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| **Radio Regulations Board****Geneva, 14–18 July 2025** | ITU official logo_blue_RGB |
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|  | **Document RRB25-2/21-E** |
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| **1st August 2025**  |

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| **Original: English** |
| minutes[[1]](#footnote-2)\* of the99th meeting of the radio regulations board |
| 14–18 July 2025 |

Present: Members, RRB

Mr A. LINHARES DE SOUZA FILHO, Chair
Ms S. HASANOVA, Vice-Chair
Mr A. ALKAHTANI, Mr E. AZZOUZ, Ms C. BEAUMIER, Mr J. CHENG, Mr M. DI CRESCENZO, Mr E.Y. FIANKO, Ms R. MANNEPALLI, Mr R. NURSHABEKOV, Mr H. TALIB

Absent: Mr Y. HENRI

 Executive Secretary, RRB
Mr M. MANIEWICZ, Director, BR

 Précis-writers
Ms S. MUTTI and Ms L. MUNSLOW

Also present: Ms D. TOMIMURA, Deputy to the Director, BR, and Chief, IAP
Mr A. VALLET, Chief, SSD
Mr J.A. CICCOROSSI, Head, SSD/SSS
Mr C.C. LOO, Head, SSD/CSS
Mr D. THAM, Head, SSD/USS
Mr J. WANG, Head, SSD/SPS
Mr A. KLYUCHAREV, SSD/SPS
Mr N. VASSILIEV, Chief, TSD
Mr B. BA, Head, TSD/TPR
Mr H. EBDELLI, acting Head, TSD/BCD
Mr C. RYU, TSD/FMD
Mr K. BOGENS, Head, TSD/FMD
Ms K. GOZAL, Administrative Secretary

|  | **Subjects discussed** | **Documents** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **1** | Opening of the meeting | - |
| **2** | Adoption of the agenda | [RRB25-2/OJ/1(Rev.1)](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-OJ-0001/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/3](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0003/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/4](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0004/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/5](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0005/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/10](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0010/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/11](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0011/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/12](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0012/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/13](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0013/en) |
| **3** | Report by the Director, BR | [RRB25-2/4RRB25-2/4(Corr.1)RRB25-2/4(Add.1)RRB25-2/4(Add.2)RRB25-2/4(Add.3)RRB25-2/4(Add.4)](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0004/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/6](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0006/en) |
| **4** | Rules of Procedure | - |
| **4.1** | List of proposed rules of procedure | [RRB25-2/1](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0001/en)[RRB24-1/1(Rev.4)](https://www.itu.int/md/R24-RRB24.1-C-0001/en) |
| **4.2** | Draft rules of procedure | [CCRR/78](https://www.itu.int/md/R00-CCRR-CIR-0078/en) |
| **4.3** | Comments from administrations | [RRB25-2/5](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0005/en) |
| **5** | Request for the cancellation of the frequency assignments to satellite networks under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations | - |
| **5.1** | Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel frequency assignments to the STATSIONAR-M2 satellite network at 3°W under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations  | [RRB25-2/2](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0002/en) |
| **5.2** | Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel frequency assignments to the CANYVAL-C satellite network under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations | [RRB25-2/3](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0003/en) |
| **6** | Requests to extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to satellite networks/systems | - |
| **6.1** | Submission by the Administration of Norway requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SE-KA-28W satellite network | [RRB25-2/7](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0007/en) |
| **6.2** | Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite system | [RRB25-2/8](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0008/en) |
| **6.3** | Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite network | [RRB25-2/9](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0009/en) |
| **6.4** | Submission by the Administration of Mexico requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignment to the THUMBSAT-1 satellite system | [RRB25-2/10](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0010/en) |
| **6.5** | Submission by the Administration of the Sultanate of Oman regarding an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network | [RRB25-2/13](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0013/en) |
| **6.6** | Submission by the Administration of Nigeria requesting to retain the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network | [RRB25-2/14](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0014/en) |
| **6.7** | Submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network | [RRB25-2/16](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0016/en) |
| **7** | Harmful interference to satellite networks | [RRB25-2/DELAYED/2](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0002/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/14](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0014/en) |
|  | Submission by the Administration of Sweden regarding harmful interference to its satellite networks at the orbital position 5°E | [RRB25-2/6](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0006/en) |
|  | Submission by the Administration of Luxembourg requesting support to resolve cases of harmful interference to its satellite services | [RRB25-2/12](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0012/en) |
| **8** | Harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services | [RRB25-2/DELAYED/1](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0001/en) |
|  | Submission by the Administrations of Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services | [RRB25-2/19](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0019/en) |
| **9** | Issues regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran | - |
|  | Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in its territory | [RRB25-2/11](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0011/en) |
|  | Submission by the Administration of the United States regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran | [RRB25-2/15](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0015/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/8](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0008/en) |
|  | Submission by the Administration of Norway regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran | [RRB25-2/17](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0017/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/7](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0007/en) |
| **10** | Submission by the Administration of Angola acting on behalf of Administrations of 16 Southern African Development Community Member States requesting to allow the submission of eight coordination filings under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** | [RRB25-2/18](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0018/en)[RRB25-2/DELAYED/9](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0009/en) |
| **11** | Confirmation of the next meeting for 2025 and indicative dates for future meetings | - |
| **12** | Other business | - |
| **13** | Approval of the summary of decisions | [RRB25-2/20](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0020/en) |
| **14** | Closure of the meeting | - |

# 1 Opening of the meeting

1.1 The **Chair** opened the 99th meeting of the Radio Regulations Board at 0900 hours on Monday, 14 July 2025, and welcomed the participants. In view of the heavy agenda, the decision had been made to start the meeting half a day early. He was sure that the deliberations would be productive, thanks to the support of all involved. He expressed regret at the absence of Mr Henri for health reasons.

1.2 The **Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau**, speaking also on behalf of the Secretary-General, likewise welcomed the Board members to Geneva. He was thankful to be participating at least remotely, as he was prevented by an accident from taking part in person. He expressed appreciation to Mr Bogens (Head, TSD/FMD) for having agreed to act as secretary of the meeting for the foreseeable future, in addition to his regular duties. He wished the Board a successful meeting and assured it of the Bureau’s support.

1.3 Board members wished both the Director and Mr Henri a speedy and full recovery.

# 2 Adoption of the agenda (Documents [RRB25-2/OJ/1(Rev.1),](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-OJ-0001/en) [RRB25-2/DELAYED/3](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0003/en), [RRB25-2/DELAYED/4](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0004/en), [RRB25-2/DELAYED/5](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0005/en), [RRB25-2/DELAYED/10](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0010/en), [RRB25-2/DELAYED/11](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0011/en), [RRB25-2/DELAYED/12](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0012/en) and [RRB25-2/DELAYED/13](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0013/en))

2.1 **Mr Bogens (Head, TSD/FMD)** said that the 14 delayed documents received by the Bureau could be divided into two groups. Those in the first group (Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12 and 13) were unrelated to any item on the agenda. Those in the second group (RRB25-2/DELAYED/1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14) were related to specific agenda items, namely agenda items 3 (Document RRB25-2/DELAYED 6), 7 (Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED 2 and 14), 8 (Document RRB25-2/DELAYED 1), 9 (Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED 7 and 8) and 10 (Document RRB25-2/DELAYED 9). In response to a query from **Mr Azzouz**, he added that Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/1 and 2 had been received minutes after the deadline; Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/7 and 8 contained the responses of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the contributions under agenda item 9 from the Administrations of Norway and the United States of America, respectively, and had been received after the 10-day deadline for such responses.

2.2 The **Chair** suggested that the Board might wish to defer consideration of the delayed contributions in the first group to its next meeting and to consider the documents in the second group under the relevant agenda items.

2.3 **Ms Beaumier** agreed with that proposal. Regarding Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/3 and 11, from the Administrations of Cyprus and Malaysia, respectively, she noted that similar requests considered by the Board in the past had been presented as requests for extensions for bringing or bringing back into use frequency assignments. The administrations concerned might wish to revisit their submissions accordingly before they were considered by the Board at its 100th meeting.

2.4 **Ms Hasanova** agreed.

2.5 **Ms Beaumier** further noted that the documents submitted under agenda items 6.1 and 6.7 (Documents RRB25-2/7 and 16, submitted by the Administrations of Norway and the United Kingdom, respectively), were almost identical and suggested that those items be discussed together.

2.6 The **Chair** and **Ms Hasanova** concurred.

2.7 **Mr Cheng** also agreed. Referring to agenda item 7, he further noted that, while Document RRB25-2/6 from the Administration of Sweden related only to harmful interference to networks at the orbital position 5°E, Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/14, submitted by the Administration of France, related to harmful interference to a broader range of EUTELSAT satellites. Perhaps the Board should limit its deliberations to harmful interference to networks at the orbital position 5°E.

2.8 **Ms Beaumier** pointed out that it was specifically stated on the cover page of Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/14 that the contribution was submitted in response to Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/2, from the Administration of the Russian Federation, which covered more than networks at the orbital position 5°E. She would have no difficulty in considering the content of Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/14 for information only.

2.9 **Ms Mannepalli**, **Ms Hasanova** and **Mr Talib** said that they were in favour of considering Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/2 and 14 for information, and therefore of deliberating on the broader range of satellites, as had been the case at previous meetings.

2.10 **Mr Azzouz** agreed with the previous speakers. Referring to the references made in several documents to the use of civilian space infrastructure for military or other purposes, he said that the Board should carefully consider how it dealt with the issue. It might in some cases be useful to convene a meeting between the United Nations bodies responsible for the peaceful uses of outer space, the Board and/or the Bureau, and the administrations concerned. In addition, he requested that the Bureau communicate to the administrations whose delayed documents had been deferred to the 100th Board meeting of the possible need to update their submissions before consideration a the 100th meeting.

2.11 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows:

“The draft agenda was adopted as amended in Document RRB25-2/OJ/1(Rev.1). The Board decided to note for information:

• Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/1 under agenda item 8;

• Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/2 and RRB25-2/DELAYED/14 under agenda item 7;

• Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/6 under agenda item 3;

• Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/7 and RRB25-2/DELAYED/8 under agenda item 9;

• Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/9 under agenda item 10.

The Board decided to defer its consideration of Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/3, in which the Administration of Cyprus requested regulatory leniency to bring into use and bring back into use the frequency assignments to the ONETEL-89.5E and KYPROS-ORION satellite networks at 89.5°E, and of Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/11 containing the relevant comments of the Administration of Malaysia, and instructed the Bureau to add the documents to the agenda of the 100th Board meeting. The Board further noted that similar situations had been treated in the past as requests for extension of the regulatory time-limit.

The Board also decided to defer its consideration of Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/4 and RRB25-2/DELAYED/5, in which the Administration of the United Kingdom requested the re-establishment of an independent monitoring campaign under RR No. **15.44** regarding continued harmful interference to emissions of its high-frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article **12**, and of Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/13 containing the response thereto of the Administration of China, and instructed the Bureau to add the documents to the agenda of the 100th Board meeting.

The Board further decided to defer its consideration of Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/10, in which the Administration of Canada requested an extension of the first milestone period (M1) for the MULTUS satellite system to 31 March 2026, and instructed the Bureau to add the document to the agenda of the 100th Board meeting.

Lastly, the Board decided to defer its consideration of Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/12, submitted by the Administration of the Dominican Republic regarding the border situation in the FM sound broadcasting frequency band between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and instructed the Bureau to add the document to the agenda of the 100th Board meeting.

The Board reminded Member States to comply with the deadlines set out in § 1.6 of the Board’s internal arrangements and working methods (Part C of the Rules of Procedure) when submitting contributions to the Board.

The Board noted that some delayed documents might need to be reviewed and updated by the administrations concerned, if needed, before their consideration at the next meeting.”

2.12 It was so **agreed**.

# 3 Report by the Director, BR (Documents [RRB25-2/4](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0004/en), [RRB25-2/4(Corr.1)](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0004/en), [RRB25-2/4(Add.1)](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0004/en), [RRB25-2/4(Add.2)](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0004/en), [RRB25-2/4(Add.3)](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0004/en), [RRB25-2/4(Add.4)](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0004/en) and [RRB25-2/DELAYED/6](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0006/en))

3.1 The **Director** thanked Board members for their good wishes and introduced his customary report in Document RRB25-2/4. All the actions arising from the previous Board meeting set out in Table 1 had been implemented; the draft dedicated webpage for publishing information on cases of harmful interference affecting the radio-navigation satellite service (RNSS) would be shared with Board members during the meeting for validation. Referring to Tables 2-5 to 2-13 in § 2 of the report, he noted that the processing of advance publication information (API) was currently taking 4.2 instead of the usual two months. That could have a serious impact, as many administrations and satellite operators relied on publication within two months to comply with the regulatory requirements set by the launcher. The backlog in terms of coordination requests was returning to normal after having peaked in April 2025.

3.2 Corrigendum 1 to the report contained updated versions of Tables 3-1 and 3-2 in § 3.1, on the implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings. Both tables indicated an unusually high number of late payments or filings cancelled because of non-payment by the United States.

3.3 Turning to § 4 of the report, he said that, while the statistics concerning reports of harmful interference and infringements of the Radio Regulations (RR) during the reporting period to terrestrial services were not out of the ordinary, those concerning space services (Table 4‑3) showed that the Bureau had received a higher than usual number of reports in May 2025, essentially owing to the large number of submissions concerning harmful interference originating in the territory of the Russian Federation and affecting the fixed-satellite service (FSS) transmissions of several United States satellites.

3.4 Referring to § 6 of the report, on the review of findings of frequency assignments to non-GSO FSS satellite systems under Resolution **85 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, he was pleased to announce that the backlog in the processing of reviews of equivalent power flux-density (epfd) limits under Article **22** had caught up with the backlog for the processing of coordination requests; in other words, there was no longer a backlog under the resolution. The Bureau would therefore resume normal publication of coordination requests and would no longer have to establish qualified favourable findings, which had been subject to further review. He applauded that long-awaited achievement and commended the work of the Space Services Department to that end.

3.5 Addendum 4 to his report contained the Bureau’s updated report on cases of harmful interference to receivers in the RNSS. It had been published exceptionally late so as to include the results of the very productive bilateral meetings held under the Bureau’s auspices between the Administration of Israel, on the one hand, and the Administrations of Jordan and Egypt, on the other.

Actions arising from the previous RRB meeting (§ 1 of, and Addendum 4 to, Document RRB25-2/4 and Document RRB25-2/DELAYED 6)

3.6 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** confirmed that all actions arising from the previous RRB meeting in respect of terrestrial services had been implemented.

3.7 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** confirmed that all actions arising from the previous RRB meeting in respect of space services had been implemented. The Bureau’s efforts to organize further meetings between the Administrations of the Russian Federation, France, Sweden and Luxembourg had nevertheless proved futile, as the Administration of the Russian Federation currently saw no reason to attend such meetings.

3.8 **Mr Azzouz**, referring to the requests for extension of a regulatory deadline listed in § 1, said that the development of criteria applying specifically to developing countries needed to be included in the Board’s report under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)** to the 2027 world radiocommunication conference (WRC‑27).

3.9 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, introducing Addendum 4 to Document RRB25-2/4, said that the Bureau had, as instructed by the Board at its 98th meeting, created a draft dedicated webpage for the publication of persistent cases of harmful interference to the RNSS. It had also convened two meetings on the cases of harmful interference involving the Administrations of Egypt, Israel and Jordan. The meetings, which had taken place at ITU headquarters on 10 July 2025, had focused on finding solutions and had taken place in a spirit of goodwill. The Bureau expected that the administrations involved would pursue their discussions and was hopeful that the situation would improve.

3.10 The Bureau continued to receive reports of harmful interference to the RNSS, notably from the Administration of Saudi Arabia, which had explicitly requested the Bureau to draw the Board’s attention to the matter. While the situation appeared likely to improve in one region, in that the administrations concerned were at least meeting and exchanging information, in another the administrations involved were not even talking. Given the persistent nature of the cases, the Bureau recommended that the Board should reiterate to the administrations concerned their obligation to engage in urgent cooperation with a view to resolving the relevant cases in accordance with the ITU Constitution and the Radio Regulations. The Board should also urge administrations to prevent any type of transmission that could adversely affect the RNSS receivers of other administrations.

3.11 Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/6 contained the explicit response of the Administration of Israel to the Board’s decision at its 98th meeting and had been received before the meetings of 10 July. The Administration of Israel did not deny the possible existence of cases of harmful interference to the RNSS of the Administrations of Jordan and Egypt, and said that it would investigate and try to find solutions; it also expressed its commitment to comply with the ITU legal framework.

3.12 **Ms Beaumier** expressed satisfaction at the developments in the cases of harmful interference to the RNSS involving the Administrations of Israel, Jordan and Egypt, and encouraged the parties to continue collaborating to resolve those cases. The Administration of Israel, in particular, should take all necessary action to immediately cease harmful interference affecting safety services. She noted with dismay, however, that despite the joint statement issued by the Secretaries-General of ITU, ICAO and IMO in March 2025, the status of RNSS interference in that and other regions had not improved. She endorsed the Bureau’s recommendations to the Board and was hopeful that the dedicated webpage, once the Board had agreed on its structure and content, would bring greater visibility to the issue and exert pressure on the administrations concerned to resolve the cases.

