

## Recommendation

# **ITU-T Q.3063 (2022) Cor. 1 (07/2023)**

SERIES Q: Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests

Signalling requirements and protocols for the NGN –  
Network signalling and control functional architecture

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Signalling procedures of calling line identification  
authentication

## **Corrigendum 1**

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# Recommendation ITU-T Q.3063

## Signalling procedures of calling line identification authentication

### Corrigendum 1

#### Summary

Signalling system No. 7 (SS7) was originally designed for operator management on the assumption that anyone connected to the SS7 network was trustable. In the current network environment however, more and more untrusted devices (including the private automatic branch exchange (PABX), call centre and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) access system,) are appearing that interconnect to a public land mobile network/public switched telephone network or PLMN/PSTN. As a result, calling line identification spoofing is particularly effective at defeating call blockers, thus leading to a variety of scams that work by avoiding identification.

The goal of Recommendation ITU-T Q.3063 is to identify the signalling requirements of calling line identification authentication including codes and signalling procedures based on the mechanism defined in Recommendation ITU-T Q.3057.

Corrigendum 1 to Recommendation ITU-T Q.3063 (2022) revises the definition of "calling line identification certificate (CLIC)".

#### History \*

Edition	Recommendation	Approval	Study Group	Unique ID
1.0	ITU-T Q.3063	2022-09-29	11	11.1002/1000/15043
1.1	ITU-T Q.3063 (2022) Cor. 1	2023-07-14	11	11.1002/1000/15577

#### Keywords

Authentication, calling line identification, signalling procedures.

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\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL <https://handle.itu.int/> in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.

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The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.

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# Recommendation ITU-T Q.3063

## Signalling procedures of calling line identification authentication

### Corrigendum 1

*Editorial note: This is a complete-text publication. Modifications introduced by this corrigendum are shown in revision marks relative to Recommendation ITU-T Q.3063 (2022).*

#### 1 Scope

This Recommendation presents the architecture and signalling procedures of calling line identification authentication in support of existing networks. Based on the architecture of the calling line identification authentication, it specifies the procedures of calling line identification authentication.

#### 2 References

The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.

- |                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| [ITU-T E.164]    | Recommendation ITU-T E.164 (2010), <i>The international public telecommunication numbering plan.</i>  |
| [ITU-T Q.731.3]  | Recommendation ITU-T Q.731.3 (2019), <i>Stage 3 description for number identification supplementary services using Signalling System No.7 – Calling line identification presentation.</i> |
| [ITU-T Q.763]    | Recommendation ITU-T Q.763 (1999), <i>Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part formats and codes.</i>   |
| [ITU-T Q.764]    | Recommendation ITU-T Q.764 (1999), <i>Signalling system No. 7 – ISDN User Part signalling procedures.</i>   |
| [ITU-T Q.1902.3] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1902.3 (2001), <i>Bearer Independent Call Control protocol (Capability Set 2) and Signalling System No. 7 ISDN User Part: Formats and codes.</i>                   |
| [ITU-T Q.1902.4] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1902.4 (2001), <i>Bearer independent call control protocol (Capability Set 2): Basic call procedures.</i>  |
| [ITU-T Q.3057]   | Recommendation ITU-T Q.3057 (2020), <i>Signalling requirements and architecture for interconnection between trustable network entities.</i>   |
| [ITU-T X.509]    | Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2019), <i>Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks.</i>                         |

#### 3 Definitions

##### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere

This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:

**3.1.1 certification authority (CA)** [ITU-T X.509]: An authority trusted by one or more entities to create and digital sign public-key certificates. Optionally the certification authority may create the subjects' keys.

## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**

This Recommendation defines the following term:

**3.2.1 calling line identification certificate (CLIC)**: A public certificate issued by a certification authority ~~ies (CAs) that~~ which is used to prove that the originating local exchange owns the calling party number.

## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**

This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:

ASN.1	Abstract Syntax Notation One
BICC	Bearer Independent Call Control
CA	Certification Authority
CLI	Calling Line Identification
CLIC	Calling Line Identification Certificate
CLIP	Calling Line Identification Presentation
DSS1	Digital subscriber Signalling System No. 1
IAM	Initial Address Message
ISDN	Integrated Services Digital Network
ISUP	ISDN User Part
PABX	Private Automatic Branch Exchange
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PLMN	Public Land Mobile Network
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
SS7	Signalling System No. 7
SSGW	Signalling Security Gateway
TM	Tandem exchange
VoIP	Voice over Internet Protocol

## **5 Conventions**


None.

## **6 Architecture of calling line identification authentication**

This clause describes the architecture, functional entities and interfaces of calling line identification authentication.



