

MINUTES*

OF THE

102ND MEETING OF THE RADIO REGULATIONS BOARD

29 June – 3 July 2026

Present:

Members, RRB

Ms S. HASANOVA, Chair
Mr J. CHENG, Vice-Chair
Mr E. AZZOUZ, Mr A. ALKAHTANI, Ms C. BEAUMIER, Mr M. DI CRESCENZO,
Mr E.Y. FIANKO, Mr Y. HENRI, Mr A. LINHARES DE SOUZA FILHO,
Ms R. MANNEPALLI, Mr R. NURSHABEKOV, Mr H. TALIB

Executive Secretary, RRB

Mr M. MANIEWICZ, Director, BR

Précis-writers

Mr P. METHVEN, Ms C. RAMAGE and Ms K. WELLS

Also present:

Ms D. TOMIMURA, Deputy to the Director, BR, and Chief, IAP

Mr A. VALLET, Chief, SSD
Mr J.A. CICCROSSI, Head, SSD/SSS
Mr C. LOO, Head, SSD/CSS
Mr D. THAM, Head, SSD/USS
Mr J. WANG, Head, SSD/SPS
Mr A. KLYUCHAREV, SSD/SPS

Mr N. VASSILIEV, Chief, TSD
Mr B. BA, Head, TSD/TPR
Mr C. RYU, TSD/FMD

Mr K. BOGENS, Head, TSD/FMD
Ms K. GOZAL, Administrative Secretary

* The minutes of the meeting reflect the detailed and comprehensive consideration by the members of the Radio Regulations Board of the items that were under consideration on the agenda of the 102nd meeting of the Board. The official decisions of the 102nd meeting of the Radio Regulations Board can be found in Document [RRB26-2/17](#).

Subjects discussed		Documents
1	Opening of the meeting	—
2	Adoption of the agenda	RRB26-2/OJ/1(Rev.1)
3	Report by the Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau	RRB26-2/5 RRB26-2/5(Add.1); RRB26-2/5(Add.2); RRB26-2/5(Add.3); RRB26-2/5(Add.4); RRB26-2/5(Add.7)
4	Rules of Procedure	—
4.1	List of proposed Rules of Procedure	RRB26-2/1 RRB24-1/1(Rev.7)
4.2	Draft Rules of Procedure	CCRR/81
4.3	Comments from administrations	RRB26-2/7
5	Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel the frequency assignments to the BLMIT-1 satellite network under No. 13.6 of the Radio Regulations	RRB26-2/6
6	Requests to extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use/bring back into use the frequency assignments to satellite networks/systems	—
6.1	Submission by the Administration of Australia requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the AUSSAT-H-160E satellite network	RRB26-2/8
6.2	Submission by the Administration of Thailand requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 satellite networks at 119.5°E	RRB26-2/9 RRB26-2/DELAYED/2
6.3	Submission by the Administration of Oman (Sultanate of) requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network	RRB26-2/12
6.4	Submission by the Administration of Italy requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks	RRB26-2/15
7	Submission by the Administration of Liechtenstein (Principality of) requesting an extension of the second milestone period (M2) for the 3ECOM-1 satellite system	RRB26-2/13 RRB26-2/DELAYED/1
8	Issues regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran	—

	Subjects discussed	Documents
	Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in its territory	RRB26-2/10
9	Cases of harmful interference	—
9.1	Submission by the Administration of the Russian Federation regarding harmful interference to its satellite networks	RRB26-2/2
9.2	Issues regarding harmful interference to emissions of high frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article 12	—
	Submission by the Administration of China (People's Republic of) regarding its frequency monitoring results on the frequency 15 295 kHz used for high frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article 12	RRB26-2/11 RRB26-2/5(Add.6)
9.3	Submission by the Administration of Lithuania (Republic of) concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services	RRB26-2/14 RRB26-2/5(Add.5)
10	Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran providing information on the Iran International satellite network issues	RRB26-2/3
11	Submission providing information on the status of telecommunications infrastructure	—
	Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran providing information on its telecommunications infrastructure issues	RRB26-2/4
	Submission by the Administration of the United States relating to the submission received from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran providing information on the Iranian telecommunications infrastructure issues	RRB26-2/16
12	Consideration of issues related to Resolution 80 (Rev.WRC-07)	—
13	Confirmation of the next meeting for 2026 and indicative dates for future meetings	—
14	Other business	—
14.1	Webpage within the Board's website to provide guidance to administrations on requests for the extension of regulatory time-limits	
15	Approval of the summary of decisions	RRB26-2/17
16	Closure of the meeting	—

1 Opening of the meeting

1.1 The **Chair** opened the 102nd meeting of the Radio Regulations Board at 0900 hours on Monday, 29 June 2026. She welcomed the participants, noting that all members were again physically present. The Board's agenda was less full than in recent times, but there were a number of sensitive issues, some of which might prove beyond the Board's mandate.

1.2 The **Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau**, speaking also on behalf of the Secretary-General, likewise welcomed the members of the Board and wished them a successful meeting.

2 Adoption of the agenda (Document [RRB26-2/OJ/1\(Rev.1\)](#))

2.1 **Mr Bogens (Head, TSD/FMD)** said that there were two further addenda to the Director's report (Addenda 6 and 7 to Document RRB26-2/5). Addendum 6 contained a communication from the Administration of the United Kingdom regarding monitoring results on the frequency 15 295 kHz; the Board might consider it under agenda item 9.2. Addendum 7 contained an update from the Administration of Switzerland on harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries; the Board might consider it alongside § 4.1 of the Director's report. In addition, the Bureau had received two late submissions: Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/1, received from the Administration of Liechtenstein on 18 June, contained further information that complemented the administration's submission under agenda item 7 and could therefore be considered for information purposes under that item; Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/2, received from the Administration of Thailand on 26 June in English only, contained further information to complement the administration's submission under agenda item 6.2 and could be considered for information purposes under that item.

2.2 **Ms Beaumier** said that it was established practice to accept late submissions for information purposes where they related to an existing agenda item, in line with § 1.6 of the working methods of the Board. Further, the submissions did not comment on contributions from other administrations; therefore, the 10-day deadline did not apply.

2.3 The draft agenda was **adopted** as amended in Document RRB26-2/OJ/1(Rev.1). The Board **decided** to note for information:

- Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/1 under agenda item 7; and
- Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/2 under agenda item 6.2.

3 Report by the Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau (Documents [RRB26-2/5](#), [RRB26-2/5\(Add.1\)](#), [RRB26-2/5\(Add.2\)](#), [RRB26-2/5\(Add.3\)](#), [RRB26-2/5\(Add.4\)](#) and [RRB26-2/5\(Add.7\)](#))

3.1 The **Director** introduced his customary report contained in Document RRB26-2/5. All the actions arising from the previous Board meeting set out in Table 1-1 had been implemented. In line with the decision of the Board, the Bureau had been objecting to frequency assignments in which the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been identified as affected on behalf of the administration, owing to the latter's lack of reliable access to the Internet. The Bureau had noticed, however, that the administration had begun entering its own comments and objections, and publicly available information suggested that the Internet had been restored, at least for government services. The Bureau would contact the administration to ascertain whether the former could discontinue entering objections on behalf of the latter. In addition, the Bureau's proposed

webpage containing guidance on the submission of extension requests had been posted to the Board's SharePoint site for members' consideration.

3.2 Referring to § 2, he noted that the data provided in the tables reflecting the Bureau's processing of filings for terrestrial and space systems were typical. There had been no revision of findings for assignments to terrestrial stations since the 101st meeting of the Board. The processing times for all special sections, except coordination requests (CR/C), were consistent with the periods specified in either the Radio Regulations or the ITU-R operational plan. The CR/C processing time had been 11.6 months as at the end of April 2026, 9.9 months as at the end of May 2026 and 9.8 months as at the end of June 2026. The processing time was expected to fall below 8 months at the end of July; however, the peak in submissions seen in December 2025 would result in the processing time rising again. Nevertheless, the otherwise consistent reduction in processing time demonstrated that the Bureau's efforts were bearing fruit. In that regard, the ITU Council had allocated an additional CHF 1 million to the Bureau to address the backlog, which would result in the recruitment of two P.3 and one P.2 staff for a fixed term of two years. The additional financing was not a permanent measure.

3.3 Under § 3, he noted that a CR/C publication had been cancelled by the Bureau as a result of non-payment of invoices, as shown in Table 3-2, and that the Council at its 2026 session had instructed the Council Working Group on financial and human resources (CWG-FHR) to conduct a cost assessment related to the implementation of Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)** and to continue its deliberations on the calculation of indirect costs and possible modifications to the free entitlement regime, taking into account outcomes of the Plenipotentiary Conference.

3.4 The tables under § 4 gave a statistical overview of interference and infringement affecting terrestrial and space services, with data broadly in line with previous reporting.

3.5 With regard to § 4.1 of and Addenda 2, 3, 4 and 7 to the report, related to harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries, he noted that there had been little tangible progress. The Administration of France had reported that the Bonifacio case persisted and that an interference report had been filed for a case in Corsica. Further, cases of interference had been recorded in the south-east of France with transmissions in Italy the suspected source. The Administration of France remained prepared to continue discussions with its Italian counterparts, but the Administration of Italy was no longer responding. Slovenia and Switzerland had both reported a lack of progress, with the former indicating that Italy was ignoring its obligations and continuing to use uncoordinated DAB blocks for the issuance of broadcasting licences, while the Administration of Switzerland had reiterated its intention to reintroduce FM broadcasting in 2027, which might lead to the re-emergence of cases of interference. A multilateral meeting was scheduled for 15-17 September in France.

3.6 The latest data on the suppression of satellite networks and systems could be found under § 5; nothing was out of the ordinary.

3.7 Lastly, § 6 contained the usual report on implementation of Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)**. As could be seen from the tables, the second milestone time-limit was approaching for some systems. By 30 April 2026, the Bureau had received 61 submissions and published 39 special sections under Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and had received 49 submissions and published 22 special sections under Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**.

Actions arising from the previous RRB meeting (§ 1 of Document RRB26-2/5)

3.8 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** confirmed that all actions arising from the previous meeting of the Board had been implemented in respect of terrestrial services.

3.9 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that all actions arising from the previous meeting of the Board had been implemented in respect of space services.

3.10 Responding to a question from **Mr Azzouz** concerning the Bureau's recording of objections on behalf of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to frequency assignments for which the administration had been identified as potentially affected, in line with the decision of the Board at its 101st meeting, the **Director** confirmed that the Bureau would not discontinue that practice without prior consultation with the administration. Furthermore, he agreed with the suggestion by **Mr Azzouz** not to base the consultation on the assumption that Internet access had been restored in the country.

3.11 **Ms Beaumier** said that, in its decision at the 101st meeting, the Board had anticipated revisiting the issue. It had not been intended as an indefinite practice; it would therefore be entirely appropriate to approach the administration and enquire as to whether it was still necessary for the Bureau to act on the administration's behalf. Unlike in Ukraine, where the situation was obviously ongoing, developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran were unclear. **Mr Henri** agreed.

3.12 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board **noted** all action items under § 1 of Document RRB26-2/5 arising from the decisions of the 101st meeting of the Board.

With respect to No. 14.1 under § 1 of Document RRB26-2/5 and pursuant to its decision at the 101st meeting to further consider that item, the Board noted that, since 28 February 2026, the Bureau had been treating all cases where the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been identified as potentially affected by the submissions of frequency assignments and allotments of another administration as having received an objection from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time, the Board further noted that the Bureau had again begun to receive relevant comments and objections from that Administration concerning special sections published in the BR IFIC.

In that regard, the Board instructed the Bureau to consult the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran and cease the implementation of the Board's instruction from its 101st meeting, if, following the consultation, it was confirmed that such actions were no longer necessary.

The Board further instructed the Bureau to report on the matter to the 103rd meeting of the Board."

3.13 It was so **agreed**.

Processing of filings for terrestrial and space systems (§ 2 of Document RRB26-2/5)

3.14 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)**, recalling the Director's introductory comments above (see § 3.2), presented the information contained in § 2.1 of Document RRB26-2/5. Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier** concerning Table 2-1, he explained that the increase in submissions in May 2026 was largely attributable to a sizeable package of filings from the Administration of Egypt for International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) stations in its mobile service.

3.15 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, recalling the Director's introductory comments above (see § 3.2), presented the information contained in § 2.2 that related to space services. Overall, the CR/C processing time had decreased from 16 months to approximately 8 months. Given that it would

soon be 8 months since the influx of 47 large submissions in December 2025, an apparent rise in processing time was to be expected in the coming months, even though the rate of processing would remain stable. Anything beyond the usual 10 to 30 monthly submissions would artificially increase processing time, as the Bureau was not staffed to absorb exceptional fluctuations. The peak in submissions at the end of 2025 could be attributed to administrations wishing to submit notices before Council Decision 482 (C01, last amended C25) and its updated cost-recovery schedule had taken effect. Nevertheless, once the December 2025 submissions had been processed, the Bureau remained confident that CR/C processing time would continue to fall, particularly in view of the approved additional recruitment, provided that submission volumes remained within the norm.

3.16 Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, he said that the entries for December 2025 in Table 2-9, on Part I-S publications, reflected that fact that the Bureau published only one circular each December, given the end-of-year closure of ITU, and on that occasion it had included particularly challenging submissions that had required extensive processing and exchanges with the submitting administration.

3.17 **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** said that the reduction in CR/C processing time was thanks in no small part to ambitious target setting, streamlined processes and, in particular, the diligence and hard work of Bureau staff, who had performed at high levels under significant and sustained stress and pressure. Those levels could not be maintained indefinitely, in particular with staff likely to take annual leave during the summer. He expressed gratitude to all those who had contributed to reducing the backlog, as well as to the Chief of SSD and Head of SSD/SPS for the assignment of an SPS staff member to SSD/CSS on a 60 per cent basis. He looked forward to the announced additional recruitment but noted that it would be some time before it had a tangible impact as recruitment, onboarding and training processes would be lengthy.

3.18 **Ms Beaumier, Ms Mannepalli and Mr Talib** welcomed the efforts and success in reducing the CR/C processing backlog and the decision of the Council to support additional recruitment by the Bureau to make sustained progress in that regard. **Ms Beaumier**, noting that the Bureau had no influence over administrations' submissions, said that processing times would invariably fluctuate when peaks in submissions caused workload to exceed capacity. **Ms Mannepalli** said that staff could not be expected to maintain high output indefinitely; additional recruitment would help to ensure that gains were not lost and that the situation stabilized by the end of the two-year financial assistance from the Council.

3.19 Responding to a question from **Mr Talib, Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that the nature and demands of the Bureau's work meant that there was not a cadre of freelance engineers that the Bureau could call on to address short-term peaks in workload. For the Bureau's purposes, a short-term recruitment horizon was two years, given that training took at least three months and achieving the necessary familiarity with the work typically required six months. Even specialists from national regulators and operators with the requisite expertise would still need extensive training.

3.20 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board noted § 2 of Document RRB26-2/5, on the processing of filings for terrestrial and space services and encouraged the Bureau to continue to make all efforts to process such filings within the regulatory time-limits, bearing in mind, *inter alia*, the decision of the ITU Council to strengthen the resources of the Space Services Department over the following two years to address the backlog in the processing of filings for space services."

3.21 It was so **agreed**.

Implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings (§ 3 of Document RRB26-2/5)

3.22 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, recalling the introductory comments made by the Director (see § 3.3 above), presented the information contained in § 3.1 of Document RRB26-2/5, on late payments and cancellations.