3.13 **Mr Azzouz** also endorsed the Bureau’s recommendations. In the absence of any meetings in the cases of harmful interference originating from the territory of the Russian Federation, the Board should instruct the Bureau to pursue its efforts to convene bilateral or multilateral meetings and to report back to the Board at the 100th meeting.

3.14 **Ms Mannepalli** said that she was encouraged at the progress made in the cases involving the Administrations of Israel, Jordan and Egypt, in particular that the Administration of Israel had engaged with the other administrations and would investigate the source of the interference. She nevertheless remained concerned at the lack of progress in other regions and agreed with Mr Azzouz on the need for bilateral or multilateral meetings between the administrations concerned. She endorsed the Bureau’s recommendations.

3.15 **Ms Hasanova** thanked all administrations, in particular the Administration of Israel, for their cooperation in resolving harmful interference cases and agreed with other Board members to instruct the Bureau to continue to support those efforts and to report to the next Board meeting.

3.16 **Mr Talib** thanked the Administrations of Israel, Jordan and Egypt for the goodwill they had demonstrated in engaging in constructive exchanges and endeavouring to resolve the cases of harmful interference to the RNSS involving them. The same approach should prevail in the other cases currently before the Board, notably those involving the Administration of the Russian Federation.

3.17 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** presented the draft dedicated webpage developed by the Bureau, at the Board’s behest, for making information on cases of harmful interference affecting the RNSS, associated RRB decisions, applicable provisions of the ITU Constitution and Radio Regulations, recommendations and other relevant information available to the ITU membership and the general public, in order to raise awareness of the issue.

3.18 In reply to a query from **Mr Fianko**, he said that any information or document posted to the webpage could be made available to TIES users only or to the general public. In that regard, **Ms Hasanova** noted that submissions to Board meetings were currently available only to persons with a TIES account, while the Board’s minutes and decisions were public.

3.19 In reply to a query from **Mr Di Crescenzo**, the **Chair** proposed that information on cases of harmful interference to the RNSS that had been resolved should be archived, not deleted.

3.20 The **Director** reminded the Board that the main purpose of *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference was to proactively make public persistent cases of harmful interference. The ITU membership wanted such interference to have consequences, and any information posted to the webpage on harmful interference to the RNSS should focus on that aspect. The webpage should not, however, make public any information that was not already in the public domain.

3.21 The **Chair** and **Mr Azzouz** agreed with that point of view.

3.22 **Mr Fianko**, recalling that it fell to the Board to decide, at the request of an administration, when a case should be listed on the webpage, considered that any statement or executive summary on that case would therefore have to be drafted by the Board, not the Bureau.

3.23 **Ms Beaumier** considered that persons consulting the webpage would expect to find a statement on each case, rather than just a full suite of the relevant documents. The webpage could have two aims: to educate the membership and to exert pressure on the parties causing harmful interference to the RNSS. It should be accessible via the ITU‑R website as opposed to the Board website, to give it greater prominence.

3.24 The **Chair** pointed out that *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) stipulated that “upon request from an administration, RRB may also consider, if appropriate, publishing relevant information on that request on the RRB and BR websites”.

3.25 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, while keeping an open mind on the exact location of the webpage, confirmed that the Bureau would never draft statements on behalf of the Board.

3.26 **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Talib** said that, in line with the Board’s decision at its 98th meeting, the webpage should be published in short order, with Mr Talib adding that there should be an indication that the webpage was dynamic.

3.27 Following further informal discussions on the webpage content, location and accessibility, the **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows on § 1 of Document RRB25-2/4:

“The Board noted all action items under § 1 of Document RRB25-2/4 arising from the decisions of the 98th Board meeting.

The Board considered the draft version of the dedicated webpage developed by the Bureau for the publication, for the ITU membership and the general public, of relevant information and associated Board decisions on cases of harmful interference affecting the RNSS. The Board proposed further improvements and requested the Bureau to publish the revised version on its webpage.

On the bilateral meetings between the Administrations of Israel, on the one hand, and the Administrations of Jordan and Egypt, on the other, to address the cases of harmful interference to the RNSS, the Board thanked the Bureau for having convened such meetings on 10 July 2025 and noted Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/6 from the Administration of Israel for information. The Board further noted with satisfaction that all three administrations had expressed willingness to cooperate for the successful resolution of the issue and decided:

• to encourage all three administrations to pursue such cooperation in goodwill to resolve all cases of harmful interference to the RNSS, in compliance with the ITU Constitution and the Radio Regulations, and to prevent their reoccurrence;

• to urge the Administration of Israel to take all necessary actions to immediately cease harmful interference that adversely impacted safety services and to report on those actions to the 100th Board meeting.

The Board instructed the Bureau to continue to support the efforts of all three administrations, as necessary, to resolve the cases of harmful interference.

On the other cases of harmful interference to RNSS receivers, the Board noted with great concern their persistence despite the 17 March 2025 joint statement from the Secretaries-General of ITU, IMO and ICAO calling for all parties to protect RNSS transmissions and reiterated to the administrations concerned their obligation to cooperate urgently in the resolution of the cases, in compliance with the ITU Constitution and the Radio Regulations. The Board also urged administrations to prevent any type of transmission that could adversely affect the RNSS receivers of other administrations.”

3.28 It was so **agreed**.

Processing of filings for terrestrial and space systems (§ 2 of Document RRB25-2/4)

3.29 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)**, outlining the information contained in the tables on the processing of notices to terrestrial services in § 2.1 of Document RRB24-2/4, said that there was nothing particular to highlight.

3.30 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, drawing attention to the tables on the processing of space notices in § 2.2 of the same document, said that, as was shown inTable 2-5, there was currently a backlog of 4.2 months in the processing of APIs for satellite networks, largely owing to a peak in submissions that was being addressed. Where satellite operators were late in filing APIs, the Bureau was providing letters to launch providers confirming receipt of the said API. It planned to issue a circular to remind administrations of the need to submit APIs well in advance so as to facilitate discussions with other countries and thus prevent harmful interference. The Bureau was concerned that some administrations did not seem to be following the consultation mechanism. It therefore planned to suggest that, at a minimum, APIs should be submitted nine months before launch.

3.31 Table 2-6 showed that the backlog in the publication of coordination requests for satellite networks had peaked in April 2025, with 336 filings under treatment. As reported at the Board’s previous meeting, the Bureau began processing the coordination requests submitted after WRC‑23 in January. Since March, it had started publishing the requests received between December 2023 and April 2024. A continuous examination process was needed: although the treatment time increased in those months when multiple submissions were received, the overall number of filings in treatment was decreasing. He provided an overview of the examination process, explaining that there were plans to perform epfd examinations alongside other technical examinations. While doing so would slow down the examination process, the advantage was that administrations would see only one full publication of the coordination request. Treatment times regarding the processing of satellite networks under Appendices **30**, **30A** and **30B**, and Part I‑S and Part II‑S/Part III‑S examinations were largely being performed within the usual time-frames.

3.32 **Ms Mannepalli**, commending the Bureau for the work carried out, said that she observed that the time-limit for processing coordination requests is consistently being exceeded and was currently four times the prescribed regulatory time-limit, while API treatment time was currently double the prescribed two-month time-limit. She wondered whether it might be worth considering increasing the time-limits, especially in relation to coordination requests. Regarding the proposed circular on API submissions, she pointed out that, according to the Rules of Procedure, APIs were to be filed no later than two months prior to satellite launch, whereas the Bureau was advocating a time-frame of nine months.

3.33 **Mr Azzouz**, also welcoming the Bureau’s efforts in respect of the processing of filings, said that he would nevertheless encourage further actions to bring treatment times into line with the relevant regulatory time-limits, including by assessing whether additional staff were needed to achieve that goal.

3.34 Responding to questions from **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** clarified that, in the circular letter, the Bureau would simply advise administrations of the risks of submitting APIs too close to the launch date and encourage them to file their APIs nine months prior to launch for the reasons already outlined. There were no current plans to seek a change of the relevant rules of procedure or modification of the Radio Regulations in that regard. When it came to efforts to bring processing times into line with regulatory time-limits, he explained that the Bureau was currently working on how best to organize the processing of filings. Since there were no mandatory time-limits for the processing of notifications, which were being handled efficiently, consideration was being given to whether members of the notification team could be assigned to help address backlogs. Should any fixed-term staff be recruited, they would likely be tasked with other elements of processing, thereby freeing up the more experienced engineers to focus on the processing of coordination requests, which was a complex task.

3.35 The Chair **proposed** that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board noted § 2 of Document RRB25-2/4, on the processing of filings for terrestrial and space systems, and encouraged the Bureau to continue to make all efforts to process such filings within the regulatory time-limits, in particular to reduce the processing time for advance publication of information and coordination requests related to space services.”

3.36 It was so **agreed**.

Implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings (§ 3 of, and Corrigendum 1 to, Document RRB25-2/4)

3.37 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** drew attention to § 3.1 of Documents RRB25-2/4 and RRB25-2/4(Corr.1), explaining that Table 3-2 had been updated to reflect the fact that a late payment had been received from the Administration of the United States prior to publication, meaning that two, rather than three, of its filings had been suppressed owing to non-payment. As the Director had noted, there had been an increase in late payments of satellite network filing invoices by that administration; a reminder had been sent regarding the six-month deadline.

3.38 Regarding § 3.2 of Document RRB25-2/4, on Council activities, he reported that the 2025 session of the Council (Council-25) had approved all of the proposals made by the Expert Group on Decision 482, agreeing that, given the significant number of changes, the revised decision would enter into force on 1 January 2026. Those changes included: a) replacing the flat fee for APIs and notifications not subject to coordination with a start fee combined with a linear fee per unit; b) setting specific fees for epfd examinations; and c) establishing additional fees for large or costly filings, which, it was also decided, would not benefit from the free entitlement. Following discussion of a proposal by the secretariat to increase further the fees put forward by the Expert Group, in order to recover indirect costs, it was agreed that in 2026 and 2027 all fees provided for by Decision 482 (C01, last amended C25) would be increased by around 10 per cent in an effort to recoup some of those costs. The Bureau was updating its software to enable administrations to calculate their costs in advance; the software would be made available ahead of the decision’s entry into force. The Council Working Group on financial and human resources had been tasked with devising a methodology for recovery of the indirect costs associated with the processing of satellite network filings, with discussions thereon set to begin in September.

3.39 The Board **noted** §§ 3.1 and 3.2 of Document RRB25-2/4, on late payments and Council activities, respectively, relating to the implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings.

Reports of harmful interference and/or infringements of the Radio Regulations (Article 15 of the Radio Regulations) (§ 4 of Document RRB25-2/4)

3.40 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)**, drawing attention to the tables in § 4 of Document RRB25-2/4, on reports of harmful interference and/or infringements of the Radio Regulations, explained that the Bureau had received 677 communications in the reporting period. Table 4-4 showed that, in March 2025, there had been a spike in reports of infringements, which related to high-frequency band interference between the Republic of Korea and China.

3.41 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that, similarly, in Table 4-3, on cases of harmful interference concerning space services, the number of cases had peaked, in May 2025, owing to interference to several INTELSAT satellites. The Bureau had been copied for information; no action was required to be taken.

3.42 The Board **noted** § 4 of Document RRB25-2/4, containing statistics on harmful interference and infringements of the Radio Regulations.

Harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries (§ 4.1 of Document RRB25-2/4 and Addenda 1, 2 and 3)

3.43 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** drew attention to Addenda 1, 2 and 3 to Document RRB25-2/4, which, he said, constituted the updates received from the Administrations of Slovenia, Italy and France, respectively, on harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands. Brief updates had also been received from the Administrations of Croatia, Malta and Switzerland, all of which had indicated that the situation remained unchanged.

3.44 In its update, on uncoordinated FM and DAB stations, the Administration of Slovenia reported that no improvements to the ongoing interference had been observed. In response, the Administration of Italy reiterated that it continued to issue licences for DAB networks in accordance with its GE06 Plan allotments and, on an exceptional basis, some frequency blocks not allocated to any country. It stressed that the use of unallocated frequency blocks was a temporary measure pending finalization of the Adriatic-Ionian agreement. It rejected the Slovenia Administration’s suggestion that it was ignoring ITU rules and obligations, noting that the problem of interference was limited to the FM band, which was critical for the dissemination of information and cultural content and thus FM stations could not simply be shut down, and stressing that the Administration of Italy was committed to resolving the issue.

3.45 Regarding FM broadcasting, the Italian Administration reported that it had allocated EUR 20 million to a compensation fund for operators who voluntarily returned FM licences in respect of stations suspected of causing harmful interference. The corresponding compensation procedure was being developed, with a view to its implementation in 2026.

3.46 In its contribution, the Administration of France reported briefly on, among other things, progress regarding the long-standing Bonifacio case; efforts made to address a new interference complaint relating to Corsica; various bilateral meetings and discussions; and the status of a methodology for compatibility analysis, which had now been validated by the two administrations.

3.47 Lastly, he added that a multilateral coordination meeting between Italy and its neighbouring countries arranged by the Bureau for June 2025 had been postponed to October owing to those administrations’ upcoming commitments, including Radio Spectrum Policy Group meetings, bilateral meetings and efforts to finalize the Adriatic-Ionian agreement. A report on the multilateral coordination meeting would be presented to the Board at its 100th meeting.

3.48 Responding to questions from **Mr Fianko** and **Ms Hasanova**, he explained that complaints from neighbouring countries regarding the DAB band related only to the fact that the Italian Administration was using unallocated channels, rather than to interference. Regarding the Adriatic-Ionian agreement, a number of bilateral meetings had been held; owing to difficulties in finding solutions between several countries, finalization of the agreement was now foreseen for the end of 2025.

3.49 In response to queries from **Ms Beaumier** and the **Chair** regarding the Italian Administration’s reference in its update to “achieving a new balance in the distribution of spectrum resources”, he clarified that the Italian Administration’s FM stations and future FM requirements exceeded the number of spectrum resources assigned to Italy in the GE84 Agreement, which that administration had not ratified. The administration was therefore seeking to negotiate a redistribution of those spectrum resources with neighbouring countries, so as to match its actual usage thereof.

3.50 **Mr Fianko**, **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Azzouz** and **Mr Cheng** highlighted some positive developments, such as the allocation of financial resources to incentivize the release of FM licences – although the corresponding procedure had yet to be approved – and the progress made on key points involving the Administration of France, including with regard to the draft agreement under RR No. **18.2**, concerning French stations broadcasting from the island of Elba.

3.51 **Mr Fianko** said that he welcomed the Italian Administration’s commitment to developing the DAB platform, notwithstanding its albeit temporary use of unallocated channels, which it was envisaged would be resolved by the forthcoming Adriatic-Ionian agreement. In his view, the long-term solution to the FM interference cases lay in migration to the DAB platform and FM switch-off. The Board should encourage continued progress and advocate greater responsiveness on the Italian Administration’s part, including in relation to the cases reported by the Administration of France.

3.52 **Ms Hasanova** said that she looked forward to confirmation at the Board’s next meeting that the compensation procedure had been finalized. It was disappointing that, overall, there had been no improvement in the long-standing situation. The Board should urge the Italian Administration to step up cooperation, with a view to resolving the outstanding issues as soon as possible.

3.53 **Ms Beaumier** said that, while slow progress was being made, more efforts were needed to expedite solutions to the various cases. Finalizing the Adriatic-Ionian agreement might prove challenging; while the issue of block allocation between Albania, Greece and North Macedonia seemed to have been resolved, another problem affecting a third-party country had apparently been created. The Board should encourage the Italian Administration to take all necessary measures to eliminate harmful interference, including by continuing to address the recommendations arising from the 2024 multilateral coordination meeting. All the parties involved should continue their coordination efforts, with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution. Until such time as the Italian Administration’s hoped-for redistribution of spectrum resources could be agreed, the current allotments and obligations must be respected.

3.54 **Mr Azzouz**, summarizing the situation, said that the Board should reiterate its previous decision, calling for the Administration of Italy to: a) ensure compliance with the Radio Regulations; b) stop issuing any new licences for uncoordinated frequencies; and c) cease the operation of all uncoordinated FM and DAB stations not provided for in the GE06 Plan and the GE84 Agreement. The Italian Administration should be encouraged to pursue its efforts in respect of the Adriatic-Ionian Agreement Group, with a view to finalizing that agreement in short course. The Board should instruct the Bureau to continue providing assistance to all administrations involved and to convene bilateral and multilateral meetings.

3.55 Regarding the FM band, he and **Mr Cheng** noted that the Italian Administration was endeavouring to implement its action plan to address FM band interference. It should, however, redouble its efforts to mitigate the impact of FM interference on neighbouring countries and accelerate progress towards a resolution. Continued discussions were needed between the Italian Administration and the neighbouring countries concerned to arrive at a mutually acceptable and realistic solution regarding the former’s FM band usage.

