencing of aliases. Otherwise, this service control option may be set according to local policy.
  - f) The **subentries** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
  - g) The **copyShallDo** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
  - h) The **partialNameResolution** shall not be set if the embedded LDAP request is not a search request. Otherwise, it shall be set according to local policy.
  - i) The **manageDSAIT** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
  - j) The **noSubtypeMatch** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
  - k) The **noSubtypeSelection** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
  - l) The **countFamily** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
  - m) The **dontSelectFriends** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
  - n) The **dontMatchFriends** service control option is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall not be set.
- The **priority** service control may be set according to local policy for the bound DSA.
  - The **timeLimit** service control may be set according to local policy for the bound DSA.
  - The **sizeLimit** service control is not relevant for intermediate DSAs and shall be absent.
  - The **scopeOfReferral** subcomponent may be set according to local policy for the bound DSA.
  - The **attributeSizeLimit** subcomponent may be set according to local policy for the bound DSA.
  - The **manageDSAITPlaneRef** subcomponent shall be absent.
  - The **serviceType** subcomponent shall be absent.
  - The **userClass** subcomponent shall be absent.

**SecurityParameters** component is specified in clause 7.10. If the argument of the operation is to be signed by the bound DSA, the **SecurityParameters** component shall be included. The absence of the **SecurityParameters** component is deemed equivalent to an empty set.

The **requestor** component shall be present if the distinguished name of the requester is known from the LDAP Bind operation. Otherwise, it shall be absent.

The **operationProgress**, **referenceType**, **entryOnly**, **exclusions** and **nameResolveOnMaster** components are defined in Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4. They are supplied by the bound DSA when acting on a continuation reference returned by another DSA in response to an earlier operation, and their values are copied by the bound DSA from the continuation reference. Otherwise, they shall be absent.

The **operationContexts** and **familyGrouping** components shall be absent.

### 13.1.3 LDAP Transport results

An **ldapTransport** result shall be returned when:

- a) all results from the LDAP server has been collected by the LDAP requester to be transmitted together in the `ldapTransport` result; or
- b) all results have been transmitted by `linkedLDAP` requests, except for the last one(s) to be transmitted by the `ldapTransport` result.

The `ldapMessages` component shall hold one or more LDAP results as defined by RFC 4511. This parameter shall be present except if the result is for a previous embedded LDAP abandon request or no result was received for an abandoned operation. Such `ldapTransport` results shall be discarded by the bound DSA. When the `ldapMessages` component is present, the LDAP messages shall be transmitted to the LDAP client one by one in the same sequence as provided in the component.

The `linkId` component shall echo the `linkId` in the argument in the corresponding `ldapTransport` request.

The `returnToClient` component may be present when an LDAP referral is returned. Otherwise, it shall be absent. If present and has the value `TRUE`, it signals that the referral shall be returned to the LDAP client rather than being handled by the bound DSA. It shall be set by the DSA generating the referral. If the referral is generated by an LDAP server, the DSA adjacent to that server may set this component based on knowledge of the policy of the LDAP server. Such information may be supplied by administrative means outside the scope of this Directory Specification.

## 13.2 Linked LDAP operation

### 13.2.1 Linked LDAP syntax

A Linked LDAP operation is used to carry a single result of an LDAP multiple results operation. The final result is not carried by this operation.

```
linkedLDAP OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT      LinkedArgument
  RESULT        LinkedResult
  CODE          id-opcode-linkedLDAP }

LinkedArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { LinkedArgumentData }

LinkedArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
  object          DistinguishedName,
  ldapMessage     LDAPMessage,
  linkId          LinkId,
  returnToClient  BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArgumentsSeq }

LinkedResult ::= NULL
```

### 13.2.2 Linked LDAP arguments

The `object` argument shall hold the distinguished name of the bound DSA as provided in the `dsa` component of the first `TraceItem` element of the `TraceInformation` data type.

The `ldapMessage` argument shall hold an `LDAPMessage` result.

The `linkId` component shall hold the same value as provided in the corresponding `ldapTransport` request.

The `returnToClient` component shall be handled as specified in clause 12.1.3.

### 13.2.3 Linked LDAP results

The `linkedLDAP` result shall be returned for each `linkedLDAP` request received to complete the handling by intermediate DSAs.

## 14 Errors

### 14.1 Error precedence

The Directory does not continue to perform an operation beyond the point at which it determines that an error is to be reported.

NOTE 1 – An implication of this rule is that the first error encountered can differ for repeated instances of the same query, as there is not a specific logical order in which to process a given query. For example, DSAs may be searched in different orders.

NOTE 2 – The rules of error precedence specified here apply only to the abstract service provided by the Directory as a whole. Different rules apply when the internal structure of the Directory is taken into account.

Should the Directory simultaneously detect more than one error, the following list determines which error is reported. An error higher in the list has a higher logical precedence than one below it, and is the error which is reported.

- a) **nameError**;
- b) **updateError**;
- c) **attributeError**;
- d) **securityError**;
- e) **serviceError**.

The following errors do not present any precedence conflicts:

- a) **abandonFailed**, because it is specific to one operation, Abandon, which can encounter no other error.
- b) **abandoned**, which is not reported if an Abandon operation is received simultaneously with the detection of an error. In this case, an **abandonFailed** error with problem **tooLate** is returned along with the report of the actual error encountered.
- c) **referral**, which is not a "real" error, only an indication that the Directory has detected that the DUA should present its request to another access point.

## 14.2 Abandoned

This outcome may be reported for any outstanding directory enquiry operation (i.e., Read, Search, Compare, List) if the DUA invokes an Abandon operation with the appropriate **InvokeId**. It shall be returned as a response to a **list** or **search** request with the **pageResults** component included with the value **abandonQuery**. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```
abandoned ERROR ::= {-- not literally an "error"
  PARAMETER   OPTIONALY-PROTECTED { AbandonedData }
  CODE        id-errcode-abandoned }
```

```
AbandonedData ::= SET {
  problem      AbandonedProblem OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }
```

```
AbandonedProblem ::= ENUMERATED {
  pagingAbandoned (0) }
```

The problem component shall not be present if this error is returned for an Abandon operation.

The problem component shall be present if this error is returned for a **list** or **search** request with the **pageResults** component included with the value **abandonQuery**. In this case, the component shall take the value **pagingAbandoned**.

The **securityParameters** component shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed.

## 14.3 Abandon Failed

The **abandonFailed** error reports a problem encountered during an attempt to abandon an operation. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```
abandonFailed ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER OPTIONALY-PROTECTED { AbandonFailedData }
  CODE        id-errcode-abandonFailed }
```

```
AbandonFailedData ::= SET {
```

```

problem    [0]  AbandonProblem,
operation  [1]  InvokeId,
... ,
... ,
COMPONENTS OF  CommonResults }

```

```

AbandonProblem ::= INTEGER {
  noSuchOperation (1),
  tooLate         (2),
  cannotAbandon  (3) }

```

The various parameters have the following meanings.

A particular **problem** that is encountered is specified. Any of the following problems may be indicated:

- a) **noSuchOperation** – When the Directory has no knowledge of the operation which is to be abandoned (this could be because no such invoke took place, or because the Directory has forgotten about it);
- b) **tooLate** – When the Directory has already responded to the operation;
- c) **cannotAbandon** – When an attempt has been made to abandon an operation for which this is prohibited (e.g., modify), or the abandon could not be performed.

The identification of the particular **operation** (invocation) to be abandoned.

The **SecurityParameters** component (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed by the Directory.

The information provided by the error problem can optionally be qualified by the use of the **notification** component of **CommonResults**.

## 14.4 Attribute Error

An **attributeError** reports an attribute-related problem. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```

attributeError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER      OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { AttributeErrorData }
  CODE           id-errcode-attributeError }

```

```

AttributeErrorData ::= SET {
  object    [0]  Name,
  problems [1]  SET OF SEQUENCE {
    problem [0]  AttributeProblem,
    type    [1]  AttributeType,
    value   [2]  AttributeValue OPTIONAL,
    ... },
  ... ,
  ... ,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

```

```

AttributeProblem ::= INTEGER {
  noSuchAttributeOrValue      (1),
  invalidAttributeSyntax     (2),
  undefinedAttributeType    (3),
  inappropriateMatching     (4),
  constraintViolation       (5),
  attributeOrValueAlreadyExists (6),
  contextViolation          (7) }

```

The various parameters have the following meaning.

The **object** component identifies the entry to which the operation was being applied when the error occurred.

One or more **problems** may be specified. Each **problem** (identified below) is accompanied by an indication of the attribute **type**, and, if necessary to avoid ambiguity, the **value**, which caused the problem:

- a) **noSuchAttributeOrValue** – The named entry lacks one of the attributes or attribute values specified as an argument of the operation.

- b) **invalidAttributeSyntax** – A purported attribute value, specified as an argument of the operation, does not conform to the attribute syntax of the attribute type.
- c) **undefinedAttributeType** – An undefined attribute type was provided as an argument to the operation. This error may occur only in relation to **addEntry** or **modifyEntry** operations.
- d) **inappropriateMatching** – An attempt was made, e.g., in a filter, to use a matching rule not defined for the attribute type concerned.
- e) **constraintViolation** – An attribute value supplied in the argument of an operation does not conform to the constraints imposed by Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2 or by the attribute definition (e.g., the value exceeds the maximum size allowed).
- f) **attributeOrValueAlreadyExists** – An attempt was made to add an attribute which already existed in the entry, or a value which already existed in the attribute.
- g) **contextViolation** – A context list or context supplied with an attribute value in the argument of an operation does not conform to the constraints imposed by Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2, by the context definition (e.g., the context value is not of the correct syntax), or the DIT Context Use.

The **SecurityParameters** component (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed by the Directory.

The information provided by the error problem can optionally be qualified by the use of the **notification** component of **CommonResults**.

## 14.5 Name Error

A **nameError** reports a problem related to the name provided as an argument to an operation. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```
nameError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER      OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { NameErrorData }
  CODE           id-errcode-nameError }
```

```
NameErrorData ::= SET {
  problem [0] NameProblem,
  matched [1] Name,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }
```

```
NameProblem ::= INTEGER {
  noSuchObject      (1),
  aliasProblem      (2),
  invalidAttributeSyntax (3),
  aliasDereferencingProblem (4)
  -- not to be used (5) -- }
```

The various components have the following meaning.