3.23 With regard to § 3.2 of Document RRB26-2/5, on Council activities in relation to cost recovery for satellite network filings, he said that the Council at its 2026 session had discussed two substantive matters, the first being on the implementation of Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)**, given the level of processing required on the part of the Bureau, for which workload was directly proportional to number of satellites in a filing. Previously, one could reasonably claim that the cost of such processing was recovered through notification fees; however, with the number of satellites in non-GSO constellations increasing dramatically, that was no longer the case. CWG-FHR had been instructed to conduct a cost assessment for the implementation of the two resolutions, which could lead to a revision of Council Decision 482 (C01, last amended C25) to provide for a specific fee for application of those resolutions. The second issue considered by the Council was how to account for indirect costs associated with the processing of satellite network filings, i.e. the cost of support services provided by other parts of the organization. The secretariat had proposed solutions, but the matter needed to be discussed at the level of the Plenipotentiary Conference as there were implications for Resolution 91 (Rev. Guadalajara, 2010) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, on cost recovery. The Plenipotentiary Conference first needed to agree on the principle and scope of cost recovery before the Council could settle on a methodology and accounting principles.

3.24 Responding to a question from **Ms Mannepalli**, he said that all costs associated with the processing of Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)** were currently considered to be covered by notification fees, which, in the view of the Bureau, was no longer sustainable in the age of non-GSO mega-constellations. Notification fees factored in complexity but did not account for the fact that, under Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)**, each and every satellite needed to be processed separately.

3.25 The Board **noted** §§ 3.1 and 3.2 of Document RRB26-2/5, on late payments and Council activities, respectively, relating to the implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings.

Reports of harmful interference and/or infringements of the Radio Regulations (Article 15 of the Radio Regulations) (§ 4 of Document RRB26-2/5)

3.26 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)**, drawing attention to the tables in § 4 of Document RRB26-2/5, said that the Bureau had received 471 communications containing reports of harmful interference and/or infringements of the Radio Regulations in the reporting period. In reply to questions from **Ms Beaumier** and **Ms Mannepalli** regarding Table 4-2, he explained that the figure of 15 given for safety services for April 2026 related to reports submitted principally by the Administration of the United States of America concerning interference in the HF band on frequencies used by the aeronautical mobile route service under Appendix **27** to the Radio Regulations. Replying to a further question from **Ms Mannepalli**, he added that an online portal for submission of reports of harmful interference to terrestrial services had recently been introduced. After initial testing in 2025, it had been operating alongside the existing submission methods since early 2026.

3.27 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, drawing attention to Table 4-3, said that, apart from the interference cases reported in the radionavigation-satellite service (RNSS) that would be discussed under agenda item 8.3, there was nothing noteworthy to report. The number of cases was within normal levels.

3.28 The Board **noted** § 4 of Document RRB26-2/5, on reports of harmful interference and/or infringements of the Radio Regulations.

Harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries (§ 4.1 of Document RRB26-2/5 and Document RRB26-2/5 (Add.1-4 and Add.7))

3.29 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)**, recalling the introductory comments made by the Director (see § 3.5 above), further introduced § 4.1 of and Addenda 2, 3, 4 and 7 to Document RRB26-2/5, which provided updates concerning the long-standing cases of interference involving Italy and its neighbouring countries. Addenda 2, 3 and 7 had been submitted by the Administrations of France, Slovenia and Switzerland, respectively, all of which had reported no improvement in the situation. Switzerland had noted that its planned reintroduction of FM operations in 2027 might result in further deterioration.

3.30 The Administration of France had reported that the Bonifacio case of interference persisted and that a new complaint had been filed by Corsica Radio, with the Administration of Italy duly informed via an Appendix **10** report of harmful interference. In February 2026, the two administrations had finalized an agreement concerning cases of interference affecting French stations broadcasting from the island of Elba; however, in March 2026, the Italian Administration, owing to the European Commission (EC) infringement procedure, had cut off bilateral coordination with the Administration of France, rendering progress in that and other regards impossible. The French Administration had sought to re-engage with its Italian counterparts but to no avail. Further, it had detected several cases of interference in the south-east of France, which it attributed to transmissions from Italy, but monitoring and verification remained ongoing. If Italy was indeed the source of the interference, an Appendix **10** report would be submitted in due course. As the Director had said, France would be hosting a multilateral coordination meeting on 15-17 September 2026.

3.31 The Administration of Slovenia had reported that Italy continued to disregard its obligations under the Geneva, 1984 (GE84) and Geneva, 2006 (GE06) Regional Agreements, the Radio Regulations and the ITU Constitution and Convention, as well as its previous written commitments on the matter. Further, it estimated that the Administration of Italy used over 15 000 uncoordinated frequencies, many of which operated with a high radiated power. Spectrum management in such a situation was not possible; the FM spectrum was highly congested in the border area. In the view of the Administration of Slovenia, Italy had to significantly reduce the number of FM frequencies in order to manage the rest. Further, it had reported that the Administration of Italy continued to issue new licences for DAB stations on uncoordinated frequencies. It called on Italy to cease the uncoordinated use of DAB blocks 7C and 7D and rigorously observe its obligations under the Radio Regulations.

3.32 For its part, the Administration of Italy had reported, in the submission contained in Addendum 4 to Document RRB26-2/5, that the use of the uncoordinated DAB blocks remained an exceptional and interim measure and stressed that it was actively conducting technical evaluations aimed at discontinuing their use. Further, it had noted that there had been no reports of harmful interference concerning DAB services. Discussions on the Adriatic-Ionian DAB agreement, described by Italy as constructive, were continuing. With regard to FM broadcasting, the Administration of Italy remained fully committed to resolving the cases of harmful interference through technically effective, proportionate and legally sound measures ; however, in its view, there were structural imbalances in the GE84 Plan which needed to be addressed, and it was not realistic to expect the administration to shut down vast swathes of its FM network. Furthermore, it had claimed that the

Administrations of Slovenia, France, Malta and Switzerland were all operating stations that were not compliant with the Radio Regulations and the GE84 Plan. While the Administration of Italy was pursuing the regularization of its FM broadcasting network within the GE84 framework, other administrations must operate their stations in compliance with the GE84 Plan if said Plan was to accommodate additional Italian stations. It had noted that the EC infringement procedure remained ongoing and that the EC itself had acknowledged the validity of the Italian Administration's concern regarding structural imbalances in the GE84 framework.

3.33 Responding to a question from **Ms Mannepalli**, he said that information on the EC infringement procedure had been presented in only a general manner. A few broad principles, such as the administration's commitment to developing a regulatory approach and legal framework for elimination of the interference, had been included but few details. The administration was also calling for a revision of the GE84 Plan, claiming that effective regularization of its FM broadcasting network required a rebalancing of frequency resources among all the countries involved, given the high level of congestion in the plan.

3.34 Responding to a question from **Mr Fianko**, he said that the legal basis for the Italian Administration's discontinuation of bilateral coordination with the Administration of France was not clear and had not been addressed in the submission from the Administration of Italy; it was, however, clear that Italy was developing mandatory, binding measures as part of the EC infringement procedure. He suspected that the administration's intention was to resume coordination once it had finalized specific measures as part of that process.

3.35 Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, he said that it was not necessary to have proof of the EC's acknowledgement of the structural imbalance of the GE84 Plan. The imbalance was well known to all, including ITU and the Bureau; it had, however, been a product of Italy's decision not to recognize the GE84 Agreement from its inception. Consequently, the Plan contained almost only assignments to Italian stations that were introduced in 1984 without further Plan updates, and the vast majority of Italy's licensed stations did not comply with it. The administration now wished to begin the notification process but had found that the level of congestion made it difficult to enter new stations in the Plan.

3.36 Responding to a question from **Mr Cheng**, he said that Italy operated an extremely large number of FM stations, many of which were local, community radio stations but with a high level of radiated power. Some 4 500 stations had been included in the GE84 Plan and coordination had been carried out by the Administration of Italy for only a further nine in the intervening years, while licensing had continued unabated. The figure of 15 000 uncoordinated stations given in Addendum 3 to Document RRB26-2/5, though high, was entirely plausible.

3.37 **Mr Azzouz** welcomed the news of the coordination meeting to be held in France and called on the Bureau to facilitate that meeting. The Administration of Italy should be urged to expedite the conclusion of the Adriatic-Ionian DAB agreement by the end of 2026, given that Switzerland would be relaunching its FM operations in 2027. The Board should encourage all administrations to ensure equitable access to frequency resources under the GE84 Plan. The GE06 Plan was similarly congested and involved both Region 1 and other countries; and yet agreement had been possible, even for the Administration of Italy, albeit after lengthy coordination. It was imperative that all countries' stations were recorded in, and operated in accordance with, the GE84 Plan. All administrations concerned should be reminded of the obligation to comply with both the GE84 Plan and the Radio Regulations.

3.38 **Ms Beaumier** expressed profound regret at the persistent lack of progress by the Italian Administration and the lack of detail in its report to the Board, in particular with regard to its submissions under the EC infringement procedure, despite the request of the Board in its decision at the 101st meeting. The administration recognized the need for a robust legislative and regulatory framework but had offered no explanation as to how it would establish one and why it had not done so yet. Furthermore, it appeared that the administration was no longer cooperating with neighbouring administrations and was more concerned with the structural imbalance in the GE84 Plan, an imbalance that it had been responsible for through both its actions and inaction. There appeared to be a complete absence of acknowledgement on the Italian side of its responsibility for the status quo; other administrations were simply expected to make concessions and accommodate the Italian Administration's years of inaction. That was not realistic. Moreover, those claims were merely an attempt to reframe the issue: the GE84 imbalance was not germane to the cases of interference. The Italian Administration was duty bound under the Radio Regulations to eliminate cases of interference reported by neighbouring administrations. The Board should express strong dissatisfaction and reiterate its decision from the previous meeting.

3.39 **Mr Fianko** concurred that the cases of interference should be resolved separately from the discussion of whether and how to revisit the GE84 Plan, and that that should be reflected in the Board's decision. Further, he said that measures under the EC infringement procedure should not interrupt the bilateral and multilateral coordination needed to resolve cases of harmful interference. The administration should be strongly urged to re-engage with its neighbouring countries in the utmost goodwill with a view to effective coordination and the elimination of all such cases.

3.40 **Mr Cheng** said that, although no cases of interference had been reported with respect to Italy's uncoordinated use of the 7C and 7D DAB blocks, the administration should be reminded that such use should be provisional and an exceptional measure to alleviate interference in FM broadcasting. Furthermore, it should cease putting into operation new DAB stations on uncoordinated frequencies. All administrations should be encouraged to strengthen efforts and negotiate in goodwill in order to conclude the Adriatic-Ionian DAB agreement as soon as possible. The situation involving FM broadcasting was extremely disappointing. He expressed concern that the Administration of Italy had brought into question the validity of the GE84 Plan, which, alongside the ITU administrative regulations and basic texts, formed the basis of the Bureau's and Board's work and of the ITU community's efforts to coordinate assignments and resolve cases of interference. All administrations should comply with instruments in force, including the Regional Agreements. The Board should reiterate its conclusion from the previous meeting and call for increased coordination to eliminate interference and respect for all recorded assignments, including those in the GE84 Plan. Further, he suggested that the matter be reported to WRC-27 for its view on the imbalance in the current GE84 Plan.

3.41 **Mr Azzouz** suggested that that matter and neighbouring countries' non-compliance with the Plan be considered alongside all other aspects of the interference issues at the multilateral coordination meeting in September 2026.

3.42 **Ms Beaumier** and **Ms Mannepalli** said that those specific issues did not relate to the reported cases of harmful interference. The meeting should focus directly and solely on resolving the reported cases of interference.

3.43 the **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude as follows on the matter:

“The Board considered in detail § 4.1 of, and Addenda 2, 3, 4 and 7 to, Document RRB26-2/5, concerning cases of harmful interference to VHF/UHF broadcasting stations between Italy and its neighbouring countries. The Board noted the following points:

- Harmful interference affecting FM broadcasting stations in VHF Band II between Italy and its neighbouring administrations remained unresolved, new cases of harmful interference had been detected, and Italy continued to put into operation DAB stations on uncoordinated frequencies;
- The Administration of Switzerland planned to restore its FM broadcasting service in 2027, which could lead to the re-emergence of previous cases of interference;
- The Administration of France had reported the temporary suspension of bilateral FM coordination activities by the Italian Administration on the basis of the ongoing European Commission (EC) infringement procedure;
- The Administration of Italy had provided an outline of the regulatory/legislative and technical/cooperative measures that it wished to pursue in terms of objectives and principles, without providing concrete information on the approach developed by the administration and reported to the EC to address FM interference and regularize its FM stations, including the implementation timeline, as had been requested by the Board at its 101st meeting;
- Several existing discrepancies between actual parameters of neighbouring countries' stations and those recorded in the GE84 Plan had been noted by Italy;
- The Administration of Italy was seeking a more balanced distribution of frequency resources that would facilitate the registration of a reasonable number of additional Italian assignments;
- The Administration of Italy continued to use uncoordinated DAB blocks as an interim measure, and no interference had been reported;
- The work to finalize the Adriatic-Ionian DAB agreement had continued, but further discussions were needed among the countries concerned;
- The ninth multilateral frequency coordination meeting between Italy and its neighbouring countries was scheduled to be held on 15-16 September in France.

Having acknowledged the updated situation provided by the Administration of Italy and its neighbouring administrations, the Board expressed profound disappointment at the severe lack of progress made by the Administration of Italy in resolving the longstanding harmful interference to FM broadcasting stations. It reminded the Administration of Italy that the EC infringement procedure was not a substitute for the administration's continued compliance with its obligations under ITU treaties. Consequently, the Board strongly urged the Administration of Italy to promptly:

- take all necessary measures to eliminate harmful interference to the FM sound broadcasting stations of its neighbouring administrations;
- provide information on the approach that the administration had developed and reported to EC to address FM interference and regularize its FM stations, including the implementation timeline, as requested by the Board at its 101st meeting;
- cease the operation of all uncoordinated FM and DAB stations and no longer license any new such stations;

- resume bilateral discussions with neighbouring administrations to resolve cases of harmful interference; and
- pursue its efforts to finalize the Adriatic-Ionian agreement, in order to encourage the transition to the DAB platform and alleviate congestion in the FM band.

The Board reminded the Italian administration that the difficulties it faced were the result of its decision not to respect or implement the GE84 agreement, not of the lack of cooperation from neighbouring administrations.

The Board also urged Italy to focus on resolving current interference cases and rigorously respect the current ITU regulatory framework.

Furthermore, the Board encouraged all administrations concerned to bring the operating characteristics of their FM stations in compliance with the GE84 Plan or to modify the Plan; to continue their coordination efforts with Italy in goodwill; and to report on progress achieved to the 103rd meeting of the Board.

The Board instructed the Bureau to:

- continue providing assistance to all administrations concerned;
- provide technical support to a multilateral coordination meeting between Italy and its neighbouring countries on 15-16 September in France; and
- continue reporting on progress on the matter to future Board meetings.”

3.44 It was so **agreed**.

Implementation of Nos. 9.38.1, 11.44.1, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49, 13.6 and Resolution 49 (Rev.WRC-23) of the Radio Regulations (§ 5 of Document RRB26-2/5)

3.45 The Board **noted** § 5 of Document RRB26-2/5, on the implementation of Nos. **9.38.1, 11.44.1, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49** and **13.6** and Resolution **49 (Rev.WRC-23)** of the Radio Regulations.

Implementation of Resolutions 35 (Rev.WRC-23) and 8 (WRC-23) (§ 6 of Document RRB26-2/5)

3.46 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** explained that a number of satellite systems were approaching the end of the second milestone period provided for in Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**. Taking into account the number of satellites successfully launched to date, it seemed likely that the final operating size of various systems listed in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 would need to be reduced in order to comply with that resolution, which, in his view, demonstrated its utility as a regulatory measure, alongside Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**, in moderating the number of satellites in orbit. As the end of the second milestone period approached, the Bureau was carefully studying the linkages between the two resolutions, the consequences of milestones being missed, and what improvements to the structure, wording or other elements of the resolutions it might be advisable for the Board and future WRCs to consider. The specific case of the 3ECOM-1 system, for which the notifying administration was Liechtenstein and the second milestone period had expired on 10 June 2026, would be dealt with under agenda item 7.