3.56 **Mr Cheng** added that, while the situation regarding the uncoordinated DAB stations seemed slowly to be improving, the Board should encourage the relevant administrations to accelerate their efforts to finalize the Adriatic-Ionian agreement.

3.57 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered in detail § 4.1 of, and Addenda 1, 2 and 3 to, Document RRB25-2/4, together with updates received from the Administrations of Croatia, Malta and Switzerland, on harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries. The Board noted the following points:

• There had been no improvements regarding the cases of harmful interference to FM broadcasting stations of neighbouring administrations.

• The neighboring administrations had also reiterated their concerns about uncoordinated usage of Italian DAB stations.

• Bilateral discussions were ongoing between some administrations to address those cases.

• The Administration of Italy was issuing licences to DAB stations in accordance with the resources assigned to Italy under the GE06 Plan, and temporarily in blocks not allotted to any country; none of those assignments had been causing harmful interference.

• The Administration of Italy was not issuing any new licences to FM stations and continued to invest considerable efforts in the Adriatic-Ionian Agreement Group, which would enable the countries concerned to implement DAB platforms.

• With respect to the FM band, Italy had allocated EUR 20 million to compensate operators who voluntarily returned their licences for stations causing cross-border interference; the aim was to publish the compensation procedure by the end of 2025 so that it could take effect in 2026.

The Board expressed appreciation for the Italian Administration’s efforts to implement its action plan. However, given that little progress had been made overall towards resolving cases of harmful interference, the Board again strongly urged the Administration of Italy to:

• stop issuing any new licences for uncoordinated frequencies that were not in accordance with the GE06 Plan;

• pursue its efforts to finalize the Adriatic-Ionian Agreement, in order to encourage the transition to the DAB platform and alleviate congestion in the FM band;

• implement the compensation procedure for operators voluntarily returning their licences and switching off their FM broadcasting stations causing interference;

• take all necessary measures to eliminate harmful interference to the FM sound broadcasting stations of neighbouring administrations, focusing on the priority list updated at the 2024 multilateral coordination meeting.

The Board invited all parties involved to continue their coordination efforts.

The Board also thanked the Bureau for its report and the support provided to the administrations concerned. It instructed the Bureau to:

• continue providing assistance to those administrations;

• organize a multilateral coordination meeting between Italy and its neighbouring countries in October 2025;

• continue reporting on progress on the matter, including the results of the 2025 multilateral coordination meeting, to future Board meetings.”

3.58 It was so **agreed**.

Implementation of Nos. 9.38.1, 11.44.1, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49, 13.6 and Resolution 49 (Rev.WRC19) of the Radio Regulations (§ 5 of Document RRB25-2/4)

3.59 The Board **noted** § 5 of Document RRB25-2/4, on the implementation of Nos. **9.38.1, 11.44.1, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49, 13.6** and Resolution **49 (Rev.WRC‑19)** of the Radio Regulations.

Review of findings to frequency assignments to non-GSO FSS satellite systems under Resolution 85 (Rev.WRC‑23) (§ 6 of Document RRB25-2/4)

3.60 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** confirmed that the Bureau’s review of epfd limits under Resolution **85 (Rev.WRC‑23)** had caught up with the coordination requests filed in 2024, i.e. those currently being examined as part of the post-WRC backlog. As a result, there were currently two sets of findings. The first related to a small set of coordination requests received between 16 December 2023 and 8 February 2024 that had been published in June 2025 with qualified favourable findings and that were open for comment for four months. Under Resolution **85 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, the Bureau had to review not only the Article **22** epfd limits under Nos. **9.35/11.31** but also the coordination requirements with respect to larger stations under No. **9.7B**. In order not to muddle the commenting process on the initial coordination request with the review of coordination requirements under No. **9.7B**, the Bureau would wait for the four-month period to expire before reviewing the small set of coordination requests received between 16 December 2023 and 8 February 2024. For coordination requests received after 8 February 2024, however, it would start to conduct the examination with respect to both the Article **22** epfd limits and the coordination requirements under No. **9.7B**. It would therefore stop the practice of establishing qualified favourable findings except when specifically asked to do so by an administration that considered that the current version of the software did not properly model its system.

3.61 As a result, the Bureau’s future reports to the Board on Resolution **85 (Rev.WRC‑23)** would be limited to the relatively few but important cases in which the administration concerned had requested a qualified finding for the above reason; cases that had been published and for which the period for comments was ongoing; and any other non-GSO filings giving rise to a specific issue in terms of the Article **22** epfd limits and the coordination requirements under No. **9.7B**.

3.62 In reply to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, he added that, unfortunately, the working party in charge of developing the methodology to assess the interference environment was ITU‑R Working Party 4A, which had one of the heaviest workloads during the current cycle. Since the absence of standardization of the No. **9.7B** procedure was not directly related to WRC‑27, it was not high on the working party’s agenda. The working party had nevertheless started to review Recommendation ITU‑R S.1526‑1 and had produced a working document on the preliminary draft revision thereof that administrations still wished to examine.

3.63 In reply to a question from **Mr Azzouz**, he said, referring to Table 6.2, that it was not clear whether the NSL‑1 and USASAT-NGSO‑8 satellites currently listed as being under examination would obtain favourable findings; the results of the examination of the NSL‑1 satellite would be published soon but more time would be required for the three USASAT-NGSO‑8 satellites. The Bureau would be sure to inform the Board accordingly.

3.64 The Board **noted** § 6 of Document RRB25-2/4, on the review of qualified favourable findings related to frequency assignments to non-GSO FSS satellite systems under Resolution**85 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, and thanked the Bureau for completing the review of the findings related to epfd limits in Article **22** and coordination requirements under No. **9.7B**.

3.65 The Board **instructed** the Bureau to report on the results of cases listed in Table 6‑2 currently under examination.

Implementation of Resolution 35 (Rev.WRC‑23) (§ 7 of Document RRB25-2/4)

3.66 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced the usual tables in § 7 of Document RRB25-2/4, on the status of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC‑23)** submissions and satellite system deployments. The resolution was having an effect on some filings. Furthermore, many filings were not even being brought into use and therefore did not appear on the table and ended up being suppressed.

3.67 In reply to a question from **Mr Cheng** about the application of *resolves*9 d) of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, whereby notifying administrations had to indicate whether any of the satellites counted as of the expiry of the relevant milestone period had been used to satisfy milestone obligations associated with frequency assignment(s) to any other non-GSO system(s) subject to the resolution and, if so, how many satellites and the identity of the non-GSO system(s) in question, he added that the Bureau would make the relevant information available in Table 7‑2.

3.68 In reply to a comment from **Mr Cheng**, **Ms Beaumier** recalled that the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure had started to consider a number of options put together by the Bureau for the simultaneous bringing or bringing back into use of multiple satellite filings in the case of non-GSO satellites but that it had put the matter on hold while it considered more urgent issues.

3.69 In reply to a query from **Mr Azzouz** regarding Table 7‑2 and discrepancies between the number of space stations deployed and the minimum number that had to be deployed to meet the relevant milestone, **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** said that administrations that were unable to meet milestone requirements were obliged, under *resolves* 11 of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**, to submit modifications to the notification for reducing the size of the constellation proportionally to what had been deployed at that milestone; for example, the Administration of Canada had submitted such a modification for the satellite network COMMSTELLATION to the Bureau that was currently under treatment.

3.70 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** confirmed that the Bureau checked compliance in terms of the number of space stations deployed whenever a milestone period expired. If an administration was found not to have deployed the requested number of space stations, it had to submit a notification reducing the filing.

3.71 The Board **noted** § 7 of Document RRB25-2/4, on implementation of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC‑23)** and **instructed** the Bureau to include additional information in Table 7‑2 on the application of *resolves*9 d) of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC‑23)**.

3.72 Having considered in detail the Report of the Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau, as contained in Document RRB25-2/4, its Corrigendum 1 and its Addenda 1, 2, 3 and 4, together with Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/6, the Board **thanked** the Bureau for the extensive and detailed information provided.

# 4 Rules of Procedure

## 4.1 List of proposed rules of procedure (Documents [RRB25-2/1](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0001/en) and [RRB24-1/1(Rev.4)](https://www.itu.int/md/R24-RRB24.1-C-0001/en))

4.1.1 **Ms Hasanova**, Chair of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, reported that the working group had revised and updated the list of proposed rules of procedure contained in Document RRB25-2/1, adding two more rules at the behest of the Bureau. The first related to Section B6 of Part B of the rules. Regarding the second, which related to a draft modification proposed by the Bureau to the rules of procedure on the receivability of forms of notice generally applicable to all notified assignments submitted to the Bureau in application of the Radio Regulatory Procedures, the working group had decided to submit the draft modification to the Board for approval and circulation to administrations for comment. The working group had also updated Attachment 4, on WRC decisions reflected in the minutes of previous WRC plenary meetings that might be candidates for, or require modifications to, rules of procedure.

4.1.2 The working group had reviewed the proposed modifications to draft rule of procedure B6 published in Annex 1 to Circular Letter CCRR/78, together with the comments received from the Administrations of the Russian Federation, Canada and the United States, and had approved Table 1 with the modification of the title of column 3, “Allocated services”, in line with the proposal from the Administration of Canada. It had modified § 2.2 by adding a note to clarify the term “neighbouring country”, in line with the proposal of the Administration of the Russian Federation, slightly amended. The introduction of the note meant that the modifications to § 2.2 proposed by the Administration of Canada were no longer necessary and that the objections of the Administration of the United States to the proposed modifications to the paragraph were moot.

4.1.3 In the absence of any comments from administrations, the working group had also approved § 3.1*ter*, specifying protection criteria, and § 3.8, the latter with some editorial modifications.

4.1.4 The working group had not accepted the proposal of the Administration of Canada to add the United States to the list of countries in the rule of procedure on No. **5.312A**, as the relevant footnote applied to the mobile service in Region 1 only and therefore only Region 1 countries were listed in No. **5.312A**; it would not be appropriate to add a Region 2 country.

4.1.5 The working group had agreed to add the generic mobile service and fixed-satellite service as protected services in Nos. **5.296A** and **5.457F**, respectively, as proposed by the Administration of Canada, but had deferred a decision on the relevant rule of procedure to the 100th Board meeting, owing to the need to develop the protection criteria for those services.

4.1.6 The Administration of Canada having asked whether the generic mobile service should be included in the protected services in Table 1 of rule of procedure B6 for the band identified for IMT subject to No. **9.21**, the working group had agreed that the Bureau would analyse Table 1 in its entirety to check whether all protected services were correctly listed and report on the results to the 100th Board meeting.

4.1.7 No comments had been received in relation to Annexes 2 and 3 to Circular Letter CCRR/78, on the addition of new rules of procedure on Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** and modifications to the existing rules of procedure on Nos. **9.21** and **9.36**, respectively.

4.1.8 Comments had been received from the Administrations of China and the United States on Annex 4 to Circular Letter CCRR/78, on the addition of a new rule of procedure on No. **13.2**. The Administration of the United States did not believe that a new rule of procedure was required. In view, however, of the interference reports submitted to the current Board meeting, the working group had agreed that a new rule of procedure was essential. In its comments on the draft rule of procedure, the Administration of the United States had also noted that other provisions of the Radio Regulations (e.g. Nos. **8.5** and **11.42**) imposed time-based requirements on administrations causing harmful interference and that there therefore appeared to be a conflict between the timelines in the draft rule of procedure and the existing provisions. In order to address the administration’s concerns, the group had agreed to include a new paragraph in the draft rule of procedure, as follows: “The Board emphasized that the procedure contained in this Rule describes the actions of the Bureau when implementing No. **13.2** but does in no way modify the duties of Administrations in the application of the provisions of the Radio Regulations related to cases of harmful interference, in particular the duty to cease such interference immediately or to promptly investigate the matter.”

4.1.9 The Administration of China had proposed the addition of the following words to section 3 of the draft rule of procedure: “For cases of harmful interference as defined in RR No. **1.169** that are confirmed by the Radiocommunication Bureau …”. It had also proposed that administrations be given 45 rather than 30 days to investigate interference cases. The working group had disagreed with both proposals, on the grounds that administrations had to take immediate action whenever the Bureau received an interference report and that a 45-day period for such action would only delay the process.

4.1.10 Regarding Annex 5 to Circular Letter CCRR/78, on the addition of new rules of procedure on No. **13.6**, the working group had considered the comments received from the Administrations of Canada proposing changes to improve the text, and from the Russian Federation and the United States objecting to the additions. It had agreed to defer consideration of Annex 5 to the 100th meeting and to ask the Board to instruct the Bureau to bring the issue to the attention of Working Party 4A and to continue taking the issue into consideration with current practice.

4.1.11 With regard to the implementation of *resolves*7 of Resolution **8 (WRC‑23)**, the Bureau had started to receive cases in which the provision applied and noted that it was unclear what technical demonstration could be provided under the resolution. In order to process the cases that it had already received, the Bureau proposed that the working group inform the Board of the situation and request the Board’s endorsement for an interim course of action; inform Working Party 4A of the potential difficulty in applying *resolves*7 of Resolution **8 (WRC‑23)** and seek its guidance or clarification; and, until such time as Working Party 4A had clarified the kind of technical demonstration that should be provided under *resolves*7 of Resolution **8 (WRC‑23)** and the methodology that should be followed, request the notifying administration to provide a commitment to comply with the requirements of the provision. The working group had endorsed that approach.

4.1.12 The working group had also initiated a review of the Rules of Procedure and identified a number of rules that might be candidates for transfer to the Radio Regulations. Proposed amendments to the relevant provisions would be considered at the 100th Board meeting.

4.1.13 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows on the matter:

“Following a meeting of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, under the leadership of Ms S. HASANOVA, the Board:

• revised and approved the list of proposed rules of procedure contained in Document RRB25-2/1, taking into account proposals by the Bureau for the revision of certain rules of procedure and proposals for new rules of procedure;

• instructed the Bureau to publish the revised list of proposed rules of procedure on the website and to prepare and circulate those draft rules of procedure well in advance of the 100th Board meeting, to allow administrations enough time to comment, noting that the draft rules of procedure contained in Attachment 4 of Document RRB25-2/1 corresponded to decisions of the WRC‑23 Plenary and that their text was not subject to modification.

The working group also initiated a review of rules of procedure and identified a number of rules that might be candidates for transfer to the Radio Regulations. Proposed amendments to the relevant provisions would be considered at its next meeting.”

4.1.14 It was so **agreed**.

## 4.2 Draft rules of procedure (Document [CCRR/78](https://www.itu.int/md/R00-CCRR-CIR-0078/en))

4.2.1 The **Chair** proposed that Circular Letter CCRR/78 be considered in conjunction with Document RRB25-2/5 under sub-item 4.3.

4.2.2 It was so **agreed**.

## 4.3 Comments from administrations (Document [RRB25-2/5](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0005/en))

4.3.1 The Board had before it Annexes 1 to 4 of the attachment to the draft summary of decisions circulated earlier to Board members and containing the draft new and modified rules of procedure set out in Circular Letter CCRR/78, as amended in the light of the comments made by administrations in Document RRB25-2/5 and of the working group’s deliberations.

ADD rules of procedure on Nos. 5.293, 5.295A, 5.307A, 5.308A and 5.325 (Annex 1 to the summary of decisions)

4.3.2 **Approved,** with effective date of application immediately after approval.

ADD rules of procedure on Resolution 170 (Rev.WRC‑23) (Annex 2 to the summary of decisions)

4.3.3 **Approved,** with effective date of application 1 January 2025.

MOD rules of procedure on Nos. 9.21 and 9.36 (Annex 3 to the summary of decisions)

4.3.4 **Approved**, with effective date of application immediately after approval.

ADD rules of procedure on No. 13.2 (Annex 4 to the summary of decisions)

4.3.5 **Approved**, with effective date of application immediately after approval.

4.3.6 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows:

“The Board discussed in detail the draft rules of procedure circulated to administrations in Circular Letter CCRR/78, along with the comments received from administrations as contained in Document RRB25-2/5. The Board approved the rules of procedure with modifications, as contained in the annexes to this summary of decisions.

The Board decided to defer its consideration of the draft rule of procedure on No. **13.6**,contained in Annex5 to CCRR/78, to the next Board meeting and instructed the Bureau to bring the content of the rules of procedure on No. **13.6** to the attention of Working Party 4A.”

4.3.7 It was so **agreed**.

# 5 Request for the cancellation of the frequency assignments to satellite networks under No. 13.6 of the Radio Regulations

## 5.1 Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel frequency assignments to the STATSIONAR-M2 satellite network at 3°W under No. 13.6 of the Radio Regulations (Document [RRB25-2/2](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0002/en))

5.1.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/2, in which the Bureau justified its request to cancel the frequency assignments to the STATSIONAR-M2 satellite network of the Russian Federation, for which the period of validity had expired. He explained that in both cases that were before the Board, the Bureau had followed the usual procedure in accordance with RR No. **13.6** by requesting the administrations concerned to provide evidence of continuous operation of the satellite network and to identify the actual satellite currently in operation, followed by two reminder letters, to which no response had been received. The Bureau was therefore requesting a decision by the Board to cancel the attendant frequency assignments and remove them from the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR).

