### Digital Financial Services Security Webinar

*Episode #4:Securing the USSD and STK Infrastructure for Mobile Payments* 

**Mwesigwa Vincent** Manager- Information Security, UCC 28<sup>th</sup> May 2025

# Agenda

- Context & Adoption
- Why security matters
- Threat Landscape
- DFS ecosystem
- Common Vulnerabilities
- Best Practices for Operators & DFS Providers
- Summary & Key Takeaways

## **USSD & STK**

Over 90% of transactions in Africa depend on USSD and STK

Services such as account opening, money transfer, bill payments

Popular due to accessibility, real-time response, low cost, no data connection needed

#### Why Security Matters

Multiple touchpoints create opportunities for cyber attacks

Risks like service disruption, fund diversion, data breaches

Trust in mobile money relies on secure infrastructure

#### Threat Landscape

Social engineering and phishing via USSD

Unauthorized access to the mobile device/theft.

SIM swap and recycling attacks

Rogue base stations (IMSI catchers)

SS7 protocol abuse and remote SIM toolkit misuse

#### **DFS** ecosystem



#### User

target user for DFS, uses mobile money application on a mobile device to access the DFS ecosystem

#### MNO

provides communication infrastructure from wireless link through the provider network

#### **DFS** Provider

application component, interfaces with payment systems and third-party providers.

## **Common Vulnerabilities**

Weak session validation and timeouts

Unencrypted channels between core systems

SIM vulnerabilities (e.g., SIMjacker, OTA attacks)

# Security practices for DFS applications based on USSD and STK

mirror\_mod = modifier\_ob mirror object to mirro irror\_mod.mirror\_object Peration = "MIRROR\_X": Peration == "MIRROR\_X": irror\_mod.use\_X = True irror\_mod.use\_X = False operation == "MIRROR\_Y irror\_mod.use\_X = False operation == "MIRROR\_Z irror\_mod.use\_X = False operation == "MIRROR\_Z irror\_mod.use\_Y = True

election at the end -add \_ob.select= 1 er\_ob.select=1 ntext.scene.objects.active "Selected" + str(modific irror\_ob.select = 0 bpy.context.selected\_ob ata.objects[one.name].selected\_ob ata.objects[one.name].selected\_ob

int("please select exactle

---- OPERATOR CLASSES ----



# Mitigation against retrieval of user data

- Enable Encryption between users' devices and base stations
- Use session timeout on the client-side to limit altered requests/responses.
- Deploy USSD PIN masking whenever possible
- Ensure there is an auditable process
- Enable option to opt-out of the USSD or STK channels
- Set transaction limits for customer withdrawals and transfers over the USSD



# SIM swap and SIM recycling risks mitigation measures

- Device authentication using the IMEI's
- The user identity verification (pin, finger face etc.
- Real time detection of sim swap and replacement
- IMSI validation gateway
- Securely store SIM data like IMSI



#### **Remote USSD execution mitigation measures**

- Disable the ADB interface, and device vendors should not ship products with Android Debug Bridge enabled over a network
- DFS users should be educated on the dangers of connecting to public Wi-Fi and granting permissions to an app on a device
- Avoid using rooted devices for DFS transactions



# SIM exploitation using binary OTA mitigation measures

- Monitoring and SMS filtering, SMS should only be allowed from whitelisted sources
- OTA messages with STK coding restricted to only from MNO platform and not from or to other subscribers
- A2P SMS traffic from content providers must be free of any STK commands
- SMS home routing

## Summary & Key Takeaways



USSD/STK are essential yet vulnerable channels ITU-T X.1456 provides a robust defense model

7

Secure implementation is achievable with proper tools and collaboration

3

Start with practical steps today to strengthen user trust and security

## Q&A



# Thank you!