#### **Digital Financial Services Security Lab**

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### **Overview**

- 1. ITU & Digital Finance
- 2. Security challenges
- 3. DFS Security Lab
- 4. Security recommendations for digital finance
- 5. USSD, Android and iOS mobile payment app security audit
- 6. Setting up the security lab & Knowledge transfer for regulators
- 7. Actions implemented



#### **ITU Digital Finance & Inclusion Journey** ITU-T Y.2741 SG 12 TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU FIGI FIGI > ITU FOCUS GROUP DIGITAL – KPIs symposium Symposium for QoS FIG FINANCIAL INCLUSION **FINANCIAL SERVICES:** SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS Next Generation Networks – Security 29 November - 1 December 2017 Bengaluru, India SG 3 – DFS FIGI FINANCIAL INCLUSION GLOBAL INITIATIVE MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 22 - 24 January 2019 Cairo, Egypt Architecture of secure mobile financia transactions in next generation netwo **ITU** ITU-T FOCUS GROUP ON DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 8 0 0 0 In 2017, 1.7 billion adults ecommendation ITU-T Y.2741 vorldwide were unbanked. Of those, 1.1 billion have a 2020 2016 2017 2021 2014 2013 2018 2019 2022 2010-2012 **ITU DFS Security Lab** For a common approach for in order to pro Lab objective Get in touch $\odot$ Collaboration w on DFS security **Digital Currency** Ø 國际电联第一次法定数字货币焦点组工作会议 **Digital Currency** E including Digital Perform DFS security audits of DFS (**Global Initiative Fiat Currency** Organise security clin Standards for digital $(\mathbf{F})$ Assist DFS regulators to eval cyber preparedness for DFI nclusion Knowledge sharing security of DFS apps Encourage adoption o standards on DFS sec The Mobile Money GOALS Revolution Part 2: Financial Inclusion Enabler Tech Watch ITUEvents Res. 89 Workshop on **Report Mobile** Insights on Digital Financial Services during COVID-19 6 standardizing Money **Digital Fiat Currency** and its Applications Webinar Series 18-20 July 2018 New York City, USA ÎŦIJ

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#### **DFS security challenges for regulators**

Weak Server Side Controls		Lack of Binary Protections		
Security Decisions via Untrusted Inputs		Insufficient Transport Layer Protection		D
Poor Authorization and Authentication				
Client Side Injection	Insecure Data Storage		Unintended Data Leakage	Cyberse capabi
Vulnerabilities		Improper Session Handling	regula	
		Broken Cryptography		



payment

applications

ators



practices for

digital finance

### **DFS Security Lab**

Provides a standard methodology to conduct security audit for mobile payment apps (USSD, Android and iOS) and address systemic vulnerabilities and verify compliance against security best practices and standards.

Website: <a href="https://figi.itu.int/figi-resources/dfs-security-lab/">https://figi.itu.int/figi-resources/dfs-security-lab/</a>



#### **DFS Security Lab - Objectives**



**Collaborate** with regulators to adopt DFS security recommendations from FIGI



Perform **security audits** of mobile payment apps (USSD, Android and iOS)



Encourage adoption of international standards on DFS security and participate in ITU-T SG17



Organise security clinics & Knowledge transfer for Security Lab



Assist regulators to evaluate the cyberresilience of DFS critical infrastructure



Networking platform for regulators for knowledge sharing on threats and vulnerabilities




### **Adoption of Security Recommendations**

Collaborate with DFS regulators and DFS providers to enhance the cybersecurity strategy for DFS and security assurance of the DFS ecosystem **by implementing the recommendations** in:

- 1. DFS Security Assurance Framework
- 2. Security testing for USSD and STK based DFS applications
- 3. Security audit of various DFS applications
- 4. DFS security audit guideline
- 5. DFS Consumer Competency Framework




FIGI



## **Adoption of Security Recommendations**

These reports contain the following specific guidelines that may be adopted by regulators.

- 1. Recommendations to mitigate SS7 vulnerabilities
- Model Memorandum of Understanding between a Telecommunications Regulator and a Central Bank Related to Security for Digital Financial Services
- 3. Recommendations for securing mobile payment apps
- 4. Recommendations for operators and regulators for SIM card risks such as SIM swap fraud and SIM card recycling






#### **USSD & STK tests**




a. SIM Swap and SIM cloning



b. susceptibility to **binary OTA attacks** (SIM jacker, WIB attacks)





c. remote USSD execution attacks



### Android and iOS app security tests

Risks	Security test		
M1 Improper Platform Usage	Check misuse of platform features or failing to use platform security controls provided		
M2 Insecure Data Storage	Check that malware and other apps do not have access to DFS sensitive information		
M3 Insecure Communication	Check that communication channels are encrypted		
M4 Insecure Authentication	Authentication cannot easily be bypassed		
M5 Insufficient Cryptography	Check crypto algorithms used		
M8 Code Tampering	Check whether it is possible to modify the code		
M9 Reverse engineering	Decompile source code		



### **DFS Security Lab Knowledge Transfer**

#### Phase 1

- Lab team and Equipment in place
- verify equipment is configured
- DFS Security Clinic

#### Phase 2

- Select mobile payment app
- Security walkthroughs online workshops

#### Phase 3

- Organise training on iOS, Android and USSD security testing
- Independent testing by Lab team
- Report on testing done

#### Phase 4


- 6-9 months period of oversight by ITU
- Mobile payment app testing reviewed by ITU
- Lessons learned of new threats and vulnerabilities



#### **Actions Implemented**

- 1. Organisation of DFS Security clinics with a focus on knowledge sharing on DFS security recommendations from FIGI
- 2. Knowledge transfer for regulators of Tanzania, Uganda and Peru to set up DFS Security Lab
- 3. Guidance on implementing recommendations DFS security recommendations
- 4. Conduct security audits of mobile payment applications and SIM cards (Zambia, Zimbabwe, The Gambia, Peru, Tanzania and Uganda).





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#### DFS security clinics held in 2021 and 2022

Security Clinics were held in some 18 countries



# Countries and Regions adopting the recommendations

