

I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n

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**Corrigendum 2**  
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SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM  
COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY

Directory

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Information technology – Open Systems  
Interconnection – The Directory: Procedures for  
distributed operation

**Technical Corrigendum 2**

Recommendation ITU-T X.518 (2008) – Technical  
Corrigendum 2



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**Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection –  
The Directory: Procedures for distributed operation**

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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD  
RECOMMENDATION ITU-TInformation technology – Open Systems Interconnection –  
The Directory: Procedures for distributed operation

## Technical Corrigendum 2

(covering resolution to defect reports 375, 376, 377, 380, 383, 384, 385, 386 and 387)

## 1) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 375

Change the second paragraph of item 1) in 16.1.4.2 as shown:

If the DSA using local knowledge knows, possibly reflected in the appropriate **MasterOrShadowAccessPoint** value, that chaining is required to the DSA to which an association is lost, it shall elect to send a **serviceError** with problem **unavailable**, ~~and~~ The notification component of the **CommonResults** data type may be included and shall then contain:

- a **dsAProblem** notification attribute with the value **id-pr-targetDsaUnavailable**; and
- a **distinguishedName** attribute having as value the distinguished name of the DSA.

Change the second paragraph in 16.1.4.4 as shown:

Additional information may ~~shall~~ be returned by a DSA in a **dsAProblem** notification attribute as follows:

## 2) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 376

In 10.3 replace:

- a) The **originator** component conveys the name of the (ultimate) originator of the request unless already specified in the security parameters. If **requestor** is present in **CommonArguments**, this argument may be omitted.

NOTE 1 – Where the originator has alternative names differentiated by context, then the name used as the value of **originator** shall be the primary distinguished name, if known. Otherwise, authentication and access control based on the value of **originator** may not work as desired.

with:

- a) The **originator** component need not be present if the **requestor** component is present in **CommonArguments**, if the **certification-path** component is present in the **SecurityParameters** value, or if requestor information is only made available in the request, but not during the Bind operation. It shall not be present if requestor information is not available. It shall be present, if requestor information is only available as the result of the Bind operation.

## 3) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 377

In 10.3, replace:

- n) **authenticationLevel** component is optionally supplied when it is required to indicate the manner in which authentication has been carried out. The **AuthenticationLevel** data type is described in ITU-T Rec. X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

with:

- n) **authenticationLevel** component, when present, shall indicate the authentication level as established during the Bind operation. If this component is absent, a performing DSA shall assume that there has been no authentication (anonymous Bind). This component should be present whenever the requestor has been authenticated. The **AuthenticationLevel** data type is described in Rec. ITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2.

#### 4) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 380

Update 10.3, item v) as shown:

- v) The dspPaging component may be used to request DSP paging. If the bound DSA is different from the initial performer (see 15.5.5) and the bound DSA supports DSP paged results, it may set this component to **TRUE** to instruct the initial performer to provide DSP paged results. If this component is **FALSE** (default), the initial performer shall not perform DSP paged result. An initial performer that supports DSP paged results ~~performer~~ shall not forward this component to DSA(s) to which it is sending subrequests.

#### 5) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 383

In 10.3, item h), delete the note and update as shown:

- h) The **referenceType** component, when present, shall indicates, to the DSA being asked to perform the operation, what type of knowledge was used to route the request to it. The DSA may therefore be able to detect errors in the knowledge held by the invoker. If such an error is detected, it shall be indicated by a **serviceError** with problem **invalidReference**. **ReferenceType** is specified fully in 10.7. If the referenceType is absent, the value superior shall be assumed.

In 10.3, item u), make the note to normal text:

In 10.11, update item b) as shown:

- b) The **aliasedRDNs** component indicates how many (if any) of the RDNs in the target object name have been produced by dereferencing an alias. The argument is only present if an alias has been dereferenced.

~~NOTE – This component is provided for compatibility with first edition implementations of the Directory. **DUAs (and DSAs) implemented according to later editions of the Directory Specifications shall always omit this parameter from the CommonArguments of a subsequent request. In this way, the Directory will not signal an error if aliases dereference to further aliases.**~~

This component shall not be included in **CommonArguments** when implementing according to the second or later editions of these Directory Specifications.

#### 6) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 384

In 10.6, replace the text under the ASN.1 with:

Each DSA, which is propagating an operation to another DSA, shall add a new **TraceItem** to the end of the **TraceInformation**. Each such **TraceItem** value has the following components:

- a) the **dsa** component that shall hold the name of the DSA which is adding the item;
- b) the **targetObject** component, when present, shall be the value the DSA adding the item received on **targetObject** component of the **ChainingArguments** value of the incoming request. This parameter shall be omitted if:
  - the request being chained came from a DUA, in which case its implied value is the **object** or **baseObject** in the DAP operation;
  - the request is received from an LDAP client, in which case its implied value is the **object** or **baseObject** of the LDAP request; or
  - if its value is the same as the (actual or implied) **targetObject** in the **ChainingArgument** of the outgoing request;
- c) the **operationProgress** component shall have a value determined as follows:
  - If the incoming request is received from a DUA, the value shall be taken from the **operationProgress** component of the **CommonArguments** of the DAP request. If this component is absent on the DAP request, the default value **notStarted** shall be used.
  - If the incoming request is received from an LDAP client, the value **notStarted** shall be used.
  - If the incoming request is received from a DSA, the value shall be taken from the **operationProgress** component of the **ChainedArguments** value. If this component is absent on the request, the default value **notStarted** shall be used.

