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Think Next, Trust Now.

ITU-T workshop 2/6/2026

EU and ETSI Verifier Authentication & Registries

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Agenda

1. Framing the problem: how to trust a verifier
2. Verifier registration process
3. Verifier validation process
4. Remarks and open issues

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Trust the Verifier



Protecting the citizen from data harvesters → only "vetted entities" can ask data.

Two trust questions:

- **Verifier, WHO are you?** (are you an authorized verifier?)
- **Verifier, WHAT may you ask for?** (what are you entitled to ask for?)

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Trust the Verifier

This talk will cover:

(1) registration process + (2) verifier validation process



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

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

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The legal & standard pillars

CIR 2025/848 (applies from **24 Dec 2026**)

ARF topic x-rr (RP data and format) → ETSI EN 319 475 (work in progress)

ARF ts-5 (API specification) → ETSI EN 319 486 (work in progress)

ETSI TS 119 411-8 (policies for RP certificates)

In the following:

- WRPAC: Wallet Relying Party Access Certificate
- WRPRC: Wallet Relying Party Registration Certificate

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Exploding the trust framework



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Registration process



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Registration process

Vetting process requests the following info:

- Legal person information
- List of offered services
- Entitlements (Service Provider)
- Attributes requested for each service
- is intermediated? (is the Service Provider intermediated by a technical provider acting on its behalf?)

Registration procedures

Member States publish **registration procedures** for relying parties based on principles defined in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/848:

- Non-Discriminatory Access
- Proportional Friction
- Identity Anchoring
- Entitlement Cross-Checking
- Purpose Limitation & Data Minimization
- Continuous Enforcement and Offboarding

Registration must be **efficient and scalable**

- Registrars provide **electronic / automated registration processes**
- Automated checks encouraged (records, powers, entitlements)
- Registrars may suspend/cancel if info is inaccurate, policy non-compliance, or oversharing request

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Registration process

At the end of registration process:

- The verifier is included in the register
- Verifier authorizations (what it can ask for) are listed on the register
- Veifier holds an access certificate
- Verifier may hold a registration certificate

Certificates

WRPAC (access certificate): authenticates the relying party to the wallet

X.509 format (specification in ETSI EN 319 475)

WRPRC (registration certificate, optional per MS): expresses intended use + authorized attributes

JWT or mDOC format (specification in ETSI EN 319 475)

WRPRC intended to act as a “cache”

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One RP, many services and instances



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See topic x-rr discussion

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Validation process



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Embedded disclosure policies

EAA providers can constrain disclosure of EAA they issue. Wallets verify policy compliance and informs user of result

- ‘No policy’ – disclose to all
- ‘Authorised relying parties only policy’ – only disclose to RPs explicitly listed RPs
- ‘Specific root of trust’ - only disclose to RPs derived from a specific root

Still unclear if user can bypass…

WRPRC vs. register access

Both modes require, at some point, **online access to a service for RP validation**

- Access to registry
- Access to CRL/OCSP for revocation check

Certificates acts as a “cache”

- For CRL: no need to access at each validation
- expiration of WRPRC in discussion – from one day to one year…

Aditional interfaces for the wallet

Common interface for lodging complaints to DPAs (EN 319 482-1)

Common interface for data deletion requests to Relying Parties (EN 319 482-2)

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ISSUES

- Vetting process is MS specific
- RP auth framework currently limited to “access to attributes”.
    - What about transactions (e.g., payment, terms&conditions, signature)?
        - Need for specific policies for transaction authorization
    - What about ”right to be forgotten” in this case?
        - Implies renounce to right to dispute
- No global mechanism in sight
- How does the approach extend to RP’s agents?

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Detailed validation process



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