3.47 In reply to a question from **Mr Azzouz**, he said that the consequences of missing a milestone were definitive: any milestone missed would require a reduction in the size of the satellite system and a corresponding modification to the filing. WRC-19 had envisaged one set of circumstances under which the first milestone requirement might be waived; only the Administration of Liechtenstein had availed itself of that possibility, in respect of the 3ECOM-1 system, and the Board had granted the waiver. WRC-23 had eliminated the possibility of further such waivers, leaving only

force majeure or co-passenger delay as potential grounds for waiving milestone requirements in the future. Waivers could be granted only by a positive decision of the Board, and the milestone provisions were mandatory.

3.48 Replying to a query from **Mr Cheng** regarding the wording of footnote 2 to Table 7-1, he confirmed that, for the satellite systems to which it applied, the relevant milestone had been met for some frequency assignments but not for others. Frequency bands for which milestones had been missed were shown in red in Table 7-2. The regulatory consequences of partially meeting a milestone were more complex for some systems than others.

3.49 **Mr Cheng**, referring to Table 7-2, enquired about the conditions under which a single satellite could be used for frequency assignments to multiple non-GSO satellite systems, in the absence of specific Rules of Procedure to cover such cases.

3.50 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** explained that the Bureau proceeded by analogy with the Rules of Procedure relating to GSO satellite systems. If two non-GSO systems had identical orbital characteristics, a single satellite would be permitted to bring frequency assignments to both systems into or back into use. If any characteristics differed between them, it would not. In the case of two systems with a shared subset of orbital planes, the characteristics would not be considered identical because of the clear potential for abuse. Such cases would be reported to WRC.

3.51 In response to comments and suggestions from several members, in particular **Ms Mannepli** and **Mr Azzouz**, the **Director** said that the layout of the table could be streamlined in future reports to present the information more clearly.

3.52 The Board noted § 6 of Document RRB26-2/5, on the implementation of Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)**.

Orbital tolerances for satellite systems not subject to Resolution 8 (WRC-23) (Document RRB26-2/5(Add.1))

3.53 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced Addendum 1 to Document RRB26-2/5, which set out the response of Working Party 4A to the Board's request at its 99th meeting for guidance or clarification concerning the draft rules of procedure on No. **13.6** regarding orbital tolerances for non-GSO satellite systems not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**. The Working Party considered that the extension of orbital tolerance limits beyond Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** was an issue to be considered only by a future competent WRC on the basis of relevant studies that would consider the impact on services other than the fixed-satellite (FSS), broadcasting-satellite (BSS) or mobile-satellite services subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** and on small satellite missions. It was not currently in a position to confirm the technical tolerance provisions contained in the draft rules of procedure and considered that, pending completion of studies, the rigorous application of non-GSO orbital tolerances might not necessarily be appropriate for small-satellite or short-duration missions or in FSS and BSS bands not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**. Working Party 4A had also questioned the proposed approach in the draft rules of procedure to enable the Bureau to take necessary action under No. **13.6** automatically.

3.54 **Mr Cheng** said that, in view of the response from Working Party 4A, the Board was not in a position to continue developing draft rules of procedure on No. **13.6**. The Bureau should report on the matter to WRC-27 and be requested to continue to apply its current practice with respect to orbital tolerances for non-GSO systems not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** in the meantime.

3.55 Responding to a question from **Ms Mannepalli, Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that the Bureau had never had any difficulty in applying the current practice; changes proposed had been agreed by the notifying administrations. Certain assignments had been cancelled but only because the administration had accepted the proposed changes to the orbital characteristics. He agreed that it would be premature to continue developing draft rules of procedure on application of No. **13.6** and supported the approach put forward by Mr Cheng.

3.56 **Ms Beaumier** said that the response from Working Party 4A was not entirely surprising. The issue affected other services for which the working party was not responsible, and input on non-GSO tolerances from other working parties would be useful. It was unfortunate that WRC-23 had decided that the Bureau's practice should be documented in a rule of procedure, only then for objections to that practice to be raised. While some of the concerns expressed were understandable, the Bureau's practice had not caused any difficulty and had been in application well before WRC-23. It allowed for a certain degree of flexibility and should continue to be implemented. Moreover, any cancellation resulting from the application of the practice would be brought to the Board for consideration in accordance with No. **13.6**. The Board should thank Working Party 4A for its feedback and instruct the Bureau to report on the matter to WRC-27. It was for WRC-27 to instruct ITU-R to study the issue.

3.57 **Mr Henri** said that it was his understanding that, should an administration object to proposed adjustments to orbital characteristics in application of the Bureau's current practice, the case would be brought to the Board for review prior to any request for cancellation under No. **13.6**. He hoped that, before WRC-27, all stakeholders, in particular those involved with non-GSO issues, would recognize the urgency and need of developing orbital tolerances for satellite systems not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**.

3.58 **Mr Azzouz**, recalling the Board's consideration of the issue at its 99th meeting, thanked the Bureau for bringing the draft rules of procedure relating to No. **13.6** to the attention of Working Party 4A. He noted the working party's observations that the extension of orbital tolerance limits beyond Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** should only be considered by a future competent WRC, that application of non-GSO orbital tolerances might not necessarily be appropriate for small-satellite or short-duration missions and that input from other space-related working parties could be beneficial. The Board should instruct the Bureau to continue to apply No. **13.6** based on its current practice pending the approval of the rules of procedure. It should also instruct the Bureau to report on the matter to WRC-27, which should provide guidance for relevant studies by ITU-R.

3.59 Following a short discussion as to whether the Board should simply note the document or instruct the Bureau to continue its current practice pending further review, in which the **Chair, Mr Azzouz, Mr Linhares de Souza Filho, Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** and **Ms Mannepalli** took part, the **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board noted Addendum 1 to Document RRB26-2/5, which contained the response from Working Party 4A concerning the draft rules of procedure on application of No. **13.6** for the cases of orbital tolerances for satellite systems not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**.

The Board instructed the Bureau to report on the matter to WRC-27 and to apply No. **13.6** based on its current practice in the meantime."

3.60 It was so **agreed**.

3.61 Having considered in detail the Report of the Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau, as contained in Document RRB26-2/5 and its Addenda 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7, the Board **thanked** the Bureau for the extensive and detailed information provided.

4 Rules of Procedure

4.1 List of proposed Rules of Procedure (Documents [RRB26-2/1](#) and [RRB24-1/1\(Rev.7\)](#))

4.1.1 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, Chair of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, reported that the working group had met four times during the Board's 102nd meeting. It had reviewed and updated the list of proposed rules of procedure set out in Document RRB26-2/1. He noted that the working group had agreed to the draft text presented by the Bureau concerning new rules of procedure on No. **9.7** of the Radio Regulations, which would be published in the next circular letter. The Bureau had presented a proposal to modify the rules of procedure on No. **5.441B**, which had been agreed at the working group level. It had also presented a background document on rules of procedure concerning the recording of earth stations associated with a space station recorded under No. **4.4** and would propose new rules of procedure concerning No. **11.32** for consideration at the next meeting.

4.1.2 The working group had continued its review to identify additional rules that might be candidates for transfer to the Radio Regulations. A compiled working document would be presented at the Board's next meeting.

4.1.3 The working group had also resumed its discussion of the rules concerning Resolution **1 (Rev. WRC-97)**, on notification of frequency assignments, and would continue its discussion on the matter at the next meeting.

4.1.4 Taking into account the information received from Working Party 4A regarding orbital tolerances for satellite systems not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** set out in Addendum 1 to Document RRB26-2/5, the working group decided to remove from the list of proposed rules of procedure possible amendments to the draft rules of procedure on No. **13.6**.

4.1.5 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude as follows on the working group's deliberations:

"Following a meeting of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, under the leadership of Mr A. Linhares de Souza Filho, the Board:

- revised and approved the list of proposed rules of procedure contained in Document RRB26-2/1, taking into account the proposals by the Bureau for the revision of certain rules of procedure and the proposals for new rules of procedure;
- instructed the Bureau to publish the revised version of the document on the website and to prepare and circulate those draft rules of procedure well in advance of the 103rd Board meeting, to allow administrations enough time to comment; and
- decided to remove possible amendments to the rules of procedure on No. **13.6** from the List, taking into account the note received from Working Party 4A.

The working group had also continued its review of the Rules of Procedure and considered proposed amendments to the relevant provisions for rules that could be transferred to the Radio Regulations. The Board planned to instruct the Bureau to circulate a first set of proposed amendments for comment by administrations at the subsequent meeting of the Board."

4.1.6 It was so **agreed**.

4.2 Draft Rules of Procedure (Document [CCRR/81](#))

4.2.1 The **Chair** proposed that Circular Letter CCRR/81 be considered in conjunction with Document RRB26-2/7 under sub-item 4.3.

4.2.2 It was so **agreed**.

4.3 Comments from administrations (Document [RRB26-2/7](#))

4.3.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced Document RRB26-2/7, in which the Administration of the United States proposed alternative wording to strengthen § 4 of the proposed draft rules of procedure on No. **21.16** by requiring notifying administrations to provide a commitment to meet the applicable power flux-density (pfd) limits. It was also proposing additional text to ensure that the Bureau published the information received from the notifying administration as part of its examination under No. **9.35** or in the Part I-S notification, and maintained lists on its public website of those non-GSO networks or systems receiving a favourable finding, of administrations having provided a commitment not to transmit towards the territory of the United States, and of frequency assignments to non-GSO networks or systems recorded under No. **4.4** for information purposes only.

4.3.2 **Mr Henri** said that the United States Administration appeared to be requesting the Bureau to undertake administrative duties on its behalf, as most of the required information could be found by appropriately querying Bureau databases on filed satellite networks or systems with favourable findings and on findings related to No. **4.4**.

4.3.3 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, Chair of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, reported that the working group had discussed in detail the draft rules of procedure circulated to administrations in Circular Letter CCRR/81, along with the proposals from the Administration of the United States regarding the draft rules of procedure on No. **21.16**. It had agreed to align the language about commitment from the notifying administration across the new paragraph and include a requirement for the Bureau to publish the method used by the notifying administration to meet the pfd limits in the relevant Special Section (either CR/C or Part I-S). It noted, however, that the proposed webpages requested by that administration would contain information that was already available in Special Sections and retrievable.

ADD rules of procedure on 11.28.1 and consequential modification to existing rules of procedure on No. 11.43A

4.3.4 **Approved**, with effective date of application immediately after approval.

MOD rules of procedure on No. 21.16

4.3.5 **Approved**, with effective date of application immediately after approval.

ADD rules of procedure on Resolution 679 (WRC-23)

4.3.6 **Approved**, with effective date of application immediately after approval.

ADD rules of procedure on Nos. 5.564A and 5.565

4.3.7 **Approved**, with effective date of application immediately after approval.

4.3.8 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board discussed in detail the draft rules of procedure circulated to administrations in Circular Letter CCRR/81, along with the comments received from the Administration of the United States, as contained in Document RRB26-2/7.

Noting that there was no comment from Administrations, the Board approved the addition of the following new rules of procedure without any change from the text contained in Circular Letter CCRR/81:

- rules of procedure on No. **11.28.1** and consequential modification to existing rules of procedure on No. **11.43A** (the Board noted that the new rule could be a candidate for transfer to the Radio Regulations);
- new rules of procedure on Resolution **679 (WRC-23)**; and
- new rules of procedure on Nos. **5.564A** and **5.565**.

Having taken into account the comments from the Administration of the United States, the Board approved the modification to the existing rules of procedure on No. **21.16**, with the following changes from the text contained in Circular Letter CCRR/81: alignment of the language about commitment from the notifying administration across the new paragraph and inclusion of a requirement for the Bureau to publish the method used by the notifying administration to meet the power flux-density limits in the relevant Special Section (either coordination request or Part I-S).

The Board also considered the other comments from the Administration of the United States but noted that the information requested was already available in Special Sections and retrievable.

Consequently, the Board approved the rules of procedure published in Circular Letter CCRR/81 as amended in the annexes to this summary of decisions.”

4.3.9 It was so **agreed**.

5 Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel the frequency assignments to the BLMIT-1 satellite network under No. 13.6 of the Radio Regulations (Document [RRB26-2/6](#))

5.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB26-2/6, in which the Bureau requested that the Board cancel the frequency assignments to the BLMIT-1 satellite network, for which the period of validity had expired. The Bureau had followed the usual procedure in accordance with No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations by requesting the Administration of China to provide evidence of continuous operation of the satellite network and to identify the actual satellite currently in operation, followed by two reminder letters, to which no response had been received.

5.2 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered the request made by the Bureau in Document RRB26-2/6 for decision on the cancellation of the frequency assignments to the BLMIT-1 satellite network under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations. The Board considered that the Bureau had acted in accordance with No. **13.6** in that it had requested the Administration of China to provide evidence that the BLMIT-1 satellite network remained operational and to identify the actual satellite currently in operation, followed by two reminders, but had received no response.

Consequently, the Board instructed the Bureau to cancel the frequency assignments to the BLMIT-1 satellite network from the Master International Frequency Register.”

5.3 It was so **agreed**.

6 Requests to extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use/bring back into use the frequency assignments to satellite networks/systems

6.1 Submission by the Administration of Australia requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the AUSSAT-H-160E satellite network (Document [RRB26-2/8](#))

6.1.1 **Mr Loo (Head, SSC/CSS)** introduced the submission contained in Document RRB26-2/8, in which the Administration of Australia requested an extension of the regulatory time-limits of 27 May 2027 and 13 January 2028 for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the AUSSAT-H-9160E satellite network until 27 May 2029 on grounds of *force majeure*. The operator, Optus Satellite Network Pty Ltd, intended to launch and operate the Optus-11 geostationary satellite, which it had contracted Airbus Defence and Space SAS to manufacture, at the 160°E orbital position in various Ku, Ka and Q/V bands. The satellite's design was based on Airbus' new OneSat platform, a next-generation "digital payload" geostationary telecommunication satellite platform with software-defined and reconfigurable beam configuration. Unfortunately, a series of delays in the manufacturing, assembly, integration and testing of flight components, which Optus described as beyond its control, had beset the manufacturing process, cumulatively pushing back expected delivery of the satellite to four years later than the original contracted date of 20 May 2023. The launch term of between 1 July and 31 December 2023 agreed separately with Arianespace S.A. would therefore be missed, leaving Optus unable to meet the first of the two regulatory time-limits for bringing into use the frequency assignments to its network. In its submission, the Administration of Australia set out details of the timelines involved; the mitigation measures taken by the operator, which included leasing third-party satellites; and the reasons why the administration considered that the four conditions for granting an extension on grounds of *force majeure* had been met.

6.1.2 In reply to questions from **Mr Cheng**, **Mr Azzouz** and **Ms Beaumier**, he said that the operator's mitigation measures might have involved using the Optus D1 or Optus D2 satellites; however, the former had left orbital position 160°E and the latter was no longer active. Other possibilities were MEASAT-3A and KOREASAT 6 that were also at that orbital position according to the Bureau's records, but there was no information from the administration of Australia on any such arrangement. It was not entirely clear from the submission why the operator had continued to work with the same manufacturer in the face of repeated delays; what information there was suggested that numerous elements of the manufacturing process involved new technology. The Bureau had received no indication that coordination had been completed with affected administrations, and that some other filings for planned and non-planned bands had been submitted for the same orbital position.

