



# Coordination of Threat Analysis in ICT Ecosystems

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- ◆ Engineering background
- ◆ Chair of citizen approach to data initiative
  - EIP-SCC: European Innovation Platform on Smart Cities and Communities
- ◆ Data protection / Privacy standards wiki for Ipen
  - [ipen.trialog.com](http://ipen.trialog.com)
- ◆ ITU-T
  - SG17
    - Cybersecurity framework for intelligent transport system
  - FG-DPM
    - Security and privacy framework



## ◆ ISO/IEC


### ■ Projects

- 27550 Privacy engineering
- 27030 Security and privacy guidelines for the IoT
- 27570 Privacy guidelines for smart cities
- 20547-4 Big data Security and privacy


### ■ Study periods

- Big data security and privacy processes
- Big data implementation security
- Framework privacy preference management (Joint ITU-ISO)






Ecosystems








Domains




Concerns




Stakeholder		Legal Compliance Concern	Management Concern	System Lifecycle Concern
<p>Demand side</p>  <p>Supply side</p>	Policy maker 	Compliance Check / Follow standards Transparency		
	Operator 	Regulation for security  Regulation for privacy	<b>Security and data protection risk analysis</b>  Agreement with other operators	Security-by-design Privacy-by-Design
	Supplier 	Operators Requirements		




# TRIALOG Ecosystem Cybersecurity: What we Have





## ◆ Four types of stakeholders






◆ Personal data ecosystem

◆ Interoperability


■ Common description

- CVIM (Common vehicle information model)




## ◆ Risk analysis includes

- security risk analysis (e.g. ISO/IEC 27005)
- privacy impact analysis (e.g. ISO/IEC 29134)




## ◆ Interoperability includes

- Functional interoperability
- Cybersecurity interoperability




# TRIALOG Different Types of Interoperability


No interoperability




Interoperability of capabilities



Interoperability of descriptions





**Service provider  
Cybersecurity framework**

- Capabilities
- Agreement
  
- Risks - Incidents - Consequences
- Measures

**Marketplace  
Cybersecurity framework**

- Capabilities
- Agreement
  
- Risks - Incidents - Consequences
- Measures

Service provider  
capability

Marketplace  
capability

<b>Secure processing</b>	Protect data processing
<b>Transparency information</b>	Provide information how data processing is protected
<b>Data controller responsibility</b>	Verifies whether service provider has data controller responsibility

<b>Secure processing</b>	Protect data pipeline and processing
<b>Owner consent</b>	Capability for vehicle owner to provide consent on personal data processing
<b>Consent revocation</b>	Capability for vehicle owner to withdraw from data pipeline
<b>Transparency information</b>	Capability to provide information on data processing chain
<b>Secure connection to service providers</b>	Capability to provide data to service provider securely
<b>Secure connection to storage providers</b>	Capability to retrieve data from storage manager securely
<b>Data processor responsibility</b>	Verifies whether marketplace has data processor responsibility

Service provider agreement

Marketplace agreement

<b>Providing evidence of capability</b>	provide evidence of cybersecurity compliance to marketplace
<b>Getting evidence of capability</b>	obtain evidence of marketplace cybersecurity compliance

<b>Providing evidence of capability</b>	provide evidence of cybersecurity compliance to service provider
<b>Getting evidence of capability</b>	obtain evidence of service provider cybersecurity compliance

## Service provider Threats

## Marketplace Threats

STRIDE threat categories	
<b>Spoofing</b>	Spoofing marketplace
<b>Tampering</b>	Integrity and completeness of data obtained from marketplace
<b>Information disclosure</b>	Eavesdropping data during communication Eavesdropping metadata (e.g. log of interactions with marketplace) Incorrect management of data processing chain leading to leaks (e.g. incorrect deletion)
<b>Denial Of Service</b>	Massive access to marketplace
LINDDUN threat categories	
<b>Linkability</b>	Anonymisation not carried out correctly Attempt from external parties to re-identify vehicle owner by using other datasets New linkability threat not taken into account

