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ITU-T

TELECOMMUNICATION
STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
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X.1500

Amendment 2

(09/2012)

SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM
COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY

Cybersecurity information exchange – Overview of
cybersecurity

Overview of cybersecurity information exchange

**Amendment 2: Revised structured cybersecurity
information exchange techniques**

Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 (2011) – Amendment 2



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Recommendation ITU-T X.1500

Overview of cybersecurity information exchange

Amendment 2

Revised structured cybersecurity information exchange techniques

Summary

Amendment 2 to Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 (2011) provides a list of structured cybersecurity information techniques that have been created to be continually updated as these techniques evolve, expand, are newly identified or are replaced. The list follows the outline provided in the body of the Recommendation. This amendment reflects the situation of recommended techniques as of September 2012, including bibliographical references.

History

Edition	Recommendation	Approval	Study Group
1.0	ITU-T X.1500	2011-04-20	17
1.1	ITU-T X.1500 (2011) Amd. 1	2012-03-02	17
1.2	ITU-T X.1500 (2011) Amd. 2	2012-09-07	17

FOREWORD

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.

The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.

The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.

In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.

NOTE

In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.

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As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/>.

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Recommendation ITU-T X.1500

Overview of cybersecurity information exchange

Amendment 2

Revised structured cybersecurity information exchange techniques

- 1) *Replace Appendix I with the appendix below.*

Appendix I

Structured cybersecurity information exchange techniques

(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)

Table I.1 – Techniques in the weakness, vulnerability and state exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
Common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE)	Common vulnerabilities and exposures is a method for identifying and exchanging information security vulnerabilities and exposures, and provides common identifiers for publicly known problems. The goal of CVE is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, repositories, and services) with this "common enumeration". CVE is designed to allow vulnerability databases and other resources to be linked together, and to facilitate the comparison of security tools and services. As such, CVE does not contain information such as risk, impact, fix information, or detailed technical information. CVE only contains the standard identifier number with status indicator, a brief description, and references to related vulnerability reports and advisories. The intention of CVE is to be comprehensive with respect to all publicly known vulnerabilities and exposures. While CVE is designed to contain mature information, the primary focus is on identifying vulnerabilities and exposures that are detected by security tools, as well as identifying any new problems that become public, and then addressing any older security problems that require validation.	[b-ITU-T X.1520]

Table I.1 – Techniques in the weakness, vulnerability and state exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
<p>Common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS)</p>	<p>The common vulnerability scoring system process provides for an open framework for communicating the characteristics and impacts of ICT vulnerabilities. CVSS consists of three groups: base, temporal and environmental. Each group produces a numeric score ranging from 0 to 10, and a vector, a compressed textual representation that reflects the values used to derive the score. The base group represents the intrinsic qualities of a vulnerability. The temporal group reflects the characteristics of a vulnerability that change over time. The environmental group represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that are unique to the environment of the user. CVSS enables ICT managers, vulnerability bulletin providers, security vendors, application vendors and researchers to all benefit by adopting a common language of scoring ICT vulnerabilities.</p>	<p>[b-ITU-T X.1521]</p>
<p>Common weakness enumeration (CWE)</p>	<p>Common weakness enumeration is a process for identifying and exchanging unified, measurable sets of software weaknesses. CWE enables more effective discussion, description, selection, and use of software security tools and services that can find these weaknesses in source code and operational systems. It also provides for better understanding and management of software weaknesses related to architecture and design. CWE implementations are compiled and updated by a diverse, international group of experts from business, academia and government agencies, ensuring breadth and depth of content. CWE provides standardized terminology, allows service providers to inform users of specific potential weaknesses and proposed resolutions, and allows software buyers to compare similar products offered by multiple vendors.</p>	<p>[b-ITU-T X.1524]</p>
<p>Common weakness scoring system (CWSS)</p>	<p>The common weakness scoring system provides for an open framework for communicating the characteristics and impacts of software weakness.</p>	<p>[b-CWSS] See Note.</p>