A particular **problem** is encountered. Any of the following problems may be indicated:

- a) **noSuchObject** – The name supplied does not match the name of any object.
- b) **aliasProblem** – An alias has been dereferenced which names no object.
- c) **invalidAttributeSyntax** – An attribute type and its accompanying attribute value in an AVA in the name are incompatible.
- d) **aliasDereferencingProblem** – An alias was encountered in a situation where it was not allowed or where access was denied.

The **matched** parameter contains the name of the lowest entry (object or alias) in the DIT that was matched, and is a truncated form of the name provided or, if an alias has been dereferenced, of the resulting name.

NOTE – If there is a problem with the attribute types and/or values in the name offered in a Directory operation argument, this is reported via a **nameError** with problem **invalidAttributeSyntax** rather than as an **attributeError** or an **updateError**.

The **SecurityParameters** component (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed by the Directory.

The information provided by the error problem can optionally be qualified by the use of the **notification** component of **CommonResults**.

## 14.6 Referral

A **referral** redirects the service-user to one or more access points better equipped to carry out the requested operation. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```
referral ERROR ::= { -- not literally an "error"
  PARAMETER      OPTIONALY-PROTECTED { ReferralData }
  CODE           id-errcode-referral }
```

```
ReferralData ::= SET {
  candidate [0] ContinuationReference,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }
```

The error has a single parameter which contains a **ContinuationReference** which can be used to progress the operation (see Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4).

If the DSA is responding to an LDAP request, the **nAddresses** component of the **PresentationAddress** data type shall hold one or more LDAP URLs as specified in clause 11.4 of Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5. This information shall be used by the bound DSA to create an LDAP referral.

The **SecurityParameters** component (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed by the Directory.

Before acting on a continuation reference, the DUA shall check that an identical request to the one that would be generated from the continuation reference has not already been issued as a part of processing the same user request. If it has, the DUA shall not act on the continuation reference. This avoids loops.

## 14.7 Security Error

A **securityError** reports a problem in carrying out an operation for security reasons. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```
securityError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER      OPTIONALY-PROTECTED { SecurityErrorData }
  CODE           id-errcode-securityError }
```

```
SecurityErrorData ::= SET {
  problem [0] SecurityProblem,
  spkmInfo [1] SPKM-ERROR OPTIONAL,
  encPwdInfo [2] EncPwdInfo OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }
```

```
SecurityProblem ::= INTEGER {
  inappropriateAuthentication (1),
  invalidCredentials (2),
  insufficientAccessRights (3),
  invalidSignature (4),
  protectionRequired (5),
  noInformation (6),
  blockedCredentials (7),
  -- invalidQOPMatch (8), obsolete
  spkmError (9),
  unsupportedAuthenticationMethod (10),
  passwordExpired (11),
```

```
inappropriateAlgorithms      (12) }
```

```
EncPwdInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  algorithms      [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                    {{SupportedAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL,
  pwdQualityRule [1] SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL,
  ... }
```

The error has a single parameter, which reports the particular **problem** encountered. The following problems may be indicated:

- a) **inappropriateAuthentication** – The level of security associated with the requester's credentials is inconsistent with the level of protection requested, e.g., simple credentials were supplied while strong credentials were required.
- b) **invalidCredentials** – The supplied credentials were invalid.
- c) **insufficientAccessRights** – The requester does not have the right to carry out the requested operation.
- d) **invalidSignature** – The signature of the request was found to be invalid.
- e) **protectionRequired** – The Directory was unwilling to carry out the requested operation because the argument was not signed.
- f) **noInformation** – The requested operation produced a security error for which no information is available.
- g) **blockedCredentials** – The credentials are blocked from consideration for security reasons (e.g., because an invalid password has been presented too many times in succession). The decision to return this error is governed by the security policy in effect for the DSA.
- h) **spkmError** – The supplied SPKM token was found to be invalid. The **spkmInfo** parameter contains an indication that this is an SPKM error token and the identifier of the SPKM context with which this error is associated.
- i) **unsupportedAuthenticationMethod** – The authentication method suggested is not supported by the DSA.
- j) **passwordExpired** – The requester cannot log onto the DSA because the password has expired. The password has to be reset by an administrator.
- k) **inappropriateAlgorithms** – The algorithms used to encrypt the password are not compatible with the algorithms stored in the DSA for the entry. The **algorithms** parameter contains the list of algorithms supported by the DSA.

NOTE – For the Bind operation or Compare operation, one or two algorithms can be specified to check the proposed password with the encrypted password and the possibly recently expired encrypted password. For change password operation the algorithm used by the current password and all the algorithms used by the password present in the history shall be returned.

The **SecurityParameters** component (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed by the Directory.

The information provided by the error problem can optionally be qualified by the use of the **notification** component of **CommonResults**.

## 14.8 Service Error

A **serviceError** reports a problem related to the provision of the service. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```
serviceError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ServiceErrorData }
  CODE      id-errcode-serviceError }
```

```
ServiceErrorData ::= SET {
  problem  [0] ServiceProblem,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }
```

```

ServiceProblem ::= INTEGER {
    busy (1),
    unavailable (2),
    unwillingToPerform (3),
    chainingRequired (4),
    unableToProceed (5),
    invalidReference (6),
    timeLimitExceeded (7),
    administrativeLimitExceeded (8),
    loopDetected (9),
    unavailableCriticalExtension (10),
    outOfScope (11),
    ditError (12),
    invalidQueryReference (13),
    requestedServiceNotAvailable (14),
    unsupportedMatchingUse (15),
    ambiguousKeyAttributes (16),
    saslBindInProgress (17),
    notSupportedByLDAP (18) }

```

The error has a single parameter which reports the particular **problem** encountered. The following problems may be indicated:

- a) **busy** – The Directory, or some part of it, is presently too busy to perform the requested operation, but may be able to do so after a short while.
- b) **unavailable** – The Directory, or some part of it, is currently unavailable.
- c) **unwillingToPerform** – The Directory, or some part of it, is not prepared to execute this request, e.g., because it would lead to excessive consumption of resources or violates the policy of an Administrative Authority involved.
- d) **chainingRequired** – The Directory is unable to accomplish the request other than by chaining; however, chaining was prohibited by means of the **chainingProhibited** service control option.
- e) **unableToProceed** – The DSA returning this error did not have administrative authority for the appropriate naming context and, as a consequence, was not able to participate in name resolution.
- f) **invalidReference** – The DSA was unable to perform the request as directed by the DUA, (via **OperationProgress**) – This may have arisen due to using an invalid referral.
- g) **timeLimitExceeded** – The Directory has reached the limit of time set by the user in a service control. No partial results are available to return to the user.
- h) **administrativeLimitExceeded** – The Directory has reached the limit set by an administrative authority, and no partial results are available to return to the user.
- i) **loopDetected** – The Directory is unable to accomplish this request due to an internal loop.
- j) **unavailableCriticalExtension** – The Directory was unable to satisfy the request because one or more critical extensions were not available.
- k) **outOfScope** – No referrals were available within the requested scope.
- l) **ditError** – The Directory is unable to accomplish the request due to a DIT consistency problem.
- m) **invalidQueryReference** – The parameters of the requested operation are invalid. This problem is reported if the **queryReference** in paged results is invalid.

NOTE – This problem is not supported by implementations based on Rec. CCITT X.511 (1988) ISO/IEC 9594-3:1990.

- n) **requestedServiceNotAvailable** – A search request failed within a service-specific administrative area because no search-rule was available for the search or because the search violated an applicable search-rule. Additional diagnostic information may be returned together with this service problem. Such additional information for different situations is defined in clause 14.
- o) **unsupportedMatchingUse** – An attempt was made, e.g., in a filter, to use a matching rule not supported by the DSA when the **performExactly** search option is set.
- p) **ambiguousKeyAttributes** – A mapping-based matching rule was selected, but the mappable filter items provided multiple matches against the relevant mapping table. This error situation is accompanied by a notification attribute, as indicated by the relevant matching-based matching rule.

- q) **saslBindInProgress** – For some authentication mechanisms, it may be necessary for the requester to invoke the **directoryBind** operation multiple times. This is indicated by the responder sending a **serviceError** with problem **saslBindInProgress**. This indicates that the responder requires the requester to invoke a new **directoryBind** operation, with the same **SaslCredentials** mechanism, to continue the authentication process. If at any stage the requester wishes to abort the process, it may invoke a **directoryBind** operation with **SaslAbort** set to **TRUE**.
- r) **notSupportedByLDAP** – A DAP request was about to be converted to a corresponding LDAP request by an LDAP requester, but the DAP requester determined that the request could not be served by LDAP.

The **SecurityParameters** component (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed by the Directory.

The information provided by the problem component can optionally be qualified by the use of the **notification** component of **CommonResults**.

## 14.9 Update Error

An **updateError** reports problems related to attempts to add, delete, or modify information in the DIB. If the arguments of the operation were signed (see clause 17.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2) by the requester or if the **errorProtection** parameter of the **SecurityParameters** data type was set to **signed** in the request, then the error parameters may be signed. Otherwise, they shall not be signed.