6.1.3 **Mr Henri** said the operator and administration appeared to have allowed ample time to meet the regulatory time-limits for bringing the frequency assignments to AUSSAT-H-160E into use and should have been in a position to do so, had it not been for the delays in manufacturing the satellite; however, given that those delays had started early in the process, i.e. six months after the signature of the contract, with never-ending cumulative delays every six months up until May 2024, with the latest information indicating an additional delay of 12 to 18 months up to mid-August 2027 at the latest, which had in large part been attributed to manufacturing issues related to new technologies, it was far from certain that they could be classified as a *force majeure* event. Although the administration had indicated that the operator had not induced the delay, the choice of a new type of satellite, namely a software-defined high-throughput satellite, had introduced new, yet

unproven technology components that had foreseeable development risks, which could have been taken into account. More information would be needed on those matters, and the mitigation measures taken, before the Board could determine whether the conditions for granting an extension on grounds of *force majeure* had been satisfied. In view of the potential for further manufacturing delays, uncertainty over the precise timing of the launch window and ongoing discussions with the launch service provider, and the fact that two more sessions of the Board were due to take place before the bringing-into-use regulatory periods expired, he suggested that additional information would be welcome from the Administration of Australia and that no decision should yet be taken on whether to grant the extension at that meeting. The in-orbit transfer and final orbital positioning of the satellite might be considered not necessary against the arrival of the satellite at 160°E in addition to the four-month orbit raising time, as it could afford the operator additional time. The requirement for bringing a frequency assignment into use under No. **11.44B** was that the satellite would have the capability of transmitting or receiving the notified frequency assignments at the notified orbital position, not necessarily be in continuing use.

6.1.4 **Ms Mannepalli**, expressing agreement with most of the points raised by Mr Henri, said that it would be helpful to have more detailed information on the flight components that had caused the manufacturing delays before deciding whether those delays could be considered foreseeable. Although Airbus was a major and proven satellite manufacturing company, setbacks were to be expected when opting for new platforms and digital payloads. Further information would be needed to determine whether the conditions for granting an extension on grounds of *force majeure* had been met.

6.1.5 **Ms Beaumier**, while expressing sympathy with the operator over the manufacturing delays encountered, said that she did not see how such delays could qualify as a *force majeure* event. While the amount of time allowed by the operator would have been ample under normal circumstances, the satellite in question was not a typical replacement but a new, state-of-the-art piece of equipment intended to operate in some frequency bands not yet in commercial use. Such initiatives involved a high degree of risk, particularly when it came to meeting delivery schedules; proper assessment of the risks involved was ultimately the operator's responsibility. Extensive delays were, regrettably, foreseeable. Unless manufacturing delays resulted directly from a *force majeure* event, it was not the Board's practice to consider them grounds for granting extensions to regulatory time-limits. Based on the information available, she was not in a position to accede to the administration's request, though additional information could be sought. In the meantime, the Administration of Australia should be encouraged to complete coordination with all interested parties and to continue to look for alternative solutions to avoid missing any regulatory deadlines. The project would ultimately serve the industry as a whole by helping to bring a new generation of satellites to market.

6.1.6 **Mr Talib, Mr Cheng, Mr Linhares Souza de Filho, Mr Azzouz and Mr Nurshabekov** echoed the views of previous speakers, as did **Mr Fianko**, who emphasized that *force majeure* could not be inferred from the fact of delay alone.

6.1.7 The **Chair**, speaking as a member of the Board, expressed the view that if the argument for granting an extension on grounds of *force majeure* had not been made satisfactorily, there was no need for the Board to request additional information. Sufficient time remained for the Administration of Australia to provide further details if it wished to.

6.1.8 **Ms Beaumier** said that the Board should establish whether any of the *force majeure* conditions seemed to have been met. In previous cases, further information had generally been requested only if it appeared that one or more of those conditions had been satisfied.

6.1.9 **Mr Henri** said that, in the light of other members' comments, he would be inclined neither to grant the extension requested nor to request additional information; the Administration of Australia would still be able to avail itself of the procedures set out in No. **14.6** of the Radio Regulations if it deemed fit. Where possible, items should not remain on the Board's agenda for extended periods. **Mr Fianko** and **Mr Di Crescenzo** concurred with that view.

6.1.10 Following informal discussions, the **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the submission from the Administration of Australia for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the AUSSAT-H-160E satellite network, as contained in Document RRB26-2/8.

The Board noted the following points:

- The regulatory time-limits to bring into use the frequency assignments to AUSSAT-H-160E satellite network were 27 May 2027 and 13 January 2028, depending on the frequency band;
- On 30 June 2020, the satellite operator had signed a contract for the manufacture of the Optus-11 satellite with its on-ground delivery planned for May 2023;
- The satellite operator had chosen to build a state-of-the-art satellite operating in multiple frequency bands that relied on new and unproven technology;
- A contract with a launch service provider had been signed on 27 October 2021 with a launch window from 1 July to 31 December 2023;
- Multiple delays in the delivery of flight components had resulted in a four-year setback in the delivery schedule, but no details had been provided on the delays;
- The satellite operator had implemented mitigation solutions for Ku-band service continuity at the orbital slot 160°E, including the use of third-party satellites, but had not been able to find viable alternatives for other frequency bands;
- No details had been provided on the alternatives pursued to demonstrate that it had been impossible to meet the regulatory time-limits;
- Based on the revised Optus-11 satellite delivery date of mid-August 2027, the earliest launch opportunity was between mid-2028 and end-2028 followed by a six-month post-launch deployment plan to complete electric orbit raising, in-orbit transfer and final positioning at the 160°E orbital position from early-2029 to mid-2029;
- The administration had requested an extension of two years to 27 May 2029 owing to *force majeure* related to multiple manufacturing, integration and qualification issues of vital flight components.

The Board concluded that the decision to select a complex design with a new platform for the Optus-11 satellite introduced a high level of risk that had been known and accepted by the satellite operator, and that could not be considered unforeseeable, inevitable or beyond the operator's control.

Consequently, the Board further concluded that the situation did not satisfy the conditions for the case to qualify as a case of *force majeure* and decided not to accede to the request from the Administration of Australia."

6.1.11 It was so **agreed**.

6.2 Submission by the Administration of Thailand requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 satellite networks at 119.5°E (Documents [RRB26-2/9](#) and [RRB26-2/DELAYED/2](#))

6.2.1 **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** introduced Document RRB26-2/9, in which the Administration of Thailand requested a 13-month extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 satellite networks at 119.5°E to 30 September 2027, on the grounds of *force majeure*. Summarizing the submission, he said that some Ka-band frequency assignments associated with the two satellite networks had been suspended on 1 September 2023; accordingly, the regulatory time-limit for their bringing back into use was 1 September 2026. The satellite operator had entered into an agreement with the satellite manufacturer (Astranis Space Technologies Corp) on 31 January 2024 for the manufacture and launch of a new geostationary Ka-band satellite (THAICOM 9) and for its in-orbit delivery to the 119.5°E orbital position on or before 31 August 2025. With contingency margins to accommodate potential schedule adjustments, the latest delivery date would have been no later than 1 December 2025. During integration and testing, the THAICOM 9 satellite project had been affected by events considered to be *force majeure* by the satellite operator, namely the late delivery of vendor components and a change of circuit board component that had been due to performance anomalies. However, those issues had been addressed. To ensure compliance with the 1 September 2026 regulatory time-limit, mitigation measures and revised deployment planning had been undertaken, including an accelerated launch to reduce the orbit-raising period from six months to approximately one month.

6.2.2 Subsequently, in March 2026 when the satellite had been approximately 90 per cent completed, a further exceptional technical event had occurred: an out-of-control anomaly of the power main board subsystem that had been identified during standard thermal qualification testing. The anomaly had occurred in a satellite sharing the same platform design architecture as the THAICOM 9 satellite and had not manifested during earlier testing activities. Corrective and preventive actions had been mandated for all satellites in the manufacturing block launch was anticipated no later than 31 March 2027. In the absence of an accelerated launch opportunity and with a six-month orbit raising period, the THAICOM 9 satellite was expected to reach the 119.5°E orbital position no later than 30 September 2027.

6.2.3 In its submission, the Administration of Thailand described efforts and measures taken to comply with the regulatory time-limit and explained how the out-of-control anomaly of the power main board subsystem met all four conditions to be considered as a case of *force majeure*. The supporting documentation set out in the annexes included confirmation of a valid launch contract, the definitive satellite agreement and correspondence between the satellite operator and manufacturer regarding the delays experienced and status of the satellite project.

6.2.4 Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/2 contained correspondence from the satellite manufacturer providing additional information on the events that had affected the production and launch of the THAICOM 9 satellite.

6.2.5 Responding to questions from **Ms Mannepalli, Mr Henri, Ms Beaumier, Mr Di Crescenzo, Mr Cheng** and **Mr Talib**, he said that the submission did not include the letter from the manufacturer to the operator (Space Tech Innovation Co. Ltd) dated 24 March 2026 regarding the test failure in one of the Block-3 satellites, to which the correspondence in Annex 4 to Document RRB26-2/9 referred. No details had been provided regarding the accelerated launch

foreseen before the power main board subsystem anomaly, it may be referring to the selection of a launch vehicle that would insert the satellite into a more favourable transfer orbit, but the revised project timeline and requested extension period were based on a non-accelerated launch scenario and a six-month orbit-raising period. At the time of suspension, the administration had invoked Article 48 of the ITU Constitution for the Ka-band frequency assignments in question, so the Bureau had not sought further details regarding the reasons for their suspension. On 2 November 2023, the Administration of Thailand had revoked the application of that article for those assignments in application of Resolution 216 (Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference. THAICOM-4 was currently at the 119.5°E orbital position and had brought into use other frequency assignments in the Ku-band for the filings. Although the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 filings shared identical Ka-band frequencies, they possessed different characteristics, and the administration was therefore seeking an extension to bring back into use the same frequency bands in both filings. As to whether the satellite platform was new and unproven, he said that THAICOM 9 was a micro-GEO satellite; four had been delivered and launched by Astranis in December 2024.

6.2.6 **Mr Azzouz** said that it was unclear from the information provided in Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/2 dated 26 June 2026 whether the re-design, manufacture and installation of the power main board had been completed. If not, the timelines in Table 4 of Document RRB26-2/9 might have to be revised.

6.2.7 **Mr Loo (Head SSD/CSS)** said that, in response to a question, as Astranis had been contracted to provide in-orbit delivery, it would be obligated to inform the operator of the anticipated launch even if all the other issues had not yet been resolved. According to the correspondence from Astranis in Annex 2 to Document RRB26-2/9, dated 29 April 2026, delivery to the launch site was planned for no later than 31 March 2027.

6.2.8 **Ms Beaumier** said that it was unclear whether the case met all the *force majeure* conditions, and the Board required further information and clarification before deciding whether or not to accede to the request. The revised project timeline in Table 4 of Document RRB26-2/9 indicated that, despite the delays incurred in 2024 and 2025, which she considered to have been manufacturing delays that did not inherently constitute *force majeure* events, the regulatory deadline could have been met with an accelerated launch planned for April 2026. However, no details or supporting evidence had been provided. Furthermore, open-source information showed that the launch had been rescheduled multiple times, raising the question of whether the regulatory deadline of 1 September 2026 could actually have been met.

6.2.9 The power main board subsystem anomaly identified in March 2026 had necessitated re-design, manufacture and installation and might constitute a *force majeure* event if the components had been successfully used in other operational satellites. However, it was unclear whether the issue was truly exceptional or simply part of usual manufacturing delays; further details and supporting evidence were required. According to the submission, the satellite had reached approximately 90 per cent completion when that anomaly had occurred, but no information had been provided on the work that remained to be done, project timelines and the launch arrangements at that time. She noted that an accelerated launch opportunity had not yet been identified, and it was unclear if the currently anticipated six-month orbit-raising period included in-orbit testing. She also questioned why plans for a replacement satellite had not been made earlier, particularly if the in-orbit satellite had been ageing. According to Annex 3 to Document RRB26-2/9, the letter proposal between Astranis and the operator was dated 24 March 2023, and

the definitive satellite agreement had been entered into on 31 January 2024, although no signature date was given.

6.2.10 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that the power main board subsystem anomaly in March 2026 should be considered a *force majeure* event. He agreed that the Administration of Thailand should have started planning for a new satellite much earlier to meet the regulatory time-limit. He would have difficulty in acceding to the extension request at present and was in favour of requesting additional information.

6.2.11 **Mr Henri** said that, from a contractual and regulatory perspective, the THAICOM 9 satellite project should have proceeded as planned in the absence of the possible *force majeure* issue. A substantial margin of at least eight months had existed between the latest planned delivery date of 1 December 2025 and the regulatory deadline of 1 September 2026. While some Board members considered that the administration had started to plan for a replacement satellite quite late on, he pointed out that THAICOM 9 was a small GEO satellite and relatively quick to manufacture. He agreed that some events cited by the administration did not constitute *force majeure*; however, the out-of-control anomaly of the power main board subsystem, owing to the failure of an installed component to meet the required technical specification, might do so. It had disrupted the implementation schedule, making it impossible to meet the regulatory deadline. He noted that other small GEO satellites manufactured by Astranis had been successfully launched. Consequently, he was inclined to accede to the request but would go along with the majority view.

6.2.12 **Mr Cheng** said that although the submission appeared comprehensive, some of the information lacked clarity. While he acknowledged that the power main board subsystem anomaly might qualify as a *force majeure* event, no technical supporting material had been provided and the exact timing of the event was unclear. Furthermore, the submission lacked evidence to confirm that the satellite had reached approximately 90 per cent completion and would have been able to meet the original regulatory deadline had the anomaly not occurred. No launch service contract or supporting document from the launch service provider had been provided, and the definitive satellite agreement was so heavily redacted that the Board could not ascertain whether the satellite had the capability to bring back into use the frequency assignments. The Board therefore did not have sufficient information to confirm that the case met all four *force majeure* conditions, and he was not in a position to accede to the request.

6.2.13 **Ms Mannepalli** said that the case contained elements of *force majeure*, notably the out-of-control anomaly of the power main board subsystem that had not manifested during earlier testing and was beyond the control of the manufacturer. However, the Board required more information demonstrating that the case met all four conditions, including further details on the satellite's readiness before the anomaly and launch arrangements.

6.2.14 **Mr Fianko** thanked the Administration of Thailand for its clear submission that set out actions taken to ensure that the regulatory deadline of 1 September 2026 would have been met. He considered that the case met the first, third and fourth conditions of *force majeure*. As to the second condition, while the administration described the anomaly as an exceptional latent technical issue, he was unsure whether it was unforeseen. Astranis had launched its first micro-GEO satellite in 2023 and had had a single satellite in orbit when the contract had been signed. A propulsion-related total loss on the same satellite platform line had also been documented in 2025. A further manufacturing defect in an early production unit was closer to a known accepted risk of selecting an emerging supplier than to an extraordinary event beyond the operator's control. While he was sympathetic to the case, the Board needed to be consistent with previous decisions indicating that the selection

of an unproven solution carried a known and accepted higher risk for the operator. The administration should be given an opportunity to clarify how the case differed from others in which the Board had deemed the risk foreseeable.

6.2.15 **Mr Talib** said that, while the case might contain elements of *force majeure*, further clarification was required to demonstrate that all four conditions had been met. The Board should invite the Administration of Thailand to provide further information to the 103rd meeting before reaching a decision on the extension requested.

6.2.16 **Mr Azzouz** said that the satellite operator appeared to have taken all measures to deploy a new satellite to meet the regulatory time-limit of 1 September 2026. The power main board anomaly identified in one of the satellites in the manufacturing block during a standard thermal qualification test was an exceptional technical event beyond the control of the administration and operator that had directly and unavoidably affected satellite delivery. That said, some information was missing from the submission, and he was therefore not in a position to grant the extension at the current meeting. The Board should invite the Administration of Thailand to provide additional evidence to the following meeting to demonstrate that all four conditions of *force majeure* had been met, including on the readiness of THAICOM 9 and launch arrangements. It should also request the Bureau to retain the relevant frequency assignments to the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 satellite networks in the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR) until the end of the Board's 103rd meeting.

