




THE LONG TERM **EFFECTIVENESS** OF A CSIRT OPERATING ON A **NATIONAL LEVEL** IS TO A LARGE EXTENT, DETERMINED BY THE TEAMS ABILITY TO INCREASE THE **RESPONSIVENESS** OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS (**ISPS**) WITHIN ITS CONSTITUENCY. THIS IS DUE IN PART TO THE ROLE OF ISPS AS THE PRIMARY SOURCE FOR **PUBLIC CONNECTIVITY**. WHILE ISPS ARE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS BEING **KEY STAKEHOLDERS** BY NATIONAL CSIRTS, FINDING VIABLE METHODS TO INCREASE THEIR RESPONSIVENESS HAS PROVEN TO BE A **CHALLENGE**. WE WILL EXAMINE THIS CHALLENGE FROM BOTH THE NATIONAL CSIRT AND ISP PERSPECTIVE, BASED ON PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE.



“HOW **NATIONAL CERT TEAMS** CAN MOTIVATE **ISPS** TO ENSURE THAT THE VICTIM NOTIFICATIONS ACTUALLY END UP REACHING ALL THE WAY TO THE **END USERS**”





# SMALL COG, LARGE MACHINE

## DOMESTIC LEVEL

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT


CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY

NATIONAL CII PROTECTION

INFORMATION SHARING

CYBER EXERCISES

PROMOTE IT-SEC COOPERATION



CYBER EXERCISES

INFORMATION SHARING


OUTREACH

NATIONAL POINT OF CONTACT

## INTERNATIONAL LEVEL




# IN A WORLD FULL OF TERMS





# THE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE





# TODAY'S MENU: 3 COURSE ARCTIC SPECIAL

## ▶ APPETIZER

- ▶ Understanding the risk of ISP codependency
- ▶ How the operational theater is changing
- ▶ The background to our approach

## ▶ ENTREE: THE TOPIC DONE THREE WAYS

- ▶ The national CSIRT perspective
- ▶ The ISP perspective
- ▶ Success stories

## ▶ DESSERT:


- ▶ Summary



## THE CHEFS



- ▶ Sindri Bjarnason (sindri@synopsys.com)
- ▶ Founding member of CERT-IS from 2011 - 2014
- ▶ Problem solving in collaboration with multiple national CSIRTs



- ▶ Juha Haaga (juha.haaga@synopsys.com)
- ▶ Developer for Codenomicon since 2012, working with AbuseSA and NCSC-FI projects
- ▶ Product manager for AbuseSA at Synopsys




**AND NOW BACK TO OUR MAIN STORY ...**






# THE AREA OF INTEREST






# THE FOCUS IN RECENT YEARS





# THE IMPACT





**WHY NOT ASK THEM NICELY DO RESPOND?**



## THE FAMILIAR RESPONSE

**WE NEED A CONTACT**

**WE NEED RESPONSE**

**YOU SHOULD BE AWARE**

**LOOK AT THE DATA**

**WE ALREADY RESPOND**

**NOT OUR PROBLEM!**

**WHO ARE YOU?**

**SPEAK WITH THE NOC!**

**WHERE IS THIS DATA  
COMING FROM?**

**LET ME GET OUR LAWYERS**



## THE TOPIC DONE THREE WAYS

**THE CSIRT PERSPECTIVE**  
**CERT-IS, ICELAND**

**THE ISP PERSPECTIVE**  
**NCSC-FI, FINLAND**

**SUCCESS STORIES**  
**CERT-EE, ESTONIA**

# ICELAND: THE NATIONAL CSIRT PERSPECTIVE



**THE CSIRT PERSPECTIVE  
CERT-IS, ICELAND**




## CERT-IS: THE BACKGROUND


- ▶ The national CERT in Iceland was established in 2011, legislation “enacted” in spring 2012
- ▶ Operates independently within the telecommunication regulatory authority
- ▶ Telecommunication organizations formed the initial constituency
- ▶ Rapid bootstrap phase provided early operational capabilities



# ICELAND: THE NATIONAL CSIRT PERSPECTIVE



# ICELAND: THE NATIONAL CSIRT PERSPECTIVE





## MAJOR COLLISIONS

**UPSTREAM REPORTING**

**ASSUMED EXISTING  
UPSTREAM CAPABILITIES**

**SHARING AWARENESS**

**ASSUMED EXISTING  
AWARENESS OF THE DATA**

**RESPONSE CAPABILITIES**

**ASSUMED EASY  
INTEGRATION**

**NATIONAL RESPONSE**

**ASSUMED DOMESTIC  
READINESS**



## UPSTREAM REPORTING

### **ASSUMED** EXISTING UPSTREAM CAPABILITIES

- ▶ CERT-IS automated (with AbuseSA / Abusehelper) most of the data processing needed on a daily basis
- ▶ This increased capacity allowed us to rapidly increase the volume and throughput of abuse data
- ▶ We assumed that our processing capacity would be met upstream, allowing the gap to grow further
- ▶ The negative impact was significant