5.1.2 **Mr Talib**, **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Azzouz**, noting that the Bureau had acted in accordance with No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations, agreed that both of the cases being considered met the requirements for cancellation and removal. **Ms Mannepalli** observed that, in the case of the STATSIONAR-M2 satellite network, the Administration of the Russian Federation had been informed in October 2024 that the Bureau would request a decision of the Board on cancellation of those frequency assignments.

5.1.3 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered the request made by the Bureau in Document RRB25-2/2 for a decision on the cancellation of the frequency assignments to the STATSIONAR-M2 satellite network under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations. The Board considered that the Bureau had acted in accordance with No. **13.6** in that it had requested the Administration of the Russian Federation to provide evidence that the STATSIONAR-M2 satellite network remained operational and to identify the actual satellite currently in operation, followed by two reminders, but had received no response. Consequently, the Board instructed the Bureau to cancel the frequency assignments to the STATSIONAR-M2 satellite network in the MIFR.”

5.1.4 It was so **agreed**.

## 5.2 Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel frequency assignments to the CANYVAL-C satellite network under No. 13.6 of the Radio Regulations (Document [RRB25-2/3](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0003/en))

5.2.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/3, in which the Bureau justified its request to cancel the frequency assignments to the CANYVAL-Csatellite network of the Republic of Korea, for which the period of validity had expired.

5.2.2 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered the request made by the Bureau in Document RRB25-2/3 for a decision on the cancellation of the frequency assignments to the CANYVAL-C satellite network under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations. The Board considered that the Bureau had acted in accordance with No. **13.6** in that it had requested the Administration of the Republic of Korea to provide evidence that the CANYVAL-C satellite network remained operational and to identify the actual satellite currently in operation, followed by two reminders, but had received no response. Consequently, the Board instructed the Bureau to cancel the frequency assignments to the CANYVAL-C satellite network in the MIFR.”

5.2.3 It was so **agreed**.

# 6 Requests to extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to satellite networks/systems

## 6.1 Submission by the Administration of Norway requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SE-KA-28W satellite network (Document [RRB25-2/7](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0007/en))

6.1.1 **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/7, in which the Administration of Norway requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use the SE-KA-28W satellite network to 15 July 2027, on the grounds of *force majeure*. He noted that, under agenda item 6.7, the submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom (Document RRB25-2/16), concerning the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network, was almost identical in content (see §§ 6.7.1–6.7.4 below).

6.1.2 Summarizing the submission, he said that the SE-KA-28W satellite network had been suspended on 17 December 2022; the regulatory time-limit for bringing its frequency assignments back into use was 17 December 2025. The satellite network was intended to support the operation of the INMARSAT-6 F2 satellite, which had been launched on 18 February 2023. During orbit raising, however, the satellite had suffered a *force majeure* event: a major power subsystem anomaly had rendered the battery unusable and the command distribution network had been damaged. The manufacturer’s investigation had identified micrometeorite impact as the cause. The satellite had been declared a total loss and passivated in its current orbit. The administration asserted that the situation met the four *force majeure* conditions.

6.1.3 The INMARSAT GX-7 satellite had been identified as the best option for bringing back into use the SE-KA-28W satellite network’s frequency assignments. The contract for construction of the GX-7 satellite had been signed on 29 May 2019; delivery was estimated for the final quarter of 2026. SpaceX planned to launch the GX-7 within two months of the satellite’s delivery; geostationary orbit was expected to be reached sometime between mid-April and mid-July 2027. In view of the uncertain delivery date, the administration was requesting an extension to 15 July 2027. The supporting documentation included correspondence between Airbus and Viasat on the investigation into the damaged INMARSAT-6 F2 satellite; information on the frequency bands – namely C-, Ka- and L-bands – that INMARSAT-6 F2 had supported; and confirmation of the ongoing construction of the INMARSAT GX-7.

6.1.4 In response to a question from **Ms Mannepalli**, he clarified that the SE-KA-28W satellite network operated in the Ka-band at 19.7-20.2 GHz and 29.5-30 GHz; the lost INMARSAT-6 F2 satellite and the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network operated in the C-, L- and Ka-bands; and the INMARSAT GX-7 satellite supported the Ka-, Q- and V-bands, although only the Ka-band was the subject of the current submission.

6.1.5 **Ms Mannepalli** said that, while, at first glance, the *force majeure* conditions appeared to have been met, insufficient evidence had been provided to substantiate the facts. The 2019 contract to manufacture the INMARSAT GX-7 satellite, for example, had not been provided, nor had the launch service contract with SpaceX. There was no information to explain why the original delivery date of 29 June 2023 had not been met, no indication of the progress made in the satellite’s construction and nothing to substantiate the launch window and project milestones. It would be interesting to know what alternative options had been explored, since satellites operating in the Ka-band were relatively common.

6.1.6 **Mr Azzouz** said that it would be useful to have an account of the events that had led to the suspension of the SE-KA-28W satellite network. He considered that the situation met the four *force majeure* conditions. He noted that, in the information provided, the timelines for assembly, final testing, launch and orbit raising of the INMARSAT GX-7 satellite had been provided. Given that the GX-7 was expected to reach its orbital position sometime between April and July 2025, he was inclined to accede to the request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use the frequency assignments to the Norwegian SE-KA-28W satellite network and to the United Kingdom INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network to 15 July 2027.

6.1.7 **Ms Beaumier**, recalling that a list of information required to facilitate the Board’s consideration of a request for extension due to *force majeure* had been endorsed by WRC‑23 (see § 13.4 of Document WRC23/528), said that the situation seemed to qualify as a *force majeure* event – the micrometeorite impact could have been neither foreseen nor prevented. However, there was insufficient supporting evidence to enable the Board to conclude that all four *force majeure* conditions, particularly that the event had made it impossible for the obligor to perform its obligation, had been met. Given that the *force majeure* event had occurred more than two years previously, it was unclear why it had not been possible to meet the regulatory time-limit. Since Inmarsat and Viasat had extensive resources, it would be helpful to know whether consideration had been given to relocating or temporarily leasing other in-orbit assets that supported the Ka-band and why the INMARSAT GX-7 was considered the only feasible option. In addition, as the timeline for the GX-7 satellite’s delivery and the launch window remained vague due to the ongoing construction, some contingencies had evidently been built into the extension requested. She was of the view that the Board should request additional information and seek updated timelines on delivery and launch so that a more precise period of extension could be determined, for consideration at the Board’s next meeting, which was being held before the regulatory time-limit expired.

6.1.8 **Mr Cheng** said that he had reached a similar conclusion: certain aspects of the case remained unclear. Information was missing as to why the SE-KA-28W satellite network had been suspended on 17 December 2022; whether the INMARSAT-6 F2, launched on 18 February 2023, would have reached the 28°W orbital position before expiration of the December 2025 regulatory time-limit, if not for the *force majeure* event; and why construction of the INMARSAT GX-7 satellite, which had been commissioned in 2019, would not be completed before the end of 2026. Supporting documentation regarding the launch provider contract, apparently signed in 2014, was absent, as was information to verify the 130 days required for orbit raising. He agreed that the Board could not accede to the extension request at the current time and that the administrations involved should be invited to submit additional information to the Board’s next meeting.

6.1.9 **Mr Nurshabekov**, **Ms Hasanova** and **Mr Fianko** agreed with other Board members that, while the damage caused to the satellite seemed to qualify as a *force majeure* event, information was missing, such as the launch contract; an explanation of the efforts made to meet the regulatory time-limit, given that the *force majeure* event had occurred in 2023; and more detail about the timelines. The Board could not accede to the request at the current time; more information should be provided.

6.1.10 **Mr Talib** said that, to his mind, the four *force majeure* conditions had been met: the loss of the satellite had clearly been beyond the control of the administrations involved and a replacement satellite had been identified and was under construction. There was, however, a lack of information covering the period between 14 August 2023 – the date of the *force majeure* event – and the last quarter of 2026. In addition, the requested extension to 15 July 2027 had not been substantiated. He agreed with other Board members that more information should be requested.

6.1.11 **Mr Di Crescenzo** said that he, too, was of the view that the case met the criteria for a *force majeure* event. He nevertheless agreed that more evidence was needed.

6.1.12 **Mr Azzouz** pointed out that the administration had explained that it had worked with the satellite operator to identify a suitable replacement, concluding that the INMARSAT GX-7 was the best option. It had provided information on timelines, which had been set by the manufacturer and launch service provider. As far as he was concerned, the case qualified as a *force majeure* event. He nevertheless had no objection if the Board wished to request further information in order to define the exact period of extension.

6.1.13 **Ms Mannepalli**, supported by the **Chair**, said that there were doubts as to whether the third condition of *force majeure* – that the event had made it impossible to meet the regulatory time-limit – had been met. The administration needed to provide substantive evidence of its efforts on that score.

6.1.14 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“Having considered in detail the request of the Administration of Norway for an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the SE-KA-28W satellite network, as presented in Document RRB25-2/7, the Board noted the following points:

• The SE-KA-28W satellite network had been suspended on 17 December 2022, and the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use the frequency assignments to the network was 17 December 2025.

• The SE-KA-28W satellite network was intended to support the operation of the INMARSAT‑6 F2 (I‑6 F2) satellite, which had been successfully launched on 18 February 2023 but had suffered a force majeure event and been declared a total loss after a micrometeorite had damaged the satellite power system during orbit raising.

• The INMARSAT GX-7 (GX-7) satellite had been identified as the best option for bringing back into use the frequency assignments to the SE-KA-28W satellite network filing in the Ka band at the earliest possible time. The contract to manufacture the satellite had been signed on 29 May 2019. The satellite was expected to be delivered by the last quarter of 2026 and to reach its geostationary satellite orbit between April and July 2027.

In assessing the case against the four conditions of *force majeure* and the duration of the requested extension, the Board noted that:

• the administration had not demonstrated that it had pursued every option to avoid missing the regulatory time-limit and that every effort had been made to limit the extension period;

• the timeline for satellite delivery by the manufacturer remained vague and no launch window had been established, with no contract or supporting evidence from the launch service provider;

• the requested extension to 15 July 2027 included contingencies.

The Board concluded that, while there were elements of *force majeure* in the request, there was currently insufficient information to determine whether the situation met all the conditions required to be considered as a case of *force majeure*. The Board therefore invited the Administration of Norway to provide additional information in sufficient detail to describe the options considered as well as the efforts and measures taken to avoid missing the deadline. The initial and revised project milestones for the construction and launch of the GX-7 satellite, before and after the *force majeure* event, should also be provided, including evidence of a contract with the launch service provider and the latest status of the satellite construction.”

6.1.15 It was so **agreed**.

## 6.2 Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite system (Document [RRB25-2/8](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0008/en))

6.2.1 **Mr Tham** **(Head, SSD/USS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/8, in which the Administration of the Republic of Korea requested a further two-month extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite system, from 31 December 2025 to 28 February 2026, on the grounds of *force majeure*. At its 94th and 97th meetings, the Board had granted extensions of the time-limit, to 31 March 2025 and to 31 December 2025, respectively, on the grounds of co-passenger delay. In the meantime, the launch provider, Arianespace, had proposed a new launch window up to 28 February 2026, owing to delays in the preparation of the co-passenger for the dual launch. The annexes to the document contained letters from Arianespace confirming the delays and the launch services contract for the satellite.

6.2.2 **Ms Beaumier** noted that the Administration of the Republic of Korea continued to refer to the case as one of *force majeure*, even though the Board had determined in its previous decisions that it was a case of co-passenger delay. All the aspects noted by the Board at its previous meetings remained valid and she therefore saw no difficulty in granting the administration’s request for a further extension to the end of the new launch window, i.e. 28 February 2026, on the grounds of co-passenger delay.

6.2.3 **Ms Mannepalli, Mr Talib, Mr Fianko, Mr Cheng, Ms Hasanova** and **Mr Nurshabekov** agreed with that point of view.

6.2.4 **Mr Azzouz** also agreed with that point of view, noting that the extension requested was qualified and limited.

6.2.5 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows on the matter:

“The Board considered the submission from the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting a two-month extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite system, to 28 February 2026, as presented in Document RRB25-2/8, and noted the following points:

• The launch service provider had again postponed the launch of the KOMPSAT-6 satellite due to delays in the preparation of the co-passenger for the dual launch.

• While the Administration of the Republic of Korea had invoked *force majeure*, the situation qualified as a case of co-passenger delay.

• The extension requested, from 31 December 2025 to 28 February 2026, was qualified and limited.

Consequently, the Board decided to accede to the request from the Administration of the Republic of Korea by extending the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite system to 28 February 2026.”

6.2.6 It was so **agreed**.

## 6.3 Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite network (Document [RRB25-2/9](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0009/en))

6.3.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/9, in which the Administration of the Republic of Korea provided additional information pertaining to its request to the 98th Board meeting for an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite network on the grounds of *force majeure*. The *force majeure* event initially invoked had been the partial suspension of the export licence, on 2 March 2022, following the onset of the Russian Federation-Ukraine crisis. The initial launch services agreement with Glavkosmos had been amended as a result and a new launch services agreement concluded with SpaceX. As indicated by SpaceX, the initial plan had been to launch the satellite as part of a “cakeplatter” mission from 1 February to 31 December 2025. Attempts to complete the launch manifest had been unsuccessful, however, and the earliest available launch windows had been delayed until 1 February 2026 to 30 April 2026 and 1 June 2026 to 31 August 2026. In its submission, the Korean Administration requested an extension of approximately seven months, from 30 January to 31 August 2026, and set out how, in its view, the request met the four conditions for the case to qualify as one of *force majeure*.

6.3.2 **Ms Beaumier** thanked the Administration of the Republic of Korea for providing a more complete submission and for demonstrating clearly how the situation satisfied the first three conditions to qualify as a case of *force majeure*: the satellite had been completed in 2021 but could not be shipped for its planned launch on a Soyuz rocket owing to the export control measures. Under a new launch service contract signed with SpaceX in 2023, the launch would have taken place by the end of December 2025, i.e. before the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments, had it not been for other delays in the form of contractual payload manifest coordination issues within SpaceX. Because of those issues, which were internal to SpaceX, the launch window had been postponed to 2026, but for two missions: the CAS500-4 satellite network and the CAS500-2 network. In her view, those delays should have been explained in greater detail in the submission. That said, the Board knew from the previous submission (Document RRB25-1/19) that SpaceX had encountered difficulties in finding two other spacecraft to complete what it termed the “cakeplatter” configuration. It was the co-passenger delays consequential to the change of launch service provider that, coming on top of the *force majeure* event, had ultimately made it impossible to meet the regulatory time-limit. She therefore concluded that all four conditions for the case to qualify as one of *force majeure* had been met.

6.3.3 On the other hand, the submission from the Korean Administration contained no justification for an extension until 31 August 2026 when an earlier window was available up to 30 April 2026. She was therefore in favour of granting an extension to 30 April 2026.

6.3.4 **Mr Azzouz** and **Ms Mannepalli** endorsed that analysis of the situation. They could also agree to an extension up to 30 April 2026, with Mr Azzouz adding that the Board’s decision should make it clear that the Board did not grant extensions long enough to cover any contingencies that might arise.

6.3.5 **Mr Cheng** agreed with the previous speakers. He nonetheless pointed out that the five satellites in the CAS500 programme were identical and wondered whether they were bringing into use the same filings. If the first satellite in the programme was still operational, there was no need for an extension.

6.3.6 **Mr Ciccorossi** pointed out that, even if the satellites’ network filings were identical and notified by the same administration, they were still valid to coexist from a regulatory standpoint.

6.3.7 **Mr Fianko** agreed with previous speakers that the Board could grant an extension to 30 April 2026. He noted, however, that the launch service agreement appended to Document RRB25-2/9 was heavily redacted. The explanation for why the Korean Administration had opted for the later launch window might be found in the redacted sections of the agreement. The Board’s decision should specifically note that the administration had provided no explanation of why it had chosen the second window instead of the first.

6.3.8 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows on the matter:

“Having considered in detail the submission of the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite network, as presented in Document RRB25-2/9, the Board noted the following points:

• Satellite construction had been completed in 2021 and a launch scheduled on a Soyuz rocket in 2022, but export control measures introduced after the Russian Federation/Ukraine crisis had made it impossible to transport the satellite to the launch site.

• The administration had signed a new launch service contract with SpaceX in 2023, with the launch initially scheduled for December 2025, before the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments of 30 January 2026.

• Due to contractual and payload manifest coordination issues within SpaceX, including difficulties in finding two other spacecraft to complete the ‘cakeplatter’ manifest and configuration, the launch window had been postponed to 2026.

• Two launch windows had been provided for the CAS500-2 and CAS500-4 missions: 1 February to 30 April 2026 and 1 June to 31 August 2026.

• The administration had requested an extension to 31 August 2026 but had provided no justification for the selection of the second launch window when an earlier one was available.

Based on the information provided at the current and the previous Board meetings, the Board concluded that the case met all the conditions to qualify as a situation of *force majeure* and decided to accede to the request from the Administration of the Republic of Korea by extending the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite system to 30 April 2026.”

