

ITU-T STUDY GROUP 2

Governing trust across borders

ITU-T E.1122 — the Registration Authority Anchor for secure signalling certificates

Chris Wendt / Somos, Inc.

Editor, ITU-T E.1122 (SG2) · IETF STIR · IETF vCon WG co-chair · ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI · CFCA Trust and Transparency Working Group · US STI-GA Technical Committee

ITU roundtable · India Mobile Congress 2026
New Delhi, India · 9 October 2026

Two Study Groups, one framework

ITU-T Study Group 11

- How certificates are issued, carried and validated
- Q.3057 architecture and trust anchor
- Q.3062 and Q.3063 signing and verification
- Q.3070 certificate issuance and the cross-border list format

ITU-T Study Group 2 · E.1122

- Who is trusted to issue them, and how that trust is shared
- Member State designation of registration authorities
- A registry of designated authorities and their trust anchors
- Cross-border sharing of trust anchors, revocation and abuse reports

E.1122 governs the entities. It does not redefine any technical function specified in the Q-series.

Trust has to work in both directions

Outbound: your calls accepted abroad

- Your operators sign calls under trust anchors your country designates
- A country with a different country code has to find those anchors and decide to trust them
- Without a common framework, each destination needs its own arrangement

Inbound: foreign calls you can trust

- International calls arrive signed under anchors you did not appoint
- You need a common basis to see who designated them and whether they are still valid
- You need to hear when one of them is compromised or misused

E.1122 gives every Member State the same interoperable framework for both, while each country keeps its own decisions.

Governance sits with numbering

1

SG2 already governs international numbering

The E.164 numbering plan, and audit of assigned international numbering resources under E.1121

2

The same division of responsibility

Member States administer national arrangements. ITU-T coordinates what has to be shared internationally. E.1122 applies that division to trust anchors


3

Existing audit practice

E.1122 points to the E.1121 audit mechanisms as a procedural reference for its registry and accountability functions

A calling line identification certificate attests to a number in E.164 format. The group that governs the numbers governs who may attest to them.

Who does what



Neither the RAA nor a TSCA-RA holds certificate-signing keys. Only the TSCA-CA issues certificates.

What the RAA does

1

Registry

- Registers TSCA-RAs designated by Member States
- Allocates or records identifiers
- Keeps status and contacts current
- Annual confirmation of continued operation

2

CB-TACL

- Cross-Border Trust Anchor Certificate List
- For each country: trust anchor CA certificates
- References to revocation information
- No end-entity certificate data

3

Abuse and revocation

- Receives reports of misuse, compromise or policy violation
- Notifies the Member States affected
- Keeps an auditable record

Not its role: holding key material · issuing, signing or revoking certificates · acting as a certificate status service · enforcement

Each country decides

Stays with the Member State


- Which entities operate as TSCA-RA in its country
- Which foreign trust anchors it accepts
- Audit, suspension, revocation and removal decisions
- How to act on abuse reports and revocation notices

Provided through the RAA

- Discovery of other countries' trust anchors and revocation information
- Notice of changes, rollovers and withdrawals
- Notice of misuse involving anchors the country relies on


The CB-TACL distributes information. It does not compel recognition.

Keeping the list current



The JWT-based submission and distribution formats are specified in ITU-T Q.3070.

Sharing fraud intelligence on certificates



Cross-border revocation events

Revocation of a trust anchor, mass revocation of end-entity certificates, or revocation after a compromise or abuse investigation: the RAA notifies every country that adopted the affected anchor.

Misuse found in one country reaches every country relying on that anchor. Each acts under its own policy.

Where E.1122 stands, and what comes next

Reference	Title	Status	Date
ITU-T Q.3070	Requirements for issuing end-entity and CA certificates (SG11)	Determined	July 2026
ITU-T E.1122	Registration Authority Anchor governance framework (SG2)	Determined	18 Sept 2026

Next steps for a Member State

- Decide who will act as TSCA-RA in your country
- Identify the trust anchors to share and the foreign anchors to accept
- Take part in the work in ITU-T Study Group 2

For the roundtable

What would your administration need in place before designating a TSCA-RA and sharing its trust anchors?