```
updateError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER    OPTIONALY-PROTECTED { UpdateErrorData }
  CODE         id-errcode-updateError }

UpdateErrorData ::= SET {
  problem      [0] UpdateProblem,
  attributeInfo [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF CHOICE {
    attributeType AttributeType,
    attribute      Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
    ... } OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

UpdateProblem ::= INTEGER {
  namingViolation           (1),
  objectClassViolation     (2),
  notAllowedOnNonLeaf     (3),
  notAllowedOnRDN         (4),
  entryAlreadyExists      (5),
  affectsMultipleDSAs     (6),
  objectClassModificationProhibited (7),
  noSuchSuperior          (8),
  notAncestor             (9),
  parentNotAncestor       (10),
  hierarchyRuleViolation  (11),
  familyRuleViolation     (12),
  insufficientPasswordQuality (13),
  passwordInHistory       (14),
  noPasswordSlot          (15) }
```

The problem parameter reports the particular problem encountered. The following problems may be indicated.

- a) **namingViolation** – The attempted addition or modification would violate the structure rules of the DIT as defined in the Directory schema and Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. That is, it would place an entry as the subordinate of an alias entry, or in a region of the DIT not permitted to a member of its object class, or would define an RDN for an entry to include a forbidden attribute type.
- b) **objectClassViolation** – The attempted update would produce an entry inconsistent with the rules for entry content; for example, its object class definition, the DIT content rules, or with the definitions of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2 as they pertain to object classes.
- c) **notAllowedOnNonLeaf** – The attempted operation is only allowed on leaf entries of the DIT.
- d) **notAllowedOnRDN** – The attempted operation would affect the RDN (e.g., removal of an attribute which is a part of the RDN).

- e) **entryAlreadyExists** – An attempted **addEntry** or **modifyDN** operation names an entry which already exists.

NOTE 1 – This includes a conflict caused by RDNs which include multiple distinguished values differentiated by contexts, regardless of context, as described in clause 9.3 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

- f) **affectsMultipleDSAs** – An attempted update would need to operate on multiple DSAs where this operation is not permitted.
- g) **objectClassModificationProhibited** – An operation attempted to modify the structural object class of an entry.
- h) **noSuchSuperior** – An attempted **ModifyDN** operation names a new superior entry that does not exist.
- i) **notAncestor** – An operation attempted to delete a compound entry without specifying the ancestor as the object.
- j) **parentNotAncestor** – An operation attempted to establish an entry as an immediately hierarchical child under a family member that is not the ancestor.
- k) **hierarchyRuleViolation** – An operation attempted to break a rule applicable to a hierarchical group: a hierarchical group has to be completely outside any service-specific administrative area or has to be completely contained within a service-specific administrative area; hierarchical group is confined to a single DSA.
- l) **familyRuleViolation** – An operation attempted to break a rule applicable to families within a compound entry.
- m) **insufficientPasswordQuality** – The new password does not satisfy the quality rules (no trivial passwords, mixture of characters, too short, etc) imposed by the Directory.

NOTE 2 – When the password is not transmitted in clear text to the DSA, the quality rule cannot be checked by the DSA but only by the DUA.

- n) **passwordInHistory** – The new password has been found in the history kept by the Directory.
- o) **noPasswordSlot** – There are no free slots left in the password history.

The **attributeInfo** parameter identifies the particular attribute type(s) and possibly value(s) causing a problem. If an **objectClassViolation** is being reported, an **attribute** item shall be present indicating the **objectClass** attribute type and listing the object class(es) that caused the problem; additional **attributeType** items may also be present (e.g., to identify missing mandatory attributes or extraneous attributes).

NOTE 3 – The **updateError** is not used to report problems with attribute types, values, or constraint violations encountered in an **addEntry**, **removeEntry**, **modifyEntry**, or **modifyDN** operation. Such problems are reported via an **attributeError**.

The **SecurityParameters** component (see clause 7.10) shall be included in the **CommonResults** (see clause 7.4) if the error is to be signed by the Directory.

The information provided by the error problem can optionally be qualified by the use of the **notification** component of **CommonResults**.

## 15 Analysis of search arguments

This clause is only relevant for a Search operation starting its initial evaluation phase within a service-specific administrative area.

This procedure has two purposes:

- a) It provides the search-validation function (see clause 16.12 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2). However, the search-validation function does not produce error information. If during the procedure an error is encountered, the evaluation stops and returns FALSE; otherwise, it returns TRUE. A search-validation against an empty search-rule will always return TRUE.
- b) It is the procedure to be used when no governing-search-rule can be located and where it is possible to identify a single search-rule the **SearchArgument** can be evaluated against, to identify why the **search** request failed. When an error condition is found in this case, the evaluation stops, the necessary diagnostic information is supplied in the **notification** component of the **CommonResults** data type and a service error with problem **requestedServiceNotAvailable** is returned. What diagnostic information is included, depends on the type of error identified.

NOTE – According to the specification above, a search request may be evaluated twice against the same search-rule. How this could be optimized is not part of this specification, but is an implementation decision.

The procedure assumes that an implementation will not allow an invocable search-rule to:

- specify unsupported attribute types, context types, matching rules, matching restrictions, etc.;
- specify mapping-based matching algorithms that are unsupported or not relevant for the type of search for which the search-rule is governing;
- specify matching rule substitutions that would violate the search-rule;
- refer to optional search-rule features not supported by the implementation; or
- be inconsistent or erroneous.

## 15.1 General check of search filter

The evaluation is performed by first checking whether the filter violates some basic restrictions using the following procedure:

- 1) If there are attribute types represented in the filter but not represented by any request-attribute-profile in the **inputAttributeTypes** search-rule component, the **notification** shall contain:
  - a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchAttributeViolation**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as values the object identifiers identifying the illegal attribute types.
- 2) If there are attribute types only represented by negated filter items, then the **notification** shall contain:
  - a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-attributeNegationViolation**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute where the values are the object identifiers identifying the attribute types illegally negated in the filter.
- 3) Check that the condition specified in the **attributeCombination** is fulfilled with respect to the non-negated presence of attribute types. If mandatory attribute types, i.e., attribute types that unconditionally have to be represented by non-negated filter items in the filter, are missing in any subfilter, the **notification** shall contain:
  - a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-missingSearchAttribute**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as values the object identifiers identifying the missing attribute types.

If a required combination is not present, the **notification** shall contain:

- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchAttributeCombinationViolation**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - an **attributeCombinations** notification attribute identifying the missing combination(s).
- 4) For request-attribute-profiles which have a **selectedValues** subcomponent but the set of values is empty, it is checked whether there is any filter item for those attribute types that do not meet one of the following requirements:
    - the filter item is of type **present** and the **contexts** subcomponent is not present in the request-attribute-profile; or
    - the filter item is of type **contextPresent** and the **contexts** subcomponent is present in the request-attribute-profile.

If the above check fails for any filter item, the **notification** shall contain:

- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchValueNotAllowed**;
- a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and

- a **filterItem** notification attribute with the failing filters items as values.
- 5) For request-attribute-profiles which have a **contexts** subcomponent, it is checked whether there are any filter items that refer to context types not included in this subcomponent. If so, the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchContextViolation**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - a **contextTypeList** notification attribute which has as values the object identifiers for the illegal context types.
- 6) If the **allowed** choice for the **subset** component is taken in the search-rule, it is checked whether the **subset** argument of the **SearchArgument** complies with that specification. If not, the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchSubsetViolation**; and
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule.

## 15.2 Check of request-attribute-profiles

If the above procedure did not yield any error, it has to be checked for each subfilter that any attribute type represented in that subfilter is also effectively present. This procedure does not specify any order in which subfilters should be evaluated. For an attribute type to be effectively present in a subfilter, it has to be represented by at least one non-negated filter item that complies with the corresponding request-attribute-profile. A non-negated filter item is evaluated using the procedure below.

The non-negated filter items are checked in the following order:

- 1) the filter items for the attribute types that unconditionally have to be represented are checked for each subfilter;
- 2) the filter items for the attribute types that conditionally have to be represented are checked for each subfilter; and
- 3) the remaining filter items are checked for each subfilter.

If a subfilter fails the evaluation, the evaluation stops and error information is returned as detailed below.

If an attribute type in a subfilter is represented by several non-negated filter items, each such filter item is in principle checked until either a complying filter item is found or all filter items are checked. If a filter item fails during the procedure, it is dropped for further evaluation. It is the last filter item to fail for the attribute type that determines the diagnostic information returned.

A filter item is evaluated using the following procedure:

- 1) If the **selectedValues** component in the request-attribute-profile is absent; or if it is present and non-empty, check whether the filter item is of type **equality**, **substrings**, **approximateMatch** or **extensibleMatch**. If not, the **notification** shall contain:
  - a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchValueRequired**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as value the object identifier identifying the attribute type from the filter item.
- 2) If the **selectedValues** subcomponent in the corresponding request-attribute-profile is present and non-empty, check whether the filter item fails to match any value specified in that subcomponent. If so, the **notification** shall contain:
  - a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-invalidSearchValue**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - a **filterItem** notification attribute with the failing filter item as the only value.
- 3) If the **contexts** subcomponent is not present, continue with the next subclause.

- 4) Check that the condition specified in the **contextCombination** subcomponent is fulfilled with respect to the presence of context types. If mandatory context types, i.e., context types that unconditionally have to be represented for the attribute type, are missing, the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-missingSearchContext**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule;
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as a single value the object identifier identifying the attribute type from the filter item;
  - a **contextTypeList** notification attribute with the object identifiers identifying the missing context types.

If a required combination is not present, the **notification** shall contain:

- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchContextCombinationViolation**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule;
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as the only value the object identifier identifying the attribute type from the filter item;
  - a **contextCombinations** notification attribute identifying the missing combination(s).
- 5) Check if the context assertions for the attribute type in the subfilter are all included in the **contexts** subcomponent. If not, the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchContextViolation**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule;
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as the only value the object identifier identifying the attribute type from the filter item; and
  - a **contextTypeList** notification attribute which has as values the object identifiers identifying the context types not allowed for the attribute type.
- 6) If context values are included for any of the context types in the **contexts** subcomponent of the request-attribute-profile, check whether any of the context assertions specified for the attribute type in the subfilter contains values not specified for the corresponding context types in **contexts** subcomponent. If so, the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-searchContextValueViolation**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule;
  - an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as the only value the object identifier identifying the attribute type from the filter item; and
  - a **contextList** notification attribute which has as values the context assertions not allowed for the attribute type.

### 15.3 Check of controls and hierarchy selections

If the search request fails the test against the control and hierarchy selections as specified in clause 16.10.5 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2, the procedure in this clause is performed.

- 1) If the **defaultControls** component of the search-rule or the **hierarchyOptions** subcomponent of the **defaultControls** is absent, and the search request specifies hierarchy selections beside **self**, then the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-hierarchySelectForbidden**; and
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule.
- 2) If there are hierarchy select options in the request that are not allowed, or some selections are missing according to the combination of the **defaultControls** and **mandatoryControls** components of the search-rule, then the **notification** shall contain:

- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-invalidHierarchySelect**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - a **hierarchySelectList** notification attribute which has as value a bitstring identifying the invalid hierarchy selection options.
- 3) If there are hierarchy select options in the request that are not supported by the DSA and which are not covered by 2), then the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-unavailableHierarchySelect**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - a **hierarchySelectList** notification attribute which has as value a bitstring identifying the unsupported hierarchy selection options.
- 4) If there are search control options (as defined by clause 11.2.1) in the request that are not allowed, or some options are missing according to the combination of the **defaultControls** and **mandatoryControls** components of the search-rule, then the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-invalidSearchControlOptions**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - a **searchControlOptionsList** notification attribute which has as value a bitstring identifying the invalid search control options.
- 5) If there are service control options in the request that are not allowed or some options are missing according to the combination of the **defaultControls** and **mandatoryControls** components of the search-rule, then the **notification** shall contain:
- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-invalidServiceControlOptions**;
  - a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule; and
  - a **serviceControlOptionsList** notification attribute which has as value a bitstring identifying the invalid service control options.

## 15.4 Check of matching use

In the search-validation procedure, this clause represents the last step in the validation and it is assumed that the **search** request has passed all other validation steps. A search-rule failing this last step is put on the **MatchProblemSR** list (see clause 19.3.2.2.1, item 3) of Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4).

If the search request does not comply with the **matchingUse** requirement as specified in clause 16.10.2 of Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2 for any of the request-attribute-profiles, then a **notification** for one of the failing request-attribute-profiles shall contain:

- a **searchServiceProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-attributeMatchingViolation** if the matching restriction is violated, or with the value **id-pr-unsupportedMatchingUse** if the matching rule is to be applied in an unsupported way;
- a **serviceType** notification attribute which has as value the **serviceType** component of the search-rule;
- an **attributeTypeList** notification attribute which has as the only value the object identifier identifying the attribute type; and
- for the matching restriction that is violated, additional notification attributes as specified by the specification for that matching restriction.

NOTE – When several request-attribute-profiles fail the validation, it is a local matter to select which one for which to create a **notification**.

## Annex A

## Abstract Service in ASN.1

(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard.)

This annex includes all of the ASN.1 type, value and information object definitions contained in this Directory Specification in the form of the ASN.1 module `DirectoryAbstractService`.