Table I.1 – Techniques in the weakness, vulnerability and state exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
<p>Open vulnerability and assessment language (OVAL)</p>	<p>Open vulnerability and assessment language is an international specification effort to promote open and publicly available security content, and to standardize the transfer of this information across the entire spectrum of security tools and services. OVAL includes a language used to encode system details, and an assortment of content repositories held throughout the community. The language standardizes the three main steps of the assessment process: representing configuration information of systems for testing, analysing the system for the presence of the specified machine state (vulnerability, configuration, patch state, etc.), and reporting the results of this assessment. The repositories are collections of publicly available and open content that utilize the language.</p> <p>OVAL schemas written in XML have been developed to serve as the framework and vocabulary of the OVAL language. These schemas correspond to the three steps of the assessment process: an OVAL system characteristics schema for representing system information, an OVAL definition schema for expressing a specific machine state, and an OVAL results schema for reporting the results of an assessment.</p>	<p>[b-OVAL]. See Note.</p>
<p>Common platform enumeration (CPE)</p>	<p>Common platform enumeration (CPE) is a standardized method to identify and describe the software systems and hardware devices present in an enterprise's computing asset inventory. CPE provides: a naming specification, including the logical structure of well-formed CPE names and the procedures for binding and unbinding these names with machine-readable encodings; a matching specification, which defines procedures for comparing CPE names to determine whether they refer to some or all of the same products or platforms; and a dictionary specification, which defines the concept of a dictionary of identifiers and prescribes high-level rules for dictionary curators.</p>	<p>[b-ITU-T X.1528] [b-ITU-T X.1528.1] [b-ITU-T X.1528.2] [b-ITU-T X.1528.3] [b-ITU-T X.1528.4]</p>
<p>Common configuration enumeration (CCE)</p>	<p>Common configuration enumeration provides unique identifiers to system configuration issues in order to facilitate fast and accurate correlation of configuration data across multiple information sources and tools. For example, CCE identifiers can be used to associate checks in configuration assessment tools with statements in configuration best-practice documents.</p>	<p>[b-CCE] See Note.</p>
<p>NOTE – ITU is currently considering the creation of an ITU-T Recommendation specifying this technique.</p>		

Table I.2 – Techniques relevant to the event, incident, and heuristics exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
Common event expression (CEE)	<p>Common event expression standardizes the way computer events are described, logged, and exchanged. By using CEE's common language and syntax, enterprise-wide log management, correlation, aggregation, auditing, and incident handling can be performed more efficiently and produce better results. The primary goal of the effort is to standardize the representation and exchange of logs from electronic systems. CEE breaks the recording and exchanging of logs into four (4) components: the event taxonomy, log syntax, log transport, and logging recommendations.</p>	<p>[b-CEE] See Note.</p>
Incident object description exchange format (IODEF)	<p>The incident object description exchange format defines a data representation that provides a standard format for the exchange of commonly exchanged information about computer security incidents. IODEF describes an information model and provides an associated data model specified with XML schema.</p>	<p>[b-ITU-T X.1541]</p>
Extensions to IODEF for reporting Phishing	<p>This extends the incident object description exchange format to support the reporting of phishing events. Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 is intended to only describe techniques for commonly understood, assured means for cybersecurity entities to exchange cybersecurity information, and does not include the uses of that information.</p>	<p>[b-IETF RFC 5901]</p>
Common attack pattern enumeration and classification (CAPEC)	<p>CAPEC is a specification method for the identification, description, and enumeration of attack patterns. Attack patterns are a powerful mechanism to capture and communicate the attacker's perspective. They are descriptions of common methods for exploiting software. They derive from the concept of design patterns applied in a destructive rather than constructive context and are generated from in-depth analysis of specific real-world exploit examples. The objective of CAPEC is to provide a publicly available catalogue of attack patterns along with a comprehensive XML schema and classification taxonomy.</p>	<p>[b-CAPEC] See Note.</p>
Malware attribution enumeration and characterization format	<p>The malware attribution enumeration and characterization format (MAEC) is a formal language that includes a schema to provide both a syntax for the common vocabulary of enumerated attributes and behaviours, and an interchange format for structured information about these data elements. The enumerations are at different levels of abstraction: low-level actions, mid-level behaviours and high-level mechanisms. At the lowest level, MAEC describes attributes tied to the basic functionality and low-level operation of malware. At the middle level, MAEC's language organizes the aforementioned low-level actions into groups for the purpose of defining mid-level behaviours. At the more conceptual and high level, MAEC's vocabulary allows for the construction of mechanisms that abstract clusters of mid-level malware behaviours based upon the achievement of a higher order classification.</p>	<p>[b-MAEC] See Note.</p>
<p>NOTE – ITU is currently considering the creation of an ITU-T Recommendation specifying this technique.</p>		

