Radiocommunication Bureau (BR)

Circular Letter
CR/531

28 May 2026

To Administrations of Member States of the ITU

Subject: **Minutes of the 101st meeting of the Radio Regulations Board**

Pursuant to the provisions of Nos. **13.18** of the Radio Regulations and in accordance with §1.10 of Part C of the Rules of Procedure, please find attached the approved minutes of the 101st meeting of the Radio Regulations Board (23-27 Mach 2026).

These minutes were approved by the Members of the Radio Regulations Board by electronic means and are available on the RRB pages of the ITU web site.

Mario Maniewicz
Director

Annex: Minutes of the 101st meeting of the Radio Regulations Board

Distribution:

- Administrations of Member States of ITU
- Members of the Radio Regulations Board

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Radio Regulations Board
Geneva, 23 – 27 March 2026

Document RRB26-1/26-E
14 April 2026
Original: English

MINUTES* OF THE 101ST MEETING OF THE RADIO REGULATIONS BOARD

23-27 March 2026

Present: Members, RRB

Ms S. HASANOVA, Chair
Mr J. CHENG, Vice-Chair
Mr E. AZZOUZ, Mr A. ALKAHTANI, Ms C. BEAUMIER, Mr M. DI CRESCENZO, Mr E.Y. FIANKO, Mr Y. HENRI, Mr A. LINHARES DE SOUZA FILHO, Ms R. MANNEPALLI, Mr R. NURSHABEKOV, Mr H. TALIB

Executive Secretary, RRB

Mr M. MANIEWICZ, Director, BR

Précis-writers

Ms L. MUNSLOW, Mr P. METHVEN and Mr T. FRENCH

Also present: Ms D. TOMIMURA, Deputy to the Director, BR, and Chief, IAP

Mr A. VALLET, Chief, SSD
Mr J.A. CICCOROSSI, Head, SSD/SSS
Mr C. LOO, Head, SSD/CSS
Mr D. THAM, Head, SSD/USS
Mr J. WANG, Head, SSD/SPS
Mr A. KLYUCHAREV, SSD/SPS

Mr N. VASSILIEV, Chief, TSD
Mr S. JALAYERIAN, TSD/TPR
Ms I. GHAZI, Head, TSD/BCD
Mr C. RYU, TSD/FMD

Mr K. BOGENS, Head, TSD/FMD
Ms K. GOZAL, Administrative Secretary

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* The minutes of the meeting reflect the detailed and comprehensive consideration by the members of the Radio Regulations Board of the items that were under consideration on the agenda of the 101st meeting of the Board. The official decisions of the 101st meeting of the Radio Regulations Board can be found in Document RRB26-1/25.

	Subjects discussed	Documents
1	Opening of the meeting	-
2	Adoption of the agenda	RRB26-1/OJ/1(Rev.1) RRB26-1/DELAYED/2 RRB26-1/DELAYED/4 RRB26-1/DELAYED/5
3	Report by the Director, BR	RRB26-1/4 RRB26-1/4(Add.1) RRB26-1/4(Add.2) RRB26-1/4(Add.3) RRB26-1/4(Add.4) RRB26-1/4(Add.5) RRB26-1/4(Add.6) RRB26-1/4(Add.8)
4	Rules of Procedure	-
4.1	List of proposed rules of procedure	RRB26-1/1 RRB24-1/1(Rev.6)
4.2	Draft rules of procedure	CCRR/80
	Comments from administrations	RRB26-1/5
5	Request for the cancellation of the frequency assignments to satellite network under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations	-
5.1	Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel frequency assignments to the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations	RRB26-1/9
6	Requests to extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use/bring back into use the frequency assignments to satellite networks/systems	-
6.1	Submissions by the Administration of Japan requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system	RRB26-1/3 RRB26-1/6
6.2	Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite network	RRB26-1/8
6.3	Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite system	RRB26-1/10
6.4	Submission by the Administration of Spain requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network	RRB26-1/14
6.5	Submission by the Administration of the Sultanate of Oman requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network	RRB26-1/15

