



Workshop on Addressing Security Challenges on a Global Scale

Session 5.1:

Global Cybersecurity Information Exchange Framework

Challenges in Sharing Security Information

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neisas

National & European Information
Sharing & Alerting System







Messaging Standard for Sharing Security Information

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
Sharing Information in ISO/IEC 270nn Context

- The emergent body of ISO/IEC guidance on Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) is in the **270nn** Series  International Organization for Standardization 
- **270nn** assumes a uniform perception of risk, by implication even across multiple organisations
- **270nn** assumes all participants can be equally trusted
- **270nn** assumes all ISMS information is equally trustworthy
- **270nn** assumes that all risk managers can assess the effectiveness of all security controls

- There **is** something special about trusted information sharing between organisations
 - Trusted Information Sharing needs **security management** of the sensitive **information exchanges** between organisations
- The EU funded MS3i and NEISAS Projects explored this topic area
- This work is forming the basis for a new Draft International Standard (IS): **ISO/IEC 27010**

Standardisation: Layered Approach

- MS3i and NEISAS focus on Management Framework to support Sharing Security Information
- Expects to build upon a number of layered components for messaging information



Standardisation: Existing Coverage


- Message Transport Standards
 - *De facto* adoption of (IETF) TCP/IP
- Message Format Standards
 - *De facto* adoption of (ISO/IEC) XML
- Message Protection Standards
 - *De facto* adoption of (W3C) XML-Sig / -Enc
- Message Content Standards
 - Mainly *de facto* adoption of (Mitre) C*E
- **ISO/IEC 27010** designed as capstone ***Information Sharing Framework*** for these layers

Information Sharing for Cybersecurity

In Cybersecurity context, **ISO/IEC 27010** needs to be considered in conjunction with other ISO/IEC efforts, in particular :

- **ISO/IEC 27032**: Guidelines for Cybersecurity
- **ISO/IEC 27035 (+ t.b.c.)**: Incident Management, Operation and Response
- **ISO/IEC 27037 (+ t.b.c.)**: Digital Evidence and Forensics

Basic Implementation Challenges to Sharing



Perception: Cognitive Biases

- Cognitive biases are patterns of deviation in judgment that occurs in particular situations, which can be:
 - Examples of evolutionary mental developments
 - e.g. adaptations that lead to more effective actions or enable faster decisions
 - Lack of appropriate mental mechanisms
 - Misapplication of a mechanism that is adaptive under different circumstances
- Of particular relevance are Kahneman/Tversky Heuristics (especially Anchoring, Availability and Representativeness)
- Cognitive Biases mean that differing people / communities will perceive **the same** information **in differing ways**

Perception: The Impact Fallacy

- Impact is a fundamental element of Information Security Risk Assessment
- Yet in many ways not suitable for Information Sharing
 - Unlikely to be a Generic Impact, but rather influenced by Environmental Factors (Organisation, Locale, Time)
 - Intrinsic modelling problems if Low Probability / High Impact: e.g. Taleb's *Black Swan*
 - Very susceptible to Cognitive Bias, in particular prior knowledge of others' assessment Situates the Appreciation by Anchoring

Trusted Information Sharing Challenges

Challenges with modelling trust in (potentially *ad hoc*) NEISAS environments:


- The communities are not necessarily aligned to the natural “Circles of Trust”
- The communities may not share either a common language and/or ontology
- The communities **may not know** trustability of *ad hoc* partners

Trust: Specious Reinforcement

- Guglielmo Marconi conjectured in 1909 that any person could be connected to another by at most 5 people:
 - Issue also reflected by “Erdős Number”, “6 Degrees of Separation”, “Kevin Bacon Game”, “Small World problem”
- Empirical evidence is number of degrees of separation closer to 7:
 - Duncan Watts (2001) test with 48,000 emails found average number of intermediaries just over 6
 - Microsoft (2007) study of 30 billion instant messenger conversations found the average path length was 6.6
- Any model of Trust should not use linear weighting for additional instances (*de minimis* for larger values)

Trust: Derived Model (1)


- Recipient's trust in received statement largely predicated on :
 - Trust in source / message
 - Source's view of statement
- Model elements:
 - Originators of information should assign a degree of trust in information they publish
 - All information be clearly identified with the source, ideally using a structured data format
 - But should be support for anonymous reporting, from Safety world experience




Trust: Derived Model (2)

Model elements (contd.) :


- Boundary Objects (structured information with mutual recognition across linguistic and domain boundaries) used to encapsulate information
- Both Originator and Recipient should assess how many times information previously received (to deal with Specious Reinforcement)
- Originator or Recipient verify information independently checked
- Recipients of information should assign a subjective rating of the source



Trust Metric: Shape Function



Matroid Algebra



approximated as
Weibull CDF


$$U = \sum_A^x \frac{1 - e^{-\left(\frac{A \cdot W \cdot n^k}{n}\right)k}}{e}$$

Pareto approach: perfection would need disproportionate effort, and may not be feasible

Information Sharing: Proof of Concept

- Public / private sector Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) stakeholders want :
 - True exchange of information, not just ‘push’ portals
 - Owners to choose who can read information, including enforcing Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)
 - ‘Peer to Peer’ exchange with no central system
- NEISAS providing prototype trusted electronic information sharing National platform based on MS3i and 27010 for threat and vulnerability information
- Will also allow bilateral exchange at the European level between National platforms

Any Questions ?



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