```

DirectoryAbstractService
  {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) directoryAbstractService(2) 9}
DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All
/*
The types and values defined in this module are exported for use in the other ASN.1
modules contained within these Directory Specifications, and for the use of other
applications which will use them to access Directory services. Other applications may
use them for their own purposes, but this will not constrain extensions and
modifications needed to maintain or improve the Directory service.
*/
IMPORTS

  -- from Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2

  id-at
    FROM UsefulDefinitions
      {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) usefulDefinitions(0) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

  Attribute{}, ATTRIBUTE, AttributeType, AttributeTypeAndValue, AttributeTypeAssertion,
  AttributeValue, AttributeValueAssertion, CONTEXT, ContextAssertion,
  DistinguishedName, MATCHING-RULE, Name, OBJECT-CLASS,
  RelativeDistinguishedName, SupportedAttributes, SupportedContexts
    FROM InformationFramework
      {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) informationFramework(1) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

  RelaxationPolicy
    FROM ServiceAdministration
      {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) serviceAdministration(33) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED{}, OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ{}
    FROM EnhancedSecurity
      {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) modules(1) enhancedSecurity(28) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

  -- from Rec. ITU-T X.518 | ISO/IEC 9594-4

  AccessPoint, ContinuationReference, Exclusions, OperationProgress, ReferenceType
    FROM DistributedOperations
      {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) distributedOperations(3) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

  -- from Rec. ITU-T X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5

  Code, ERROR, id-errcode-abandoned, id-errcode-abandonFailed,
  id-errcode-attributeError, id-errcode-nameError, id-errcode-referral,
  id-errcode-securityError, id-errcode-serviceError, id-errcode-updateError,
  id-opcode-abandon, id-opcode-addEntry, id-opcode-administerPassword,
  id-opcode-compare, id-opcode-changePassword, id-opcode-ldapTransport,
  id-opcode-linkedLDAP, id-opcode-list, id-opcode-modifyDN,
  id-opcode-modifyEntry, id-opcode-read, id-opcode-removeEntry,
  id-opcode-search, InvokeId, OPERATION
    FROM CommonProtocolSpecification
      {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) commonProtocolSpecification(35) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

  -- from Rec. ITU-T X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6

  DirectoryString{}, UnboundedDirectoryString
    FROM SelectedAttributeTypes

```

```

    {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) selectedAttributeTypes(5) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS
-- from Rec. ITU-T X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8

AlgorithmIdentifier{}, CertificationPath, ENCRYPTED{}, HASH{}, SIGNED{},
SupportedAlgorithms
  FROM AuthenticationFramework
    {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) authenticationFramework(7) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

UserPwd
  FROM PasswordPolicy
    {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) passwordPolicy(39) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

AttributeCertificationPath
  FROM AttributeCertificateDefinitions
    {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) attributeCertificateDefinitions(32) 9}
    WITH SUCCESSORS

-- from Rec. ITU-T X.525 | ISO/IEC 9594-9

AgreementID
  FROM DirectoryShadowAbstractService
    {joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) directoryShadowAbstractService(15) 9}
    WITH SUCCESSORS

-- from IETF RFC 2025

SPKM-ERROR, SPKM-REP-TI, SPKM-REQ
  FROM SpkmGssTokens {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) spkm(1) spkmGssTokens(10)}

-- from IETF RFC 4511

LDAPMessage
  FROM Lightweight-Directory-Access-Protocol-V3
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) directory(1) ldap(18)} ;

-- Common data types

CommonArguments ::= SET {
  serviceControls      [30] ServiceControls      DEFAULT {},
  securityParameters   [29] SecurityParameters   OPTIONAL,
  requestor            [28] DistinguishedName     OPTIONAL,
  operationProgress    [27] OperationProgress
    DEFAULT {nameResolutionPhase notStarted},
  aliasedRDNs          [26] INTEGER              OPTIONAL,
  criticalExtensions   [25] BIT STRING           OPTIONAL,
  referenceType        [24] ReferenceType         OPTIONAL,
  entryOnly            [23] BOOLEAN              DEFAULT TRUE,
  exclusions           [22] Exclusions            OPTIONAL,
  nameResolveOnMaster [21] BOOLEAN              DEFAULT FALSE,
  operationContexts    [20] ContextSelection     OPTIONAL,
  familyGrouping       [19] FamilyGrouping        DEFAULT entryOnly,
  ... }

CommonArgumentsSeq ::= SEQUENCE {
  serviceControls      [30] ServiceControls      DEFAULT {},
  securityParameters   [29] SecurityParameters   OPTIONAL,
  requestor            [28] DistinguishedName     OPTIONAL,
  operationProgress    [27] OperationProgress
    DEFAULT {nameResolutionPhase notStarted},
  aliasedRDNs          [26] INTEGER              OPTIONAL,
  criticalExtensions   [25] BIT STRING           OPTIONAL,
  referenceType        [24] ReferenceType         OPTIONAL,
  entryOnly            [23] BOOLEAN              DEFAULT TRUE,
  exclusions           [22] Exclusions            OPTIONAL,
  nameResolveOnMaster [21] BOOLEAN              DEFAULT FALSE,
  operationContexts    [20] ContextSelection     OPTIONAL,
  familyGrouping       [19] FamilyGrouping        DEFAULT entryOnly,
  ... }

```

```

FamilyGrouping ::= ENUMERATED {
    entryOnly      (1),
    compoundEntry  (2),
    strands        (3),
    multiStrand    (4),
    ... }

CommonResults ::= SET {
    securityParameters [30] SecurityParameters OPTIONAL,
    performer          [29] DistinguishedName  OPTIONAL,
    aliasDereferenced  [28] BOOLEAN           DEFAULT FALSE,
    notification       [27] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                        {{SupportedAttributes}} OPTIONAL,
    ... }

CommonResultsSeq ::= SEQUENCE {
    securityParameters [30] SecurityParameters OPTIONAL,
    performer          [29] DistinguishedName  OPTIONAL,
    aliasDereferenced  [28] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    notification       [27] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
                        {{SupportedAttributes}} OPTIONAL,
    ... }

ServiceControls ::= SET {
    options           [0] ServiceControlOptions DEFAULT {},
    priority          [1] INTEGER {low(0), medium(1), high(2)} DEFAULT medium,
    timeLimit        [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    sizeLimit        [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    scopeOfReferral  [4] INTEGER {dmd(0), country(1)} OPTIONAL,
    attributeSizeLimit [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    manageDSAITPlaneRef [6] SEQUENCE {
        dsaName          Name,
        agreementID      AgreementID,
        ... } OPTIONAL,
    serviceType      [7] OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    userClass        [8] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    ... }

ServiceControlOptions ::= BIT STRING {
    preferChaining      (0),
    chainingProhibited (1),
    localScope          (2),
    dontUseCopy         (3),
    dontDereferenceAliases (4),
    subentries          (5),
    copyShallDo        (6),
    partialNameResolution (7),
    manageDSAIT        (8),
    noSubtypeMatch      (9),
    noSubtypeSelection (10),
    countFamily         (11),
    dontSelectFriends  (12),
    dontMatchFriends   (13),
    allowWriteableCopy (14)}

EntryInformationSelection ::= SET {
    attributes          CHOICE {
        allUserAttributes [0] NULL,
        select            [1] SET OF AttributeType
        -- empty set implies no attributes are requested -- } DEFAULT allUserAttributes:NULL,
    infoTypes          [2] INTEGER {
        attributeTypesOnly (0),
        attributeTypesAndValues (1)} DEFAULT attributeTypesAndValues,
    extraAttributes    CHOICE {
        allOperationalAttributes [3] NULL,
        select                  [4] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeType } OPTIONAL,
    contextSelection   ContextSelection OPTIONAL,
    returnContexts     BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    familyReturn       FamilyReturn DEFAULT
                        {memberSelect contributingEntriesOnly} }

```

```

ContextSelection ::= CHOICE {
    allContexts      NULL,
    selectedContexts SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF TypeAndContextAssertion,
    ... }

TypeAndContextAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
    type              AttributeType,
    contextAssertions CHOICE {
        preference    SEQUENCE OF ContextAssertion,
        all            SET OF ContextAssertion,
        ...},
    ... }

FamilyReturn ::= SEQUENCE {
    memberSelect     ENUMERATED {
        contributingEntriesOnly (1),
        participatingEntriesOnly (2),
        compoundEntry           (3),
        ...},
    familySelect     SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT-CLASS.&id OPTIONAL,
    ... }

EntryInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
    name              Name,
    fromEntry         BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    information       SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF CHOICE {
        attributeType AttributeType,
        attribute       Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
        ...} OPTIONAL,
    incompleteEntry  [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    partialName      [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    derivedEntry     [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ... }

family-information ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX FamilyEntries
    USAGE      directoryOperation
    ID         id-at-family-information }

FamilyEntries ::= SEQUENCE {
    family-class OBJECT-CLASS.&id, -- structural object class value
    familyEntries SEQUENCE OF FamilyEntry,
    ... }

FamilyEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
    rdn              RelativeDistinguishedName,
    information      SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
        attributeType AttributeType,
        attribute       Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
        ...},
    family-info      SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF FamilyEntries OPTIONAL,
    ... }

Filter ::= CHOICE {
    item [0] FilterItem,
    and  [1] SET OF Filter,
    or   [2] SET OF Filter,
    not  [3] Filter,
    ... }

FilterItem ::= CHOICE {
    equality [0] AttributeValueAssertion,
    substrings [1] SEQUENCE {
        type          ATTRIBUTE.&id({SupportedAttributes}),
        strings       SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
            initial [0] ATTRIBUTE.&Type
                ({{SupportedAttributes}}{@substrings.type}),
            any [1] ATTRIBUTE.&Type
                ({{SupportedAttributes}}{@substrings.type}),
            final [2] ATTRIBUTE.&Type
                ({{SupportedAttributes}}{@substrings.type}),
        }
    }
}

```

```

        control                Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
                                -- Used to specify interpretation of following items
        ... },
        ... },
greaterOrEqual                [2] AttributeValueAssertion,
lessOrEqual                   [3] AttributeValueAssertion,
present                       [4] AttributeType,
approximateMatch              [5] AttributeValueAssertion,
extensibleMatch               [6] MatchingRuleAssertion,
contextPresent                [7] AttributeTypeAssertion,
... }

MatchingRuleAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
    matchingRule [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF MATCHING-RULE.&id,
    type         [2] AttributeType OPTIONAL,
    matchValue   [3] MATCHING-RULE.&AssertionType (CONSTRAINED BY {
        -- matchValue shall be a value of type specified by the &AssertionType field of
        -- one of the MATCHING-RULE information objects identified by matchingRule -- }),
    dnAttributes [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ... }

PagedResultsRequest ::= CHOICE {
    newRequest          SEQUENCE {
        pageSize        INTEGER,
        sortKeys        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SortKey OPTIONAL,
        reverse         [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        unmerged        [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        pageNumber      [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
        ...},
    queryReference      OCTET STRING,
    abandonQuery       [0] OCTET STRING,
    ... }

SortKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    type                AttributeType,
    orderingRule        MATCHING-RULE.&id OPTIONAL,
    ... }

SecurityParameters ::= SET {
    certification-path [0] CertificationPath OPTIONAL,
    name                [1] DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
    time                [2] Time OPTIONAL,
    random              [3] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
    target              [4] ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL,
    --                  [5] Not to be used
    operationCode       [6] Code OPTIONAL,
    --                  [7] Not to be used
    errorProtection     [8] ErrorProtectionRequest OPTIONAL,
    errorCode           [9] Code OPTIONAL,
    ... }

ProtectionRequest ::= INTEGER {none(0), signed(1)}

Time ::= CHOICE {
    utcTime             UTCTime,
    generalizedTime     GeneralizedTime,
    ... }

ErrorProtectionRequest ::= INTEGER {none(0), signed(1)}

-- Bind and unbind operations

directoryBind OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT DirectoryBindArgument
    RESULT   DirectoryBindResult
    ERRORS   {directoryBindError} }

DirectoryBindArgument ::= SET {
    credentials [0] Credentials OPTIONAL,
    versions    [1] Versions DEFAULT {v1},
    ... }

```

```

Credentials ::= CHOICE {
    simple          [0] SimpleCredentials,
    strong          [1] StrongCredentials,
    externalProcedure [2] EXTERNAL,
    spkm           [3] SpkmCredentials,
    sasl           [4] SaslCredentials,
    ... }

SimpleCredentials ::= SEQUENCE {
    name          [0] DistinguishedName,
    validity      [1] SET {
        time1     [0] CHOICE {
            utc          UTCTime,
            gt          GeneralizedTime} OPTIONAL,
        time2     [1] CHOICE {
            utc          UTCTime,
            gt          GeneralizedTime} OPTIONAL,
        random1   [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
        random2   [3] BIT STRING OPTIONAL} OPTIONAL,
    password     [2] CHOICE {
        unprotected OCTET STRING,
        protected   HASH{OCTET STRING},
        ...,
        userPwd     [0] UserPwd } OPTIONAL }

StrongCredentials ::= SET {
    certification-path [0] CertificationPath OPTIONAL,
    bind-token         [1] Token,
    name               [2] DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
    attributeCertificationPath [3] AttributeCertificationPath OPTIONAL,
    ... }

SpkmCredentials ::= CHOICE {
    req [0] SPKM-REQ,
    rep [1] SPKM-REP-TI,
    ... }

SaslCredentials ::= SEQUENCE {
    mechanism [0] DirectoryString{ub-saslMechanism},
    credentials [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    saslAbort [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ... }

ub-saslMechanism INTEGER ::= 20 -- According to RFC 2222

Token ::= SIGNED{TokenContent}

TokenContent ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
    name      [1] DistinguishedName,
    time      [2] Time,
    random    [3] BIT STRING,
    response  [4] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
    ... }

Versions ::= BIT STRING {v1(0), v2(1)}

DirectoryBindResult ::= SET {
    credentials [0] Credentials OPTIONAL,
    versions    [1] Versions DEFAULT {v1},
    ...,
    pwdResponseValue [2] PwdResponseValue OPTIONAL }

PwdResponseValue ::= SEQUENCE {
    warning CHOICE {
        timeLeft [0] INTEGER (0..MAX),
        graceRemaining [1] INTEGER (0..MAX),
        ... } OPTIONAL,
    error ENUMERATED {
        passwordExpired (0),

```

```

    changeAfterReset (1),
    ... } OPTIONAL}

directoryBindError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED {SET {
    versions          [0] Versions DEFAULT {v1},
    error             CHOICE {
      serviceError    [1] ServiceProblem,
      securityError    [2] SecurityProblem,
      ...},
    securityParameters [30] SecurityParameters OPTIONAL }}}

BindKeyInfo ::= ENCRYPTED{BIT STRING}

-- Operations, arguments, and results

read OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  ReadArgument
  RESULT    ReadResult
  ERRORS    {attributeError |
             nameError |
             serviceError |
             referral |
             abandoned |
             securityError}
  CODE      id-opcode-read }

ReadArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ReadArgumentData }

ReadArgumentData ::= SET {
  object          [0] Name,
  selection        [1] EntryInformationSelection DEFAULT {},
  modifyRightsRequest [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF      CommonArguments }

ReadResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ReadResultData }

ReadResultData ::= SET {
  entry          [0] EntryInformation,
  modifyRights   [1] ModifyRights OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF      CommonResults }

ModifyRights ::= SET OF SEQUENCE {
  item          CHOICE {
    entry       [0] NULL,
    attribute   [1] AttributeType,
    value       [2] AttributeValueAssertion,
    ...},
  permission    [3] BIT STRING {
    add         (0),
    remove     (1),
    rename     (2),
    move       (3)},
  ... }

compare OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT  CompareArgument
  RESULT    CompareResult
  ERRORS    {attributeError |
             nameError |
             serviceError |
             referral |
             abandoned |
             securityError}
  CODE      id-opcode-compare }

```

CompareArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { CompareArgumentData }

```
CompareArgumentData ::= SET {
  object      [0] Name,
  purported   [1] AttributeValueAssertion,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }
```

CompareResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { CompareResultData }

```
CompareResultData ::= SET {
  name          Name OPTIONAL,
  matched       [0] BOOLEAN,
  fromEntry     [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
  matchedSubtype [2] AttributeType OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }
```

```
abandon OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT AbandonArgument
  RESULT   AbandonResult
  ERRORS   {abandonFailed}
  CODE     id-opcode-abandon }
```

AbandonArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AbandonArgumentData }

```
AbandonArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
  invokeID [0] InvokeId,
  ... }
```

```
AbandonResult ::= CHOICE {
  null          NULL,
  information   OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AbandonResultData },
  ... }
```

```
AbandonResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
  invokeID      InvokeId,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }
```

```
list OPERATION ::= {
  ARGUMENT ListArgument
  RESULT   ListResult
  ERRORS   {nameError |
            serviceError |
            referral |
            abandoned |
            securityError}
  CODE     id-opcode-list }
```

ListArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ListArgumentData }

```
ListArgumentData ::= SET {
  object      [0] Name,
  pagedResults [1] PagedResultsRequest OPTIONAL,
  listFamily  [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments
}
```

ListResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ListResultData }

```
ListResultData ::= CHOICE {
  listInfo      SET {
    name          Name OPTIONAL,
    subordinates  [1] SET OF SEQUENCE {
```

```

        rdn                                RelativeDistinguishedName,
        aliasEntry                          [0] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        fromEntry                            [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
        ... },
    partialOutcomeQualifier [2] PartialOutcomeQualifier OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF                            CommonResults
    },
    uncorrelatedListInfo [0] SET OF ListResult,
    ... }

PartialOutcomeQualifier ::= SET {
    limitProblem [0] LimitProblem OPTIONAL,
    unexplored [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF ContinuationReference OPTIONAL,
    unavailableCriticalExtensions [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    unknownErrors [3] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF ABSTRACT-SYNTAX.&Type OPTIONAL,
    queryReference [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    overspecFilter [5] Filter OPTIONAL,
    notification [6] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
        Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}} OPTIONAL,
    entryCount CHOICE {
        bestEstimate [7] INTEGER,
        lowEstimate [8] INTEGER,
        exact [9] INTEGER,
        ...} OPTIONAL
    -- [10] Not to be used -- }

LimitProblem ::= INTEGER {
    timeLimitExceeded (0),
    sizeLimitExceeded (1),
    administrativeLimitExceeded (2) }

search OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT SearchArgument
    RESULT SearchResult
    ERRORS {attributeError |
        nameError |
        serviceError |
        referral |
        abandoned |
        securityError}
    CODE id-opcode-search }

SearchArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { SearchArgumentData }