## 6.1 Reference architecture



**Figure 6-1 – Reference architecture of calling line identification authentication**

The scheme for calling line identification authentication is the application of [ITU-T Q.3057] which introduces a public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme for the network. The architecture of the scheme is shown in Figure 6-1. The scheme will have certification authorities (CAs) certify, issue, and revoke calling line identification certificates (CLICs) for the calling parties that have proven ownership of their respective calling party numbers. After successfully obtaining the CLIC, the calling party's originating local exchange or outgoing signalling security gateway (SSGW) can then use the calling line identification certificate to generate an authenticated call request, by extending the existing initial address message (IAM). Upon receiving an IAM call request, the incoming SSGW or destination local exchange then checks for the presence and validity of authenticated call request parameters and presents the validated calling line identification (CLI) using a security indicator during the call setup to the called party.

## 6.2 Functional entities

The role of each actor with regard to the calling line identification authentication scheme is as follows:

- **Certification authority (CA):** an entity in the network that verifies calling line identification (CLI) ownership and issues calling line identification certificates (CLICs) to a requester that successfully provided proof of calling line identification ownership. The CA is a trusted third party, trusted both by the calling party and by the called party relying upon the certificate. The CA is also responsible for revoking calling line identification certificates if needed.
- **Calling party:** sets up a call request with the originating exchange for the called party. Under the calling line identification authentication scheme, the originating exchange may initiate a request to obtain a calling line identification certificate from the CA.
- **Originating local exchange:** an entity initiates call setup upon a call request from the calling party. As an option functionality, the originating local exchange may obtain and store the calling line identification certificates from the CA for the calling party identification.
- **Transit exchange:** an interconnecting switch in the public switched telephone network (PSTN) that helps to route the calls from the originating exchange to the destination exchange.
- **Signalling security gateway (SSGW):** an entity obtains and stores the calling line identification certificates from the CA for the calling party's identification, generates an authenticated call setting up message on behalf of originating local exchange. The SSGW also receives the authenticated call setting up message and checks the validity and authenticity of the call request from another SSGW.

- **Destination local exchange:** an entity terminates the call and sends the call setup message to the called party. As an option functionality, destination local exchange may receive the authenticated call setting up message and check the validity and authenticity of the call request, and it sets up the call with the called party with a security indicator showing the calling line identification verification status.

## 7 Procedure of calling line identification authentication

The processes of the authentication scheme can be logically divided into 3 parts: certificate generating, call request initiating, and certificate verification.

In the certificate generating process, defined by [ITU-T Q.3057], the goal is for a CA to verify a SSGW's ownership and that the SSGW can be trusted in the network, afterwards the CA will issue a certificate to the SSGW. Once the CA issues a certificate to the SSGW, the SSGW will then need to generate a public-private key pair and store the private key securely. After proving to the CA that the SSGW is really the owner of the public key, the public key of the SSGW is signed by the CA with attributes indicating identification ownership information, turning it into a calling line identification certificate.


The core process is sequenced as follows:

### 7.1 Certification generating

The certificate generating process is sequenced as follows:

1. The SSGW setup connection with CA, generates a public-private key pair  $P_O$  and  $Q_O$ .
2. The SSGW authenticates its identity to the CA using the  $Sc$  interface defined by [ITU-T Q.3057]. SSGW sends its identity  $A$  encrypted with CA's public key  $P_C$  to the CA.
3. Once the CA authenticates the identity of the SSGW the CA creates an encrypted nonce  $EN_S$  by first generating a random nonce  $N_S$  and then encrypting it with the SSGW's public key  $P_O$ .  $EN_S = \text{Encrypt}(P_O)\{N_S\}$ .
4. The CA creates a signature  $EN-Sig_S$  by its private key  $Q_C$ .  $EN-Sig_S = \text{Sign}(Q_C)(EN_S)$ .
5. The CA sends  $EN_S$  and  $EN-Sig_S$  back to the SSGW.
6. The SSGW verifies the signature  $EN_S$  to ensure the CA's identity.
7. If  $EN-Sig_S$  is valid, the SSGW decrypts  $EN_S$  with private key  $Q_O$  to obtain  $N_S$ .
8. The SSGW sends decrypted  $N_S$  to CA for proving that the SSGW is really the owner of the public key.
9. The CA verifies  $N_S$  and, if valid, sets a validity time  $V_A$  and generates a certificate  $C_S$  for the SSGW by signing its identification  $A$ , public key  $P_O$  and  $V_A$  using the CA's private key.
10. The CA sends  $C_S$  to the SSGW.

A sequence diagram of the certificate generating process is shown in Figure 7-1.



**Figure 7-1 – Procedure of certificate generating**

In actual deployment, there can be several CAs, allowing different users, such as those in different networks or regions, to verify with an appropriate root CA, as defined by [ITU-T Q.3057].

With regards to the certificate format, it could be based on [ITU-T X.509] format, and the calling line identification in the certificate is based on international E.164 format.