## 7) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 385

In 3.7, add the following definition:

**3.7.6 distributed directory:** An interconnection set of a DSA and, in addition, one or more DSAs and/or LDAP servers.

In 15.1, change the first paragraph as shown:

Each DSA is equipped with procedures capable of completely fulfilling all Directory operations. In the case that a DSA contains the entire DIB, all operations are, ~~in fact,~~ completely carried out within that DSA. In the case that the DIB is distributed across a distributed directory ~~multiple DSAs,~~ the completion of a typical operation is fragmented, with just a portion of that operation carried out in each of potentially many cooperating DSAs and LDAP servers.

## 8) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 386

Update 16.1.3 as shown:

### 16.1.3 Errors

At each stage of the processing, an error may be detected during the execution of any sub-procedure. The error identified within this sub-procedure is normally returned to the requestor as a corresponding protocol error. In this case, the **Operation Dispatcher** is terminated immediately. In the case that multiple errors are received, one shall be ~~local procedures may selected one of them~~ to be returned (see 12.1 of Rec. ITU-T X.511 | ISO/IEC 9594-3.

Alternatively, a procedure may choose to process errors (e.g., if a **serviceError** with problem **busy** is returned to a chained search subrequest) at certain points of operation processing. In this case, the procedure continues with its execution and no error is returned to the requestor.

The conditions under which a DSA may optionally ~~sign the errors returned are specified in clause 12 of Rec. ITU-T X.511 | ISO/IEC 9594-3~~ in a distributed operation based on error protection requested.

## 9) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 387

In 10.8 and Annex A, update as shown:

```
MasterOrShadowAccessPoint ::= SET {
  COMPONENTS OF AccessPoint,
  category          [3]  ENUMERATED {
    master           (0),
    shadow           (1),
    writeableCopy   (2) } DEFAULT master,
  chainingRequired [5]  BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }
```

In 10.8, item b), update as shown:

- b) A **MasterOrShadowAccessPoint** value identifies an access point to the Directory. The **category**, either **master** or **shadow**, of the access point is dependent upon whether it points to a naming context or commonly usable replicated area. The category **writeableCopy** is only applicable if the access point is for an LDAP server with writeable copy entries. The **chainingRequired** component indicates whether chaining is required for that DSA, i.e., a referral shall not be returned for that DSA.

In 18.3.4, replace Figure 12 with Figure 12 from Rec. ITU-T X.518 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-4:2001.

In 18.3.4.1, update item 1) as shown:

- 1) If the DSE is not of type **shadow** ~~and it is not of type **writeableCopy**~~, then check if all **criticalExtensions** are supported. If they are, then return **entry suitable**, else return **unsupported critical extension**.

*In 18.3.4.1, delete item 3) and shift numbering accordingly.*

*In 20.1.1, modify as shown:*

### **20.1.1 Master only strategy**

A DSA may choose this strategy to prevent the usage of shadowed information when performing a parallel or sequential multi-chaining caused by NSSR decomposition, or request decomposition during a Search or List evaluation. For this strategy, during a Search or List operation evaluation, the `excludeShadows` component of the `ChainingArguments` is set to `TRUE`. If NSSRs are encountered during Name Resolution, a DSA may set `nameResolveOnMaster` to `TRUE` to ensure that only a single path is followed. `nameResolveOnMaster` shall be set to `TRUE` if NSSRs are encountered and the operation is one of the Directory modification operations. In either case, only the DSA(s) that hold the ~~(primary)~~ master entry (or entries) relevant to the operation shall perform the operation. This master only strategy can be used during both parallel as well as sequential multi-chaining.

NOTE – Setting `nameResolveOnMaster` to `TRUE` eliminates the possibility of multiple paths during name resolution by:

- 1) ignoring shadow entries ~~and writeable copies of entries~~; and
- 2) by ensuring that only one DSA may proceed with name resolution in situations where a complex DIT distribution would otherwise permit more than one to proceed.

This is achieved by allowing only the DSA holding the ~~(primary)~~ master entry corresponding to the first `nextRDNTToBeResolved` RDNs of the target object name to continue with name resolution. Any other DSAs will not be able to proceed even though they may hold master entries which match more of the target object name.

*Delete second paragraph of 22.1.2.*

*Delete clauses C.2.1, C.3.4, C.4 and C.5.*



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