



Enhancing the security of CIIPs in Europe - ENISA's Approach

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Securing Europe's Information Society



Positioning ENISA activities



HANDS ON

POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION


MOBILISING COMMUNITIES

TRAINING
COURSES



RECOMMENDATIONS

National Cyber Security Strategies in EU



Critical Information Infrastructure (CII)



“ ICT systems that are critical infrastructures for themselves or that are essential for the operation of critical infrastructures (telecommunications, computers/software, Internet, satellites, etc.) ”

Critical Sectors in EU MS



Sectors	Energy	ICT	Water	Food	Health	Financial	Public Legal Order & Civil Admin.	Transport	Chemical & Nuclear Industry	Space & Research
AU	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
BE	✓	✓				✓		✓		
CZ	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓		
DK	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓		
EE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
FI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
FR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
DE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
EL	✓							✓		
HU	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
IT	✓							✓		
MT	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓		
NL	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
PL	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	
SK	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓		
ES	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
UK	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		
CH	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		

Critical Information Infrastructure Protection in Europe: ENISA efforts




**Communication networks:
Critical information
Infrastructure and Internet
Infrastructure**



ICS SCADA

Smart grids



eHealth

Finance

Transport



2015 studies on CIIs



- Stock Taking, Analysis and Recommendations on the protection of CIIs
- Analysis of ICS-SCADA Cyber Security Maturity Levels in Critical Sectors
- Communication networks dependencies in smart grids
- Security and resilience for E-health infrastructure
- Security and resilience for cloud computing in the Finance sector




Key Findings



Key Findings



National Authorities



- Most countries have assigned responsibility to Information security agencies, Emergency or CIP agencies, or National regulatory agencies
- Reason: Historical development or indicator for how the problem is perceived
- Only four countries have assigned CIIP to Information security forums or Intelligence security agencies
- In two cases, responsibility is shared between a Ministry and a public agency




Key Findings



Task and Responsibilities

- Most tasks are on the operational level (10-12 / out of 12 examined countries) (darkblue)
- 7 to 8 countries have been assigned responsibilities on the politico-strategic level (lightblue)
- 4 countries have been tasked with the supervision of institutions other than CERT. These include mainly regulatory tasks (red)




Key Findings




Public-private Cooperation | Risk Assessment

Cooperation between private and public stakeholders



- Ten out of 18 examined countries have developed partnerships with private actors
- Trend towards more institutionalised forms of cooperation with the private stakeholders

Risk Assessment





- The majority of the 16 examined countries has conducted RA on a national level or a planning to do so
- This can be seen as an indicator for how a government perceives the problem

Key Findings



Obligations and Requirements



- Only five of 17 examined countries have established mandatory incident reporting across all sectors
- All Member States have implemented mandatory incident reporting in the telecommunications sector
- Other important sectors: Finance, Energy, Public Administration
- Six countries have implemented no mandatory security audits in any sector
- Security Audits are either of less priority for countries or hard to implement



Governance of CIIP



Governance of CIIP



Three profiles of CIIP-governance have been examined

Centralised approach

Decentralised approach

Co-regulation with private sector

- The different profiles illustrate specific forms of CIIP governance, which are defined by their shared characteristics. The profiles are not exclusive types, but are rather points on a spectrum
- These profiles can help to understand how CIIP is organised in the individual Member States
- Can help to understand and what CIIP-measures and -actions can possibly be transferred from one Member State to another



Governance of CIIP




The centralised approach

The centralised approach is characterised by

- Central authority across sectors
- Comprehensive legislation

Examples

- France



Governance of CIIP




The decentralised approach

The decentralised approach is characterised by

- Principle of subsidiarity
- Strong cooperation between public agencies
- Sector-specific legislation

Examples

- Sweden



Governance of CIIP




The co-regulation approach

The co-regulation approach is characterised by

- Institutionalised cooperation with the private sector
- Horizontal relationship between public and private parties

Examples

- Netherlands



Goals



- 01** Raise the level of awareness on CIIP in Europe

- 02** Support Private and Public Sector with focused studies and tools

- 03** Facilitate information exchange and collaboration

- 04** Foster the growth of communication networks and industry

- 05** Enable higher level of security for Europe's Critical Infrastructures



Thank you

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<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/scada>

ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF ICS SCADA IN EUROPE