6.3.9 It was so **agreed**.

## 6.4 Submission by the Administration of Mexico requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignment to the THUMBSAT-1 satellite system (Document [RRB25-2/10](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0010/en))

6.4.1 **Mr Ciccorossi** **(Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/10, in which the Administration of Mexico requested a further extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignment to the THUMBSAT-1 satellite system, a picosatellite operating in the 400 MHz range. He said that, at its 98th meeting, the Board had decided to accede to the Administration’s previous request by extending the seven-year regulatory time-limit of 9 March 2025 to 31 March 2025 on the grounds of co-passenger delay. The administration was now requesting a further extension to 31 August 2025.

6.4.2 With reference to its previous submission (Documents RRB25-1/18 and RRB25-1/DELAYED/6), the Administration of Mexico explained that it had requested a six-month extension of the regulatory time-limit owing to co-passenger delay. Having reviewed the minutes of the Board’s 98th meeting, the administration had come to understand that ambiguities in its original submission had regrettably caused some confusion with regard to the extension requested. The Board had thus granted an extension that, in the administration’s view, was somewhat restrictive, given that the delays described had been beyond its control. In its latest submission, the administration clarified that, while Beijing CAS Space, with whom it had signed a launch service contract in December 2024, had set an initial launch date of 30 March 2025, it had also provided for the possibility of postponement to the third quarter of 2025. On 14 March, Beijing CAS Space had notified the administration that the mission was now scheduled for launch on 30 July, while emphasizing that further changes were possible. Subsequently, on 24 May, Beijing CAS Space communicated that the launch window might be extended to 31 August.

6.4.3 Following a request for clarification from **Mr Talib**, he explained that, while the Administration of Mexico had initially sought an extension of up to six months beyond the regulatory time-limit of 9 March 2025, it was asking for an extension to 31 August, not 9 September.

6.4.4 **Ms Mannepalli** said that, at its 98th meeting, the Board, having considered the information provided, about which there had been some confusion, had decided to grant an extension on the grounds of co-passenger delay to 31 March 2025. In the latest submission, it was explained that, owing to the failure of the Y-6 mission and delays to the primary payload, the launch date had been postponed. In a letter dated 24 May, Beijing CAS Space had notified the administration of a 15 July launch date and a launch window of up to 31 August. In the light of the updated information and the documents provided, she was of the view that the situation was a continuation of the ongoing co-passenger delay and was inclined to accede to the Mexican Administration’s request.

6.4.5 **Mr Azzouz**, recalling the Board’s previous decision, said that he was satisfied that the additional request was for a limited and qualified extension of the regulatory time-limit on the grounds of co-passenger delay. The launch had been subject to several delays and had officially been postponed by the launch service provider. He, too, supported an extension to 31 August 2025.

6.4.6 **Mr Fianko**, **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Talib** and **Ms Hasanova** agreed that the situation qualified as a case of co-passenger delay and that, based on the explanation and supporting documentation provided, they, too, would support an extension of the regulatory time-limit to 31 August 2025. **Ms Beaumier** expressed appreciation for the information provided by the Mexican Administration, in which it had acknowledged the ambiguity of aspects of its previous submission.

6.4.7 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board carefully considered Document RRB25-2/10, in which the Administration of Mexico requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the THUMBSAT-1 satellite network. The Board noted the following points:

• The Board had previously granted the THUMBSAT-1 satellite system an extension on the grounds of co-passenger delays to 31 March 2025.

• The launch had again been postponed due to co-passenger delays and a new launch window had been scheduled: 15 July to 31 August 2025.

Based on that information and the supporting evidence provided, the Board decided to extend the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignment to the THUMBSAT-1 satellite system to 31 August 2025.”

6.4.8 It was so **agreed**.

## 6.5 Submission by the Administration of the Sultanate of Oman regarding an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network (Document [RRB25-2/13](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0013/en))

6.5.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** said that, in Document RRB25-2/13, the Administration of Oman had provided further information, as requested by the Board at its 98th meeting, to substantiate its requested extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network, on the grounds of *force majeure*, as detailed in Documents RRB25-1/21 and RRB25-1/DELAYED/5. Notwithstanding the delays in bringing into use the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network’s frequency assignments, progress had been made: the process for selecting a satellite manufacturer was in its final stages and a contract was expected to be signed in the last quarter of 2025, with launch planned for 2028.

6.5.2 At its 98th meeting, the Board had acknowledged some evidence of *force majeure* and sought additional information. In response, the administration had submitted the following: details of the long-term plans for the operation of the satellite network; an explanation of the arrangements made to procure an interim satellite to bring into use the frequency assignments within the regulatory time-limit; confirmation that the power available on the OG2 interim satellite was sufficient to comply with the requirements of RR No. **11.44B**; and clarification of the timelines specified in the contract for commissioning and orbit raising of the primary and secondary payloads. The supporting documentation included a copy of the satellite tender process, correspondence concerning negotiations with several satellite manufacturers and a communication confirming the OG2 satellite’s capabilities. The administration was requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to 31 December 2025.

6.5.3 **Ms Beaumier** recalled that the satellite project, which was of critical importance to the Administration of Oman and would connect remote and underserved communities, had been initiated in 2021 but had faced delays for various reasons, including the administration’s lack of experience in managing satellite projects, frequency coordination-related challenges, higher than expected costs, and the adverse global economic conditions attributable to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. She said that significant progress had nevertheless been made, with final negotiations on a manufacturing contract under way and 14 out of 16 frequency coordination agreements having been signed. The administration had invested considerable time and resources in building a satellite and in meeting the regulatory requirements.

6.5.4 Regarding the *force majeure* conditions evoked – namely rescheduling by the launch provider (SpaceX) and, subsequently, a co-passenger delay – the Board had previously queried why the administration had left so little time, less than eight months, to procure a gap-filler satellite and bring into use the frequency assignments within the time-limit. According to the information received, the process of procuring an interim satellite had begun 18 months before the time-limit, although some of that time had been spent on obtaining government approvals. The assumptions regarding the initial mission profile and timelines were well explained; to her mind, however, they were valid only if the OG2 satellite was to be released first, since the primary payload provider had not been selected at that time. While she agreed that the two-month delay imposed by the launch provider qualified as a case of *force majeure*, she considered that the delays attributable to adjustments in the mission profile would have been foreseeable, even if irresistible, by more experienced administrations. Given that Oman was a developing country embarking on its first satellite project, its inexperience had undoubtedly contributed to the lack of contingency planning. It was on that basis only that the additional 69 days requested for the mission profile adjustment could qualify as a *force majeure* event. She was therefore inclined to support granting the requested extension for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network, since it was qualified and limited to seven months, to 31 December 2025.

6.5.5 **Ms Hasanova** and **Mr Fianko**, noting that the additional information provided by the administration had allayed the Board’s concerns, expressed support for granting the requested extension of the regulatory time-limit to 31 December 2025.

6.5.6 **Mr Talib**, **Mr Cheng** and **Mr Nurshabekov**, expressing appreciation for the detailed information and supporting evidence provided and drawing attention to the fact that Oman was a developing country launching its first satellite, observed that the administration had been diligent in its efforts to meet its regulatory requirements and voiced support for granting an extension to 31 December 2025.

6.5.7 **Mr Azzouz**, outlining the chronology of the case, recalled that the project had faced various delays beyond the administration’s control and that a decision on the satellite manufacturer had been deferred, in 2021, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. He said that, according to the additional information submitted, the administration was in the closing stages of negotiations with satellite manufacturers, the shortlisted bidders having submitted their final offers on 13 June 2025. While Oman was a developing country, it had made great strides in terms of securing the requisite budget, reaching coordination agreements with other administrations and preparing for the launch of the OG2 interim satellite in order to bring into use the frequency assignments within the time-limit. The planned launch of the OG2 satellite in May 2025, which would have ensured delivery at the orbital position ahead of the regulatory time-limit of 7 June 2025, had been delayed for reasons of co-passenger delay.

6.5.8 Regarding the length of extension, he noted that the launch of the OG2 satellite, which was now scheduled for 24 August 2025, would take 21 days, commissioning would require a further 14 days, and orbital transfer and orbit raising would last a combined 69 days. The satellite would therefore arrive at its deployment location 104 days after launch, or by 6 December 2025, according to the timelines set out in Document RRB25-2/13. While he would not oppose the majority view of Board members, he considered that the Board should grant an extension to 6 December 2025.

6.5.9 **Ms Mannepalli** said that, in response to the Board’s request at its 98th meeting, the Administration of Oman had provided further information, notably an in-depth explanation of the planned long-term operation of the frequency assignments. It had also outlined the rationale with regard to making alternative arrangements, following the various delays and challenges it faced, to bring into use the frequency assignments within the regulatory time-limit by procuring an interim satellite. According to Document RRB25-2/13, efforts to secure and bring into use that interim satellite had begun much earlier. She had some sympathy for the administration, which had dealt with complex challenges, such as having to coordinate with multiple administrations, and had faced a steep learning curve. She was therefore in favour of granting an extension of the regulatory time-limit of 7 June 2025 to either 6 December 2025, as Mr Azzouz had suggested, or 31 December 2025, the date the administration had requested.

6.5.10 **Ms Beaumier** said that, on further reflection, the requested extension to 31 December 2025 seemed to include three weeks of contingency; while there was some sympathy for a developing country launching its first satellite, no justification had been provided for the additional time-frame. As the launch was scheduled for 24 August – just over a month away – it was reasonable to expect a short launch window. While she would abide by the majority view of Board members, the Board’s decisions had to be consistent: the Board did not generally include contingencies when granting extensions. At the same time, she noted that it was not uncommon for launch dates to be affected by short delays. She therefore proposed granting an extension that took those elements into account. **Mr Di Crescenzo** concurred with that approach.

6.5.11 **Mr Talib** and **Ms Hasanova** said that, while they understood Ms Beaumier’s concerns, they were inclined to grant the requested extension to 31 December in view of the additional information that had been provided. **Ms Hasanova** added that if the administration suffered any delay, it would be forced to submit a further request to the Board at its next meeting, to which several submissions had already been deferred.

6.5.12 **Mr Fianko** said that the Board should adhere to its principles and ensure consistency. Since it did not generally include contingencies when granting extensions, he would favour an extension based on the calculations the administration itself had provided. Should there be any slippage in the launch of the OG2 satellite, the administration could submit another request to the Board’s next meeting, which was in November 2025 – before the satellite was due to reach the orbital position.

6.5.13 **Ms Mannepalli** agreed on the need for consistency of approach, noting that Mr Azzouz had provided a useful overview of the timelines. Since no justification had been provided for an extension beyond 6 December, the question was whether to grant the extension to 6 December only or to provide some leeway to account for short delays.

6.5.14 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** pointed out that arrival at the orbital position on 6 December was contingent upon a 24 August launch. It was not unusual, however, for the actual launch date to vary slightly from the planned date: meteorological conditions, for example, might cause short delays. The Board might therefore consider incorporating a small margin in the extension granted; otherwise, if launch was delayed by even one day, the administration would be forced to seek another extension. **Mr Azzouz** agreed that launch dates could be affected by the prevailing weather conditions.

6.5.15 Following a discussion in which the **Chair**, **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Cheng** and **Mr Fianko** took part, **Mr Fianko** said that a deadline of 13 December would be appropriate, since it provided for a seven-day window after the planned launch date, thereby accounting for any short delays.

6.5.16 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered in detail Document RRB25-2/13, which complemented Documents RRB25-1/21 and RRB25-1/DELAYED/5 presented at the 98th Board meeting and in which the Administration of Oman requested a seven-month extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network, to 31 December 2025. The Board noted the following points:

• The Administration of Oman had invested much time and effort to build and launch the country’s first national telecommunication satellite and to fulfil all the ITU regulatory requirements but faced difficulties that delayed progress.

• Negotiations for the selection of a manufacturer were in the final stages and a contract was expected to be signed in the fourth quarter of 2025 for a launch in the second half of 2028.

• Frequency coordination agreements had been concluded with 14 out of 16 affected administrations.

• The process to procure an in-orbit satellite had begun 18 months before the regulatory time-limit but necessitated additional government approvals that had delayed the selection process.

• The power available on the OG-2 satellite was sufficient to comply with RR No. **11.44B** requirements.

• An adjustment to the mission profile had been foreseeable but irresistible, given that the OG-2 satellite was a secondary payload.

• No justification had been provided for an extension beyond 6 December 2025, when the satellite was expected to reach its orbital position.

Based on the information and supporting evidence provided, and also taking into account that it was not uncommon for launch dates to be delayed by a few days, the Board concluded that the case met all the conditions to qualify as a situation of *force majeure* and decided to accede to the request of the Administration of Oman by granting an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network to 13 December 2025.”

6.5.17 It was so **agreed**.

## 6.6 Submission by the Administration of Nigeria requesting to retain the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network (Document [RRB25-2/14](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0014/en))

6.6.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/14, which contained a request from the Administration of Nigeria to retain the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT‑2D (9.5°W) satellite network. Those assignments had been the subject of a request to extend the regulatory time-limit, on the grounds of *force majeure*, submitted to the Board’s 98th meeting. The Board had been unable to conclude that the facts presented met the requirements for *force majeure* or co-passenger delay. The administration therefore requested the Board to ask the Bureau to retain the relevant frequency assignments until the end of WRC‑27 pending further deliberations at the conference on the criteria and conditions on which the Board could consider granting an extension to a developing country and in order to allow it to present the case to WRC‑27. In its submission, the Administration of Nigeria explained the ongoing challenges that it faced, as a developing country administration, in the deployment of satellite systems but said that it had made every effort to comply with the provisions of the Radio Regulations. The NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network was part of the administration’s long-term critical ICT infrastructure strategy to expand space-based communication and bridge the digital divide.

6.6.2 In reply to a request for clarification from **Ms Mannepalli**, he added that, while the Nigerian Administration’s submission to the 98th Board meeting (Document RRB25-1/2) had related to two satellite networks (NIGCOMSAT-2B (9.5°W) and NIGCOMSAT-2D (16°W)), the current submission concerned only the NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network (9.5°W). Since the 98th meeting, the Bureau had provided the Administration of Nigeria with a great deal of assistance in terms of the information missing from its original submission and the Administration of Nigeria had provided information on the NIGCOMSAT-2B satellite network, for which some of the frequency assignments had been notified and brought into use. The NIGCOMSAT-2B network had perhaps not been mentioned in the current submission for that reason. Furthermore, the previous submission had indicated that the NIGCOMSAT-2B satellite network was located at 9.5°W; the current submission indicated that it was the NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network that was located at that position. Perhaps the Administration of Nigeria had changed the filing name in the meantime, but the information provided in the current submission corresponded to that recorded in the Bureau’s database.

6.6.3 **Ms Hasanova** noted that the Nigerian Administration’s earlier request for an extension had now become a request to retain the frequency assignments for a satellite network. Moreover, the administration had provided no evidence of the many difficulties that it said had delayed progress on the project nor of its efforts to meet the regulatory time-limit. She might have been able to agree to the request if it was for only a three- or five-month period, but WRC‑27 was over two years away and she was therefore unable to support the request in the current circumstances.

6.6.4 **Ms Beaumier** said that she shared Ms Hasanova’s concerns. At the 98th Board meeting, the Administration of Nigeria had submitted a delayed contribution (Document RRB25-1/DELAYED/7) in which it had said that it would submit additional information to the current meeting; that was the only reason why the frequency assignments concerned had not been cancelled. However, no additional information had been provided to the current meeting. Instead, the administration had informed the Board that it had made every effort to comply with the Radio Regulations but had not elaborated on the nature of those efforts. Its request that the frequency assignments be retained pending further deliberations at WRC‑27, under agenda item 7, on criteria and conditions enabling the Board to consider granting an extension to a developing country, assumed that there would be actual proposals on that subject. While it was true that the Board had invited ITU‑R to conduct studies with a view to developing such criteria and conditions, no work had been done to date, and none would be unless administrations submitted relevant contributions. It was certainly the prerogative of the Administration of Nigeria to submit the case to WRC‑27, but she would nonetheless find it difficult to keep a filing alive for more than two years on the basis of so little information. The Administration of Nigeria had had multiple opportunities to provide the Board with, at a minimum, details of the nature and status of the satellite project and the efforts made to implement it, but it had chosen not to do so. In her view, granting the request to retain the assignments in the MIFR under those circumstances would be tantamount to supporting spectrum reservation, which the Board could not in good conscience do.

6.6.5 **Mr Fianko** considered that the facts bore out the previous speakers’ views but had led him to a different view on the Board’s conclusion. According to the Bureau, the Administration of Nigeria had brought into use the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2B satellite network. It might be working on similar plans to bring into use the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2D network. He would prefer not to grant the request to retain the frequency assignments until the end of WRC‑27 and instead to give the Administration of Nigeria until the next Board meeting to provide further information. If the administration was unable to show sufficient grounds for retaining the frequency assignments by that time, then the assignments should be cancelled at that point.

