

ITU Kaleidoscope 2014

Living in a converged world - impossible without standards?

A Non Cooperative TV White Space Broadband market Model for Rural Entrepreneurs

S.M Nleya, A. Bagula, M. Zennaro & E. Pietrosemoli



University of Cape town
snleya@cs.uct.ac.za

**Saint Petersburg,
Russian Federation**

OVERVIEW

- ❖ INTRODUCTION
- ❖ PROBLEM
- ❖ SYSTEM MODEL
- ❖ NUMERICAL RESULTS
- ❖ CONCLUSION&FURTHER WORK

INTRODUCTION

ECONOMIC




- Better Access to Public Services
- More informed/engaged citizen
- Quality of Life
- Community

SOCIAL






PROBLEM

- Dynamic spectrum sharing under competition.
 - The challenge is that of analyzing and obtaining an equilibrium pricing scheme for a smart mesh network in which multiple primary services(P_{us}) are willing to share allocated spectrum with a secondary service.
 - Catalyze decrease in costs and increased access
- 

SYSTEM MODEL



SYSTEM MODEL

- A Non cooperative game theoretic approach
- Bertrand game adapted to address the problem of competitive pricing in a dynamic spectrum access where a few Primary users(Pus) services offer spectrum opportunities to a secondary service

SYSTEM MODEL

Players	Licensed Pus and an Unlicensed SU
Action	Pus Strategize in terms of prices
payoff	Profit of selling spectrum units to SU




Parameter	Description
λ	Traffic arrival rate
k_j^p	Spectral efficiency of Primary User
ϕ_i	payoff
k_i^s	Spectral efficiency of secondary User
W	Primary Spectrum
γ_i	Channel quality
Q_i	Secondary Spectrum
D_i	Delay
T_i	Throughput
C_i	Cost due to QoS Metric
d	constant
P_i	Price

SYSTEM MODEL

The spectral efficiency of transmission for secondary user i is expressed as

$$k_i = \log_2(1 + Ky_i)$$


$$K = \frac{1.5}{\ln\left(\frac{0.2}{BER^{tar}}\right)}$$



SYSTEM MODEL

A quadratic utility function

$$\psi = \sum_{i=1}^M Q_i k_i^s - \frac{1}{2} (\sum_{i=1}^M Q_i^2 + 2\Delta \sum_{i=1}^M Q_i Q_j) - \sum_{i=1}^M P_i Q_i$$

is implored to ascertain level of spectrum demand



SYSTEM MODEL

Parameter	Associated Cost	Revenue	Payoff
Delay, $D_i(Q_i) = \frac{\lambda_i}{2k_i^p(W-Q)^2 - \lambda_i k_i^p(W-Q)}$	$C_i = dD_i(Q_i)$	$R(D_i) = Q_i P_i$	$\phi^D = P_i \frac{k_i^S - P_i - \Delta(k_j^S - P_j)}{1 - \Delta^2} \frac{d\lambda_i}{2(W_i - Q_i)^2 - 2\lambda_i(W_i - Q_i)}$
Throughput, $T_i(Q_i) = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{\beta Q_i}{\sqrt{n \log n}}$	$C_i = dT_i(Q_i)$	$R(T_i) = Q_i P_i$	$\phi^T = P_i \frac{k_i^S - P_i - \Delta(k_j^S - P_j)}{1 - \Delta^2} \frac{k_i^S - P_i - \Delta(k_j^S - P_j)}{1 - \Delta^2}$


NUMERICAL RESULTS

Parameter	Value
PU spectrum	5MHz
BER	10^{-4}
Channel Quality range	10-20dB
d	1
Y(1)	15dB
Y(2)	18db
Δ	0.4
P(2)	1
λ	4

NUMERICAL RESULTS

Demand, Revenue, Profit and Cost


Delay



NUMERICAL RESULTS

Demand, Revenue, Profit and Cost

Throughput





NUMERICAL RESULTS


Demand, Revenue, Profit and Cost

- When the first PU increases its price, the SU demand decreases.
- The cost of the Primary user decreases since the SU demands less. Hence the size of the residual spectrum increases and this translates to a smaller delay.
- The revenue and profit initially increase and then begins to decline. At a smaller price a large amount of spectrum is sold and vice –versa resulting in a smaller revenue.
- Optimal price exists for the best response of PU

NUMERICAL RESULTS

Delay


Best Response



NUMERICAL RESULTS


Best Response

Throughput



NUMERICAL RESULTS


Channel Quality



NUMERICAL RESULTS

Channel Quality

Throughput





CONCLUSION & FURTHER WORK

- Non cooperative interaction of Pus and Sus
- Analytic models based on delay and Throughput
- Catalyze decrease in cost and increase access to broadband-rural and remote areas
- Extend model by coupling TV white space allocation with routing module

Thanks!
Questions?