	Subjects discussed	Documents
	Submission by the Administration of Papua New Guinea relating to the submission by the Sultanate of Oman requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network	RRB26-1/18
6.6	Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network	RRB26-1/21
6.7	Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network	RRB26-1/20
6.8	Submission by the Administration of Italy requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks	RRB26-1/23
6.9	Submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland providing additional information supporting its request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network	RRB26-1/24(Rev.1)
7	Issues regarding the provision of STARLINK satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran	-
	Submissions by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the provision of STARLINK satellite services in its territory	RRB26-1/2 RRB26-1/7
	Submission by the Administration of the United States regarding the provision of STARLINK satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran	RRB26-1/22
8	Cases of harmful interference	
8.1	Submission by the Administration of France regarding harmful interference to its satellite network at the orbital position 70.5°E	RRB26-1/12 RRB26-1/DELAYED/3
8.2	Issues regarding harmful interference to emissions of high-frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article **12**	-
	Submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding harmful interference to emissions of its high-frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article **12**	RRB26-1/13 RRB26-1/DELAYED/1
	Submission by the Administration of China (People's Republic of) on its frequency monitoring in response to the submissions received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding harmful interference to emissions of its high-frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article **12**	RRB26-1/19
8.3	Submission by the Administrations of Estonia (Republic of), Latvia (Republic of) and Lithuania (Republic of) concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services	RRB26-1/16 RRB26-1/4(Add.7)

	Subjects discussed	Documents
9	Submission by the Administration of Canada requesting an additional extension of the first milestone period (M1) for the MULTUS satellite system	RRB26-1/11
10	Submission by the Administration of Armenia regarding recognition of its comments and objections with respect to modifications of GE84 and GE06 Plans published in Special Sections GE06/233, GE84/353, GE84/354 and GE84/355	RRB26-1/17
11	Consideration of issues related to Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**	-
12	RRB participation in the Plenipotentiary Conference 2026 (PP-26) and the World Radiocommunication Seminar 2026 (WRS-26)	-
13	Confirmation of the next meeting for 2026 and indicative dates for future meetings	-
14	Other business	-
14.1	Request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to treat all cases, as of 28 February 2026, where the administration is identified as potentially affected by the submissions of frequency assignments and allotments of other administrations	-
14.2	Webpage within the Board's website to provide guidance to administrations on requests for the extension of regulatory time-limits	-
14.3	Case related to the recording of frequency assignments to the HIBLEO-2 satellite system in the aeronautical mobile-satellite (route) service (AMS(R)S) in the frequency band 1 616.0045-1 626.4955 MHz	-
15	Approval of the summary of decisions	RRB26-1/25
16	Closure of the meeting	-

1 Opening of the meeting

1.1 The **Chair** opened the 101st meeting of the Radio Regulations Board at 0900 hours on Monday, 23 March 2026. She welcomed the participants, noting that Mr Alkahtani was attending remotely, and looked forward to a productive meeting with the support of all involved.

1.2 The **Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau**, speaking also on behalf of the Secretary-General, welcomed the Board members to Geneva for their first meeting of 2026 and congratulated Ms Hasanova and Mr Cheng on their appointments as Chair and Vice-Chair, respectively. It was another milestone year for the Board, as 2026 marked the 120th anniversary of the Radio Regulations. The Board members were guardians of an international treaty governing the use of the radio-frequency spectrum and satellite orbits that had already weathered international conflicts and geopolitical tensions. He wished the Board a successful meeting and assured it of the Bureau's full support.

2 Adoption of the agenda (Documents RRB26-1/OJ/1(Rev.1), RRB26-1/DELAYED/2, RRB26-1/DELAYED/4 and RRB26-1/DELAYED/5

2.1 **Mr Bogens (Head, TSD/FMD)** said that he wished to draw the Board's attention to four further addenda to the Director's report (Addenda 5, 6, 7 and 8 to Document RRB26-1/4). Addendum 5, received from the Administration of Slovenia, concerned harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries, as did Addendum 6, which contained a summary of the updates that had been received from the Administrations of Malta and Switzerland. Addendum 8 contained information concerning the bringing into use of the CENTISPACE-2 non-geostationary satellite system notified by the Administration of China. The Board may wish to consider those three addenda alongside the Report by the Director under agenda item 3. Addendum 7 reported on a meeting between the Administrations of Lithuania and the Russian Federation concerning harmful interference affecting radionavigation-satellite service (RNSS) receivers located in the territory of the Administration of Lithuania; the Board might wish to consider it under agenda item 8.3.