STRIDE threat categories	
<b>Spoofing</b>	Spoofing storage provider Spoofing service provider
<b>Tampering</b>	Integrity and completeness of data provided to service provider
<b>Repudiation</b>	Service provider repudiation
<b>Information disclosure</b>	Eavesdropping data during communication Eavesdropping metadata (e.g. log of interactions with storage provider and with service provider) Incorrect management of data pipeline leading to leaks (e.g. incorrect deletion)
<b>Denial Of Service</b>	Massive access to marketplace by faked service providers
<b>Elevation of privilege</b>	Incorrect management of vehicle owner privacy rules (expressed in obtained metadata)
LINDDUN threat categories	
<b>Linkability</b>	Anonymisation not carried out correctly New linkability threat not taken into account



## Service provider Incidents

Incident	Description	Severity
<b>Massive personal data breach</b>	Public report of potential massive personal data leak because of improper operation at service provider level	Maximum
<b>Massive denial of service</b>	Service provider can no longer operate.	Significant

## Marketplace Incidents

Incident	Description	Severity
<b>Case of personal data breach</b>	Public reporting that personal data vault has been accessed or that it has been processed against consent or privacy rules	Significant
<b>Massive business data leak.</b>	Public report of potential massive business data leak because of improper operation at marketplace level	Maximum
<b>Massive personal data breach</b>	Public report of potential massive personal data leak because of improper operation at marketplace level.	Maximum
<b>Massive denial of service</b>	Marketplace can no longer operate.	Significant


## Service provider measures

## Marketplace Measures

ISO 27001 Categories of controls		Control
Information security policies	Management direction.	Data management policies
Human resource security	During employment	Internal cybersecurity preparedness
		External cybersecurity preparedness
Access control	System and application access control	Secure access to marketplace provider
Cryptography	Cryptographic controls	Anonymisation of data sets
Operation security	Operational procedures and responsibilities	Operation procedures for data processing
	Logging and monitoring	Logging capabilities
	Control of operational software	Operation procedures for transparency.
	Technical vulnerability management	<b>Plausibility check</b>
Communication security	Information transfer	Secure transmission of data
System acquisition, development and maintenance	Security in development and support processes	Secure data processing capabilities
		Cybersecurity monitoring capabilities
Information security incident management	Management of information security incidents and improvements	Alerting data processing chain
Information security aspects of business continuity management	Information security continuity	Assurance of service provider cybersecurity capabilities
		Periodic review of service provider cybersecurity capabilities
Compliance	Compliance with legal and contractual requirements	GDPR and cybersecurity compliance verification
	Information security reviews	Periodic review of interoperability

ISO 27001 Categories of controls		Control
Information security policies	Management direction.	Data management policies
Human resource security	During employment	Internal cybersecurity preparedness
		External cybersecurity preparedness
Access control	Business requirements for access control	Requirements for service provider access
	System and application access control	Secure access from service provider Secure access to cloud storage provider
Cryptography	Cryptographic controls	<b>Confidentiality of personal data vaults</b>
		Anonymisation of data sets
Operation security	Operational procedures and responsibilities	Operation procedures for data search and processing
	Logging and monitoring	Logging capabilities
	Control of operational software	Operation procedures for transparency.
Communication security	Information transfer	Secure transmission of data
System acquisition, development and maintenance	Security in development and support processes	Secure data pipeline capabilities
		Cybersecurity monitoring capabilities
Information security incident management	Management of information security incidents and improvements	Alerting data processing chain
Information security aspects of business continuity management	Information security continuity	Assurance of cloud storage manager cybersecurity capabilities
		Periodic review of cloud storage manager cybersecurity capabilities
Compliance	Compliance with legal and contractual requirements	GDPR and cybersecurity compliance verification
	Information security reviews	Periodic review of interoperability

- ◆ Need for ecosystem design viewpoint
- ◆ Need for ecosystem risk analysis
- ◆ Need for interoperability of cybersecurity capabilities
- ◆ Need for Coordination of cybersecurity capabilities between different stakeholders of an ecosystem
- ◆ Ecosystem vision must be better explained at standardisation level





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**Questions?**