### NEGATIVE IMPACT

- ▶ The initial dialog with the upstream responders was focused on dealing with the ever increasing stream of abuse data
- ▶ The focus should have been “where could we start” instead of “we need to solve this”
- ▶ The underdeveloped knowledge of the actual abuse data added to the confusion
- ▶ Significantly delayed any collaboration



## SHARING AWARENESS


### **ASSUMED** EXISTING AWARENESS OF THE DATA

- ▶ As more abuse data becomes available to national CSIRTs, the gap between the situational awareness available to the team and domestic actors grows
- ▶ If the teams priorities and actions are shaped by its own situational awareness that does not extend to its constituency, the team risks isolation



# AREAS OF **SUCCESS**

WHERE LIMITED RESOURCES YIELD HIGH UTILITY





## EASY INTEGRATION

NATIONAL EXERCISES

DATA EVALUATION

ISP REQUIREMENTS


## DELIVERING UTILITY

- ▶ The first step is to identify the roles and requirements within the constituency and estimate the needed commitment of resources
- ▶ Translates to asking “what is needed and where”
- ▶ Integrating with and enhancing existing response procedures offers higher sustainability





# NATIONAL RESPONSE CAPACITY



ESTONIA: SUCCESS IN THE FIELD



**SUCCESS STORIES  
CERT-EE, ESTONIA**



## CERT-EE: THE BACKGROUND

- ▶ The national CERT in Estonia was established in 2006
- ▶ Extensive constituency that included majority of public organizations
- ▶ Assumed national responsibility roles from the start



# THE FUNDAMENTALS

## DEVELOPING TRUST

- ▶ CERT-EE as an organization
- ▶ The capabilities of the team
- ▶ Between individual members

## BUILDING RELATIONS

- ▶ Multiple levels
  - ▶ Technical operators
  - ▶ management
- ▶ Information exchange



## WALLED GARDEN PROJECT

### FEATURES

- ▶ Automated response to network abuse reports
- ▶ Customers temporarily confined to an information portal

## THE MAIN POINTS

- ▶ Ensuring the quality of the data being processed
- ▶ Single ISP implementation at the beginning
- ▶ The ISP was the authority

# FINLAND: THE ISP PERSPECTIVE



**THE ISP PERSPECTIVE**  
**NCSC-FI, FINLAND**



## FINLAND: THE BACKGROUND

- ▶ The National Cyber Security Centre in Finland has a long history
- ▶ The largest ISP began incrementally investing resources into abuse reporting already 15 years ago.
- ▶ Collaboration is very mature, and the ISP has independent abuse management capability that exceeds CERT expectations



## THE SUCCESS FACTORS

**TRUST**

**FRIENDLY CSIRT – ISP  
RELATIONSHIP**

**FRIENDLY COMPETITION**

**ANONYMOUS ISP  
PERFORMANCE REPORTS**

**MATURITY OVER TIME**

**INCREMENTAL BUILD UP OF  
ABUSE HANDLING CAPABILITY**

**AUTOMATION**

**REDUCES ISP RESOURCE  
IMPACT FOR RESPONSE**





## TRUST

### FRIENDLY CSIRT – ISP RELATIONSHIP

- ▶ NCSC-FI is within telecommunications regulatory authority, but they have not needed to apply regulatory pressure to get results
- ▶ Lawyers do not run the show – NCSC-FI can discuss directly with subject matter experts
- ▶ Open discussion on how to best tackle specific issues, and ISPs contribute by sharing what is easiest for them



## FRIENDLY COMPETITION

### ANONYMOUS ISP PERFORMANCE REPORTS

- ▶ NCSC-FI acts as a neutral party and publishes anonymised annual report on how well ISPs perform on abuse handling
- ▶ Each ISP is shown how well they did, and how they are positioned in the rankings
- ▶ Top performers are keen to use their status for marketing purposes, and publish who they are in the anonymised report



## MATURITY OVER TIME

### SMALL INCREMENTS LEADING TO BIG RESULTS

- ▶ Finland has the advantage that this process has been ongoing for 15 years
- ▶ ISPs who were able to pay attention, developed response capability as new threat types appeared
- ▶ Time spent on perfecting the customer communications



## AUTOMATION

### REDUCES ISP RESOURCE IMPACT FOR RESPONSE

- ▶ Automated abuse report processing makes this possible for ISP
  - ▶ In-house developed systems in Finland
- ▶ Automated notification systems that relay abuse information over various channels – SMS, email, walled garden (captive portal)
- ▶ ISPs who were paying attention, developed response capability as new threat types appeared



**“SOCIETY’S GROWING INFORMATION INTENSITY, THE INCREASE OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND OUTSOURCING, INTEGRATION BETWEEN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, THE USE OF OPEN NETWORKS AS WELL AS THE GROWING RELIANCE ON ELECTRICITY HAVE SET TOTALLY NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURING SOCIETY’S VITAL FUNCTIONS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS, DURING SERIOUS DISTURBANCES IN NORMAL CONDITIONS AND IN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.”**

## **Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy**



## SUMMARY

- ▶ The challenge is almost entirely social – the technical problems are relatively easy to solve



**THANK YOU!**

**Q&A**