A CA issues a public-key certificate of the SSGW by digital signing identification of information, including its distinguished name, the identification of the SSGW, a validity period, and the value of a public-key algorithm and public key. The following ASN.1 data type specifies the syntax of public-key certificates:

```

Certificate ::= SIGNED{TBSCertificate}

TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
    version                [0] Version DEFAULT v1,
    serialNumber            CertificateSerialNumber,
    signature               AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
    issuer                  Name,
    validity                Validity,
    subject                 Name,
    subjectPublicKeyInfo    SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
    issuerUniqueIdentifier  [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    [[2: -- if present, version shall be v2 or v3
    subjectUniqueIdentifier [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL]],

```

```

    [[3: -- if present, version shall be v2 or v3
    extensions          [3] Extensions OPTIONAL]]
}

Version ::= INTEGER {v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)}

CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER

Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
    notBefore Time,
    notAfter Time,
    ... }

SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{{SupportedAlgorithms}},
    subjectPublicKey BIT STRING,
    ... }

Time ::= CHOICE {
    utcTime UTCTime,
    generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }

Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension

Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
    extnId EXTENSION.&id({ExtensionSet}),
    critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    extnValue OCTET STRING
        (CONTAINING EXTENSION.&ExtnType({ExtensionSet}{@extnId})
        ENCODED BY der),
    ... }

der OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
    {joint-iso-itu-t asn1(1) ber-derived(2) distinguished-encoding(1)}

ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= {...}

```


## 7.2 Call request initiating

The call request initiating process is sequenced as follows:

Prerequisites: (1) the SSGW has CA's public key  $P_c$ , and (2) the SSGW has certificate  $C_S$  and its private key  $Q_o$ .

- a) When the originating exchange receives a call request from the user A, an IAM with the calling party number is generated for the call request as usual. The IAM may be succeeded by several tandem exchanges (TMs) before reaching the outgoing SSGW.
- b) The outgoing SSGW analyses the routing information to determine the routing of the call, The SSGW analyses the bearer independent call control/ ISDN user part or BICC/ISUP parameter and gets the CLI information. The SSGW creates the hash  $H_A$  of the CLI parameter.
- c) The outgoing SSGW generates an IAM signature  $IAM-Sig_A$  by signing  $H_A$ .  $IAM-Sig_A = Sign(Q_o)\{H_A\}$ .
- d) The outgoing SSGW attaches the IAM signature  $IAM-Sig_A$  and certificate  $C_S$  in the optional parameters (refer to clauses 7.1 and 7.2) of the IAM and sends the extended IAM to the SSGW act as incoming exchange.

A sequence diagram of the call request initiating process is shown in Figure 7-2:




**Figure 7-2 – Procedure of call request initiating at the SSGW**

### 7.3 Certification verification

The verification process is sequenced as follows:

- a) The incoming SSGW obtains the extended IAM and checks if the certificate  $C_S$  is valid, expired or revoked.
- b) If the  $C_S$  is valid, the IAM signature is verified against the CLI.
- c) If the IAM signature is valid and the called party number is correct, the SSGW removes the optional parameters  $IAM-Sig_A$ , hashed  $CLI H_A$  and certificate  $C_S$ .
- d) The SSGW sends the IAM to the destination exchange.
- e) If the IAM signature is not valid or the called party number is not correct, the SSGW sends the IAM to the destination exchange without the calling party number parameter when the call is allowed to pass the call according to the policy.

A sequence diagram of the verification process is shown in Figure 7-3:



**Figure 7-3 – Procedure of verification at the SSGW**

## **8 Procedure of calling line identification presentation**

This clause was produced to meet the need for the implementation of the calling line identification authentication. It should be read in conjunction with [ITU-T Q.731.3].

### **8.1 Actions at the outgoing SSGW/international gateway exchange**

The procedure of calling line identification presentation (CLIP) for outgoing SSGW/ international gateway exchange is defined in clause 6.4.2.3 of [ITU-T Q.731.3]. The extended parameters which include authentication information should be included in IAM for calling line identification authentication.

To ensure transit compatibility, the extended IAM should include a "parameter compatibility information" parameter to instruct the existing transit exchanges to transfer the extended IAM parameters transparently to the next exchange. The format of the parameter compatibility information parameter field is shown in clause 3.41 of [ITU-T Q.763] and clause 6.71 of [ITU-T Q.1902.3].

## **8.2 Actions at the transit exchange**

On receipt of unrecognized signalling information parameters, the specified compatibility signalling procedures which can be found in clause 2.9.5.3.2 of [ITU-T Q.764] and clause 13.4.4.2 of [ITU-T Q.1902.4] should be performed by the transit exchange between the outgoing and incoming international exchange.

## **8.3 Actions at the incoming SSGW/ international gateway exchange**

If the calling party number is valid, the procedure of calling line identification presentation for incoming SSGW/ international gateway exchange is defined in clause 6.4.2.4 of [ITU-T Q.731.3]. Extended parameter for calling line identification authentication should be included in the IAM.

If the calling party number is not valid and the call may not be blocked according to the policy. If the call can be processed the calling party number parameter should be removed.

## **8.4 Action at the destination local exchange (optional)**

If the called user is provided with the CLIP supplementary service and the extended parameter for calling line identification authentication is available, the extended information should be included in SETUP message sending to the called user.







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