SearchArgumentData ::= SET {
    baseObject [0] Name,
    subset [1] INTEGER {
        baseObject (0),
        oneLevel (1),
        wholeSubtree (2)} DEFAULT baseObject,
    filter [2] Filter DEFAULT and:{},
    searchAliases [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    selection [4] EntryInformationSelection DEFAULT {},
    pagedResults [5] PagedResultsRequest OPTIONAL,
    matchedValuesOnly [6] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    extendedFilter [7] Filter OPTIONAL,
    checkOverspecified [8] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    relaxation [9] RelaxationPolicy OPTIONAL,
    extendedArea [10] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    hierarchySelections [11] HierarchySelections DEFAULT {self},
    searchControlOptions [12] SearchControlOptions DEFAULT {searchAliases},
    joinArguments [13] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JoinArgument OPTIONAL,
    joinType [14] ENUMERATED {
        innerJoin (0),
        leftOuterJoin (1),
        fullOuterJoin (2)} DEFAULT leftOuterJoin,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }

```

```

HierarchySelections ::= BIT STRING {
    self          (0),
    children      (1),
    parent        (2),
    hierarchy     (3),
    top           (4),
    subtree       (5),
    siblings      (6),
    siblingChildren (7),
    siblingSubtree (8),
    all           (9) }

SearchControlOptions ::= BIT STRING {
    searchAliases      (0),
    matchedValuesOnly (1),
    checkOverspecified (2),
    performExactly     (3),
    includeAllAreas   (4),
    noSystemRelaxation (5),
    dnAttribute        (6),
    matchOnResidualName (7),
    entryCount         (8),
    useSubset          (9),
    separateFamilyMembers (10),
    searchFamily       (11) }

JoinArgument ::= SEQUENCE {
    joinBaseObject [0] Name,
    domainLocalID  [1] DomainLocalID OPTIONAL,
    joinSubset     [2] ENUMERATED {
        baseObject (0),
        oneLevel   (1),
        wholeSubtree (2),
        ... } DEFAULT baseObject,
    joinFilter     [3] Filter OPTIONAL,
    joinAttributes [4] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JoinAttPair OPTIONAL,
    joinSelection  [5] EntryInformationSelection,
    ... }

DomainLocalID ::= UnboundedDirectoryString

JoinAttPair ::= SEQUENCE {
    baseAtt      AttributeType,
    joinAtt      AttributeType,
    joinContext  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JoinContextType OPTIONAL,
    ... }

JoinContextType ::= CONTEXT.&id({SupportedContexts})

SearchResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { SearchResultData }

SearchResultData ::= CHOICE {
    searchInfo          SET {
        name          Name OPTIONAL,
        entries       [0] SET OF EntryInformation,
        partialOutcomeQualifier [2] PartialOutcomeQualifier OPTIONAL,
        altMatching    [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        ...,
        ...,
        COMPONENTS OF CommonResults
    },
    uncorrelatedSearchInfo [0] SET OF SearchResult,
    ... }

addEntry OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT  AddEntryArgument
    RESULT    AddEntryResult
    ERRORS    {attributeError |
                nameError |
                serviceError |

```

```

        referral |
        securityError |
        updateError}
CODE      id-opcode-addEntry }

```

AddEntryArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { AddEntryArgumentData }

```

AddEntryArgumentData ::= SET {
    object      [0] Name,
    entry       [1] SET OF Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
    targetSystem [2] AccessPoint OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }

```

```

AddEntryResult ::= CHOICE {
    null        NULL,
    information  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AddEntryResultData },
    ... }

```

```

AddEntryResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

```

```

removeEntry OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT RemoveEntryArgument
    RESULT   RemoveEntryResult
    ERRORS   {nameError |
              serviceError |
              referral |
              securityError |
              updateError}
    CODE     id-opcode-removeEntry }

```

RemoveEntryArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { RemoveEntryArgumentData }

```

RemoveEntryArgumentData ::= SET {
    object      [0] Name,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments
}

```

```

RemoveEntryResult ::= CHOICE {
    null        NULL,
    information  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { RemoveEntryResultData },
    ... }

```

```

RemoveEntryResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

```

```

modifyEntry OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT ModifyEntryArgument
    RESULT   ModifyEntryResult
    ERRORS   {attributeError |
              nameError |
              serviceError |
              referral |
              securityError |
              updateError}
    CODE     id-opcode-modifyEntry }

```

ModifyEntryArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ModifyEntryArgumentData }

```

ModifyEntryArgumentData ::= SET {
    object      [0] Name,
    changes     [1] SEQUENCE OF EntryModification,
    selection   [2] EntryInformationSelection OPTIONAL,
}

```

```

... ,
... ,
COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }

ModifyEntryResult ::= CHOICE {
    null          NULL,
    information   OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ModifyEntryResultData },
    ... }

ModifyEntryResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
    entry        [0] EntryInformation OPTIONAL,
    ... ,
    ... ,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

EntryModification ::= CHOICE {
    addAttribute   [0] Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
    removeAttribute [1] AttributeType,
    addValues      [2] Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
    removeValues  [3] Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
    alterValues   [4] AttributeTypeAndValue,
    resetValue    [5] AttributeType,
    replaceValues [6] Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
    ... }

modifyDN OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT ModifyDNArgument
    RESULT   ModifyDNResult
    ERRORS   {nameError |
              serviceError |
              referral |
              securityError |
              updateError}
    CODE     id-opcode-modifyDN }

ModifyDNArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ModifyDNArgumentData }

ModifyDNArgumentData ::= SET {
    object        [0] DistinguishedName,
    newRDN        [1] RelativeDistinguishedName,
    deleteOldRDN [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    newSuperior   [3] DistinguishedName OPTIONAL,
    ... ,
    ... ,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonArguments }

ModifyDNResult ::= CHOICE {
    null          NULL,
    information   OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ModifyDNResultData },
    ... }

ModifyDNResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
    newRDN        RelativeDistinguishedName,
    ... ,
    ... ,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

changePassword OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT ChangePasswordArgument
    RESULT   ChangePasswordResult
    ERRORS   {securityError |
              updateError }
    CODE     id-opcode-changePassword }

ChangePasswordArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ChangePasswordArgumentData }

ChangePasswordArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
    object        [0] DistinguishedName,
    oldPwd        [1] UserPwd,
    newPwd        [2] UserPwd,
    ... }

```

```

ChangePasswordResult ::= CHOICE {
    null          NULL,
    information   OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { ChangePasswordResultData },
    ...}

ChangePasswordResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

administerPassword OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT   AdministerPasswordArgument
    RESULT     AdministerPasswordResult
    ERRORS     {securityError |
                updateError}
    CODE       id-opcode-administerPassword }

AdministerPasswordArgument ::=
    OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AdministerPasswordArgumentData }

AdministerPasswordArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
    object [0] DistinguishedName,
    newPwd [1] UserPwd,
    ... }

AdministerPasswordResult ::= CHOICE {
    null NULL,
    information OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { AdministerPasswordResultData },
    ...}

AdministerPasswordResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

ldapTransport OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT   LdapArgument
    RESULT     SEQUENCE OF LDAPMessage
    ERRORS     { abandonFailed | abandoned }
    CODE       id-opcode-ldapTransport }

LdapArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { LdapArgumentData }

LdapArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {
    object      DistinguishedName,
    ldapMessage LDAPMessage,
    linkId      LinkId OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonArgumentsSeq }

LinkId ::= INTEGER

LdapResult ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { LdapResultData }

LdapResultData ::= SEQUENCE {
    ldapMessages SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF LDAPMessage OPTIONAL,
    returnToClient BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResultsSeq }

linkedLDAP OPERATION ::= {
    ARGUMENT   LinkedArgument
    RESULT     LinkedResult
    CODE       id-opcode-linkedLDAP }

LinkedArgument ::= OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED-SEQ { LinkedArgumentData }

LinkedArgumentData ::= SEQUENCE {

```

```

object      DistinguishedName,
ldapMessage LDAPMessage,
linkId      LinkId,
returnToClient BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
...
...
COMPONENTS OF CommonArgumentsSeq }

LinkedResult ::= NULL

-- Errors and parameters

abandoned ERROR ::= {-- not literally an "error"
  PARAMETER  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { AbandonedData }
  CODE       id-errcode-abandoned }

AbandonedData ::= SET {
  problem     AbandonedProblem OPTIONAL,
  ...
  ...
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

AbandonedProblem ::= ENUMERATED {
  pagingAbandoned (0) }

abandonFailed ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { AbandonFailedData }
  CODE       id-errcode-abandonFailed }

AbandonFailedData ::= SET {
  problem     [0] AbandonProblem,
  operation   [1] InvokeId,
  ...
  ...
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

AbandonProblem ::= INTEGER {
  noSuchOperation (1),
  tooLate         (2),
  cannotAbandon  (3) }

attributeError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { AttributeErrorData }
  CODE       id-errcode-attributeError }

AttributeErrorData ::= SET {
  object     [0] Name,
  problems   [1] SET OF SEQUENCE {
    problem [0] AttributeProblem,
    type    [1] AttributeType,
    value   [2] AttributeValue OPTIONAL,
    ...},
  ...
  ...
  COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

AttributeProblem ::= INTEGER {
  noSuchAttributeOrValue (1),
  invalidAttributeSyntax (2),
  undefinedAttributeType (3),
  inappropriateMatching (4),
  constraintViolation    (5),
  attributeOrValueAlreadyExists (6),
  contextViolation       (7) }

nameError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER  OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { NameErrorData }
  CODE       id-errcode-nameError }

NameErrorData ::= SET {
  problem [0] NameProblem,

```

```

    matched [1] Name,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

NameProblem ::= INTEGER {
    noSuchObject          (1),
    aliasProblem          (2),
    invalidAttributeSyntax (3),
    aliasDereferencingProblem (4)
    -- not to be used      (5)-- }

referral ERROR ::= { -- not literally an "error"
    PARAMETER      OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ReferralData }
    CODE           id-errcode-referral }

ReferralData ::= SET {
    candidate [0] ContinuationReference,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

securityError ERROR ::= {
    PARAMETER      OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { SecurityErrorData }
    CODE           id-errcode-securityError }

SecurityErrorData ::= SET {
    problem [0] SecurityProblem,
    spkmInfo [1] SPKM-ERROR OPTIONAL,
    encPwdInfo [2] EncPwdInfo OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