6.2.17 **Ms Beaumier** pointed out that, although several Board members appeared to accept that the administration had secured an accelerated launch that would have ensured compliance with the regulatory deadline prior to the power main board subsystem anomaly, no supporting evidence or details on launch arrangements had been provided. Noting that the administration needed to establish that those elements had been in place in order to satisfy the fourth condition, she said that the Board required sufficient information to confirm that the situation met all the conditions to qualify as a case of *force majeure*.

6.2.18 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the submission from the Administration of Thailand requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 satellite networks at 119.5°E, as contained in Document RRB26-2/9, and noted Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/2 from the same administration for information.

The Board noted the following points:

- The regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 satellite networks at 119.5°E was 1 September 2026, and the notifying administration was seeking a 13-month extension of the time-limit to 30 September 2027 owing to *force majeure*;
- The satellite operator had signed a contract with a manufacturer on 31 January 2024 to build the THAICOM 9 satellite with its in-orbit delivery to the 119.5°E orbital position on or before 31 August 2025, but no later than 1 December 2025;
- In March 2026, an unexpected power main board anomaly had been identified in one satellite forming part of the same manufacturing block and sharing the same platform design architecture as the THAICOM 9 satellite;

- Prior to the anomaly, qualification processes and testing activities for similar manufacturing programmes had been successfully conducted without indication of a systemic issue with that component;
- Despite earlier delays, the regulatory deadline could have been met with an accelerated launch but no details or supporting evidence had been provided;
- The satellite had reached approximately 90 per cent completion when the *force majeure* event occurred but no details had been provided to demonstrate that the satellite would have been ready for its planned launch in the second quarter of 2026;
- No details had been provided on the launch arrangements that had been in place when the anomaly had been detected, in particular in relation to the accelerated launch plan;
- The THAICOM 9 satellite was expected to be ready for launch by 31 March 2027, and would require six months for orbit raising with arrival at the 119.5°E orbital position by 30 September 2027.

Based on the information provided, the Board concluded that there were elements of *force majeure*, but that further clarification was required to demonstrate that all conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied.

Consequently, the Board was not in a position to accede to the request for extension at that meeting and invited the Administration of Thailand to submit to the 103rd meeting of the Board the following information:

- Further details on the satellite readiness, including project timelines before and after the *force majeure* event had occurred;
- Additional information, including supporting evidence from the launch service provider, to support the initial accelerated launch plan and the revised launch plan.

In addition, the Board instructed the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments to the THAICOM-IP1 and THAICOM-P3 satellite networks in the Master International Frequency Register until the end of the 103rd meeting of the Board.”

6.2.19 It was so **agreed**.

6.3 Submission by the Administration of Oman (Sultanate of) requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network (Document [RRB26-2/12](#))

6.3.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB26-2/12, in which the Administration of Oman had provided information, at the invitation of the Board at its 101st meeting, to substantiate its request for a further extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network from 13 December 2025 to 19 April 2027, the Board having determined at that meeting that the situation was no longer a case of co-passenger delay but might contain elements of *force majeure*. In its lengthy submission, the administration explained the long-term operational commitment and regulatory continuity framework; the updated status and implementation progress of OMANSAT-1; the progress of frequency coordination procedures (including information on the ongoing coordination with the Administration of Papua New Guinea); and the technical readiness and capability of the interim satellite, Orbit-Guard-2 (OG2). The administration had also provided an assessment of how the events affecting the satellite project met the four conditions of *force majeure*. Those events had included the contractual non-compliance of the initial orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) provider, Epic

Aerospace (EPIC), in providing the updated launch manifest, revised mission schedule and official SpaceX communications for the Chimera Geo-2 mission, and the decision to switch to a new OTV provider, Impulse Space, with the launch of the OG2 on the Helios-1 OTV initially planned from 1 June to 1 December 2026, but subsequently shifted by Impulse Space from 1 January to 1 May 2027. The administration had also indicated that the failure of EPIC's first OTV mission, Chimera Geo-1, had further validated its decision to switch to an alternative OTV provider. The submission contained 16 annexes providing various supporting documentation.

6.3.2 Responding to a question from **Mr Henri**, who recalled that the launch of the Chimera Geo-2 mission had originally been scheduled for 1 May 2025, he said that the Bureau had no additional information than the one presented to the meeting as to why Epic Aerospace had waited until 16 October 2025 to inform the orbit service provider, Infinite Orbits, of the launch delay. **Ms Mannepalli** noted from the submission that Epic Aerospace had subsequently ceased all substantive communication with Infinite Orbits.

6.3.3 **Mr Azzouz** thanked the Administration of Oman for the comprehensive information provided. A high percentage of coordination agreements had been completed and coordination with the Administration of Papua New Guinea was continuing at the operator level. Outlining the facts of the case, he said that an interim satellite, OG-2, would be deployed to bring the frequency assignments into use within the regulatory time-limit. However, owing to Epic Aerospace's failure to respond to formal requests for clarifications, the administration had decided to switch to a new OTV provider, and the scheduled launch window had subsequently also been changed. In his view, those events were beyond the control of the administration and operator and qualified as *force majeure*. The administration had always responded to the Board's requests for further information. A period of 108 days had been anticipated between the target launch date of 1 January 2027 and the 19 April 2027 date of bringing into use. The OG-2 satellite would remain at the orbital position for a continuous period of 90-days until 19 July 2027, at which point the frequency assignments would be suspended. The three-year suspension period would provide sufficient time to finalize the manufacture and launch of OMANSAT-1. The project represented Oman's first national satellite and was essential given the country's topography. Consequently, he strongly supported granting an extension until 19 April 2027.

6.3.4 The **Chair** noted that the Administration of Oman had provided extensive information, including a chronological timeline, to demonstrate how the situation qualified as a *force majeure* event.

6.3.5 **Ms Mannepalli** thanked the Administration of Oman for providing such exhaustive information and summarized the facts of the case. Following its decision to switch to an alternative OTV provider, Infinite Orbits had been informed that the launch window had been moved to 1 January–1 May 2027. In its submission, the administration had explained the technical maturity of the Impulse Space Helios-1 OTV, demonstrating its due diligence in selecting that vehicle. Noting that the case concerned Oman's first national satellite project, the significant investment in the OMANSAT-1 satellite and the explanations as to how all four conditions of *force majeure* had been met, she strongly supported acceding to the request and granting an extension to 19 April 2027 with a possible additional seven days as a meteorological buffer.

6.3.6 **Mr Talib** said that the Administration of Oman had provided comprehensive information in response to the Board's request at its 101st meeting. The administration had demonstrated that the four conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied and that the delays incurred were beyond its control. It had also provided an update on the progress of frequency coordination procedures and

detailed information on the interim solution, namely the OG-2 payload to bring into use the frequency assignments. The satellite project was important for Oman, a developing country. An extension until 19 April 2027 was reasonable and should be granted.

6.3.7 **Mr Henri** recalled the Board's consideration of the issue at its 99th and 100th meetings. At the latter, the Board had noted that the launch of the OG-2 satellite, contracted as an interim satellite to bring into use the frequency assignments within the regulatory time-limit, had been delayed by unforeseen schedule changes requested by the launch provider due to delays faced by its primary payload. At the time, the administration had not invoked *force majeure* due to a lack of communication from Epic Aerospace with Infinite Orbits. However, the failure of Epic Aerospace to provide updated launch manifests despite repeated requests, compelling Infinite Orbits to change OTV provider, had been identified as an important issue in the latest submission. Noting that the unique launch characteristics of the OG-2 satellite (a 16-unit GEO CubeSat) necessitated the use of an OTV, he said that the technology, although promising, was in its infancy. The OTV would not appear to be a launch priority, which might explain the further shift in the launch window by the new OTV provider to 1 January–1 May 2027, with an anticipated arrival at the orbital position in April 2027. He would have difficulty in classifying the delay as *force majeure*, considering that there was an accepted risk in launching a CubeSat into a geostationary satellite orbit using an OTV. Moreover, the interim satellite was being used for the sole purpose of bringing into use the frequency assignments for a continuous period of 90 days before their subsequent suspension. While he recognized the efforts of the Administration of Oman to build a new satellite, the process had begun quite late with respect to the regulatory timing for the satellite network filing. He was therefore uncomfortable in granting the requested extension.

6.3.8 **Mr Nurshabekov**, noting that the Board had concluded at its 101st meeting that there might be elements of *force majeure* present in the case, said that he was minded to grant an extension until 19 April 2027. The project was the first national satellite for Oman, which was a developing country, and the administration had provided additional information as requested, including on the updated status and implementation of OMANSAT-1, progress made in coordination with affected administrations and details regarding the interim satellite.

6.3.9 **Mr Fianko** said that in his view, the first, third and fourth conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied: the failure of a contracted OTV provider to respond to communications and the subsequent change in the revised launch window by the new OTV provider was beyond the control of the obligor; the administration had pursued other options and had demonstrated proactive mitigation; and a causal effective connection was shown in the table in § 4.3 of the submission. That said, he was unsure whether the second condition had been met and whether the event was unforeseen or irresistible. However, Oman was a developing country launching its first national telecommunication satellite and had limited experience with satellite projects, and he was inclined to grant an extension until 19 April 2027.

6.3.10 **Mr Cheng** said that the Administration of Oman had invested significant time and effort to build and launch the country's first national telecommunication satellite. The contract for the manufacture of OMANSAT-1 had been signed on 23 November 2025, with on-ground and in-orbit delivery planned for the third quarter of 2028 and the second quarter of 2029, respectively. At its 99th meeting, the Board had concluded that the case met all the conditions to qualify as a situation of *force majeure*. At that time, the interim satellite was due to be launched by Epic Aerospace, but that OTV provider had not provided the information sought by Infinite Orbits. Furthermore, its first OTV mission, Chimera Geo-1, had suffered a total failure. Infinite Orbits had therefore decided to change the OTV provider to Impulse Space. The Administration of Oman had limited experience on

satellite projects; it had endeavoured to meet the regulatory requirements but had encountered several unexpected delays that were beyond its control. In his view, the case continued to qualify as one of *force majeure* and he could agree to grant an extension until 19 April 2027.

6.3.11 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that, while Board members had sympathy with developing countries, the Board had no guidance from WRC on the treatment of requests from such countries. The Board must therefore refrain from taking into account a country's development status in its evaluation of cases. One of the main issues raised during consideration of the case at the 101st meeting had been the lack of information from the OTV and launch service providers, which had been addressed in Annexes 9 and 10 of the submission. Recalling that the case had been discussed by the Board over several meetings and noting the additional information provided to the current meeting, he said that the case qualified as one of *force majeure* and he would support an extension until 19 April 2027.

6.3.12 **Ms Beaumier** thanked the Administration of Oman for its detailed and comprehensive submission, noting that the chronology of events was particularly helpful. She was pleased that the construction of OMANSAT-1 with Airbus was proceeding according to plan and that coordination discussions with the remaining affected administrations were ongoing. However, she was still not convinced that the Board had all the information it required.

6.3.13 The failure of Epic Aerospace's Chimera Geo-1 mission, launched in February 2025, appeared to have affected launch schedules and might therefore be a factor in the extension request. The launch schedule changes, which had been attributed to SpaceX, not the previous mission failure, had been reported to the satellite operator on 16 October 2025, as detailed in Annex 16 of the current submission. The OTV provider, Epic Aerospace, had subsequently ceased its communications and had failed to provide the clarifications requested by the Board at its 100th meeting. However, as detailed in Annex 10, the rideshare delivery agreement between Infinite Orbits and the new OTV provider, Impulse Space, had been signed on 14 November 2025, which was the final day of the Board's 100th meeting and before the Board's conclusions seeking additional information would have been published.

6.3.14 The Board had previously concluded that the case qualified as a situation of *force majeure* when the mission profile had changed, delaying the launch of the OG-2 satellite. Although delays might well be expected for a secondary payload riding on an OTV that itself was also a secondary payload, the Board had recognized the administration's limited experience and had decided to give it the benefit of the doubt. She did not, however, agree that the case continued to qualify as *force majeure*. In its latest submission, the administration had invoked a new event, namely the cessation of communication by Epic Aerospace, originating from the failure of Epic Aerospace's Chimera Geo-1 mission. It had explained how the cessation of communication, change of OTV provider and subsequent launch window shift met the four conditions of *force majeure*, but had not provided any rationale for its decision to select the Chimera-Geo-2 OTV, which was an unproven vehicle and involved a higher risk.

6.3.15 **Mr Di Crescenzo**, recalling the Board's conclusion at its 99th meeting that the case met all the conditions to qualify as a situation of *force majeure*, said that, based on the information provided, he would support an extension until 19 April 2027.

6.3.16 **Mr Alkahtani** said that the satellite project was real and ongoing, and the Board should decide to accede to the extension request at the current meeting. **Mr Azzouz** agreed.

6.3.17 **Ms Beaumier** emphasized that the *force majeure* event now being invoked was different to that considered by the Board at its 99th meeting. Although the contract with Epic Aerospace had been signed before the failure of the Chimera Geo-1 mission, no justification had been provided for the decision to choose the unproven EPIC OTV. She was therefore unsure as to whether the first condition for *force majeure* had been met. The Board's decision at the 101st meeting had been quite generic and further clarification was required to demonstrate that all conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied. Recalling the Board's consideration at the 100th meeting of the United Kingdom Administration's request to extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the GANTS-2 and GANTS-3 satellite networks following the failure of Epic Aerospace's Chimera Geo-1 mission, she said that the Board needed to be thorough and consistent in its decisions. It should therefore invite the Administration of Oman to provide a detailed rationale and justification for the selection of the EPIC OTV.

6.3.18 **Mr Azzouz** noted that the gap-filler satellite would remain in position for a 90-day period. Selection criteria would vary from country to country according to the rules in place, and financial considerations might well be a factor for some administrations. **Ms Beaumier** said that, while government organizations might often be obligated to select the lowest-cost tender, such considerations had not been mentioned in the submission.

6.3.19 The **Chair**, speaking as a Board member, said that the Administration of Oman had already undertaken significant efforts to implement what was undeniably a genuine project. The OG-2 gap-filler satellite had been manufactured and would stay at the orbital position for 90 days to bring the frequency assignments into use. She was in favour of an extension but agreed that further justification might be needed.

6.3.20 **Mr Fianko** said that, while he would have preferred the Board to take a decision on the matter at the current meeting, it was important to be consistent with previous decisions. He had some doubt as to whether the second condition for *force majeure* had been satisfied and could therefore go along with seeking further clarification.

6.3.21 **Mr Cheng** said that it might be advisable to seek further information to ensure consistency in the Board's decisions. He recalled that, at its 100th meeting during consideration of the case involving the United Kingdom Administration and the use of the EPIC Chimera-Geo-1 transfer vehicle, the Board had concluded that the decision to use an unproven vehicle to launch a satellite came with a higher risk that could not be considered unforeseeable. The Board should set out its approach in regard to such cases in its report to WRC-27 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**.

6.3.22 Following informal consultations as to whether the administration had submitted sufficient information in its submissions to earlier meetings to justify its decision to use the Chimera Geo-2 OTV, the **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered in detail Document RRB26-2/12, in which the Administration of Oman had requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network.

