ITU-T

TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU

Technical Report Corrigendum 1

(04/2021)

XSTR-SEC-QKD

Security considerations for quantum key distribution networks

Corrigendum 1

T-UT



Summary

This Corrigendum 1 of ITU-T TR.SEC-QKD "Security considerations for quantum key distribution network" changes relevant expressions relative to "IT-secure", changes "qubits" into "quantum states", changes "co-fibre" into "co-propagation" and modifies relevant content.

NOTE – This is an informative ITU-T publication. Mandatory provisions, such as those found in ITU-T Recommendations, are outside the scope of this publication. This publication should only be referenced bibliographically in ITU-T Recommendations.

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5 Introduction to the QKDN

Revise the text of clause 5 as follows:

The concept of QKD network (QKDN) needs to be introduced by extending the point-to-point topology of QKD link to a multi-hop topology in order to share information theoretically secure (IT-secure) keys between any user applications even when they are not directly connected via a QKD link.

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 The quantum relay scheme is the ideal solution to <u>distribute</u> relay qubits <u>quantum states</u> toover long distance but the required quantum memory and quantum repeater technology are currently <u>under development and are</u> not <u>commercially</u> available.

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A QKD link consists of a quantum channel and a classical channel. The quantum channel is a physical optical path that is only used to transmit <u>quantum statesqubits</u>. The classical channel, which is used to exchange information such as key synchronization and<u>for</u> key distillation, can be a conventional Internet <u>protocol (IP)</u> channel that is not necessarily optical.

6 Security considerations for QKDN

Revise the text of clause 6 as follows:

The <u>key establishment process of keys generated by</u> QKD protocol operate<u>d</u> by two entities, for example, sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob), can be proven as information-theoretically secure based on the quantum information theory.

7 Standardization issues and suggestions for future work on QKDN

Revise the text of clause 7 as follows:

2) Issue 2: How to ensure security of trusted-relay-based QKDN?

Currently, QKD security study is being pursued in ETSI <u>[b-ETSI White paper no. 27]</u> and ISO <u>[b-ETSI White paper no. 27]</u> and <u>[b-ISO/IEC QKD project 23837]</u>[b-ISO/IEC QKD work items].

3) Issue 3: How to reduce QKD deployment cost?

...The possible means include <u>co-propagation</u> co-fibre transmission of QKD <u>signals channels</u> and <u>classical signals through a common fibre in</u> existing optical transmission networks, integration of QKD modules into telecom network devices, etc.

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