SecurityProblem ::= INTEGER {
    inappropriateAuthentication (1),
    invalidCredentials (2),
    insufficientAccessRights (3),
    invalidSignature (4),
    protectionRequired (5),
    noInformation (6),
    blockedCredentials (7),
    -- invalidQOPMatch (8), obsolete
    spkmError (9),
    unsupportedAuthenticationMethod (10),
    passwordExpired (11),
    inappropriateAlgorithms (12) }

EncPwdInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithms [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
        {{SupportedAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL,
    pwdQualityRule [1] SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL,
    ... }

serviceError ERROR ::= {
    PARAMETER      OPTIONALLY-PROTECTED { ServiceErrorData }
    CODE           id-errcode-serviceError }

ServiceErrorData ::= SET {
    problem [0] ServiceProblem,
    ...,
    ...,
    COMPONENTS OF CommonResults }

ServiceProblem ::= INTEGER {
    busy (1),
    unavailable (2),
    unwillingToPerform (3),
    chainingRequired (4),
    unableToProceed (5),
    invalidReference (6),

```

```

timeLimitExceeded          (7),
administrativeLimitExceeded (8),
loopDetected               (9),
unavailableCriticalExtension (10),
outOfScope                (11),
ditError                   (12),
invalidQueryReference      (13),
requestedServiceNotAvailable (14),
unsupportedMatchingUse      (15),
ambiguousKeyAttributes      (16),
sas1BindInProgress         (17),
notSupportedByLDAP         (18) }

updateError ERROR ::= {
  PARAMETER  OPTIONALY-PROTECTED { UpdateErrorData }
  CODE       id-errcode-updateError }

UpdateErrorData ::= SET {
  problem      [0] UpdateProblem,
  attributeInfo [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF CHOICE {
    attributeType      AttributeType,
    attribute           Attribute{{SupportedAttributes}},
    ... } OPTIONAL,
  ...,
  ...,
  COMPONENTS OF      CommonResults }

UpdateProblem ::= INTEGER {
  namingViolation          (1),
  objectClassViolation     (2),
  notAllowedOnNonLeaf     (3),
  notAllowedOnRDN         (4),
  entryAlreadyExists      (5),
  affectsMultipleDSAs     (6),
  objectClassModificationProhibited (7),
  noSuchSuperior          (8),
  notAncestor             (9),
  parentNotAncestor       (10),
  hierarchyRuleViolation  (11),
  familyRuleViolation     (12),
  insufficientPasswordQuality (13),
  passwordInHistory       (14),
  noPasswordSlot          (15) }

-- attribute types

id-at-family-information OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 64}

END -- DirectoryAbstractService


```

**Annex B**


**Operational semantics for Basic Access Control**

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard.)

This annex contains a number of charts that describe the semantics associated with Basic Access Control as it applies to the processing of a Directory operation (see Figures B.1 to B.16).



**Figure B.1 – Alias dereferencing in Name Resolution**



**Figure B.2 – Return of Name Error**




Figure B.3 – Non-disclosure of the existence of an Entry




Figure B.4 – Return of Distinguished Name





Figure B.5 – Read operation



**Figure B.6 – NoSuchAttributeOrValue for Read**






Figure B.7 – Compare operation




**Figure B.8 – List operation**






**Figure B.10 – Alias dereference in Search**




**Figure B.11 – Entry selection in Search**



X.511(12)\_FB.12

Figure B.12 – Add Entry operation



X.511(12)\_FB.13

Figure B.13 – Remove Entry operation





Figure B.14 – Modify Entry operation



**Figure B.15 – ModifyDN operation**




Figure B.16 – Modify Add Attribute or Values

## Annex C

## Examples of searching families of entries

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard.)

## C.1 Single family example

Suppose Charles Smith has multiple modes of communication: A landline telephone, a fax, a mobile phone and e-mail, and each mode has its own associated parameters. Suppose further that Charles Smith has two e-mail accounts, one at his place of work and one at home, and that both offer POP3 mailboxes and SMTP servers. All this information can be held in a compound entry, with Charles Smith's member being the ancestor, with each mode of communication being a child member, and with each e-mail service being a child of the e-mail mode of communication. This is shown in Figure C.1 below. As all the members immediately subordinate to the ancestor has the same structural object class (**comAddr**), the compound entry consists of a single family.




Figure C.1 – Charles Smith's family of entries

Suppose a **search** request is generated with a base object of {...o=Andersen Express}, a filter of {telNo=1234 & tariff=normal}, and a subset of **wholeSubtree** or **oneLevel1**. With the **familyGrouping** parameter set to:

- entryOnly**: No members of the family would match the filter.
- strands** or **multiStrand**: No strand or multi-strand in the family would match the filter.
- compoundEntry**: Member 2 and member 3 would together match the filter and would be marked as contributing members. All the members are marked as participating members.


Nothing from this compound entry would be returned for cases a) and b) above.

For case c) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification (e.g., given by **familyReturn** in **EntryInformationSelection**):

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: The members marked as contributing members, i.e., members 2 and 3 would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly** and **compoundEntry**: All the members in the compound entry would be returned.

### C.2 Multiple families example

Suppose Charles Smith only has a landline telephone and e-mail, but also has two postal addresses with associated parameters. All this information can be held in a compound entry, with Charles Smith's member being the ancestor and with each mode of communication or postal address being a child member. This is shown in Figure C.2 below. As the members immediately subordinate to the ancestor are of two different structural object classes (**comAddr** and **postAddr**), the compound entry consists of two families, where members 1, 2 and 3 constitute one family, and members 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 constitute another family.



X.511(12)\_FC.2

Figure C.2 – Charles Smith's families of entries

#### C.2.1 Filter example 1

Now suppose a Search request is generated with a base object of {...o=Andersen Express}, a filter of {telNo=1234 & service=e-mail & streetAddr=Main & postalCode=3740 }, and a subset of **wholeSubtree** or **oneLevel**. With the **familyGrouping** parameter set to:

- a) **entryOnly**: No single member of the compound entry would match the filter.
- b) **strands**: No single strand in any of the families would match the filter.
- c) **multiStrand**: No combination of strands, one strand from each family, would match the filter.
- d) **compoundEntry**: Members 2, 3, 4 and 5 would together match the filter and would be marked as contributing members. All the members are marked as participating members.

Nothing from this compound entry would be returned for cases a), b) and c) above.

For case d) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: The members marked as contributing members, i.e., members 2, 3, 4 and 5 would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly** and **compoundEntry**: All the members within the compound entry would be returned.

### C.2.2 Filter example 2

If we change the filter to {rfc822=cs@cs.dk & service=e-mail & streetAddr=Main & postalCode=1815}. With the **familyGrouping** parameter set to:

- a) **entryOnly**: No single member of the compound entry would match the filter.
- b) **strands**: No single strand in any of the families would match the filter.
- c) **multiStrand**: The strand ending in member 2 together with any strand going through member 5 would match the filter. Members 2 and 5 have contributed to the matching and would be marked as contributing members. Members 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are marked as participating members.
- d) **compoundEntry**: Members 2 and 5 would together match the filter and would be marked as contributing members. All the members are marked as participating members.

Nothing from this compound entry would be returned for cases a) and b) above.

For case c) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: The members marked as contributing members, i.e., members 2 and 5, would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly**: The members marked as participating members are returned, i.e., the members 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
- iii) **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

For case d) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: The members marked as contributing members, i.e., members 2 and 5, would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly** and **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

### C.2.3 Filter example 3

If we now change the filter to {rfc822=cs@cs.dk & service=e-mail}. With the **familyGrouping** parameter set to:

- a) **entryOnly**: Member 5 alone would match the filter and this member would be marked as a contributing member and as a participating member.
- b) **strands**: Any strand going through member 5 would match the filter. Member 5 would be marked as a contributing member. Members 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 would be marked as participating members.
- c) **multiStrand**: Any strand going through member 5 together with any strand of the postal address family would match the filter. Entries 5 would be marked as a contributing member. Members 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 would be marked as participating members.
- d) **compoundEntry**: Member 5 would match the filter and would be marked as a contributing member. All the members are marked as participating members.

For case a) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly** and **participatingEntriesOnly**: Member 5 would be returned.
- ii) **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

For case b) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: Member 5 would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly**: All the members marked as participating members are returned, i.e., the members 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
- iii) **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

For case c) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: Member 5 would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly**: All the members marked as participating members are returned, i.e., the member 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
- iii) **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

For case d) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: Member 5 would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly** and **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

#### C.2.4 Filter example 4

If we finally change the filter to {cn=Smith & givenName=Charles}. The ancestor alone would match the filter.

- a) **entryOnly**: Only the ancestor (member 1) would be marked as a contributing member and as a participating member.
- b) **strands**, **multiStrand** and **compoundEntry**: The ancestor would be marked as a contributing member and all members would be marked as participating members.

For case a) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly** and **participatingEntriesOnly**: Member 1 would be returned.
- ii) **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

For case b) above, the returned information would be dependent on the family return specification:

- i) **contributingEntriesOnly**: Member 1 would be returned.
- ii) **participatingEntriesOnly** and **compoundEntry**: All the members of the compound entry would be returned.

## Annex D

## External ASN.1 module

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard.)

This annex provides an external ASN.1 module referenced by this Directory Specification. This module is provided for easy compilation of the ASN.1 modules defined by these Directory Specifications.

The following module is an abstract of the module specified by IETF RFC 2025. This module imports data types from Rec. ITU-T X.501 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:1995 and Rec. ITU-T X.509 (1993) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:1995. The import statements have been changed to allow import from the latest edition of those two Directory Specifications by adding the `WITH SUCCESSORS` instruction.

```

SpkmGssTokens {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
  mechanisms(5) spkm(1) spkmGssTokens(10)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL

IMPORTS
  Name
    FROM InformationFramework {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)
      informationFramework(1) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS

  Certificate, CertificateList, CertificatePair, AlgorithmIdentifier{},
  SupportedAlgorithms, Validity
    FROM AuthenticationFramework {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)
      authenticationFramework(7) 9} WITH SUCCESSORS ;

-- types

SPKM-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
  requestToken  REQ-TOKEN,
  certif-data   [0] CertificationData OPTIONAL,
  auth-data     [1] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}

CertificationData ::= SEQUENCE {
  certificationPath          [0] CertificationPath OPTIONAL,
  certificateRevocationList  [1] CertificateList OPTIONAL
} -- at least one of the above shall be present

CertificationPath ::= SEQUENCE {
  userKeyId          [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
  userCertif         [1] Certificate OPTIONAL,
  verifyKeyId        [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
  userVerifyCertif   [3] Certificate OPTIONAL,
  theCACertificates  [4] SEQUENCE OF CertificatePair OPTIONAL
} -- Presence of [2] or [3] implies that [0] or [1] must also be
-- present. Presence of [4] implies that at least one of [0], [1],
-- [2], and [3] must also be present.