The Board expressed its appreciation to the Administration of Oman for the comprehensive submission and noted the following points:

- The administration had requested a further extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments in the 17.70-21.20 GHz and 27.50-31.00 GHz frequency bands to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network, from 13 December 2025 to 19 April 2027;

- The administration had secured a gap-filler mission that involved the launch of the OG-2 satellite using an EPIC orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) (Chimera-Geo-2) to bring into use the frequency assignments to its satellite network by 13 December 2025;
- The administration had been unable to provide the additional information from the OTV and launch service providers that the Board had requested at its 100th meeting to support an additional extension to 20 July 2026 that was due to co-passenger delay;
- In the absence of a response from both the OTV and launch service providers, arrangements had been made with a different OTV provider, and the launch of the OG2 satellite had been rescheduled, with a launch window from 1 January to 1 May 2027;
- The administration had requested that the regulatory time-limit be further extended from 13 December 2025 to 19 April 2027 owing to a *force majeure* event related to the failure of Chimera-Geo-1 OTV in February 2025 and of its provider to provide a revised launch schedule since November 2025;
- Progress had been made towards completion of frequency coordination agreements and in satellite construction since the previous Board meeting;
- The decision to rely on a new orbit transfer vehicle to launch a satellite involved a higher risk that was known and accepted by the satellite operator;
- No rationale had been provided for the selection of the EPIC Chimera-GEO-2 OTV given that it was an unproven vehicle when the contract was signed with Infinite Orbits.

Based on the information provided, the Board concluded that there were elements of *force majeure* but that further clarification was required to demonstrate that all conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied.

Consequently, the Board was not in a position to accede to the request for extension at that meeting and invited the Administration of Oman to provide a detailed rationale for the selection of the EPIC OTV to the 103rd meeting of the Board.

In addition, the Board instructed the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network in the Master International Frequency Register until the end of the 103rd meeting of the Board.”

6.3.23 It was so **agreed**.

6.4 Submission by the Administration of Italy requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks (Document [RRB26-2/15](#))

6.4.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced the submission contained in Document RRB26-2/15, in which the Administration of Italy requested an extension to the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks on grounds of *force majeure*. According to the administration, the submission had been provided in response to the invitation issued by the Board at its 101st meeting and contained the information required under Part A1 of the Board’s Rules of Procedure. The requested extension of six months, until 15 March 2028, to bring back into use the UHF, SHF, EHF and S band frequency assignments following the planned launch of two new satellites, SICRAL 3A and SICRAL 3B, and subsequent electric orbit-raising period had been calculated exclusively on the basis of the updated contractual schedule from the industrial consortium providing launch services, in strict accordance with ITU guidance, with no contingency margins allowed.

6.4.2 In reply to a question from **Mr Henri**, **Ms Beaumier** and **Mr Azzouz**, he drew attention to footnote 3 in the submission, in which the Administration of Italy explained that, while the time needed to bring back into use the UHF band frequency assignment was currently projected at 10 months beyond the existing regulatory time-limit, taking into account the updated launch schedule for the SICRAL 3B satellite, an extension of at least six months would allow for corrective measures to be taken with a view to recovering the schedule and meeting the revised deadline.

6.4.3 **Mr Cheng** observed that the supporting document provided in Attachment 1 to the submission was a declaration from the industrial consortium, rather than a legal contract as the Board would usually expect.

6.4.4 **Mr Henri**, echoing that concern, said that certain key dates, including the original delivery date and planned launch dates for the two satellites and the date on which the Ministry of Defence, as operator, had granted a six-month contract extension to the manufacturer, appeared to be missing from the materials submitted, which made it difficult to assess whether the existing regulatory time-limit could have been respected had events not intervened. He suggested that additional information should be requested before any decision could be taken on granting an extension. While the administration had clearly made significant efforts to mitigate the impact of the three events it described as *force majeure*, more specific details on how manufacturing delays had affected the initial timeline for the project would be useful. Information on the impact of the six-month delay on the initial project milestones with, for example, the initial and revised project timing for the construction, launch window, launch and orbit raising of the satellite could be useful.

6.4.5 **Mr Azzouz** agreed that more information was needed before the requested six-month extension could be granted, in particular with regard to the effect of the delay on each of the satellite network filings concerned. Several sessions of the Board would be held before the current regulatory period expired, allowing for further discussion.

6.4.6 **Ms Beaumier** said that the administration appeared to be working to bring all the relevant frequency assignments back into use at the notified orbital position, even though the two new satellites would handle different bands and one would take longer to reach its final operating position than the other. The information already provided suggested that there were elements of *force majeure* in the case, but further details were needed on the status of construction and launch plans before those events had occurred in order to confirm that all conditions for *force majeure* were satisfied and that, had it not been for those events, the regulatory time-limit would not have been exceeded.

6.4.7 **Mr Cheng** said that he would have expected to see more formal documentation submitted, such as contracts or binding agreements, even if some information had to be redacted in view of the military nature of the satellites and networks in question. In particular, the timelines involved should not need to be kept confidential. Such information was required under Part A1 of the Rules of Procedure in order for the Board to take its decisions. More detailed supporting documents were needed to demonstrate that the two satellites would have been ready to bring the frequency assignments back into use before the regulatory time-limit expired and that there was a causal connection between the putative *force majeure* events and the deadline being missed.

6.4.8 **Mr Talib** echoed the comments made and agreed that additional information should be requested from the administration before any extension could be granted.

6.4.9 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered the request of the Administration of Italy for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use (BBIU) the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks, as contained in Document RRB26-2/15.

The Board expressed its appreciation to the Administration of Italy for providing additional information, with supporting documentation, and noted the following points:

- Under the SICRAL 3 programme, two complementary satellites, SICRAL 3A and SICRAL 3B, were under construction and were scheduled to be launched in July and December 2027, respectively, and expected to reach their orbital position by March and July 2028, respectively, taking into account the orbit-raising period;
- The regulatory time-limits to bring back into use the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks were 15 September 2027, and the administration was seeking an extension until 15 March 2028 for both filings;
- Three independent events (i. the destruction of the CIRETEC printed circuit board manufacturing facility on 30 January 2022; ii. the Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict and international embargo restrictions since 24 February 2022; iii. the global semiconductor shortage with a peak impact period in 2021-2022) had had a material impact on the SICRAL 3 programme schedule, with their combined effects making it impossible to complete the BBIU process prior to the 15 September 2027 regulatory time-limit;
- All feasible mitigation measures had been implemented, reducing the cumulative impact to initial programme delay from approximately 12 months to six months;
- The residual delay of six months was consistent with the contractual extension granted to the manufacturer by the contracting authority;
- No details had been provided on the status of the satellite construction and launch plans that would demonstrate that the frequency assignments could have been brought into use if not for the *force majeure* events;
- An agreement with a launch service provider had been reached but there was no supporting evidence.

The Board concluded that there were elements of *force majeure*, but that further clarification was required to demonstrate that all conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied.

Consequently, the Board was not in a position to accede to the request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks at that meeting and invited the Administration of Italy to submit to the 103rd meeting of the Board the status of launch plans and the satellite construction before each of the *force majeure* events, including the date it had begun and whether it had been expected to be completed prior to the initial launch window, along with supporting documentation.”

6.4.10 It was so **agreed**.

7 Submission by the Administration of Liechtenstein (Principality of) requesting an extension of the second milestone period (M2) for the 3ECOM-1 satellite system (Document [RRB26-2/13](#) and [RRB26-2/DELAYED/1](#))

7.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced the submission contained in Document RRB26-2/13, in which the Administration of Liechtenstein requested an extension of the second milestone period under Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** for the 3ECOM-1 satellite system,

which was operated by Mountain Ridge, a wholly owned subsidiary of the manufacturer, Open Cosmos. He also drew attention to Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/1, which the Board had agreed to consider for information. He explained that, with the second milestone period for the 3ECOM-1 system expiring on 10 June 2026, and NewSpace India Limited, the provider that the operator had originally planned to entrust with the launch, having grounded its fleet following a launch failure on 12 January 2026, the Administration of Liechtenstein had outlined what it viewed as reasons justifying an extension until 30 June 2027 on grounds of *force majeure*. According to the administration, the launch service disruption had prevented the planned launch and deployment of 24 satellites intended to contribute to meeting the 50 per cent deployment requirement for the system.

7.2 In reply to questions from **Mr Azzouz**, **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, he clarified that the original filing had indicated a system of 288 satellites, which implied that 144 would need to have been deployed by 10 June 2026 to meet the requirements of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**.

7.3 Responding to a question from **Mr Azzouz** about the nature and presentation of the information in Attachments MR-4.6 to MR-4.9 to the submission contained in Document RRB26-2/13, none of which bore a signature, **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** explained that the Administration of Liechtenstein had included some publicly available information in support of the widely acknowledged lack of launch capacity affecting the space industry. The case was the first of its kind, but such submissions were increasingly to be expected as the Bureau began dealing with more cases in which circumstances such as lack of available launch capacity played a role. With regard to the size of the 3ECOM-1 satellite system, the administration appeared cognizant of the fact that the filing would need to be amended in due course to reduce the number of satellites involved; however, given that the manufacturer had successfully launched only two satellites to date – on 22 January 2026, thereby bringing back into use the frequency assignments suspended on 16 February 2023 – a refusal to grant the extension requested would mean that the system would be limited to a maximum of four. The request for an extension appeared to reflect what the operator had expected to be able to achieve by the existing deadline, had events not supervened.

7.4 **Ms Beaumier** expressed the view that the crux of the matter was not the eventual size of the constellation but whether the threshold to grant an extension on grounds of *force majeure* had been met. In her view, the launch failure in January 2026 constituted a *force majeure* event with a direct impact on the launch originally planned for May 2026. If not for that, it seemed as though the operator and manufacturer would have been in a position to proceed with the launch of at least 24 satellites before the end of the second milestone period.

7.5 **Mr Henri** said that the characteristics of the notified frequency assignments in the filing of the non-GSO system would certainly need to be modified to fit the number of space stations ultimately retained as deployed for the second milestone provided for in Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**; however, it was unclear how many satellites the operator could realistically have launched in May 2026. According to the information in Attachment MR-3, by 5 June 2026 only 11 satellites had been completed. The process for registering satellite system frequency assignments included ample time for all steps to be completed. Indeed, such time, i.e. the seven-year regulatory time limit for bringing into use the system and subsequent time-limit to achieve the milestone, was necessary to secure funding for the project, ensure that the frequencies could be operated without causing harmful interference, and ensure the manufacture, launch and deployment of the satellites and bringing into use of frequency assignments in conformity with Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**. The fact that the operator had received its licence from the administration at a very late stage on 3 December

2025, a few months prior to deadline for the second milestone, and that very few satellites would have been ready for launch even at the point when the launch failure had occurred suggested that neither the administration nor the operator had acted with the necessary alacrity and that the operator had accepted a certain degree of risk. The system had already benefited from a waiver of the time-limit for the first milestone period, which the Board had granted at its 93rd meeting. His inclination would be not to accede to the request for a second extension.

7.6 **Mr Cheng** said that, when the Board had granted the first waiver, the administration had presented a credible plan indicating how the second milestone would be reached, including a binding agreement on the construction and launch of the full constellation of satellites. The submission contained in Document RRB26-2/13, however, did not appear to mention that agreement, and no explanation was given as to why it had not been executed. While the 12 January 2026 launch failure might be classed as a *force majeure* event, it was far from certain that any satellites could have been launched by 10 June 2026, taking into account the need for final testing and for transport from the manufacturing facility in the United Kingdom to the launch site in India. By December 2025, no formal contract had been signed with the potential launch service provider; Attachment MR-2 referred only to a “bilateral letter of intent”. On that basis, he did not consider that the conditions for granting an extension on grounds of *force majeure* had been satisfied and could not accede to the administration’s request.

7.7 **Ms Mannepalli** said that, in view of the uncertainty over how many satellites would have been ready for launch before the second milestone period expired and whether there was a *force majeure* element in the case, further information should be sought from the administration before an extension could be granted. **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** and **Mr Azzouz** agreed with that suggestion.

7.8 **Mr Fianko**, drawing attention to certain similarities with the case of the MULTUS satellite system, which involved the Administration of Canada and had been discussed at the Board’s 100th and 101st meetings, said that Mr Cheng’s remarks pointed to the need for further consideration of whether the fourth condition for establishing *force majeure* had been satisfied. The first three seemed to have been: the launch failure and fleet grounding were beyond the operator’s control; the event was not foreseeable, given the long flight history and success rate of the selected launch vehicle; and the lack of alternative launch capacity had rendered the launch impossible, despite the operator’s attempts at mitigation. The fact that so few satellites had been ready for launch, however, threw the notion of a causal link into doubt.

7.9 **Ms Beaumier** said that it was not unusual for plans to change. A separate issue was how many satellites could feasibly have been ready for launch, which should be the figure taken into account for any extension granted, though allowance should be made for the fact that manufacturing priorities might have shifted when it became clear that the May 2026 launch would not take place.

7.10 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** observed that launch-specific manufacturing and testing activities would necessarily have been postponed until the nature of the launch vehicle was confirmed. He added that the case was the first in which the Board was called on to decide whether to extend the second milestone period for a satellite system under Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**. The consequences of the failed launch in January 2026 were potentially far-reaching. The 3ECOM-1 filing had already undergone several changes of operator, most recently in December 2025.

7.11 In the light of that explanation, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that he was inclined to agree with Ms Beaumier: there was clear evidence of a *force majeure* event having occurred, but

more information was needed on the timelines in the case and whether the 24 satellites referred to in the submission could have been launched before the end of the second milestone period.

7.12 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** emphasized that, with the advent of non-GSO satellite systems, the Board was likely to encounter more such cases: the larger number of satellites involved would inevitably make delays more common. Regulatory certainty would help to facilitate the process. **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** added that, under Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**, the notifying administration must submit a modification to its filing within 90 days of a milestone being missed. The Bureau was bound to proceed on the assumption that the number of satellites in the system would be reduced unless specifically instructed otherwise by the Board. In that respect, the regulatory situation for such systems was different from that applying to the bringing into use or bringing back into use of frequency assignments to other satellites, where filings would be suppressed in the MIFR if regulatory time-limits were not respected. **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** suggested that the Bureau could be instructed not to apply the relevant provisions of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** until after the Board's 103rd meeting, a suggestion which **Ms Mannepalli** supported.

7.13 **Mr Cheng** emphasized that the Board's conclusion on the matter might set a precedent for future cases involving non-GSO satellite systems, but **Ms Beaumier** suggested that few very similar cases were likely to arise, as the only waiver that the Board had granted in respect of the first milestone period related to the satellite system under discussion. **Mr Cheng** said that the administration should be asked what had become of the binding agreement that had informed the Board's decision at its 93rd meeting. The requirement laid down in Annex 2 to Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** could not be overlooked. **Ms Beaumier** said that any points noted in the Board's conclusion should be logically connected with specific elements of its decision. **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** concurred, adding that there should be no suggestion of revisiting the Board's previous decision and that clarification was needed regarding how many satellites the operator planned to launch. **Ms Beaumier** reiterated her view that the Board did not need to know the final intended size of the constellation in order to determine whether an extension could be granted, but should consider how many satellites the operator might reasonably have been expecting to launch before the end of the second milestone period and whether the *force majeure* conditions had been satisfied. **Mr Di Crescenzo** agreed that there was no need to request information on the intended size of the satellite constellation.

7.14 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the request of the Administration of Liechtenstein for an extension of the second milestone period (M2) for the 3ECOM-1 satellite system, as contained in Document RRB26-2/13, and noted Document RRB26-2/DELAYED/1 from the same administration for information.

