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| ITU Member States, members of the Regional Commonwealth in the field of Communications (RCC) |
| PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO RESOLUTION 65 |
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| **Abstract:** | During the previous study period, significant progress was made on matters related to the provision of information on calling party number (CPN) delivery, calling line identification (CLI), and origin identification (OI). This included the development and adoption of new ITU-T Recommendations, as well as amendments to existing ones, particularly in relation to public-key certificates at the signalling level, including CLI signing in SS7 networks. In light of this work, it is proposed that ITU-T Study Group 2, in close collaboration with ITU-T Study Group 11, should be tasked with developing a procedure for selecting registration authorities to support the distribution of public-key certificates to be used in the exchange of signalling messages.RCC proposes to revise Resolution 65, on calling party number delivery, calling line identification and origin identification information. |
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MOD RCC/40A34/1

RESOLUTION 65 (Rev. New Delhi, 2024)

Calling party number delivery, calling line identification and origin identification information

(Johannesburg, 2008; Dubai, 2012; Hammamet, 2016; Geneva, 2022; New Delhi, 2024)

The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (New Delhi, 2024),

concerned

*a)* that there appears to be a trend to either suppress or amend the transmission across international boundaries of calling party number (CPN), calling line identification (CLI) and origin identification (OI) information, in particular the country code and the national destination code;

*b)* that such practices have an unfavourable effect on security and economic issues, in particular for developing countries[[1]](#footnote-1)1;

*c)* about the number of cases so far reported to the Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) on ITU‑T E.164 numbering misappropriation and misuse related to CPN non-delivery or spoofing;

*d)* that work on this topic in Study Group 2 of the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU‑T) needs to be expedited and expanded to cater for the changing environment of service delivery and network infrastructures, including emerging telecommunications/information and communication technologies and services, such as next-generation networks and future networks,

noting

*a)* relevant ITU‑T Recommendations, in particular:

i) ITU‑T E.156: Guidelines for ITU‑T action on reported misuse of ITU‑T E.164 number resources;

ii) ITU‑T E.157: International calling party number delivery;

iii) ITU-T E.370: Service principles when public circuit switches international telecommunication networks interwork with IP-based networks;

iv) ITU‑T E.164: The international public telecommunication numbering plan;

v) ITU‑T I.251.3: Number identification supplementary services: Calling line identification presentation;

vi) ITU‑T I.251.4: Number identification supplementary services: Calling line identification restriction;

vii) ITU‑T I.251.7: Number identification supplementary services: Malicious call identification;

viii) ITU‑T Q.731.x-series, concerning stage 3 descriptions for number identification supplementary services using Signalling System No. 7;

ix) ITU‑T Q.731.7: Stage 3 description for number identification supplementary services using Signalling System No. 7: Malicious call identification (MCID);

x) ITU‑T Q.764: Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part signalling procedures;

xi) Amendment 7 to ITU‑T Q.763: Extensions for the support for the calling line identification authentication;

xii) Amendment 2 to ITU‑T Q.931: Extensions for the support for the calling line identification authentication;

xiii) Amendment 6 to ITU‑T Q.1902.3: Extensions for the support for the calling line identification authentication;

xiv) ITU‑T Q.1912.5: Interworking between Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Bearer Independent Call Control protocol or ISDN User Part;

xv) ITU-T Q.3057: Signalling requirements and architecture for interconnection between trustable network entities;

xvi) ITU‑T Q.3062: Signalling procedures and protocols for enabling interconnection between trustable network entities in support of existing and emerging networks;

xvii) ITU‑T Q.3063: Signalling procedures of calling line identification authentication;

xviii) ITU‑T X.509: Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks;

*b)* relevant resolutions:

i) Resolution 61 (Rev. Geneva, 2022) of this assembly, on misappropriation and misuse of international telecommunication numbering resources;

ii) Resolution 21 (Rev. Dubai, 2018) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, on measures concerning alternative calling procedures on international telecommunication networks;

iii) Resolution 29 (Rev. Geneva, 2022) of this assembly, on alternative calling procedures on international telecommunication networks;