REQ-TOKEN ::= SEQUENCE {
  req-contents  Req-contents,
  algId         AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
  req-integrity Integrity -- "token" is Req-contents
}

Integrity ::= BIT STRING

-- If corresponding algId specifies a signing algorithm,
-- "Integrity" holds the result of applying the signing procedure
-- specified in algId to the BER-encoded octet string which results
-- from applying the hashing procedure (also specified in algId) to
-- the DER-encoded octets of "token".
-- Alternatively, if corresponding algId specifies a MACing

```

```

-- algorithm, "Integrity" holds the result of applying the MACing
-- procedure specified in algId to the DER-encoded octets of
-- "token"

Req-contents ::= SEQUENCE {
    tok-id      INTEGER(256), -- shall contain 0100 (hex)
    context-id  Random-Integer,
    pvno       BIT STRING,
    timestamp   UTCTime OPTIONAL, -- mandatory for SPKM-2
    randSrc     Random-Integer,
    targ-name  Name,
    src-name    [0] Name OPTIONAL,
    req-data    Context-Data,
    validity    [1] Validity OPTIONAL,
    key-estb-set Key-Estb-Algs,
    key-estb-req BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
    key-src-bind OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
    -- This field must be present for the case of SPKM-2
    -- unilateral authen. if the K-ALG in use does not provide
    -- such a binding (but is optional for all other cases).
    -- The octet string holds the result of applying the
    -- mandatory hashing procedure (in MANDATORY I-ALG;
    -- see Section 2.1) as follows: MD5(src || context_key),
    -- where "src" is the DER-encoded octets of src-name,
    -- "context-key" is the symmetric key (i.e., the
    -- unprotected version of what is transmitted in
    -- key-estb-req), and "||" is the concatenation operation.
}

Random-Integer ::= BIT STRING

Context-Data ::= SEQUENCE {
    channelId  ChannelId OPTIONAL,
    seq-number INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    options    Options,
    conf-alg   Conf-Algs,
    intg-alg   Intg-Algs,
    owf-alg    OWF-Algs
}

ChannelId ::= OCTET STRING

Options ::= BIT STRING {
    delegation-state(0), mutual-state(1), replay-det-state(2), sequence-state(3),
    conf-avail(4), integ-avail(5), target-certif-data-required(6)
}

Conf-Algs ::= CHOICE {
    algs [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
    null [1] NULL
}

Intg-Algs ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}}

OWF-Algs ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}}

Key-Estb-Algs ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}}

SPKM-REP-TI ::= SEQUENCE {
    responseToken REP-TI-TOKEN,
    certif-data   CertificationData OPTIONAL
    -- present if target-certif-data-required option was
} -- set to TRUE in SPKM-REQ

REP-TI-TOKEN ::= SEQUENCE {
    rep-ti-contents Rep-ti-contents,
    algId           AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
    rep-ti-integ    Integrity -- "token" is Rep-ti-contents
}

Rep-ti-contents ::= SEQUENCE {
    tok-id      INTEGER(512), -- shall contain 0200 (hex)

```

```

context-id      Random-Integer,
pvno           [0] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
timestamp      UTCTime OPTIONAL, -- mandatory for SPKM-2
randTarg       Random-Integer,
src-name       [1] Name OPTIONAL,
targ-name      Name,
randSrc        Random-Integer,
rep-data       Context-Data,
validity       [2] Validity OPTIONAL,
key-estb-id    AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL,
key-estb-str   BIT STRING OPTIONAL
}

SPKM-REP-IT ::= SEQUENCE {
  responseToken  REP-IT-TOKEN,
  algId          AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
  rep-it-integ   Integrity -- "token" is REP-IT-TOKEN
}

REP-IT-TOKEN ::= SEQUENCE {
  tok-id        INTEGER(768), -- shall contain 0300 (hex)
  context-id    Random-Integer,
  randSrc       Random-Integer,
  randTarg      Random-Integer,
  targ-name    Name,
  src-name      Name OPTIONAL,
  key-estb-rep  BIT STRING OPTIONAL
}

SPKM-ERROR ::= SEQUENCE {
  errorToken    ERROR-TOKEN,
  algId         AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
  integrity     Integrity -- "token" is ERROR-TOKEN
}

ERROR-TOKEN ::= SEQUENCE {
  tok-id        INTEGER(1024), -- shall contain 0400 (hex)
  context-id    Random-Integer
}

SPKM-MIC ::= SEQUENCE {mic-header  Mic-Header,
                       int-cksum   BIT STRING
}

Mic-Header ::= SEQUENCE {
  tok-id        INTEGER(257), -- shall contain 0101 (hex)
  context-id    Random-Integer,
  int-alg       [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL,
  snd-seq      [1] SeqNum OPTIONAL
}

SeqNum ::= SEQUENCE {num          INTEGER,
                     dir-ind     BOOLEAN
}

SPKM-WRAP ::= SEQUENCE {wrap-header  Wrap-Header,
                       wrap-body    Wrap-Body
}

Wrap-Header ::= SEQUENCE {
  tok-id        INTEGER(513), -- shall contain 0201 (hex)
  context-id    Random-Integer,
  int-alg       [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL,
  conf-alg      [1] Conf-Alg OPTIONAL,
  snd-seq      [2] SeqNum OPTIONAL
}

Wrap-Body ::= SEQUENCE {int-cksum  BIT STRING,
                       data        BIT STRING
}

```

ISO/IEC 9594-3:2020 (E)

```

Conf-Alg ::= CHOICE {
  algId [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
  null [1] NULL
}

SPKM-DEL ::= SEQUENCE {del-header Del-Header,
                       int-cksum BIT STRING
}

Del-Header ::= SEQUENCE {
  tok-id INTEGER(769), -- shall contain 0301 (hex)
  context-id Random-Integer,
  int-alg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL,
  snd-seq [1] SeqNum OPTIONAL
}

-- other types
-- from [RFC-1508]
MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

InitialContextToken ::= [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE {
  thisMech MechType,
  innerContextToken SPKMLInnerContextToken
} -- when thisMech is SPKM-1 or SPKM-2

SPKMLInnerContextToken ::= CHOICE {
  req [0] SPKM-REQ,
  rep-ti [1] SPKM-REP-TI,
  rep-it [2] SPKM-REP-IT,
  error [3] SPKM-ERROR,
  mic [4] SPKM-MIC,
  wrap [5] SPKM-WRAP,
  del [6] SPKM-DEL
}

-- from [RFC-1510]
AuthorizationData ::=
  SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {ad-type INTEGER,
                       ad-data OCTET STRING}

-- object identifier assignments
md5-DES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
  integrity(3) md5-DES-CBC(1)}

sum64-DES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
  integrity(3) sum64-DES-CBC(2)}

spkm-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
  mechanisms(5) spkm(1) spkm-1(1)}

spkm-2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
  mechanisms(5) spkm(1) spkm-2(2)}

END -- SpkmGssTokens

```

## Annex E

## Use of protected passwords for Bind operations

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard.)

The protected component of **SimpleCredentials** specifies an **OCTET STRING** to be hashed. This annex provides information about how this octet string may be constructed. It also proposes some suggested associated procedures.

In its simple form, the octet string is constructed as the DER encoding of the following:

```
SEQUENCE {
  name      DistinguishedName,
  time1     GeneralizedTime,
  random1   BIT STRING,
  password  OCTET STRING }
```

The **name** component is the distinguished name of the sender and the **password** component is the password of the sender.

The sender generates the two other values as follows:

- a) The **time1** value should specify the time after which the authentication should fail. This time should be "closely" after the current time.
- b) The **random1** value is a new random number generated for each authentication attempt. The value should be sufficiently large to prevent the same number to be generated frequently.

The same pair of **time1** and **random1** should never be used more than once.

The same value of **name**, **time1** and **random1** shall be supplied in the **SimpleCredentials** data type of the Bind.

NOTE 1 – The hashing algorithm is also transferred.

The receiver of a Bind request/result will perform the authentication as follows:

- a) If the value in **time1**, as supplied in the **SimpleCredentials**, is less than the current time seen by the recipient, the authentication already fails here. Also, the time value should be different from recently received time values.
- b) If the value in the **random1**, as supplied in the **SimpleCredentials**, is equal to a value received in a recent Bind request/response, the authentication also fails.
- c) If **time1** and **random1** appear to be valid, the **name**, **time1** and **random1** included in the Bind request/result, together with the local copy of the password, are used to generate a copy of the message digest using the algorithm indicated.
- d) If the generated message digest is equal to the message digest received in the Bind request/result, the authentication is positive, otherwise it fails.

The above procedure allows the password to be protected during transfer and it prevents a replay of the transmission sequence. If the attempted reply is done early, the random number will cause the authentication to fail. If the reply is attempted sometime later, the random number may be accepted, but the authentication will fail due to the time value.

The scheme above may be extended by using the following sequence.

```
SEQUENCE {
  f1      OCTET STRING, -- hashed octet string from above
  time2   GeneralizedTime,
  random2 BIT STRING }
```

The DER encoding of this data type is then used as the octet string in the **SimpleCredentials**.

In this case, the **time2** and **random2** also have to be included in **SimpleCredentials**.

The hashing algorithm used for producing the **f1** component shall be the same as that used for the hashing, as indicated within the **HASH** data type within **SimpleCredentials**.

NOTE 2 – This Directory Specification does not give any recommendation as to how values for **time2** and **random2** are selected.

## Annex F

### Amendments and corrigenda

(This annex does not form an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard.)

This edition of this Directory Specification includes the following amendment to the previous edition that was balloted and approved by ISO/IEC:

- Amendment 1 on General updates

This edition of this Directory Specification does not include any technical corrigenda, as there were no accepted defect reports against the previous edition of this Directory Specification.



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