6.6.6 **Mr Azzouz** suggested that the Board should instruct the Bureau to invite the Administration of Nigeria to submit a contribution to WRC‑27 for a decision; the Board could provide guidance on the kind of detailed information such a contribution should contain. The Board should also include the criteria and conditions on which it could grant extensions of regulatory time-limits for bringing frequency assignments into use in the case of developing countries in its report to WRC‑27 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)**. It should work with the Bureau to provide guidance for discussion of the matter at WRC‑27, just as it had done in respect of Resolution **559 (WRC‑19)**.

6.6.7 **Ms Mannepalli** said that, while she had sympathy for the Nigerian Administration’s plight, the Board did not have authority to make decisions based on the kinds of issues – political and others – faced by developing countries. She agreed with Mr Azzouz that the point should be stressed in the Board’s report under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)**, with indications of the minimum information required for the Board to consider a developing country request for an extension. In the circumstances, she would find it difficult to accede to the request.

6.6.8 **Mr Talib** agreed with previous speakers that, even though the request had been submitted to the Board several times, the information required for a decision had still not been provided. The Board’s report to a previous WRC under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)** had already established the minimum information required for the Board to accede to such a request, and the Administration of Nigeria had not provided that information. It would not make sense to retain the filings given the amount of time remaining until WRC‑27 and he was therefore not in a position to accede to the request. However, he felt sympathy for the situation of the Administration of Nigeria and would therefore agree to retain the filing until the end of the Board’s 100th meeting and to give the administration one more opportunity to provide the requisite information.

6.6.9 **Mr Di Crescenzo** said that he would find it difficult to accede to the request to retain the filings until the end of WRC‑27, which would be tantamount to granting an extension of over two years – the Nigerian Administration might find a solution for bringing the frequency assignments into use in the meantime. He nevertheless felt sympathy for the political issues faced by developing countries and therefore supported the proposal to give the Administration of Nigeria a further three months, to the 100th Board meeting, to provide the information requested by the Board.

6.6.10 The **Chair** said that, while he had sympathy for the needs of developing countries, the Board had instructed the Bureau, at its 98th meeting, to retain the frequency assignments on the grounds that the Administration of Nigeria had stated its intention to provide additional information at the 99th meeting but no such information had been provided. Granting the administration a further three months to provide information might send the wrong signal.

6.6.11 **Mr Cheng** said that, while he sympathized with the situation faced by the Nigerian Administration, the Board could grant only limited and qualified extensions in cases of *force majeure* or co-passenger delay. It could therefore not accede to the present request. He nevertheless agreed with previous speakers that the frequency assignments should be retained until the next Board meeting to give the administration one more opportunity to clarify the situation and to explain, for example, why the orbital position of the NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network had been changed.

6.6.12 **Ms Beaumier**, referring to the suggestion that the Board should be proactive and include potential solutions in its report to WRC‑27 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)**, recalled that when the issue of the criteria and conditions for granting extensions to developing countries had first been raised at WRC‑19, the Board had provided some ideas for potential solutions but, as was often the case, there had not been enough time to consider the matter fully and so no decisions had been made other than to study the matter during the next cycle. The COVID-19 pandemic had undermined that and many other efforts, but the Board had reminded the conference of the issue in its report under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)** to WRC‑23. In her view, given the sensitive nature of the matter, the conference would make no decisions on the basis of a Board recommendation; it would want to discuss the matter fully.

6.6.13 During the current cycle there might well have been cases of developing countries that would have qualified for an extension had the requisite criteria and conditions been determined, but, from everything the Board had seen so far, she did not think that the case submitted by the Nigerian Administration would qualify because of the total absence of information. In other cases in which the Board had been unable to grant an extension because it did not have authority to do so, some dating back to even before she had become a Board member, the Board had had no difficulty in instructing the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments until a WRC because a great deal of information had been provided. In the present case, an instruction to retain the frequency assignments until the end of WRC‑27 would be tantamount to granting the Administration of Nigeria the three-year extension it had originally requested; the Board would be setting an unfortunate precedent were it to do so.

6.6.14 **Mr Nurshabekov**, looking ahead to what would happen if the Board granted the Administration of Nigeria a further three months to provide information and if that information was still not forthcoming, said that the Board would be setting a precedent for an administration that had not made the requisite efforts to justify its request for an extension. It might therefore be wise to stipulate in the Board’s decision that the frequency assignments would be cancelled at the end of the 100th Board meeting if the necessary information had not been provided by that time. The Administration of Nigeria remained free, of course, to submit the case to WRC‑27.

6.6.15 Following informal discussions on whether to retain the filings until the end of the 100th Board meeting, the **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows on the matter:

“The Board considered Document RRB25-2/14, in which the Administration of Nigeria requested that the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network be retained until the end of WRC‑27. The Board noted the following points:

• While the Administration of Nigeria, in Document RRB25-1/DELAYED/7, had requested additional time to provide additional information to its request in Document RRB25-1/2 regarding an extension of the regulatory time-limits to bring into use the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2D (at 9.5°W) and NIGCOMSAT-2B (at 16°W) satellite networks, no additional information had been provided to the Board in support of its request for extension.

• The Administration of Nigeria had requested the Board to instruct the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2D (9.5°W) satellite network until the end of WRC‑27 pending further deliberations at WRC‑27 on the criteria and conditions on which the Board could consider granting an extension to a developing country and in order to present the case to WRC‑27.

• No details had been provided on the nature and status of the satellite project and the efforts undertaken to implement it and meet the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments.

Given that the Administration of Nigeria had had multiple opportunities to provide information to justify its request and substantiate its claims, the Board concluded that there were no grounds to instruct the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments to the NIGCOMSAT-2D satellite network until the end of WRC‑27.”

6.6.16 It was so **agreed**.

## 6.7 Submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network (Document [RRB25-2/16](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0016/en))

6.7.1 **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/16, in which the Administration of the United Kingdom requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network. He noted that the submission, including the supporting documentation, was almost identical to that provided by the Administration of Norway (Document RRB25-2/7) under agenda item 6.1, the only exception being that the submission concerned the INMARSAT-6-28W network (see §§ 6.1.1–6.1.15 above).

6.7.2 The Board’s discussion of this item is summarized in §§ 6.1.1–6.1.15 above.

6.7.3 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“Having considered in detail the request of the Administration of the United Kingdom for an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network, as presented in Document RRB25-2/16, the Board noted the following points:

• The INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network had been suspended on 17 December 2022, and the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use the frequency assignments to the network was 17 December 2025.

• The INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network was intended to support the operation of the INMARSAT-6 F2 (I-6 F2) satellite, which had been successfully launched on 18 February 2023 but had suffered a *force majeure* event and been declared a total loss after a micrometeorite had damaged the satellite power system during orbit raising.

• The INMARSAT GX-7 (GX-7) satellite had been identified as the best option for bringing back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network filing in the Ka band at the earliest possible time. The contract to manufacture the satellite had been signed on 29 May 2019. The satellite was expected to be delivered by the last quarter of 2026 and to reach its geostationary satellite orbit between April and July 2027.

In assessing the case against the four conditions of *force majeure* and the duration of the requested extension, the Board noted that:

• the administration had not demonstrated that it had pursued every option to avoid missing the regulatory time-limit and that every effort had been made to limit the extension period;

• the timeline for satellite delivery by the manufacturer remained vague and no launch window had been established, with no contract or supporting evidence from the launch service provider;

• the requested extension until 15 July 2027 included contingencies.

The Board concluded that, while there were elements of *force majeure* in the request, there was currently insufficient information to determine whether the situation met all the conditions required to be considered as a case of *force majeure*. The Board therefore invited the Administration of the United Kingdom to provide additional information in sufficient detail to describe the options considered as well as the efforts and measures taken to avoid missing the deadline. The initial and revised project milestones for the construction and launch of the GX-7 satellite, before and after the *force majeure* event, should also be provided, including evidence of a contract with the launch service provider and the latest status of the satellite construction.”

6.7.4 It was so **agreed**.

# 7 Harmful interference to satellite networks (Documents [RRB25-2/DELAYED/2](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0002/en) and [RRB25-2/DELAYED/14](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0014/en)

Submission by the Administration of Sweden regarding harmful interference to its satellite networks at the orbital position 5°E (Document [RRB25-2/6](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0006/en))

Submission by the Administration of Luxembourg requesting support to resolve cases of harmful interference to its satellite services (Document [RRB25-2/12](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0012/en))

7.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced Document RRB25-2/6, in which the Administration of Sweden reported that, since 8 March 2024, multiple incidents of harmful interference to the ASTRA‑4A satellite had occurred. On 25 December, the situation had escalated, causing intermittent service disruptions of up to 10 hours. Since 7 March 2025 some improvement had been observed, with a drop in the interferer’s power levels; despite numerous efforts to resolve the issue, however, occasional interference had continued, and the risk of recurrence was high. The origin of the interference had been geolocated to the territory of the Russian Federation and the Crimean Peninsula, as confirmed by the Leeheim Space Radio Monitoring Station. The annex contained spectrum plots of the interference, which affected the FSS in the 14 GHz band, and geolocation measurements. The Administration of Sweden concluded that, given its scale and sophistication – switching from continuous wave to high-power carriers and even full transponders – the interference was intentional and targeted, and the source had advanced engineering skills and access to substantial resources.

7.2 In Document RRB25-2/12, the Administration of Luxembourg referred to its previous submissions to the Board and requested continued assistance to resolve harmful interference events, including to encourage the Administration of the Russian Federation to engage in discussions. It noted that the Bureau had tried unsuccessfully to arrange a meeting between the Administrations of Luxembourg and the Russian Federation.

7.3 In Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/2, the Administration of the Russian Federation reported on the findings of an investigation that it had carried out in response to the submissions by the Administrations of Sweden, France and Luxembourg to the Board’s 98th meeting (Documents RRB25-1/6 and RRB25-1/13; RRB25-1/17 and RRB25-1/DELAYED/8; and RRB25-1/20, respectively). No radio devices that might have caused harmful interference to the broadcasting-satellite service feeder links in the 18 GHz range had been identified. The administration noted that the use of the 14 GHz range for feeder links of the broadcasting-satellite service was reserved for countries outside Europe, in accordance with RR No. **5.506**. It concluded that the interference might be due to military radio equipment; the civilian space infrastructure of several States, including the three administrations concerned, was apparently being used for the military benefit of a third State, which the Administration of the Russian Federation considered unacceptable. It had repeatedly brought that issue to the attention of other United Nations entities, including the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Until that issue had been resolved, it saw no purpose in holding additional meetings with those administrations.

7.4 In response to Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/2, the Administration of France had submitted Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/14, in which it stated that, despite efforts, the ongoing harmful interference continued, seriously affecting the operations of several Eutelsat satellite transponders. It had received acknowledgement from the Administration of the Russian Federation of all but two of its letters on the subject; to date, it had not received any evidence regarding the outcome of the Russian investigation, as had been discussed at a bilateral meeting held on 14 March 2025. It lamented the lack of follow-up action to that meeting and regretted that no further meetings had been held. Regarding RR No. **5.506**, the administration expressed disappointment that no substantive answers had been provided regarding the reported harmful interference, which, it said, used high-power clean or modulated carriers targeting civilian services in the 13/14 GHz range and had not affected broadcasting-satellite services. The French satellite networks involved were operated in conformity with the Radio Regulations and had the right to international protection and recognition. Lastly, it requested the Board to instruct the Bureau to take a number of actions, including to: a) request an immediate cessation of any deliberate harmful interference; b) convene a meeting to discuss the outstanding issues; and c) publish, in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, information on the origin of the interference on the websites of the Board and the Bureau.

7.5 Responding to questions from **Ms Beaumier** and **Mr Talib**, he confirmed that the interference reported by the three administrations had affected FSS transmissions in the 13/14 GHz range. In the past, the Administration of Sweden had observed some interference to broadcasting-satellite services, although that was not the subject of the latest submission. The Leeheim Space Radio Monitoring Station had performed geolocation measurements in early 2025; the Administration of the Russian Federation had not disputed those measurements. Lastly, to date, two bilateral meetings had been held – one between the Administrations of the Russian Federation and Sweden; the other between the Administrations of France and the Russian Federation. There had been no bilateral meeting with the Administration of Luxembourg or multilateral meeting of all four administrations.

7.6 **Mr Azzouz** said that, in the light of the information provided, the Board should reiterate its previous decision and request the Administration of the Russian Federation to do the following: a) immediately cease any deliberate action to cause harmful interference to frequency assignments of other administrations; and b) provide information on the status of its investigation and any actions taken to determine whether any earth stations currently deployed at, or close to, the geolocated locations might have the capability to cause harmful interference to frequency assignments in the 13/14 GHz frequency range of other administrations. It should encourage all the administrations concerned to cooperate in goodwill to resolve the long-standing issue. The Board should instruct the Bureau to convene further meetings of those administrations, including to discuss possible technological solutions; and ensure ongoing international monitoring until the problem had been resolved. It should also instruct the Bureau to create a dedicated webpage on which to publish relevant information on long-standing cases of harmful interference, in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022), to raise awareness of such matters.

7.7 **Ms Beaumier** said that she welcomed the information provided by the Administration of the Russian Federation on the status of its investigations; at the same time, its unwillingness to cooperate further on the matter until a separate issue had been resolved elsewhere in the United Nations system was disappointing. The peaceful use of civilian infrastructure was a subject beyond the scope of the Board’s mandate. The matter at hand concerned ongoing harmful interference affecting FSS transponders; the frequency assignments had duly been registered and were entitled to international protection. She agreed with Mr Azzouz’s proposals regarding the Board’s decision.

7.8 Responding to a query from the **Chair**, she recalled that, at its 98th meeting, the Board had decided that it was premature to accede to the request previously made by the Administrations of France and Sweden for the Board to publish relevant information in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) but had agreed to revisit that decision at the current meeting. She was now supportive of the Board taking the requested action.

7.9 **Mr Talib**, **Ms Mannepalli** and **Ms Hasanova** concurred with the approach outlined by previous speakers, including with regard to the publication of relevant information on a webpage.

7.10 **Ms Mannepalli** noted that the reference by the Administration of the Russian Federation to RR No. **5.506** was irrelevant, as the cases of harmful interference currently before the Board concerned FSS transmissions. She emphasized that the Board’s mandate was to ensure the interference-free operation of stations operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations. Both she and **Ms Hasanova** considered that the Bureau should convene further meetings between the Administration of the Russian Federation and the other administrations, including the Administration of Luxembourg, while also acknowledging the attendant challenges in that regard, given the current stance on that aspect of the Administration of the Russian Federation. **Ms Hasanova** said that she found that stance regrettable, and she and **Mr Cheng** recalled the administration’s obligations under Article 45 of the ITU Constitution and RR Article **15**.

7.11 **Mr Talib** added that the Bureau should endeavour to arrange a multilateral meeting of all four administrations to facilitate information exchange and further encourage action on the part of the Administration of the Russian Federation.

7.12 **Mr Cheng**, summarizing the facts of the case, said that, for the first time since the harmful interference had been reported, the Administration of the Russian Federation had raised the issue of the use of civilian space infrastructure for military purposes and invoked the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty). As the Board dealt only with matters related to the ITU Constitution and the Radio Regulations, it might be useful to invite the administration to clarify its intentions, noting that it had said that it did not intend to deliberately cause interference to the civilian infrastructure of other administrations. He agreed that the Board should urge the administrations concerned to collaborate and exercise goodwill with a view to resolving the issue. Regarding the publication of information on a webpage, he could go along with the majority view of Board members.

7.13 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board considered in detail Document RRB25-2/6, from the Administration of Sweden, and Document RRB25-2/12, from the Administration of Luxembourg, regarding harmful interference to their respective satellite networks and services. The Board also noted Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/2, from the Administration of the Russian Federation, and Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/14, from the Administration of France, both for information. The Board noted the following points:

• The Administration of Sweden had continued to receive harmful interference to its FSS satellite services in the 13/14 GHz range that originated from the territory of the Russian Federation (Pionersky, Kaliningrad) and the Crimean Peninsula (Sevastopol) despite the many letters sent by the Administration of Sweden to ITU and the Administration of the Russian Federation, the Board’s requests in the matter and the bilateral meeting between the Administrations of the Russian Federation and Sweden on 13 March 2025.

• The Administration of Sweden had previously reported harmful interference to BSS feeder links in the 18 GHz range but no such harmful interference had been reported since the 98th Board meeting.

• The Administration of the Russian Federation had still not engaged in discussions with the Administration of Luxembourg despite several unfruitful attempts by the Bureau to organize a meeting.

• The Administration of the Russian Federation had investigated the cases reported but had identified no radio devices that might have caused harmful interference (content spoofing) to the BSS feeder links for the satellite networks SIRIUS-4-BSS, SIRIUS-5E-2, SIRIUS-5-BSS-2, SIRIUS-6-BSS, F-SAT-N3-21.5E, F-SAT-N-E-13E, F-SAT-N3-13E, F-SAT-N3-10E and EUTELSAT 3-10E in the 18 GHz range.

• According to the Administration of the Russian Federation, the interference to the receiving space stations of the satellite services of France, Sweden and Luxembourg in the 13/14 GHz range might be due to the use of military radio equipment.

