



# Securing Telephone Networks: Toward a Collaborative Approach for Combating Fraudulent Communications Using Digital Certificates

**Zimbabwe's Context** 

# In the Absence of Mitigation

# Senior citizens target of multiple financial scams

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- 1. Free Wi-Fi
- 2. Public Wi-Fi
- 3. Free Mobile Apps
- 4. Free Online Tools
- 5. High Financial Services Penetration

Old iOS versions Old phones Ubiquitous-?Appearing everywhere, anytime launch of unlicensed financial services? SS7 Vulnerabilities

### **Current Cyber-related Crimes in Zimbabwe**

#### **Whatsapp Fraud**

- 1. Obtain OTP
- 2. Install the account on another device
- 3. Restore contacts from online backup
- 4. Initiate conversations
- 5. Request for financial assistance



How do
Scammers
know one has
been paid a
pension?



#### **Signalling System Number 7**

- I. Intercept Messages
- II. Re-route calls
- III. Location Tracking

OTP based crimes

Phishing

#### **BEC**

- 1. Impersonation of Supplier
- 2. Redirection
- 3. Change of banking details

## What can an individual do?

Avoid posting cell phone numbers on publicly available platforms or spaces(LinkedIn, Facebook, etc

I recommend receiving your OTP to a secure email address, as compared to SMS

Where features are available, make use of an Authenticator application

For your Recovery email, enforce primary device-based validation before the account can be accessed from an unauthorised device

General Cyber Security
Hygience

# DFS operator controls to mitigate SS7 risks





User education




Detecting and mitigating social engineering attacks with MT-USSD and interception of USSD



Bidirectional OTP SMS flow

## What can Telcos do in Simple English?



## What can Telcos do for Engineers?

## Recommendations for MNO to mitigate SS7 Risks

- Secure GSM ciphers for radio network traffic
- Session time out
- USSD PIN masking
- Secure and monitor core network traffic
- Limit access to traces and logs
- SMS filtering
- SMS home routing

```
1 13:08:00.624000
                                       1841
> Frame 1: 218 bytes on wire (1744 bits), 218 bytes captured (1744 bits)
 Ethernet II, Src: Private 01:01:01:01:01:01:01:01:01), Dst: MS-NLB-PhysSer
 Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 1.1.1.1, Dst: 2.2.2.2
 Stream Control Transmission Protocol, Src Port: 2984 (2984), Dst Port: 2984
  MTP 2 User Adaptation Layer
  Message Transfer Part Level 3
 Signalling Connection Control Part
 Transaction Capabilities Application Part

V GSM Mobile Application

  Component: invoke (1)
     v invoke
          invokeID: 1
         opCode: localValue (0)
          ussd-DataCodingScheme: 0f
       ussd-String: aa180da682dd6c31192d36bbdd46
            USSD String: *140*0761241377#
       w msisdn: 917267415827f2
            1... .... = Extension: No Extension
             .801 .... # Nature of number: International Number (8x1)
             .... 8001 = Number plan: ISDN/Telephony Numbering (Rec ITU-T E.1)
          E.164 number (MSISDN): 27761485722
               Country Code: South Africa (Republic of) (27)
```





# What is Zimbabwe doing?





MOU between the Telecoms regulator and the Central Bank. A standing Committee convenes quarterly



Joint guidelines that attempt to mitigate SS7 and DFS-associated risks



Collaboration between the ITU and Telecom Regulator POTRAZ




Advocacy at the highest level of Government



Targeted awareness campaigns for the Elderly





# Example of a DFS test done on a mobile application in Zimbabwe

- Over Ten Banking Apps have been tested in Zimbabwe,
- Recommendations extended to the banks for remediation
- All banks have submitted evidence of the remediation of time-bound plans to remediate

## What is the ITU doing?

#### **ITU-T Recommendations and Standards**

**ITU-T Study Group 11** leads signalling security work and has developed standards to strengthen SS7 and related protocols:

- **Q.3062 & Q.3063**: Procedures for interconnection between trusted network entities and authentication of calling line identification.
- **Q.3057**: Digital certificate-based mechanisms for caller ID authentication, even for legacy SS7 networks.
- Draft standards like Q.TSCA (certificate requirements for signalling trust) and Q.DMSA (detection and mitigation of signalling attacks)

#### **Capacity Building**

- 1. Assisting in the establishment of DFS Labs across the world
- 2. Training of trainers
- 3. Specialised skills training