*c)* No. 32 (Article 3.6) of the International Telecommunication Regulations (Dubai, 2012) (ITRs) regarding the provision of international CLI by the signatory Member States to the ITRs,

noting further

*a)* that some countries and regions have adopted national laws, directives and recommendations regarding CPN non-delivery and spoofing, and/or on ensuring confidence in OI, and that some countries have national data-protection and data-privacy laws, directives and recommendations;

*b)* that the CPN makes it possible to identify the party responsible for making the call;

*c)* that the presence of verification mechanisms for the various calling party identifiers may increase the reliability of the information transmitted;

*d)* that ITU‑T Study Group 11 developed several standards defining the procedure for incorporating and validating digital public-key certificates at the signalling level, including CLI signing in SS7 networks,

reaffirming

that it is the sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommunications and, as such, regulate the provision of CLI, CPN delivery and OI information, taking into account the Preamble to the ITU Constitution and the relevant provisions of the ITRs related to the provision of CLI information,

resolves

1 that international CPN delivery shall be provided on the basis of the relevant ITU‑T Recommendations;

2 that international CLI and OI delivery shall be provided on the basis of the relevant ITU-T Recommendations where technically possible;

3 that the delivered CPN should contain at least either the calling party number or the specially allocated number of the operator/service provider responsible for making the call, so that a terminating country can identify the operator/service provider of the outgoing call, or identify the terminal that originates the call, before it is delivered from the originating country to that terminating country;

4 that the delivered CPN and the CLI, if delivered, shall include sufficient information to allow proper billing and accounting, for each international call;

5 that the OI information in a heterogeneous networking environment shall, where technically possible, be an identifier assigned to a subscriber by the originating service provider, or be replaced by a default identifier by the originating provider to identify the origin of the call, if specified by the administration;

6 that the CPN, CLI and OI information shall be transmitted transparently by transit networks (including hubs);

7 to encourage operators to make OI information, wherever applicable, CPN and CLI reliable and verifiable in order to combat spoofing and other forms of numbering misuse;

8 that the service providers are encouraged to utilize the public-key certificates (e.g. ITU‑T X.509) to sign CLI and other information in the signalling exchange;

9 that ITU‑T should deploy and maintain a procedure for selecting registration authorities to support the allocation of digital public certificates to be used in the signalling exchange of telecommunication networks in order to combat different type of attacks on ICT infrastructure (e.g. spoofing numbers, robocalls, scam calls, etc.),

instructs

1 ITU‑T Study Group 2, ITU‑T Study Group 3 and, where required, ITU‑T Study Groups 11 and 17 to further study the emerging issues of CPN delivery, CLI and OI information, in particular for a heterogeneous networking environment, including security methods and possible validation techniques;

2 ITU‑T Study Group 2, in close collaboration with ITU‑T Study Group 11, to develop a procedure for selecting registration authorities to support the allocation of digital public certificates to be used in the signalling exchange of telecommunication networks;

3 the study groups concerned to expedite work on Recommendations that would provide additional detail and guidance for the implementation of this resolution;

4 the Director of TSB to report on the progress achieved by the study groups in implementing this resolution, which is intended to improve security and minimize fraud, and minimize technical harm as called for by Article 42 of the Constitution;

5 the Director of TSB to share information on country experiences regarding the implementation of this resolution, in a centralized location,

invites Member States

1 to contribute to this work, to share information regarding their experiences in implementing this resolution and to cooperate in the implementation of this resolution;

2 to consider developing, within their national regulatory and legal frameworks, guidelines or other means for implementing this resolution.

**Reasons:** Study Group 2, in close collaboration with ITU-T Study Group 11 should be instructed to develop a procedure for selecting registration authorities to support the distribution of public-key certificates to be used in the exchange of signalling messages, including CLI signing.

1. 1 These include the least developed countries, small island developing states, landlocked developing countries and countries with economies in transition. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)