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| World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA-20) Geneva, 1-9 March 2022 |  |
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| PLENARY MEETING | Addendum 20 to Document 40-E |
|  | **7 February 2022** |
|  | **Original: Russian** |
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| ITU Member States, members of the Regional Commonwealth in the field of Communications (RCC) | |
| PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF RESOLUTION 65 | |
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Proposal

It is proposed that modifications and additions be made to sections of Resolution 65, as indicated in the text that follows.

MOD RCC/40A20/1

RESOLUTION 65 (Rev. Geneva, 2022)

Calling party number delivery, calling line identification and origin identification information

(Johannesburg, 2008; Dubai, 2012; Hammamet, 2016; Geneva, 2022)

The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (Geneva, 2022),

concerned

*a)* that there appears to be a trend to suppress the transmission across international boundaries of calling party number (CPN), calling line identification (CLI) and origin identification (OI) information, in particular the country code and the national destination code;

*b)* that such practices have an unfavourable effect on security and economic issues, in particular for developing countries[[1]](#footnote-1)1;

*c)* about the significant number of cases reported to the Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) on ITU‑T E.164 numbering misappropriation and misuse related to CPN non-delivery or spoofing;

*d)* that work on this topic in Study Group 2 of the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU‑T) needs to be expedited and expanded to cater for the changing environment of service delivery and network infrastructures, including next-generation networks (NGN) and future networks (FN),

noting

*a)* relevant ITU‑T Recommendations, in particular:

i) ITU‑T E.156: Guidelines for ITU‑T action on reported misuse of ITU‑T E.164 number resources;

ii) ITU‑T E.157: International calling party number delivery;

iii) ITU‑T E.164: The international public telecommunication numbering plan;

iv) ITU‑T I.251.3: Number identification supplementary services: Calling Line Identification Presentation;

v) ITU‑T I.251.4: Number identification supplementary services: Calling Line Identification Restriction;

vi) ITU‑T I.251.7: Number identification supplementary services: Malicious call identification;

vii) ITU‑T Q.731.x-series, concerning stage 3 descriptions for number identification supplementary services using Signalling System No. 7;

viii) ITU‑T Q.731.7: Stage 3 description for number identification supplementary services using Signalling System No. 7: Malicious call identification (MCID);

ix) ITU‑T Q.764: Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part signalling procedures;

x) ITU‑T Q.1912.5: Interworking between Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Bearer Independent Call Control protocol or ISDN User Part;

xi) ITU-T Q.3057: Signalling requirements and architecture for interconnection between trustable network entities;

*b)* relevant resolutions:

i) Resolution 61 (Rev. Dubai, 2012) of the World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly, on misappropriation and misuse of international telecommunication numbering resources;

ii) Resolution 21 (Rev. Busan, 2014) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, on measures concerning alternative calling procedures on international telecommunication networks;

iii) Resolution 29 (Rev. Hammamet, 2016) of this assembly, on alternative calling procedures on international telecommunication networks;

*c)* No. 31B (Article 3.6) of the International Telecommunication Regulations (Dubai, 2012) (ITR) regarding the provision of international CLI by the signatory Member States to the ITR,

noting further

*a)* that the calling party number makes it possible to identify the party (natural or legal person) responsible for making the call;

*b)* that some countries and regions have adopted national laws, directives and recommendations regarding CPN non-delivery and spoofing, and/or on ensuring confidence in OI;

*c)* that some countries have national data-protection and data-privacy laws, directives and recommendations;

*d)* that the presence of verification mechanisms for the various calling party identifiers may significantly increase the reliability of the information transmitted;

*e)* that at the ITU Workshop on “Improving the Security of Signalling Protocols” (November 2021) it was stressed that digital certificates may be used in signalling messages to prevent CPN spoofing;

*f)* that digital certificates shall be mutually compatible in different domains (e.g. SIP, SS7, etc.) and shall be connected to common digital identification management platforms at the operator level and, possibly, the subscriber level (CLI, CPN, OI),

reaffirming

that it is the sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommunications and, as such, regulate the provision of CLI, CPN delivery and OI information, taking into account the Preamble to the ITU Constitution and the relevant provisions of the ITR related to identification information provision of CLI,

resolves

1 that international CPN delivery shall be provided based on the relevant ITU‑T Recommendations;

2 that international CLI and OI delivery shall be provided based on the relevant ITU-T Recommendations where technically possible;

3 that the delivered CPN shall contain at least either the calling party number or the specially allocated number of the operator/service provider responsible for making the call so that a terminating country can identify the operator/service provider of the outgoing calls, or identify the terminal that originates the call, before they are delivered from the originating country to that terminating country;

4 that the delivered CPN and the CLI, if delivered, shall include sufficient information to allow proper billing and accounting, for each international call;

5 that the OI information in a heterogeneous networking environment shall, where technically possible, be an identifier assigned to a subscriber by the originating service provider, or be replaced by a default identifier by the originating provider to identify the origin of the call;

6 that the CPN, CLI and OI information shall be transmitted transparently by transit networks (including hubs);

7 that the CPN, CLI and OI information shall be reliable and verifiable;

8 that it is recommended that operators include digital certificates in signalling protocols for reliable CPN and CLI delivery, including to combat spoofing;

9 that appropriate centres and registrars are necessary to verify such identifiers,

instructs

1 ITU‑T Study Group 2, ITU‑T Study Group 3 and, where required, ITU‑T Study Group 11 and ITU‑T Study Group 17 to further study the emerging issues of CPN delivery, CLI and OI information, including with the use of various identifier verification mechanisms, in particular for a heterogeneous networking environment, including security methods and possible validation techniques, and the possibility of using ITU-T resources to support the operation of calling party identifier verification mechanisms on international telecommunication networks;

2 ITU‑T Study Group 2 and, where required, ITU‑T Study Group 11 and ITU‑T Study Group 17 to study the process involved in the verification of the party requesting a CPN/CLI digital certificate, including to combat spoofing, the issuance process, including the use of ITU-T resources for the dissemination of information on the certificate issued among operators, and the use of TSB resources to support the real-time verification process;

3 the study groups concerned to expedite work on Recommendations that would provide additional detail and guidance for the implementation of this resolution;

4 the Director of the TSB to report on the progress achieved by the study groups in implementing this resolution, which is intended to improve security and minimize fraud, and minimize technical harm as called for by Article 42 of the Constitution,

invites Member States

1 to contribute to this work and to cooperate in the implementation of this resolution;

2 to consider developing, within their national regulatory and legal frameworks, guidelines or other means for implementing this resolution.

1. 1 These include the least developed countries, small island developing states, landlocked developing countries and countries with economies in transition. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)