The Board noted the following points:

- The M2 regulatory time-limit for the 3ECOM-1 satellite system had been 10 June 2026;
- The satellite operator had been in discussion with a launch service provider to finalize a contract for the launch of 24 satellites via two dedicated launches to take place in May 2026 when the launch vehicle intended to be used to launch the satellites had suffered a failure on 12 January 2026;
- The satellite operator had made efforts to find alternative launch options before the M2 regulatory time-limit, but without success;

- A contract with a new launch service provider had been signed on 12 June 2026 for four launch service missions to launch the 24 satellites between September 2026 and June 2027;
- The administration was seeking an extension of the M2 regulatory time-limit to 30 June 2027 owing to *force majeure*;
- By 5 June 2026, 28 satellites had been either completed or at a very late stage of manufacture (subject to final launch-specific testing); however, no details had been provided on the status of the satellites' construction and the project milestones before and after the *force majeure* event.

The Board further noted that:

- at its 93rd meeting, it had granted the administration a waiver from the requirements to meet the M1 regulatory time-limit based, *inter alia*, on a plan to meet the M2 time-limit; and
- no information had been provided to explain the change of plans.

Based on the information provided, the Board concluded that the situation might qualify as a case of *force majeure* but that additional information was required to demonstrate that all conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied.

Consequently, the Board was not in a position to accede to the request from the Administration of Liechtenstein at that meeting and invited the Administration of Liechtenstein to submit to the 103rd meeting of the Board the following information:

- The project milestones for the construction and launch of the satellites in sufficient detail to demonstrate that 24 satellites could have been deployed in time to meet the M2 regulatory time-limit if not for the *force majeure* event;
- The status of the satellites' construction prior to the failure of the launch vehicle on 12 January 2026;
- A description of the satellite project and deployment plan and a rationale for the differences with the one presented at the 93rd meeting.

In addition, the Board instructed the Bureau to suspend the application of any M2 regulatory time-limit under Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and Resolution **8 (Rev.WRC-23)** in respect of the 3ECOM-1 satellite system until the end of the 103rd meeting of the Board."

7.15 It was so **agreed**.

8 Issues regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in its territory (Document [RRB26-2/10](#))

8.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced Document RRB26-2/10, in which the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that it was continuing to undertake all possible measures to identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals in its territory but was facing difficulties, including the small size of the terminals and the country's vast area and challenging topography. It considered that a more effective solution would be for the satellite operator to disable the satellite terminals, as had been done in other countries. It also explained that, based on measurements conducted in May 2026, Starlink services remained operational and accessible within its territory.

As to the Board's conclusion at its 101st meeting that it did not have the authority to suspend frequency assignments to satellite systems for non-compliance of the notifying administration under Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**, the administration pointed out that provisions currently existed in the Radio Regulations to allow the Board to suspend the frequency assignments of satellite networks. It requested the Board to reiterate its earlier position that the Starlink satellite operator should immediately cease unauthorized transmissions to and from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to condemn the behaviour of the administrations responsible. It also requested the Board to adopt a resolution initiating the suspension of the satellite operator's filings to safeguard the integrity of regulatory procedures, uphold the rights of other administrations and ensure proper application of the Radio Regulations.

8.2 While the Iranian Administration had alluded to provisions of the Radio Regulations concerning earth stations on board vessels (ESVs) to support to its claim that the Board could initiate the suspension of frequency assignments, Resolution **902 (Rev.WRC-23)** did not make reference to any actions of the Board. However, *further resolves* 3 of Resolution **123 (WRC-23)**, on earth stations in motion (ESIMs), provided that the Bureau could submit cases to the Board for review and the necessary actions (including suppression of the frequency assignment in question), as appropriate. In his view, WRC-23 had not intended to extend the Board's powers to all possible cases by including such a provision in a resolution concerning ESIMs. Responding to a question from **Ms Mannepilli**, he said that no resolutions concerning ESVs provided for such action by the Board.

8.3 He noted that the Board might wish, in its report to WRC-27 on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**, to refer to its limited powers to enforce its decisions in cases of non-compliance with Article **18** of the Radio Regulations or Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**. Responding to a question from **Mr Azzouz**, he said that it would be more logical for the matter to be raised at WRC by the Board in its report on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)** rather than by the Director in his report to the conference.

8.4 **Ms Beaumier** said that the Board understood the difficulties associated with identifying the terminals. By reiterating its request that the Iranian Administration pursue its efforts to identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals in its territory, in accordance with Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**, the Board certainly did not expect the administration to locate all such terminals. It was simply repeating that ongoing obligation and should continue to do so. There was no question, however, that the most effective option would be for the operator to deactivate the terminals. She noted with concern that the unauthorized operation of the terminals in the territory of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran continued and that the Administrations of Norway and the United States remained unwilling to enforce the Board's decisions.

8.5 As to the Iranian Administration's request that the Board initiate the suspension of the filings, she agreed that *further resolves* 3 of Resolution **123 (WRC-23)** did provide for the suppression of frequency assignments by the Board in relation to ESIMs, rather than ESVs, with suppression representing the most severe action that could be taken. Resolution **123 (WRC-23)** was very specific to ESIMs and applied to an entirely different context. In her view, the Board could not extrapolate the regulatory framework set out in that resolution to the current case; doing so would cause it to act beyond its mandate and in a manner that was not consistent with the current regulatory framework. The Board did not have explicit authority, from either the Radio Regulations or a WRC, to take such action. While cancellation could ensue under No. **13.6**, it would follow the application of a strict regulatory procedure. Generally speaking, however, the Radio Regulations lacked inherent enforcement mechanisms, even for cases of harmful interference. It was therefore not surprising that no such mechanisms existed regarding the unauthorized operation of certain stations. The matter would be addressed in the Board's report to WRC-27 under Resolution **80**

(Rev.WRC-07). Proposals on the issue were also under discussion in ITU-R in the context of preparations for the conference.

8.6 **Mr Azzouz** thanked Ms Beaumier for including the issue in the Board's report to WRC-27 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**. Noting that the issue had been under the Board's consideration since its 92nd meeting, in March 2023, he observed that the Iranian Administration had again reported, based on measurements conducted in May 2026, the continuing unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals within its territory and the difficulties involved in locating and identifying such terminals. The Board should reiterate its previous decisions on the matter: it should continue to request the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pursue all efforts, to the extent possible, to identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals within its territory; urge the Administrations of Norway and the United States to take all appropriate actions to have the operator immediately disable unauthorized transmissions; and request those administrations to comply with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and also Article **18** of the Radio Regulations. **Ms Mannepalli** agreed, noting that, in accordance with *resolves 3 i)* of Resolution **22 (Rev. WRC-23)**, the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had to take all appropriate actions at its disposal to stop the unauthorized transmissions.

8.7 **Mr Azzouz** also suggested that, although not specifically requested by the administration, the Bureau should publish the outcome of its consideration of the item at the current meeting on the dedicated webpage under *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board 2* of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference. **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** and **Mr Talib** supported that suggestion, as did **Mr Cheng**, who said that it would give greater visibility to the issue.

8.8 **Ms Mannepalli** said that the action provided for in *further resolves 3* of Resolution **123 (WRC-23)** applied to cases of unacceptable interference from non-GSO ESIMs that had persisted for more than 30 days after the Bureau had sent a reminder to the notifying administrations. The case under discussion, however, did not concern harmful interference; rather, it concerned the unauthorized operation of terminals in a territory where the service was not permitted. Consequently, *further resolves 3* of Resolution **123 (WRC-23)** could not be applied. The Board should reiterate the conclusion that it had drawn on the matter at its 101st meeting, namely that it did not have the authority to suspend or cancel the frequency assignments.

8.9 **Mr Fianko** said that the information in the latest submission served to reinforce the facts of the case, which were already very well established, and the Board should reiterate its previous decision. With regard to the observation that provisions existed to allow the Board to suspend frequency assignments, he said that the Iranian Administration's ESV analogy did not apply. The ESV regime had its own specific regulatory conditions and did not grant general suspension powers to the Board for unrelated cases of non-compliance. To accede to the administration's request, the Board would have to assume enforcement or sanction powers beyond its current mandate, an action that it had been careful to avoid. He therefore did not support the request and considered that the Board should restate its earlier position on the matter.

8.10 **Ms Beaumier**, referring to the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the Radio Regulations, noted that the entire regulatory framework relied on the goodwill and commitment of all Member States to comply with the Radio Regulations and to cooperate with each other in the event of difficulties. That said, the Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes had been signed by certain Member States only. In its report to WRC-27 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**,

the Board would highlight challenges encountered regarding compliance with its decisions but had yet to decide what action it wished to recommend.

8.11 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** pointed out that the Radio Regulations constituted an international treaty and enforcement powers lay with Member States, which must uphold their responsibilities.

8.12 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that, although the lack of response and action from the Administrations of Norway and the United States was disappointing, the Board should continue to urge those administrations to comply with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and Article **18** of the Radio Regulations. It could not take any further action unless granted additional powers by a WRC. **Mr Talib** endorsed those comments, noting that the suspension of the frequency assignments for non-compliance with Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** would be beyond the Board's current mandate.

8.13 **Mr Cheng** observed that the issue had been under the Board's consideration since the 92nd meeting, and no progress had yet been made. The notifying administrations had not provided any input to the current meeting and continued to disregard the Board's decisions and requests. However, the Board had been clear about the obligations of those administrations under the Radio Regulations and Constitution, and the fact that the unauthorized transmissions in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran were in direct contravention of the Constitution and Convention and the Radio Regulations. The Board must remain consistent and stand by its previous decisions. It did not have the authority to suspend frequency assignments to satellite systems for non-compliance of the notifying administration with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and No. **18.1** of the Radio Regulations.

8.14 **Mr Henri** observed that certain resolutions, namely Resolutions **121 (WRC-23)** and **123 (WRC-23)** concerning ESIMs and Resolution **679 (WRC-23)** concerning the inter-satellite service, provided for the possibility of Board action, including suppression of frequency assignments. However, in the current case, the Board did not have the authority for such action, as requested by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Additional measures to enforce the observance and strict application of regulatory provisions might be welcome and the issue might be addressed in the Board's report to WRC-27 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**; ultimately, it was up to Member States at a WRC to decide whether to discuss an expanded enforcement role for the Board. In its conclusion, the Board should reiterate its previous decision and might also wish to indicate that it had been acting within its mandate under Article 14, No. 96 of the Constitution.

8.15 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board carefully considered Document RRB26-2/10 from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the provision of Starlink satellite transmissions within Iranian territory.

The Board noted the following points:

- The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had again reported the continuing unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals within its territory;
- The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had reiterated the difficulties involved in identifying or locating all such terminals across its large territory due to the structure of the small devices;
- The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had again requested the Board to initiate the suspension of the frequency assignments of the Starlink satellite network.

The Board further noted the following:

- The issue of unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals within the territory of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been under the consideration of the Board since its 92nd meeting (20-24 March 2023) without any progress;
- The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had the ongoing responsibility to take all appropriate actions at its disposal to stop unauthorized transmissions on its territory, to the extent possible, but there was no obligation to identify and locate all unauthorized stations on its territory in order for the satellite network operator to provide assistance;
- The satellite operator had the capability to deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals within the territory of another country;
- No response had been received from the Administrations of Norway or the United States;
- The regulatory framework found in Resolution **123 (WRC-23)** for earth stations in motion (ESIMs) could not be extended in the application of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** without an explicit decision by a WRC.

The Board reiterated the conclusion that it had drawn at its 101st meeting; namely, that the Board did not have the authority to suspend frequency assignments to satellite systems for non-compliance of the notifying administration with Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**.

Furthermore, the Board reiterated its decisions made at the 101st meeting to:

- continue to request the Administrations of Norway and the United States to comply with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and also Article **18** of the Radio Regulations;
- strongly urge the Administrations of Norway and the United States to take all appropriate actions at their disposal to have the operator of the Starlink system immediately disable unauthorized transmissions from its terminals within the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
- continue to request the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pursue all efforts, to the extent possible, to identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals within its territory, in accordance with *resolves* 3 i) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**; and
- include the issue of unauthorized transmissions from earth stations in its report to WRC-27 on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**, with a view to discussing, *inter alia*, the difficulties encountered in the application of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**.

The Board instructed the Bureau to publish the outcome of the consideration of the item at the present meeting on the dedicated webpage under *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board 2* of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference.”

8.16 It was so agreed.

9 Cases of harmful interference

9.1 Submission by the Administration of the Russian Federation regarding harmful interference to its satellite networks (Document [RRB26-2/2](#))

9.1.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced the submission contained in Document RRB26-2/2, in which the Administration of the Russian Federation provided information on harmful interference that had been affecting the Ku-band transponders of its Yamal-402 (55°E) satellite since 1 January 2025. The satellite networks concerned – KUPON-1, KUPON-1M and YAMAL-55E – were

all recorded in the Master International Frequency Register. Radio monitoring systems operated by the administration's General Radio Frequency Centre and by Gazprom Space Systems had determined that the harmful interference was being generated deliberately from the territory of Ukraine. In the administration's view, such action violated Article **15.1** of the Radio Regulations and constituted an act of electronic warfare. Annex 1 to the submission provided technical details on the nature of the interference, which took the form of a sweeping carrier, and described how its source had been geolocated to near Kyiv; the report had been prepared using the form contained in Appendix **10** to the Radio Regulations. Although the geolocation techniques used had an accuracy of around 50 km, the Bureau considered it plausible that in all the cases studied, the interference had originated from the same place. The use of a sweeping carrier suggested that the interference was indeed being caused deliberately.

9.1.2 In reply to questions from **Mr Talib**, he explained that Gazprom Space Systems, which operated the YAMAL-55E network, also undertook private radio monitoring activities. As the case had only recently been submitted to the Board, no other monitoring had been carried out by other administrations to confirm the information; in particular, there had as yet been no comment from the Administration of Ukraine. Replying to **Mr Henri**, he said that no further reports of harmful interference had been received since the date of the submission, which had not arrived in time for consideration at the Board's 101st meeting, but nor had there been any indication that the interference had ceased. The submission stated that different transponders had been targeted on various occasions and that the interference was intermittent; however, as it appeared to form a pattern, the incidents had been presented to the Board as a single case.

9.1.3 **Mr Azzouz**, emphasizing that the jamming techniques described in the submission were a form of electronic warfare, said that the regular and unacceptable interference reported was causing disruption to satellite communication and broadcasting networks. The Board should instruct the Bureau to continue supporting the Administrations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine with a view to resolving what was a long-standing issue; it should also invite the Administration of Ukraine to comply with the ITU Constitution and relevant provisions of the Radio Regulations. The Bureau should convene a meeting of the administrations concerned to discuss the matter in a spirit of goodwill and cooperation.

9.1.4 **Ms Mannefalli** welcomed the detailed information provided by the Administration of the Russian Federation in response to the request made by the Board at its 100th meeting. The administration had indicated that intentional, harmful interference in the form of high-power sweeping was affecting Ku-band transponders. She suggested that the Bureau should be instructed to take action under Nos. **15.44** to **15.46** of the Radio Regulations, using any available measures to resolve the issue, and to report the outcome to the Board at its 103rd meeting.

9.1.5 **Mr Fianko** emphasized the need for the Board to maintain a consistent approach to claims of harmful interference and to remain focused on radiocommunication issues. The root cause of the interference in question lay outside the scope of the Board's mandate, but the obligation to ensure that stations did not cause harmful interference was incumbent upon all States, regardless of the broader context.

9.1.6 **Mr Nurshabekov**, echoing Mr Fianko's comments, added that Article 45 of the ITU Constitution was also relevant to the case.

9.1.7 Having received clarification from **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** that the Appendix **10** reports submitted by the Administration of the Russian Federation had also been sent to the Administration of Ukraine, which had yet to respond, **Ms Beaumier** said that the Board should instruct the Bureau

to follow up on the matter with that administration, which should be invited to investigate and take action. If the Board felt that sufficient information had been submitted to confirm that the interference was deliberate, it could state in its conclusion that such interference should cease. The Bureau should also be instructed to support the efforts of both administrations to resolve the issue.

