

Showcase of offline payments for digital currencies

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Plan

1

Consecutive offline payment

4

Feedback on practical experimentation

2

Funding and defunding

5

Video





3

Selecting the right secure elements for your offline wallet



1. Consecutive offline payment


Overview



Consecutive offline payment

- Immediate settlement finality
- Decreasing the load on server side



Alice obtains her offline wallet



Original Issuer
Decentralized or centralized authority




Alice




Alice's
generated key
pair



Alice's
balance






Alice's
nonce







Issuer's
Public Key



Alice seals one payment for Bob






Bob credits his offline wallet



-  Legitimate emitter
-  Right amount
-  For me
-  Alice's nonce never received





Bob seals one payment for Carole



2. Funding/Defunding




Online




Original Issuer
Decentralized or centralized authority



Bob's funding online → offline



Carol's defunding offline → online



Carol's defunding




Carol






Being ledger agnostic

- Programmability
- Cryptography
- Account based or token based: does it matter?




What if Bob frauds? Double income



Bob seals one payment for Bob




Bob seals one payment for Bob - Amd



Replay

- Alice re-sends the *same* transaction to Bob
 - **Offline** - The payee's device needs to track the previously received nonces
 - **Defunding online** - The smart contract Checker needs to track the previously received nonces




From	Nonce
Alice	1
...	...



Double spending

- Alice sends the same token twice with the same nonce
 - Different recipient
 - Different amount



Double spending (con't)

- Alice has no access to her private keys
 - No way to generate a transaction bypassing the offline wallet



Alice



Sign a new payment
Decrement balance
Increment nonce
Remember the payment

3. Selecting the right secure elements for your offline wallet

Offline wallet on the field: required protection

Modification of data, code
T.Phys-Manipulation

Malfunction due to stress
T.Malfunction

Abuse of Functionality
T.Abuse-Func

Disclosure of data by physical probing or leakage (emanations, variation in power consumption, changes in processing time, ...)

Cloning

T.Phys-Probing, T.Leak-Inherent

Deficiency of random number (e.g. key generation)

T.RND



10.00


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





Assets

Risk: generating money

Choosing the right security





Payer vs payee

- The payer needs a secure element
- The payee does not

4. Feedback on practical experimentation

Payer-Payee Communication

- QR codes: Reduce data size for easy scanning!

Binary to Text encoding to generate QR code

- EMV: TLV and Base64 encoding (Textual representation)
 - Represents binary data (=a sequence of 8-bit bytes) in sequences of 24 bits
- We chose TL and ISO 8859 encoding
 - Keeps binary data (=a sequence of 8-bit bytes) in a sequence of 8 bits
- Simple versus mutual authentication
- Asynchronous is convenient

Communication (con't)

- BLE
- NFC