Table I.3 – Techniques relevant to the policy exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
Traffic light protocol (TLP)	<p>The traffic light protocol (TLP) was created to encourage greater sharing of sensitive information. The originator signals how widely they want their information to be circulated beyond the immediate recipient. The TLP provides a simple method to achieve this. It is designed to improve the flow of information between individuals, organizations or communities in a controlled and trusted way. The TLP is based on the concept of the originator labelling information with one of four colours to indicate what further dissemination, if any, the recipient can undertake. The recipient must consult the originator if wider dissemination is required. The TLP is accepted as a model for trusted information exchange among security communities in over 30 countries. The four "information sharing levels" for the handling of sensitive information are:</p> <p>RED – Personal. This information is for named recipients only. In the context of a meeting, for example, RED information is limited to those present. In most circumstances RED information will be passed verbally or in person.</p> <p>AMBER – Limited distribution. The recipient may share AMBER information with others within their organization, but only on a "need-to-know" basis.</p> <p>GREEN – Community wide. Information in this category can be circulated widely within a particular community. However, the information may not be published or posted on the Internet, nor released outside of the community.</p> <p>WHITE – Unlimited. Subject to standard copyright rules, WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction.</p>	[b-TLP]

Table I.4 – Techniques relevant to the identification, discovery, and query cluster

Technique	Description	References
Discovery mechanisms in the exchange of cybersecurity information	<p>These techniques include methods and mechanisms which can be used to identify and locate sources of cybersecurity information, types of cybersecurity information, specific instances of cybersecurity information, methods available for access of cybersecurity information as well as policies which may apply to the access of cybersecurity information.</p>	[b-ITU-T X.1570]
Guidelines for administering the OID arc for cybersecurity information exchange	<p>A common global cybersecurity identifier namespace is described, together with administrative requirements, as part of a coherent OID arc, and includes identifiers for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • cybersecurity information; • cybersecurity organizations; • cybersecurity policy. 	[b-ITU-T X.1500.1]

Table I.5 – Techniques relevant to the identity assurance cluster

Technique	Description	References
<p>Trusted platforms</p>	<p>Computing and communications products with embedded trusted platform modules (TPMs) advance the ability of businesses, institutions, government agencies, and consumers to conduct trustworthy information exchange; therefore, TPMs are relevant to most CYBEX implementations. TPMs are special-purpose integrated circuits (ICs) built into a variety of platforms to enable strong user authentication and machine attestation – essential to prevent inappropriate access to confidential and sensitive information and to protect against compromised networks.</p> <p>Trusted platform module technology is based on open standards to ensure interoperability of diverse products in mixed-vendor environments. The prevalent TPM standard consists of a set of specifications developed and maintained by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), alongside with a protection profile for security evaluation against the common criteria.</p> <p>The design principles give the basic concepts of the TPM and generic information relative to TPM functionality. A TPM designer must review and implement the information in the TPM main specification (parts 1-3) and review the platform specific document for the intended platform. The platform specific document contains normative statements that affect the design and implementation of a TPM. A TPM designer must review and implement the requirements, including testing and evaluation, as set by the TCG conformance workgroup. The TPM must comply with the requirements and pass any evaluations set by the conformance workgroup. The TPM may undergo more stringent testing and evaluation.</p>	<p>[b-TPM]</p>
<p>Trusted network connect</p>	<p>ICT security operations often desire to discover the state of operating system (OS)-level and the application software used by the supporting network. For example, when systems lack OS security patches or antivirus signatures, reliable notification is crucial to containing the damage associated with network-based attacks. Making this appraisal requires reliable information that a connected system is in a particular state.</p> <p>In order to prevent systems (e.g., hacked systems) from falsifying information, successful appraisal requires a hardware basis on the system to be appraised. Trusted platforms are embedded in the hardware to record certain facts about the boot process and deliver them in digitally signed form. Furthermore, major chip manufacturers are now supplementing the trusted platforms with a "late launch" capability that allows for execution of trusted code later in the boot sequence. This, in turn, allows events to be reliably recorded after the hardware-specific boot process.</p>	<p>[b-TNC]</p>