9.1.8 **Mr Cheng**, acknowledging the difficult situation in the region, said that all Member States of the Union must respect the rights of other Administrations under ITU instruments and uphold their own obligations. The Administration of Ukraine should be invited to investigate the matter and take appropriate action to eliminate any harmful interference identified.

9.1.9 In the light of Mr Cheng's comments and the explanations provided by the Bureau, **Mr Talib** suggested that the Board should reiterate the conclusion reached at its 100th meeting and request the Bureau to continue its efforts to work with the two administrations concerned with a view to organizing a meeting at which the situation could be discussed and potentially resolved.

9.1.10 The **Chair** expressed the view that the Board could not instruct the Bureau to convene such a meeting. She proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered in detail Document RRB26-2/2 from the Administration of the Russian Federation regarding the harmful interference to its satellite networks.

The Board noted the following points:

- The Administration of the Russian Federation had reported cases of harmful interference, observed from 1 January 2025 to the present, affecting the Ku-band transponders of satellite Yamal 402 (55°E), recorded in the Master International Frequency Register under satellite networks KUPON-1, KUPON-1M and YAMAL-55E;
- The interference affected the channels of television and radio broadcasting networks and of civil and commercial communication networks of different users operating on the territory of the Russian Federation;
- Based on its satellite monitoring results, the Administration of the Russian Federation had highlighted that the harmful interference was being deliberately generated from the territory of Ukraine;
- Reports of harmful interference had been provided under Appendix 10 of the Radio Regulations.

The Board urged the Administration of Ukraine to comply with No. 15.1 of the Radio Regulations and Article 45 of the ITU Constitution.

The Board further invited the administrations concerned to cooperate in goodwill to solve the cases of harmful interference.

The Board instructed the Bureau to:

- invite the Administration of Ukraine to investigate and take appropriate action to resolve the reported cases of harmful interference, in the event of their continuation;
- continue to provide support to the administrations concerned to resolve the case of harmful interference; and
- report on progress on the matter to the 103rd meeting of the Board."

9.1.11 It was so **agreed**.

9.2 Issues regarding harmful interference to emissions of high frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article 12

Submission by the Administration of China (People's Republic of) regarding its frequency monitoring results on the frequency 15 295 kHz used for high frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article 12 (Document [RRB26-2/11](#) and [RRB26-2/5\(Add.6\)](#))

9.2.1 **Mr Ba (Head TSD/TPR)** presented Document RRB26-2/11, in which the Administration of China reported on the monitoring activities it had conducted since the Board's last meeting with respect to the 15 295 kHz frequency that had previously been the subject of complaints from the Administration of the United Kingdom. During the monitoring period, no emissions other than the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) English-language broadcasting signal had been observed. Technical monitoring data, including spectrum plots and geolocation maps, were set out in the attachment.

9.2.2 In Addendum 6 to Document RRB26-2/5, the Administration of the United Kingdom reported that since 26 March 2026 it had conducted daily monitoring of the 15 295 kHz frequency using United Kingdom and third-party stations in the same UTC monitoring periods. No harmful and persistent interference affecting the frequency had been detected at those times.

9.2.3 **Mr Azzouz** congratulated both administrations for resolving the matter and thanked the Bureau for its assistance. He hoped that the issue would not recur when the seasonal broadcasting schedule changed.

9.2.4 **Ms Mannepal** also thanked both administrations and the Bureau and welcomed the resolution of the harmful interference issue. She was particularly grateful to the Administration of China for its proactive monitoring.

9.2.5 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered in detail Document RRB26-2/11 from the Administration of China and Addendum 6 to Document RRB26-2/5 containing a communication from the Administration of the United Kingdom; both documents related to monitoring activities of the frequency 15 295 kHz, which had previously been the subject of interference reports from the United Kingdom.

The Board noted the following points:

- The Administration of China had conducted a monitoring campaign on that frequency, submitted detailed technical results to the Board, and indicated that no emissions other than the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) English-language broadcasting signal had been observed;
- Since 26 March 2026, the Administration of the United Kingdom had conducted daily monitoring of the frequency 15 295 kHz and had detected no interference.

The Board noted with satisfaction that harmful interference on the frequency 15 295 kHz used by HF broadcasting stations of the United Kingdom had not occurred during the period concerned and thanked both administrations for having cooperated in a spirit of goodwill."

9.2.6 It was so **agreed**.

9.3 Submission by the Administration of Lithuania (Republic of) concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services (Documents [RRB26-2/14](#) and [RRB26-2/5\(Add.5\)](#))

9.3.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced the submission contained in Document RRB26-2/14, which provided updated information from the Administration of Lithuania concerning harmful interference in the Baltic region. He explained that, while the Administration of Lithuania had noted with appreciation the action taken by the Board and Bureau previously, there had been no significant improvement in the situation. In addition to the previously noted interference to the RNSS and IMT services in border areas, a growing impact on terrestrial and maritime operations had been observed. The evidence collected continued to indicate that the sources of interference were located within the territory of the Russian Federation, including the Kaliningrad area. Despite repeated notifications, several Board decisions and procedures initiated by the Bureau, no response had been received from the Administration of the Russian Federation and no effective measures appeared to have been taken to ensure that the interference ceased. Addendum 5 to Document RRB26-2/5 contained an updated report from the Director on harmful interference to receivers in the RNSS. All the reports of harmful interference received concerned the Baltic region. While similar cases of harmful interference were doubtless occurring elsewhere, reports of interference were seldom submitted in relation to conflict zones. In the Baltic region, jamming and spoofing continued. The situation was deteriorating, and the Board might wish to consider instructing the Bureau to take further action to facilitate a resolution.

9.3.2 In reply to questions from **Ms Mannepli** and **Mr Azzouz**, he explained that, while interference to RNSS frequency bands was increasingly widespread and affected IMT services across Lithuania, an additional issue of direct interference to IMT frequency bands had been observed in areas bordering Kaliningrad. To date, however, little detailed information had been received regarding the latter issue.

9.3.3 **Mr Azzouz** suggested that, in addition to reiterating the elements of its previous decision that related to interference to the RNSS, continuing to urge the Administration of the Russian Federation to take the action previously requested, and updating its instructions to the Bureau, the Board should request information from the Administration of Lithuania regarding the interference to IMT frequency bands, including details of technical parameters.

9.3.4 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered in detail the request from the Administration of Lithuania concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite (RNSS) and mobile services, as contained in Document RRB26-2/14. In addition, the Board took note of an updated report concerning harmful interference to RNSS receivers, provided by the Bureau in Addendum 5 to Document RRB26-2/5.

The Board noted that the Administration of Lithuania had reported continued harmful interference affecting RNSS and International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) systems in border areas and indicated a growing impact on its terrestrial and maritime operations, noting in particular that:

- harmful interference to IMT frequency bands remained present in the region near the Kaliningrad border;
- cases of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing continued to be detected on a regular basis; and

- no response had been received from the Administration of the Russian Federation to the reports of harmful interference.

The Board strongly urged the Administration of the Russian Federation to:

- prevent any type of transmission that could adversely affect RNSS receivers within the territory of the Administration of Lithuania; and
- take the necessary actions to respond to the communications from the Administration of Lithuania reporting harmful interference to their RNSS and IMT services.

The Board instructed the Bureau to:

- continue to invite both administrations concerned to cooperate in goodwill to solve the cases of harmful interference;
- remind the administrations concerned of their obligation to cooperate urgently in the resolution of the cases in compliance with the ITU Constitution and Radio Regulations;
- invite the Administration of Lithuania to provide more information regarding the cases of interference affecting IMT systems;
- provide support to the administrations for a bilateral or multilateral meeting to resolve the cases of interference;
- publish newly submitted information on the cases of harmful interference to RNSS receivers on the dedicated webpage; and
- report on progress on the matter to the 103rd meeting of the Board.”

9.3.5 It was so **agreed**.

10 Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran providing information on the Iran International satellite network issues (Document [RRB26-2/3](#))

10.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced Document RRB26-2/3, in which the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Board that the “Iran International” television satellite channel, which was facilitated by technical infrastructure in Slovenia and by Arabsat, was currently utilizing international satellite capacities to broadcast content that promoted violence, incited hatred and was aimed at undermining national security and public order. Such actions constituted a clear violation of several international agreements, including the ITU Constitution and Convention. The Iranian Administration emphasized the need for all Member States to respect the sovereignty and rights of others and ensure that their registered satellite operators did not serve as platforms for spreading violence and incitement. It requested the Bureau and the Board to take immediate and necessary measures within their mandates to address those violations and ensure that the operators ceased providing facilities for the network.

10.2 He noted that the administration had not identified the transmissions as causing harmful interference. Moreover, as the issue involved TV channels, Article **18** of the Radio Regulations and Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** would not apply. It was therefore for the Board to determine the extent to which the Iranian Administration’s request fell within its mandate.

10.3 The **Chair**, responding to a comment from **Mr Cheng** to the effect that some elements of the submission related to Nos. 1 and 7 of the ITU Constitution, said that in her view, the request concerned ITU’s work, but was outside the Board’s mandate.

10.4 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** pointed out that, as provided for in the ITU Constitution and Convention, the Board's mandate focused primarily on the Radio Regulations.

10.5 **Ms Beaumier** said that international satellite capacities were being used to broadcast content that was problematic to the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although the administration had referred to provisions of the ITU Constitution emphasizing the need for telecommunications to be used to promote peaceful relations and highlighted the obligation of operators to avoid harmful interference or activities that disrupted public order, it had not reported any cases of harmful interference, and that was the issue within the Board's remit. Accordingly, while the submission related to ITU's work, it fell outside the mandate of the Board.

10.6 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered Document RRB26-2/3 from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which had provided information on issues concerning the satellite network "Iran International".

The Board noted that the submission had drawn the attention of the Board to issues concerning content broadcast by the satellite network Iran International which fell outside the mandate of the Board."

10.7 It was so **agreed**.

11 Submission providing information on the status of telecommunications infrastructure

Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran providing information on its telecommunications infrastructure issues (Document [RRB26-2/4](#))

Submission by the Administration of the United States relating to the submission received from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran providing information on the Iranian telecommunications infrastructure issues (Document [RRB26-2/16](#))

11.1 The **Director** introduced the submissions contained in Documents RRB26-2/4 and RRB26-2/16, explaining that the issues to which they related cut across several department of the Bureau.

11.2 The **Chair** expressed the view that the matter fell outside the Board's mandate.

11.3 **Mr Fianko**, agreeing with that view, added that the submissions concerned questions of international law and the use of force, on which the Board had no authority to issue findings. It would be inappropriate for it to do so.

11.4 The **Director** suggested that, should the Board reach that conclusion, it should make it clear that what fell outside its mandate was the substance of the matter, rather than the submissions *per se*.

11.5 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered Document RRB26-2/4 from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Document RRB26-2/16 from the Administration of the United States of America.

The Board noted that the submission from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had drawn the attention of the Board to the damage caused to its telecommunication infrastructure by the United States and Israel.

The Board further noted that the Administration of the United States considered that the Islamic Republic of Iran's complaints to ITU were inappropriate.

The Board concluded that the issues raised by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran were outside its mandate."

11.6 It was so **agreed**.

12 Consideration of issues related to Resolution 80 (Rev.WRC-07)

12.1 **Ms Beaumier**, speaking in her capacity as Chair of the Working Group on the Report on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)** to WRC-27, said that the working group had identified various new issues for inclusion in the report to WRC-27: the implementation of Resolutions **170 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**; the recording of assignments under No. **11.41**; compliance of interim satellites with No. **11.44B** and ITU-R Recommendation S.1003; systems not subject to coordination; and the application of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** in conjunction with Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**. Other topics in the report had featured in reports to previous conferences. The working group would continue its deliberations.

12.2 Following a meeting of the Working Group on the Report on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)** to WRC-27, under the leadership of Ms Beaumier, the Board **considered** a first draft of the report. A second draft of the report would be developed and considered at the 103rd meeting of the Board.

13 Confirmation of the next meeting for 2026 and indicative dates for future meetings

13.1 The Board confirmed the dates for the 103rd meeting as 26-30 October 2026 (Room L).

13.2 The Board further tentatively confirmed the dates for its subsequent meetings in 2027, as follows:

- 104th meeting: 5-19 February 2027 (Room L);
- 105th meeting: 24 May–1 June 2027 (Room L);
- 106th meeting: 20-24 September 2027 (Room L).

14 Other business

14.1 Webpage within the Board's website to provide guidance to administrations on requests for the extension of regulatory time-limits

14.1.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, having invited comments from Board members earlier in the meeting on the draft webpage developed by the Bureau to provide guidance to administrations on requests for extension of regulatory-time limits, presented a revised version of the webpage, updated to reflect the feedback received. The title had been aligned with that of the relevant section of the Rules of Procedure to read "Rules concerning the extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use satellite assignments – Guidance to administrations". The Rules of Procedure had been linked. The draft webpage began with an explanation that the Board did not have the mandate to grant requests for extensions of regulatory time-limits for developing countries that did not qualify as cases of *force majeure* or co-passenger delay until a future competent WRC had taken a decision on criteria and conditions in that regard. It contained three sections setting out, respectively, the Opinion of the ITU Legal Adviser on *force majeure* and information to provide in situations of *force majeure* and of co-passenger delay. The sections on situations of *force majeure*

and of co-passenger delay explained the Board's view outlined in its report to WRC-23 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)** that there was no benefit in invoking *force majeure* for a case of co-passenger delay and set out the Board's approach with respect to the use of electric propulsion. The section on *force majeure* also explained the Board's approach regarding in-orbit testing and contingency periods. Following the Board's approval, the webpage would be available on the Board's website under the Special Topics tab. It might also be featured under the Highlights tab.

14.1.2 **Ms Beaumier** and **Ms Mannepalli** thanked the Bureau for developing the draft webpage.

14.1.3 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the draft webpage containing the rules concerning the extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use and bringing back into use frequency assignments to satellite networks/systems and guidance to administrations and thanked the Bureau for the preparation thereof.

The Board decided to include on the webpage a paragraph to clarify that the Board did not currently have the authority to grant extensions of regulatory time-limits from developing countries that did not qualify as cases of *force majeure* or co-passenger delay as it had received several such requests since WRC-23. The Board noted with regret that, despite the Board's previous recommendation and WRC decisions, no ITU-R studies had yet been conducted on specific criteria and conditions upon which the Board could consider granting such extensions. Until those studies had been completed and the corresponding criteria adopted by a WRC, the Board had no authority to grant extensions on that basis.

The Board instructed the Bureau to publish the webpage on the Board's website."

14.1.4 It was so **agreed**.

15 Approval of the summary of decisions (Document [RRB26-2/17](#))

15.1 The Board **approved** the summary of decisions as contained in Document RRB26-2/17.

16 Closure of the meeting

16.1 The **Chair** thanked Board members for their collaborative and constructive approach, which had enabled smooth progress to be made. She also thanked the Vice-Chair and the chairs of the working groups for their efforts and the Director, staff of the Bureau and all others involved in facilitating the work of the Board for their support and guidance.

16.2 Board members expressed appreciation to the Chair for her excellent management and preparation. They also thanked the Vice-Chair, chairs of the working groups, the Director and all secretariat staff for their contributions.

16.3 The **Director** welcomed the trust that existed between the Board and the Bureau. As members consolidated their experience, helped by collegial sharing of knowledge and expertise, the decision-making process became more assured, working methods were streamlined and an atmosphere conducive to consensus-building was created, making it ever more rewarding to support the Board in its work.

16.4 The **Chair**, expressing appreciation for the kind words addressed to her, closed the meeting at 1525 hours on 3 July 2026.

The Executive Secretary:
M. MANIEWICZ

The Chair:
S. HASANOVA