• The Administration of the Russian Federation had invoked the issue of the peaceful use of the civilian space infrastructure of France, Sweden and Luxembourg and had set the resolution of that issue in United Nations bodies, other than ITU, as a pre-condition for its engagement in any further meetings with those administrations.

The Board expressed the view that compliance with treaty obligations under the ITU Constitution and Radio Regulations could not be conditioned on the resolution of an issue outside the scope of ITU. Consequently, the Board again strongly urged the Administration of the Russian Federation:

• to immediately cease any deliberate action to cause harmful interference to frequency assignments of other administrations;

• to continue investigating whether any earth station currently deployed at, or close to, the locations identified by geolocation measurements might have the capability to cause harmful interference in the 13/14 GHz frequency range, and to take the necessary actions in compliance with Article 45 of the ITU Constitution (“All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Member States …”), so as to prevent the reoccurrence of such harmful interference;

• to provide information on the status of its investigation and actions carried out since the cases had been reported and prior to the 100th Board meeting.

The Board instructed the Bureau to:

• convene further meetings of the Administrations of the Russian Federation, France, Sweden and Luxembourg in the second half of 2025, so as to resolve the harmful interference cases reported by administrations and prevent their reoccurrence;

• invite all the administrations concerned to cooperate in goodwill to solve the cases of harmful interference;

• report on progress to the 100th Board meeting.

Furthermore, referring to its discussion of the case at its previous meetings, the Board decided to accede to the request of the Administrations of France and Sweden to publish the relevant information under *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference. The Board therefore instructed the Bureau to develop the relevant webpage for consideration at the next Board meeting.”

7.14 It was so **agreed**.

# 8 Harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services (Document [RRB25-2/DELAYED/1](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0001/en))

Submission by the Administrations of Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services (Document [RRB25‑2/19](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0019/en))

8.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/19, in which the Administrations of Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania reported continued and even worsening harmful interference to receivers in the RNSS in the Baltic region. The harmful interference had expanded to additional services and its effects had also been observed inland at ground level. It had also been observed in frequency bands allocated to the mobile service and identified for IMT, with implications for safety, security and economic activity. The submission went on to detail the efforts of each administration to bring the harmful interference to the attention of the Administration of the Russian Federation, to no avail. In conclusion, the submitting administrations pointed out that the Russian Administration had taken no remedial action to cease the harmful interference, as it had been urged to do by the Board at its 98th meeting, and therefore asked the Bureau to pursue its efforts under RR No. **13.2** and submit the document to the Board at its 99th meeting.

8.2 In Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/1, the Administration of the Russian Federation, responding to the decision made by the Board at its 98th meeting, said that, while it recognized the importance of ensuring the interference-free operation of RNSS systems and of the relevant provisions of the Radio Regulations, it also noted that for three years information from such systems had been used for illegal purposes, for example, to guide munitions to military and civilian infrastructure located on Russian territory, including in the regions bordering on Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The operation of radio equipment that might be at the origin of the harmful interference to the receiving devices of the RNSS to which Document RRB25-2/19 referred was a forced measure aimed at warding off threats to facilities that were vital for the population, such as nuclear power stations and transport infrastructure. Any interference to receivers in the RNSS could only be terminated once those threats had ceased. The Administration of the Russian Federation went on to say that it was cognizant of the safety aspects associated with the use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems and was taking all possible measures to minimize the impact on civilian receivers.

8.3 In reply to a question from **Mr Azzouz**, he confirmed that, while the submitting administrations said that monitoring activities had also detected sources of interference to GLONASS, GALILEO and GPS systems in the L1, L2 and L5 frequency bands (i.e. those in the Baltic region), the Bureau, as reported in Addendum 4 to Document RRB25-2/4, had received reports of similar harmful interference in other regions, in particular from the Administration of Saudi Arabia.

8.4 In reply to questions from **Mr Azzouz** and the **Chair**, **Mr Ba (Head, TSD/TPR)** said that the Administrations of Finland and Lithuania had also reported persistent interference to IMT systems. In the case of Finland, the Administration of the Russian Federation had acknowledged receipt of the interference reports but had taken no other action. In the case of Lithuania, the administration had made repeated attempts to contact the Administration of the Russian Federation but had received no response. It had asked for the Bureau’s assistance with regard to interference in the 400 and 900 MHz bands under RR No. **51.42**, and the Bureau had immediately requested the administrations concerned to cooperate, in application of RR No. **15.25**, with a view to resolving the issue. Once again, the Administration of the Russian Federation had acknowledged receipt of the request but had not indicated any measures that it might have taken in response.

8.5 **Mr Azzouz**, observing that the harmful interference to the RNSS concerned mainly air and maritime traffic and had increased significantly in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, said that such interference had significant implications for safety-of-life services and economic activities in Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania. The Administration of the Russian Federation had given no indication that it was working to resolve the issue, even though monitoring activities had indicated that the source of the interference was on Russian territory. The Board should therefore reiterate the decision it had taken at its 98th meeting and instruct the Bureau to urge the Administration of the Russian Federation to take all necessary actions to immediately cease harmful interference that adversely affected safety services and to continue reporting on progress on the matter to future Board meetings. It should strongly urge the Administration of the Russian Federation to comply with all relevant provisions of Articles 45 and 47 of the ITU Constitution, RR Nos. **4.10**, **15.1**, **15.28** and **15.37**, and *resolves to urge administrations* of Resolution **676 (WRC‑23)**, in particular when harmful interference adversely affected safety services. Lastly, the Board should instruct the Bureau to convene bilateral or multilateral coordination meetings between the administrations concerned and invite them to report any progress in the matter.

8.6 **Ms Mannepalli**, noting that the information concerning interference in IMT bands was incomplete, considered that the Board should focus on the harmful interference to the RNSS at the current meeting. It was very unfortunate that the harmful interference persisted. In the absence of tangible action on the part of the Russian Federation, she agreed that the Board should reiterate its decision from the 98th meeting.

8.7 **Mr Cheng** said that it was his understanding, from the information provided by the Administration of the Russian Federation, that, owing to the special situation in the region, the operation of radio equipment that might cause harmful interference to RNSS receiving devices was a forced measure. In view of the current situation in the region, the Board should urge the relevant administrations to collaborate and exercise the utmost goodwill and mutual assistance in the resolution of the harmful interference and to take all possible measures to minimize the impact on RNSS receiving devices. The Administration of the Russian Federation should also be invited to investigate the interference in the IMT band and work with the Administration of Finland to resolve the issue and report to the next Board meeting.

8.8 **Ms Beaumier** said that she found it deeply troubling that, despite the call from three intergovernmental organizations for all parties to protect RNSS transmissions for safety reasons and to bolster the resilience of services on which everyone depended, not only were the cases of harmful interference continuing, they had worsened, affecting additional services and more extensive territories. Moreover, some administrations had still not received any response to their communications to the Administration of the Russian Federation and others had merely received acknowledgments under RR No. **15.35**. She deemed the rationale of the Administration of the Russian Federation, that it was only causing harmful interference to RNSS receivers to protect its infrastructure from guided attacks, unacceptable. A military conflict between two nations could not justify an administration’s failure to respect its obligations under ITU instruments with respect to third parties.

8.9 In her view, the Board should reiterate its call for the Administration of the Russian Federation to abide by its treaty obligations, to take the necessary actions to respond to communications from administrations that had reported harmful interference and to immediately cease harmful interference originating from its territory. The Board should use the strongest possible terms to express its disapproval of how the situation was evolving and, if possible, escalate the matter within ITU.

8.10 **Ms Hasanova** expressed regret that there were more rather than fewer instances of harmful interference to Estonian, Finnish, Latvian and Lithuanian frequency assignments and that no action had been taken by the Administration of the Russian Federation. The harmful interference was affecting safety systems and therefore the operation of aircraft and maritime vessels by the submitting administrations. She joined previous speakers in urging that administration to cease the harmful interference originating from Russian territory.

8.11 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows on the matter:

“The Board considered in detail Document RRB25-2/19, in which the Administrations of Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania reported on harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite service (RNSS) and mobile service (MS). The Board also noted Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/1, from the Administration of the Russian Federation, for information. The Board noted the following points:

• Cases of harmful interference to RNSS receivers affecting safety services, civil aviation and maritime services had persisted and expanded to affect larger territories.

• The administrations of Finland and Lithuania had reported new cases of harmful interference affecting IMT stations.

• Some administrations had not received any response to the interference reports from the Administration of the Russian Federation, while others had only received acknowledgements of receipt under RR No. **15.35** without any further action being taken.

• Harmful interference had been deliberately caused to RNSS receivers in the region by the Russian Federation as a means of protecting its infrastructure.

The Board expressed its grave concern at how the situation was evolving and emphasized that a military conflict between two nations could not justify the non-respect by those nations of their obligations under the ITU instruments with respect to other nations and put at risk critical infrastructures and lives in those other nations not party to the conflict.

The Board strongly urged the Administration of the Russian Federation to:

• comply with all the relevant provisions of Articles 45 and 47 of the ITU Constitution, RR Nos. **4.10, 15.1, 15.28** and **15.37**, and *resolves to urge administrations* of Resolution **676 (WRC‑23)**, in particular when harmful interference adversely affected safety services;

• take the necessary actions to respond to communications from administrations reporting harmful interference to the RNSS and immediately cease the harmful interference that originated from its territory;

• investigate the cases of interference to IMT stations reported by the Administrations of Finland and Lithuania, and take appropriate action, in coordination with those administrations, to resolve them.

The Board reiterated the decision made at its 98th meeting and instructed the Bureau to:

• urge the Administration of the Russian Federation to take all possible actions to immediately cease any source of harmful interference to safety services in the RNSS;

• support the efforts of the administrations concerned to resolve the cases of harmful interference, in particular by convening bilateral or multilateral meetings between the Administration of the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and the Administrations of Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, on the other, to resolve the cases of harmful interference to the RNSS reported by administrations and prevent their reoccurrence;

• report on progress in the matter to the 100th Board meeting.”

8.12 It was so **agreed**.

# 9 Issues regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in its territory (Document [RRB25-2/11](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0011/en))

Submission by the Administration of the United States regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Documents [RRB25-2/15](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0015/en) and [RRB25-2/DELAYED/8](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0008/en))

Submission by the Administration of Norway regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Documents [RRB25-2/17](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0017/en) and [RRB25-2/DELAYED/7](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0007/en))

9.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, introducing the item, said that, in Document RRB25-2/11, the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed disappointment that it was apparently technically impossible to shut down unauthorized terminals that were operating in its territory. It recalled that recent discussions in Working Party 4A on agenda item 1.5 of WRC‑27 had included contributions on how non-GSO operators operating in the medium and low Earth orbits would be able to locate and terminate transmissions by unauthorized terminals in order to comply with RR Article **18** and Resolution **22** **(Rev.WRC‑23).** One of those submissions was provided in Annex 2. The administration called upon the Board to reiterate its previous decision, condemning the Administrations of Norway and the United States for contraventions of the ITU Constitution and Convention, RR Article **18**, and Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC‑23)**; and requested the Board to publish information on the case in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference.

9.2 In Document RRB25-2/15, the Administration of the United States maintained that the case was a matter not of cross-border interference but of Iranian border and customs enforcement. It also introduced a new argument concerning the interpretation of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**. In its view, the Board had: a) ignored *resolves*3 i), according to which an administration that had identified unauthorized earth station transmissions in its territory was required to take all appropriate actions at its disposal to the extent of its ability to stop such unauthorized transmissions; b) failed to seek information from the Iranian Administration on its implementation of *resolves*3 i); and c) asserted incorrectly that reporting administrations did not have to provide information on terminals operating without authorization. The administration also contended that the Board had overinterpreted Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, reading into it a commitment on the part of notifying administrations and satellite operators to geolocate and disable terminals remotely. Given that the issue involved differences of treaty interpretation, particularly in relation to Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** – which could only be resolved by Member States at a WRC – it asserted that publication of a webpage, in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022), would be inappropriate; neither the Board nor the Bureau should intervene in debates between Member States.

9.3 In Document RRB25-2/17, the Administration of Norway presented its views, which differed somewhat to those of the Administration of the United States. It stated that, according to the satellite operator, it was not feasible to check every single user terminal communicating globally with its space stations to identify whether any terminals were operating in a territory where the service had not been authorized. On the basis of the current text of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, which, it said, had been agreed following careful drafting and compromises made at WRC‑19, it failed to see how it could compel Starlink to disable all terminals in a specific area. The administration viewed the matter as an issue not of non-observance of the Radio Regulations but of differing interpretations of the relevant provisions. It considered that the proposed publication of a webpage on the subject risked pre-empting the outcome of discussions under agenda item 1.5 of WRC‑27.

9.4 In Documents RRB25-2/DELAYED/7 and RRB25-2/DELAYED/8, the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran responded to the submissions by the Administrations of Norway and the United States, respectively. It rejected the notion that the problem was one of border and customs enforcement, emphasizing that the issue at hand related not to the smuggling of STARLINK terminals into its territory but to the unauthorized operation thereof. Regarding its obligations under Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, it stressed the geographical challenges it faced in tracking down unauthorized terminals, suggesting that the rational approach would simply be to disable them, as had been done by other operators and by Starlink itself in other countries. It alleged that, during a recent attack on its territory, the “invading country” had deployed Starlink terminals on uncrewed aerial vehicles. It considered that the provisions of the Radio Regulations as they currently stood were clear; it was not necessary to await the outcome of discussions on agenda item 1.5 of WRC‑27.

9.5 **Mr Azzouz**, summarizing the facts of the case, said that he wished to thank the administrations for the information provided, while noting that some elements were unrelated to the matter at hand. He outlined the various arguments that had been presented, including that: a) it was not practicable for the satellite operator to check every single satellite terminal for authorized or unauthorized operation; b) geographical complexities made it difficult for the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to identify illegal terminals; and c) other satellite operators had submitted to Working Party 4A information on how they would comply with Article **18** and Resolution **22** **(Rev.WRC‑23)**. He emphasized that the Board was not creating any new commitment by requesting notifying administrations to geolocate and disable terminals; such measures were part of the successful implementation of Resolution **22** **(Rev.WRC‑23)** and, moreover, had previously been taken in other countries.

9.6 In the light of the evidence provided by the Iranian Administration and the long-standing nature of the case, the Board should reiterate its previous decision, including by urging the notifying administrations to comply with their obligations under the ITU Constitution and Convention and the Radio Regulations. It should strongly urge the notifying administration of Starlink to, among other things, take all appropriate actions at its disposal, to the extent of its ability, to cease immediately unauthorized transmissions of Starlink terminals within the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including by remotely disabling those terminals if necessary. **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Cheng** and **Mr Fianko** concurred.

9.7 **Ms Beaumier**, welcoming the submissions received, which contained some new information, said that she was nevertheless disappointed that no progress had been made, especially as, in the Board’s understanding, solutions were readily available to the satellite operator. Regarding the argument raised in relation to *resolves*3 i) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, she recalled that, at previous meetings, the Board had sought information from the Iranian Administration on the steps it had taken to stop unauthorized transmissions in its territory. The administration had responded, at the Board’s 96th meeting, with information on efforts made to identify and geolocate terminals, while emphasizing the challenges of detecting such terminals owing to their small size and portability and the country’s vast territory and challenging terrain. While she appreciated the immensity of the task, emphasizing that the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran could not remedy the issue alone, she agreed that the reporting administration should further elaborate on the measures being taken on an ongoing basis to locate and seize some of those terminals. The Board should therefore request the Iranian Administration to provide a comprehensive account of the actions it had taken since the Board’s 96th meeting to comply with *resolves*3 i) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**. The **Chair**, **Mr Cheng** and **Mr Fianko** agreed with that suggestion.

9.8 She emphasized that the Board stood by its interpretation of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** in terms of what was expected of notifying administrators and satellite operators. While *resolves*3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** did not explicitly provide that notifying administrators and satellite operators were required to geolocate and disable terminals remotely, she recalled that, at WRC‑19, it had ultimately been agreed that satellite operators might have to intervene to ensure that only duly authorized terminals communicated with their satellites; if necessary, they should switch off the transponder or channel being used in order to terminate unauthorized transmissions. The intention behind *resolves*3 ii) had thus been that notifying administrations and satellite operators would cooperate to the maximum extent possible to resolve the matter in a satisfactory and timely manner. While those discussions had centred on GSO rather than non-GSO satellites, the implication was that a satellite operator should geolocate and deactivate terminals remotely if it had the means to do so.

9.9 She found it hard to believe the Norwegian Administration’s assertion that it was not able to compel Starlink to disable all terminals in a specific area, when there was evidence that similar measures had been taken by Starlink at the behest of other administrations. Moreover, in view of the information submitted to Working Party 4A by other satellite operators, in which they described how they could do that very task, it was difficult to understand how Starlink – a leader in the field – would not have those same operational capabilities. Recognizing that there was an issue of interpretation of *resolves 3 ii)* of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and of what compliance with that provision really entailed, she was of the view that the publication of the case pursuant to *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Buucharest, 2022) might not be the most appropriate vehicle to resolve the matter. She disagreed, however, that to publish information in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) might somehow pre-empt discussions under agenda item 1.5 of WRC‑27. The Board had made its decisions based on the Radio Regulations and Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** as they currently stood, not taking into account future deliberations.