2.2 He further drew attention to three late submissions (Documents RRB26-1/DELAYED/1 to 3). Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/1, dated 16 March 2026, had been submitted by the Administration of China, in Chinese only; it contained information supplementing the contents of that administration's submission. It was responding to the submission from the Administration of the United Kingdom (document RRB26-1/13) under agenda item 8.2 and therefore was not compliant with the 10-day deadline provided in No. 1.6 of Part C of the Rules of Procedure. Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/2, dated 18 March, had been received from the Administration of the Russian Federation, in Russian only, and concerned harmful interference to that administration's satellite networks, a topic that was not currently on the Board's agenda. He recalled that delayed submissions should at least be provided in English; translations of both late submissions were, however, now available. Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/3, dated 20 March, had been received from the Administration of France and was related to agenda item 8.1.

2.3 Lastly, since Document RRB26-1/18, submitted by the Administration of Papua New Guinea, concerned Document RRB26-1/15 containing the request by the Administration of Oman for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network, it was proposed to consider both documents under one agenda item, namely item 6.5.

2.4 **Ms Mannepalli** said that, since Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/1 contained additional information from the Administration of China in response to the submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom, she would have no objection to it being considered for information under agenda item 8.2.

2.5 **Mr Azzouz** said that, since Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/2 did not concern an issue on the Board's agenda it should be deferred to the Board's next meeting.

2.6 **Mr Cheng** said that, while he had no strong views on the matter, the Board might consider that document as an addendum to the Director's report, since it responded to a decision of the Board at its previous meeting. A similar approach had been taken in relation to a late submission received from the Administration of Israel at the Board's 100th meeting.

2.7 **Ms Mannepalli** said that, unlike the late submission from the Administration of Israel, Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/2 from the Administration of the Russian Federation did not relate to any of the content of the Report by the Director. Moreover, there was no existing item on the agenda under which the document could be considered. She agreed with Mr Azzouz that consideration of that document should be deferred to the Board's next meeting. **Ms Beaumier** and **Mr Talib** concurred with that approach.

2.8 The **Chair** noted that Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/3, from the Administration of France, contained an important update to agenda item 8.1, namely that the harmful interference had ceased.

2.9 **Mr Azzouz** added that the document supplemented the content of RRB26-1/12, submitted by the same administration; he was in favour of its inclusion under agenda item 8.1.

2.10 The **Chair**, drawing attention to agenda items 6.6 and 6.7, concerning requests for extension from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran, said that, since the cases were related, the Board might wish to consider them together, with a view to issuing a single decision.

2.11 **Mr Azzouz** recalled that, at its previous meeting, the Board had considered the cases as two separate matters, notwithstanding the obvious links between them. Moreover, the extensions of the regulatory time-limit requested were different in each case.

2.12 **Ms Beaumier** agreed with Mr Azzouz, noting that, at its 100th meeting, the Board had reached different conclusions in each case. Given the content of the documents, she proposed that the order in which the Board considered Documents RRB26-1/20 and 21, under items 6.7 and 6.6, respectively, should be reversed.

2.13 In response to a query from **Mr Azzouz**, **Ms Beaumier** explained that the submission by the Administration of Canada was being considered under agenda item 9 and not as a sub-item under agenda item 6 because it concerned a request for an extension of the first milestone period rather than of the regulatory time-limit to bring or bring back into use frequency assignments to a satellite system. For that reason, the matters should be considered separately. **Mr Di Crescenzo** concurred.

2.14 Later during the meeting, the **Director** informed the Board that two further delayed documents had been received – Documents RRB26-1/DELAYED/4 and 5 – from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva. The first had been addressed to him; the second had been addressed to the Secretary-General. He recalled that, in accordance with § 1.6 of the Board's internal arrangements and working methods, submissions received after the start of the Board's meeting would not be considered by the Board unless there were exceptional circumstances.