Table I.5 – Techniques relevant to the identity assurance cluster

Technique	Description	References
	<p>Network configuration management is effectively a deployment of system attestation: software agents on enterprise machines that periodically send configuration reports to a central repository, which evaluates and flags non-compliant systems. Data from these software agents, while valuable, is easily modified by an attacker. Using the widespread deployment of trusted platforms to enable a more trustworthy evaluation of system state would greatly increase an enterprise's confidence in its configuration management data.</p> <p>Trusted network connect (TNC) is an open architecture for network access control. Its aim is to enable network operators to provide endpoint integrity at every network connection, thus enabling interoperability among multi-vendor network endpoints.</p>	
Entity authentication assurance	<p>This standard provides an authentication life cycle framework for managing the assurance of an entity's identity and its associated identity information in a given context. Specifically it provides methods to 1) qualitatively measure and assign relative assurance levels to the authentication of an entity's identities and its associated identity information, and 2) communicate relative authentication assurance levels.</p>	[b-EAA] See Note.
Extended validation certificate framework	<p>The extended validation certificate framework consists of an integrated combination of technologies, protocols, identity proofing, life cycle management, and auditing practices that describe the minimum requirements that must be met in order to issue and maintain extended validation certificates ("EV Certificates") concerning a subject organization. The framework accommodates a wide range of security, localization and notification requirements.</p>	[b-EVCERT]
Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates	<p>The specified document specifies policy requirements relating to certification authorities (CAs) issuing public key certificates, including extended validation certificates (EVC). It defines policy requirements on the operation and management practices of certification authorities issuing and managing certificates such that subscribers, subjects certified by the CA and relying parties may have confidence in the applicability of the certificate in support of cryptographic mechanisms.</p>	[b-ETSI TS 102 042]
<p>NOTE – ITU is currently considering the creation of an ITU-T Recommendation specifying this technique.</p>		

Table I.6 – Techniques relevant to the exchange protocol cluster

Technique	Description	References
Real-time inter-network defense (RID)	Real-time inter-network defense (RID) provides a framework for the exchange of incident information. The RID standard provides the set of incident coordination messages necessary to communicate IODEF documents securely between entities. RID is a wrapper for IODEF documents, including any extensions of IODEF. The standard messages and exchange formats include security, privacy and policy options/considerations that are necessary in a global incident coordination scheme. RID is the security layer between IODEF documents and the transport protocol. The transport selected is decided upon by the entities communicating incident information. The transport may be the specified RID transport (HTTP/TLS), BEEP, SOAP, or a protocol specified in the future.	[b-ITU-T X.1580]
Transport of real-time inter-network defense (RID) messages	This mechanism specifies the transport of real-time inter-network defense (RID) messages within HTTP Request and Response messages transported over TLS.	[b-ITU-T X.1581]
Blocks extensible exchange protocol (BEEP) profile for CYBEX	A BEEP profile for cybersecurity information exchange techniques specifies the BEEP profile for use within CYBEX. BEEP is a generic application protocol kernel for connection-oriented, asynchronous interactions described in [b-IETF RFC 3080]. At BEEP's core is a framing mechanism that permits simultaneous and independent exchanges of messages between peers. All exchanges occur in the context of a channel – a binding to a well-defined aspect of the application, such as transport security, user authentication, or data exchange. Each channel has an associated "profile" that defines the syntax and semantics of the messages exchanged.	[b-IETF RFC 3080] See Note.
Simple object access protocol (SOAP) for CYBEX	SOAP is a lightweight protocol for exchange of information in a decentralized, distributed environment. It is an XML-based protocol that consists of three parts: an envelope that defines a framework for describing what is in a message and how to process it, a set of encoding rules for expressing instances of application-defined datatypes, and a convention for representing remote procedure calls and responses. SOAP can potentially be used in combination with a variety of other protocols; however, the only bindings defined in this document describe how to use SOAP in combination with HTTP and HTTP extension framework.	[b-SOAP]
NOTE – ITU is currently considering the creation of an ITU-T Recommendation specifying this technique.		

2) Replace the bibliography with the bibliography below:

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