9.10 **Mr Fianko** added that the Board should reject any attempt to reframe the issue as a customs and border matter. He considered that, if the notifying administrations were to compel the satellite operator to meet its obligations under Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, the problem would be entirely resolved. The operator undoubtedly had the requisite capacities.

9.11 **Mr Cheng** said that he was disappointed that, once again, the notifying administration of Starlink had failed to explain specifically why it had not been possible to disable all Starlink terminals operating without authorization in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the same manner as had been done in other countries. The Board had made clear its interpretation of Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC‑23)** and RR No. **18.1**; he could not agree with the differing interpretation of the former. In his view, the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken all possible measures to the extent of its ability, given the technical challenges it faced. The Board could nevertheless request further information on the ongoing measures being taken in that endeavour.

9.12 **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Cheng** and **Mr Fianko** said that, given that the matter had been discussed at length in several meetings, the Board should proceed with publication of the relevant information on the matter, in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022). **Ms Beaumier** said that, in the light of the United States Administration’s differing interpretation of that resolution, publication of the webpage ought to be put on hold, noting that the issue would be included in the Board’s report to WRC-27 under Resolution **80 Rev.WRC-07)** for decision.

9.13 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, responding to a question from the **Chair**, explained that the proposed webpage could contain background information on the relevant regulations and resolutions, as well as copies of the Board’s decisions and links to the relevant documents – with the same permissions as on the Board’s website – considered by the Board at the meetings in which the case was discussed. If other information, such as a statement or a summary, was to be included, it would need to be prepared by the Board.

9.14 **The Director** reiterated that point, noting that the Bureau could not interpret the Board’s decisions, nor could it draft any statement or summary of the case in question. It was important to take that aspect into account in any future cases in which the Board decided to publish information in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board*2of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022).

9.15 Following a discussion in which the **Chair**, **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Fianko** and **Ms Mannepalli** took part, **Ms Mannepalli** clarified that the aim was to present a factual summary of the case. The Board should nevertheless first consider the new issues raised by the Administration of the United States, including its assertion that the Board had overinterpreted Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, before considering whether to publish the webpage, once it had been finalized. **Ms Beaumier** and **Mr Fianko** agreed. The **Chair** added that, in its previous decision, the Board had requested only that the Bureau draft a webpage for its consideration; there was no imperative to publish it at the current meeting.

9.16 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

“The Board carefully considered Document RRB25-2/11 from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Document RRB25-2/15 from the Administration of the United States and Document RRB25-2/17 from the Administration of Norway, on the provision of Starlink satellite transmissions in Iranian territory. The Board also noted Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/7 and RRB25-2/DELAYED/8 from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Board noted the following points:

• The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had again reported the continuing unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals within its territory.

• The Administration of Norway had again reported that, according to its satellite operator, it would not be practicable to verify whether every single user terminal that communicated with its space stations worldwide had been brought into a territory where the service had not been authorized.

• From reliable publicly available information, Starlink had been able to do so upon request in other countries.

• During discussions in recent Working Party 4A meetings, satellite operators had presented operational solutions implemented in their satellite systems that allowed them to disable unauthorized operation/terminals to ensure compliance with RR No. **18.1** and Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**.

• With respect to *resolves* 3 i) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had indicated at the 96th Board meeting that it had made efforts to detect and identify the location of terminals but that it was a difficult task due to the small size and portability of the terminals and the vast geography and challenging topography of its territory, without elaborating on the nature of the efforts undertaken.

• The Administration of the United States disagreed with the Board’s interpretation of *resolves* 3 of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**.

• The Administrations of both the United States and Norway had expressed concerns regarding the publication of the case on a Bureau and Board webpage pursuant to *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, given their different interpretation of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**.

Taking into account the above information and the concerns regarding the interpretation and application of *resolves* 3 of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, the Board expressed the following view:

• When adopting *resolves* 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, WRC‑19 had envisaged that the notifying administration and satellite operator might need to intervene to terminate the unauthorized transmission if the administration concerned had not been successful. No limitations had been placed on the means it could use to resolve the matter.

• While not explicitly stated as a requirement in *resolves* 2 and 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, there was an implied requirement for the administrations and satellite operators to use any means available and necessary, to the maximum extent possible, to resolve the issue in a satisfactory and timely manner. Therefore, compliance with *resolves* 2 and 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** could involve geolocating and deactivating terminals remotely, if those capabilities were available to the satellite system operator. Such a requirement was consistent with the intent of WRC‑19 and the text of *resolves* 2 and 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**.

• Decisions were based on the application of the current regulations and of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, in particular as they currently stood, and are not taking into account deliberations under WRC‑27 agenda item 1.5.

Consequently, the Board:

• requested the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide detailed information on actions and measures taken since the 96th Board meeting and on an ongoing basis to identify and deactivate unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals in its territory in accordance with *resolves* 3 i) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)**;

• urged the Administration of Norway to take all appropriate actions at its disposal, to the extent of its ability, to immediately cease unauthorized transmissions of Starlink terminals within the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including by remotely disabling those terminals if necessary;

• once more instructed the Bureau to invite the Administration of Norway, with copy to the Administration of the United States, to explain specifically why it had been impossible to disable all Starlink terminals operating without authorization in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the same manner as had been done in other countries and thus to comply with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC‑23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC‑23)**.

The Board decided to include the above issue in its report under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)** to WRC‑27. The Board also instructed the Bureau to finalize the development of the webpage related to the publication of information under *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, for consideration at the next Board meeting.”

9.17 It was so **agreed**.

# 10 Submission by the Administration of Angola acting on behalf of Administrations of 16 Southern African Development Community Member States requesting to allow the submission of eight coordination filings under Resolution 170 (Rev.WRC‑23) (Documents [RRB25-2/18](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0018/en) and [RRB25-2/DELAYED/9](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-SP-0009/en))

10.1 **Mr Wang (Head, SSD/SPS)** introduced Document RRB25-2/18, which had been submitted by 16 Southern African Development Community (SADC) administrations following the 98th Board meeting. At its 98th meeting, the Board had noted that, under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, the special submission procedure requested by the administrations could only be applied by administrations having no assignment in the List of RR Appendix **30B** or assignment submitted under § 6.1 of RR Appendix **30B**. Since some of the 16 SADC administrations concerned were also among the group of administrations that had submitted two Regional African Satellite Communication Organization (RASCOM) network filings under RR Appendix **30B**, they were currently ineligible to submit a filing under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)**. The Board had therefore instructed the Bureau to obtain the agreement of those administrations to remove their names from the RASCOM filings, to enable them to take advantage of Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** while remaining part of RASCOM.

10.2 In their submission, the SADC administrations said that removing their names from the RASCOM filings would involve legal and procedural reviews of intergovernmental obligations and high-level political dialogue among governments, owing to the regional and continental implications, that could require a significant amount of time, possibly extending beyond WRC‑27. The SADC administrations further believed that the eligibility criteria under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** had been intended to apply only to systems submitted after WRC‑07; assignments submitted before WRC‑07 under suppressed subregional provisions should not disqualify an administration from benefiting under the resolution. That interpretation was, according to the administrations, supported by Working Party 4A, which had included a text on the matter in the chair’s report following its May 2025 meeting.

10.3 In view of the foregoing, the SADC administrations requested the Board to authorize the Administration of Angola, acting on their behalf, to submit up to eight Part A filings under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, pending final determination of the eligibility issue at WRC‑27. They noted that the SADC satellite initiative would promote achievement of the ITU and United Nations development agendas and the implementation of several ITU resolutions cited in the document. They further noted that Council-25 had approved the SADC proposal to exempt seven of its coordination filings under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** from the payment of cost-recovery fees, as explained in Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/9. Lastly, they noted that a single Part B final characteristics filing would be submitted after WRC‑27.

10.4 In reply to a question from **Ms Beaumier**,he recalled that, when Resolution **170** had been developed by Working Party 4A during the preparations for WRC-19, some administrations had mentioned the difficulty encountered by developing countries in utilizing Appendix **30B** frequency bands because of additional systems introduced after WRC‑03. Resolution **170** had been developed to resolve that issue, and the intention had clearly been to give favourable treatment to new submissions from developing countries, but only once. At the time, no distinction had been made between previous subregional systems and additional systems.

10.5 In reply to a question from **Mr Azzouz** and the **Chair**, he said that it was his understanding that Working Party 4A had yet to conclude on the question of eligibility. The results of the working party’s informal discussions of the question had been included as an attachment to the chair’s report at the request of some administrations.

10.6 The **Chair** said that, in his view, an attachment that was not in the main part of the report could not be said to represent the opinion of Working Party 4A.

10.7 **Ms Beaumier** said that it was her understanding that the SADC document had been submitted to Sub-Working Group 4A3, which had not had enough time to discuss it. The results set out in the attachment to the chair’s report were the outcome of informal discussions and had not been vetted by the sub-working group, the working group or Working Party 4A.

10.8 **Mr Azzouz** summarized the main points in the case and stressed the importance of avoiding any delay in the SADC shared satellite initiative, which would benefit people in the region by connecting the unconnected, bridging the digital divide and promoting achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Board should instruct the Bureau to continue assisting the administrations concerned by authorizing the Administration of Angola to submit eight Part A filings under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** and to subsequently consider the single Part B final characteristic filing submitted by the same administration. It should also advise the SADC administrations to submit the question of eligibility to WRC‑27. He proposed that the issue be included in the Board’s report under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC‑07)** to WRC‑27, with a view to achieving an outcome as successful as for Resolution **559 (WRC‑19)**.

10.9 **Ms Beaumier** expressed surprise that it would take more than two years to remove an administration’s name from a filing. She reassured the administrations concerned that there would be no regulatory consequences if their names were removed from, and subsequently returned to, the RASCOM filings.

10.10 **Mr Di Crescenzo** said that it was his understanding that RASCOM had filed a notification for an orbital position at 2.9°E and that the relevant satellite had been operational as of 2003, i.e. before 2007. Strictly speaking, therefore, the administrations concerned were not entitled to benefit from Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)**. In practical terms, however, they were entitled to 16 orbital positions and had selected 8 positions for one filing. Ultimately, therefore, they would have 2 instead of 16 positions. Considered from that perspective, he supported their request.

10.11 **Ms Mannepalli** considered that, given that the SADC administrations would find it difficult to have their names removed from the RASCOM filings and that Council-25 had exempted them from the cost-recovery fees for the eight Part A submissions they planned to file, the Board should agree to their proposal and leave it to WRC‑27 to decide the eligibility criteria. The Board should therefore instruct the Bureau to process the submissions for eight orbital filings.

10.12 **Mr Talib** observed that Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** was an important means of giving developing countries access to orbital positions, that clearly the removal of some administrations’ names from the RASCOM filings raised issues of a political nature and that Working Party 4A had yet to make a determination on the question of eligibility. For all those reasons, he considered that the Board should approve the proposal of the SADC administrations and instruct the Bureau to process a maximum of eight filings to be registered in line with Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)**, pending the deliberations at WRC‑27.

10.13 **Mr Cheng**, noting that the objective of the procedures prescribed in Appendix **30B** was to guarantee in practice equitable access for all countries to the geostationary-satellite orbit in the FSS frequency bands covered by the appendix, said that it was his understanding that Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** had been established based on that principle. Given that the question of eligibility criteria would be addressed at WRC‑27, and in order to preserve the possibility for the SADC administrations to submit their filings, he agreed to the administrations’ proposal that they be permitted to file their submissions and that the Bureau process up to eight Part A coordination filings, pending a final decision by WRC‑27.

10.14 **Ms Hasanova** agreed with previous speakers that the SADC administrations should not lose the opportunity to submit their filings and that the question of eligibility criteria be left to WRC‑27 to decide.

10.15 **Ms Beaumier** also agreed with that point of view but stressed that, ultimately, there must be only one final Part B submission.

10.16 **Mr Fianko** also expressed support for the proposal of the SADC administrations.

10.17 The **Chair** proposed that the Board should conclude as follows on the matter:

“Having considered in detail the request of the Administration of Angola, acting on behalf of 16 Member States of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as contained in Document RRB25-2/18, and noting Document RRB25-2/DELAYED/9 for information, the Board noted the following points:

• The Bureau had consulted with the SADC administrations concerned to seek their concurrence for the removal of their names from the RASCOM filings, thereby enabling their eligibility for submissions under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** while allowing continued participation in the RASCOM Inter-governmental Satellite Organization.

• The SADC Member States had found that the process of removing a Member State’s name from the RASCOM filings would require legal and procedural reviews and high-level discussions that could extend beyond WRC‑27.

• The SADC Member States had submitted a contribution to the Working Party 4A meeting in May 2025 seeking clarification on the eligibility for submissions under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)**. The result of informal discussions in a sub-working group included in Attachment 1 of the Chairman’s Report indicated that WRC-19‑ might not have intended to apply eligibility restrictions to former subregional systems such as the RASCOM filings but that further discussions were needed to confirm that view.

• As the issue regarding the restrictions on the application of Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** was expected to be deliberated at WRC‑27, the final determination of the eligibility of the SADC administrations for the application of the resolution while remaining associated with the RASCOM Appendix **30B** filings remained pending.

Consequently, the Board decided that:

• the Bureau should process the simultaneous submissions of up to eight filings under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** selected by the SADC administrations and publish them in Part A Special Sections;

• once that step had been accomplished, the Administration of Angola should inform the Bureau of the selected optimal orbital position as soon as it had been decided based on the progress of coordination before the Part B stage;

• the Bureau should cancel all the other remaining submissions and associated Part A Special Sections under Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)** when the Part B notice was submitted;

• since the concept of subregional system had been suppressed by WRC‑07, RASCOM filings should be treated as additional systems, in accordance with the latest version of RR Appendix **30B**.

The Board invited the Administration of Angola to submit a request to WRC‑27 for clarification on the eligibility issue of Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC‑23)**.

The Board instructed the Bureau to:

• defer the application of the eligibility restriction until the matter had been considered by WRC‑27 and to review the eligibility of the SADC Member States based on the decision of WRC‑27;

• treat any modification to RASCOM filings as additional systems, in accordance with the latest version of RR Appendix **30B**, i.e. the change of the members in the filings did not imply any modification to the service areas of the additional systems;

• report on progress on the matter to future Board meetings.”

10.18 It was so **agreed**.

# 11 Confirmation of the next meeting for 2025 and indicative dates for future meetings

11.1 The Board **agreed** to confirm the dates for its 100th meeting as 10–14 November 2025 (Room L).

11.2 The Board further tentatively confirmed the dates for its subsequent meetings in 2026, as follows:

• 101st meeting: 23–27 March 2026 (Room L);

• 102nd meeting: 29 June–3 July 2026 (Room L);

• 103rd meeting: 26–30 October 2026 (Room L).

# 12 Other business

12.1 There was no other business.

# 13 Approval of the summary of decisions (Document [RRB25-2/20](https://www.itu.int/md/R25-RRB25.2-C-0020/en))

13.1 The Board **approved** the summary of decisions contained in Document RRB25-2/20.

# 14 Closure of the meeting

14.1 The **Director** thanked the Chair and the Chair of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure for having run their meetings, both of which had had long agendas, with their usual efficiency. Board members had again participated very actively and demonstrated that they were eager to reach a consensus, two factors that made Board meetings enjoyable. He thanked everyone for their understanding of the limits to his participation at the current meeting.

14.2 The next meeting would be the Board’s 100th and would also mark the 30th anniversary of the Board itself. His plans to mark both occasions were well in hand.

14.3 **Mr Azzouz, Ms Mannepalli, Mr Talib** and **Ms Beaumier** thanked the Chair and the Vice-Chair and Chair of the working group for their hard work. They expressed appreciation to the Bureau for its support and swift replies to any questions raised, and to the Director for providing guidance as required. They wished their colleagues, all of whom had contributed to the success of the meeting, safe travels back to their respective countries.

14.4 **Ms Hasanova** thanked the Director and her fellow Board members for their kind words. She very much enjoyed her responsibilities and endeavoured to discharge them to the best of her abilities. She commended the Chair on the successful conclusion of the meeting and thanked the Director for joining virtually.

14.5 The **Chair** expressed his gratitude to his fellow Board members. Thanks to their remarkable teamwork, dedication and collaboration, they had completed a dense agenda with many challenging issues. He thanked the Bureau and the Director for their work in the background. The Board’s 100th meeting promised to be a milestone. He was sure that, with the collective expertise of all participants, the Board would continue to shape impactful outcomes.

14.6 The **Chair** closed the meeting at 1640 hours on Friday, 18 July 2025.

The Executive Secretary: The Chair:
M. MANIEWICZ A. LINHARES DE SOUZA FILHO

1. \* The minutes of the meeting reflect the detailed and comprehensive consideration by the members of the Radio Regulations Board of the items that were under consideration on the agenda of the 99th meeting of the Board. The official decisions of the 99th meeting of the Radio Regulations Board can be found in Document RRB25-2/20. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)