# DFS Security Recommendations for Regulators and Providers

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#### **DFS Security Recommendations**

- 1. Security recommendations to protect against DFS SIM related risks
- 2. <u>Recommendations to mitigate SS7 vulnerabilities</u>
- 3. DFS Mobile application security Best practices (From ITU-T X.1150)
- 4. <u>Template for a Model MOU between a Telecommunications Regulator and Central Bank related to</u> <u>DFS Security</u>
- 5. DFS consumer competency framework



#### **Regulatory Guidance to Mitigate SIM Risks**



## **Poll** Question

#### Which of these SIM card-related security risks are you familiar with?



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#### **SIM Risks**

- SIM cloning
- SIM swaps
- SIM Recycling
- Binary over the air attacks (Sim jacker and WIB browser attacks)



# Your phone Attacker's phone



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#### **SIM Risks**





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Business News > Wealth > Save > Airtel issues fraudster duplicate SIM without proper verification, Soldier loses lakhs from SBI a/c: How to protect yourself

#### Airtel issues fraudster duplicate SIM without proper verification, Soldier loses lakhs from SB a/c: How to protect yourself

By Neelanjit Das, ET Online = Last Updated: Aug 20, 2024, 08:33:00 PM IST



#### Synopsis

SIM card fraud: Bharti Airtel has issued a duplicate mobile SIM card to a fraudster and as a result of this a Indian Army soldier posted in Jammu & Kashmir lost Rs 2.87 lakh from this State Bank of India (SBI) a/c. The soldier fought with Airtel for 7 years and finally won the case with Rs 4.83 lakh compensation to be payable by Airtel; NCDRC.



A soldier who was a long-term <u>Airtel</u> customer lost Rs 2,87,630 from his <u>State Bank of India</u> (SBI) savings bank account due to a mobile '<u>SIM swap</u> <u>fraud</u>'. The <u>fraud</u> happened when Airtel issued a duplicate mobile <u>SIM</u> card to an unknown person without





### DFS Operators Controls to Mitigate SIM Swaps

- Real time IMSI/ICCID detection
- Real time device change detection – device to DFS account binding
- Encourage use of secure DFS access through apps.



Category: PREMIUM						
API Name	API Definition					
Sim Swap API	API which allows a corporate customer to check if a given MSISDN has performed a SIM swap. Returns 'MSISDN',' date of last SIM swap'					
Authentication API	API which allows a corporate customer to use MTN Service to send OTPs . A customer is onboarded on the MTN instance and the OTP service is configurable to them					
KYC Premium API	API allows a customer to check if the KYC info provided by its customers matches with that provided at Sim registration. Returns one or more actual customer details. This requires customer consent					



#### **Guidance to Mitigate SS7 Threats**

<u>Related report</u>: <u>Technical report on SS7 vulnerabilities and mitigation</u> <u>measures for digital financial services transactions</u>



#### **Poll Question**

SS7 (Signalling System No. 7) is a network protocol used by telecom companies. Vulnerabilities in SS7 can impact the security of Digital Financial Services (DFS).

How familiar are you with SS7 and its potential impact on DFS?



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3 assaf@DESKTOP-MCKINNK: /mnt/c/Work/Vaulto/Vaulto/tests

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assaf@DESKTOP-MCKINNK:~\$ cd /mnt/c/Work/Vaulto/Vaulto/tests/

assaf@DESKTOP-MCKINNK:/mnt/c/Work/Vaulto/Vaulto/tests\$ clear

assaf@DESKTOP-MCKINNK:/mnt/c/Work/Vaulto/Vaulto/tests\$ python demo\_ul\_sms\_intercept.py 972502138133 ne

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#### **Regulatory Guidance to Mitigate SS7 Risks**

- Regulatory coordination between telco and DFS regulator on SS7 vulnerabilities.
- Incentivize the industry
- Education for telecom and financial services regulators on SS7 vulnerabilities and impact to DFS
- Telecom regulators to establish baseline security measures for each SS7 risk category
- IMSI validation gateway: An API that provides status of a number and real time country where client is located.



#### **Recommendations for MNO to Mitigate SS7 Risks**

- SS7 interconnect security monitoring guidelines
- Session time out
- USSD PIN masking
- Secure and monitor core network traffic
- Limit access to traces and logs
- SMS filtering
- SMS home routing

```
1 13:08:00.624000
                                       1841
                                                               8744
 Frame 1: 218 bytes on wire (1744 bits), 218 bytes captured (1744 bits)
> Ethernet II, Src: Private_01:01:01:01:01:01:01:01), Dst: MS-NLB-PhysSer
 Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 1.1.1.1, Dst: 2.2.2.2
  Stream Control Transmission Protocol, Src Port: 2984 (2984), Dst Port: 2984
  MTP 2 User Adaptation Layer
  Message Transfer Part Level 3
Signalling Connection Control Part
Transaction Capabilities Application Part
✓ GSM Mobile Application

    Component: invoke (1)

     ✓ invoke
          invokeID: 1
        > opCode: localValue (0)
          ussd-DataCodingScheme: 0f
        v ussd-String: aa180da682dd6c31192d36bbdd46
             USSD String: *140*0761241377#

    msisdn: 917267415827f2

             1... = Extension: No Extension
              .001 .... = Nature of number: International Number (0x1)
             .... 0001 = Number plan: ISDN/Telephony Numbering (Rec ITU-T E.1)
          Y E.164 number (MSISDN): 27761485722
                Country Code: South Africa (Republic of) (27)
```



#### **DFS Operator Controls to Mitigate SS7 Risks**

- Session time out
- Transaction limits for insecure channels
- User education
- Detecting and mitigating social engineering attacks with MT-USSD and interception of USSD
- Bidirectional OTP SMS flow





#### **ITU-T Study Group 11 Work on SS7**

#### **Published Recommendations and Technical Reports:**

- <u>ITU-T QSTR-SS7-DFS (2019)</u>: SS7 vulnerabilities and mitigation measures for digital financial services transactions
- <u>ITU-T QSTR-USSD (2021)</u> Low resource requirement, quantum resistant, encryption of USSD messages for use in financial services
- <u>ITU-T Q.3062 (2022)</u>: Signaling procedures and protocols for enabling interconnection between trustable network entities in support of existing and emerging networks
- <u>ITU-T Q.3063 (2022)</u>: Signaling procedures of calling line identification authentication
- <u>Draft Q.TSCA</u>: Requirements for issuing End-Entity and Certification Authority certificates for enabling trustable signaling interconnection between network entities.
- <u>Draft Q.DMSA</u>: Principles for detection and mitigation of signaling attacks in security signaling gateway





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Contact: <a href="mailto:dfssecuritylab@itu.int">dfssecuritylab@itu.int</a>



# Thank you!