NOKIA Bell Labs

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5G Security Overview: Security for Programmable Cloud-Based Mobile Networks

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Outline

- 5G security drivers, threats, requirements and high level vision
- Layers of mobile network security today
- From LTE to 5G – towards a programmable, cloud-based, sliced network
- Elements of a 5G security architecture
- Layers of mobile network security in a 3GPP-specified 5G System
- (Network slicing security)
- Summary: Securing programmable, cloud-based, sliced 5G networks

5G Security Drivers



5G Security Threats

The well-known large-scale threats apply:

- Exploits of software vulnerabilities
- Exploits of configuration errors and bad operational practices
- Flooding attacks (from multiple sources): (Distributed) DoS attacks

Adopting new networking paradigms increases the attack surface

- SDN: Separating forwarding and control, splitting up monolithic control into various control apps running on a common SDN controller
- NFV: Adding a virtualization layer, a new stack of management and orchestration (MANO) components and various new interfaces

Infrastructure sharing facilitates side channel attacks

Critical services in 5G → Successful attacks may have higher impacts

5G Security Requirements: Example NGMN Alliance

NGMN Alliance 5G Whitepaper, Version 1.0, 17-February-2015:
"enhanced performance is expected to be provided along … with the capability to, among others, **ensure security and trust, identity, and privacy**"



"Specific security design for use cases which require extremely low latency (including the latency of initiating communications)"

"Improve resilience and availability of the network against signalling based threats, including overload"

"Improve security of 5G small cell nodes"

"provide better secrecy than 4G"

"Improve system robustness against smart jamming attacks"

➢ Substantial security requirements!

5G Security Vision



Layers of Mobile Network Security as of Today (Example LTE)

3GPP-specified security architecture

Network security not specified by 3GPP

Network element security measures





- threat and risk analysis per network element
- network element security architecture
- secure coding
- hardening
- security testing
- security audit
- security vulnerability monitoring
- patching process

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From LTE to 5G: Adopting New Networking Paradigms



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A Programmable, Cloud-Based, Sliced 5G Network



Elements of a 5G Security Architecture

Authentication/authorization, key agreement

Security assurance for NFV environments

Security negotiation, key hierarchy
Enhanced control plane robustness
Enhanced subscriber privacy

NFV/SDN security

Security management and orchestration

Network slicing security

Self-adaptive, intelligent security controls



Subscriber/device identifiers/credentials
Secure hardware

Crypto algorithms
Physical layer security
Jamming protection

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Layers of Mobile Network Security in a 3GPP 5G System

3GPP-specified security architecture

- New access-agnostic authentication framework
- Enhanced subscription privacy and user plane protection
- EAP-based “secondary authentication”
- Security for service-based interfaces
- Enhancements for interconnection security

5G Phase 1 Rel.15

Network security not specified by 3GPP

- Holistic, automated security management and orchestration
- Perimeter security and traffic filtering by virtual firewalls
- Logically or even physically separated security zones
- Traffic separation by VLANs and wide area VPNs
- Automated, self-adaptive, intelligent security controls

VNF security
Telco cloud security

- Sound, robust implementations of the virtualization layer (e.g. hypervisor) and the overall cloud platform software
- Sound, robust, security aware implementation of the VNFs
- Integrity (trust) assurance for both platform and VNFs

Network Slice Isolation – The Crucial Slicing Security Aspect

Isolation in the cloud by NFV mechanisms in the (central/edge) cloud



Isolation by equipment-specific mecha-nisms on (non virtualized) RAN equipment

Isolation in the transport by VPNs created via SDN

Specific Attacks Against Sliced Networks

Slicing-specific attacks

- DoS attacks on “small” slices
- Attacks on interfaces to common network parts (vertical → mobile network operator)
- Attacks on management interfaces provided for verticals to manage their slices
- Attacks via inter-slice interfaces
- Attacks on slicing-specific procedures: Slice selection, slicing-specific authentication and authorization, slice management
- Malicious message routing between different slices

➢ Mitigation by state-of-the-art means – with room for improvement

Summary: Securing Programmable, Cloud-Based, Sliced 5G Networks

Demanding new use cases require supreme, built-in security.

The variety of use cases requires increased flexibility in the security setup.

Making networks programmable, moving into the telco cloud and introducing multi-tenancy has a strong impact on 5G security concepts:

- Securing SDN and NFV;
- Transferring filtering, network zoning and traffic separation concepts into the telco cloud, where physical separation is much less an option;
- Isolating multiple slices of multiple tenants (e.g. industry verticals).

Highly dynamic 5G networks require a high level of automation in security orchestration and management, as well as automated, analytics- and machine-learning-based attack detection and mitigation.

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