2.15 **Mr Henri** said that, while the documents contained information that was sensitive in nature, none of the information related to any of the items on the Board's agenda. The rules were clear; consideration of the documents should be deferred to the Board's next meeting. **Mr Azzouz**, **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, **Mr Cheng**, **Mr Alkahtani** and **Ms Mannepalli** agreed.

2.16 **Ms Beaumier** added that much of the content of those documents appeared to fall outside the scope of the Board's mandate.

2.17 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The draft agenda was adopted as amended in Document RRB26-1/OJ/1(Rev.1). The Board decided to note for information:

- Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/1 under agenda item 8.2;
- Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/3 under agenda item 8.1.

The Board decided to defer its consideration of Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/2, in which the Administration of the Russian Federation had informed the Bureau of harmful interference to its satellite networks. The

Board also decided to defer its consideration of Documents RRB26-1/DELAYED/4 and RRB26-1/DELAYED/5, which had been received from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran and provided information on international satellite network issues affecting that administration, and instructed the Bureau to add those documents to the agenda of the 102nd Board Meeting."

2.18 It was so **agreed**.

3 Report by the Director, BR (Documents RRB26-1/4, RRB26-1/4(Add.1), RRB26-1/4(Add.2), RRB26-1/4(Add.3), RRB26-1/4(Add.4), RRB26-1/4(Add.5), RRB26-1/4(Add.6) and RRB26-1/4(Add.8))

3.1 The **Director** introduced his customary report in Document RRB26-1/4. All the actions arising from the previous Board meeting set out in Table 1-1 had been implemented. Referring to § 3 j) of Table 1-1, a report on the meeting between the Administrations of Lithuania and the Russian Federation was contained in Addendum 7, which would be considered under agenda item 8.3. While written reports on the implementation of decisions under § 3 k) and § 10.2 had been expected to be included as addenda to Document RRB26-1/4, oral reports would be delivered instead as the cases had not significantly evolved.

3.2 Referring to § 2.2, he noted that the processing times of all special sections except the publication of coordination requests (CR/Cs) were within the specified regulatory periods, while the processing times of the latter had been decreasing since May 2025, demonstrating the Bureau's efforts to address the backlog. Nevertheless, the current processing time stood at 14 months as compared to the regulatory requirement of four months. At the time of writing the report, the Bureau had been concerned about a recruitment freeze due to budgetary constraints; the recruitment situation had, however, since improved. He was thus hopeful that, with recruitment, the Bureau would be able to address the backlog in the following months. Under § 3.2, he noted that the Bureau had explained the impact of the CR/C backlog on ITU budget implementation to the ITU Council Working Group on financial and human resources (CWG-FHR).

3.3 Turning to § 4.1 on harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries, he said that he had, as instructed, written to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, requesting that the administration take all necessary measures to eliminate harmful FM interference and cease the operation of uncoordinated broadcasting stations. That letter and the response received by the Bureau were found in Addendum 1 to the report. Addenda 2, 4, 5 and 6 all contained reports from affected countries, most of which had noted a lack of progress. The Administration of France had reported that the harmful interference to the Bonifacio station persisted and that a new complaint by Corsica Radio had been filed, but that several bilateral meetings had been held and that a methodology for compatibility analysis had been validated by both administrations. The Administration of Switzerland had reported that it planned to bring back into use a number of FM frequencies that had been switched off as part of the transition to DAB, due to a significant drop in listeners. Addendum 3 contained a report from the Administration of Italy, in which the administration had stressed that its use of two DAB blocks had been an exceptional, interim measure and that no cases of harmful DAB interference had been reported. The report also detailed actions that had been taken by the administration to comply with the requests of the European Commission (EC) and avoid an EC infringement procedure.

3.4 For the first time, § 6 included a report on the implementation of Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**. As at 3 February 2026, the Bureau had received 46 related submissions and published 17 special sections; it had also developed a dedicated webpage which provided up-to-date information on implementation of the resolution.

3.5 Under § 7, the Bureau had provided an update on the processing of Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC-23),** in particular the eight submissions from the Administration of Angola on behalf of the Southern African Development Community concerning its international satellite organization, the Southern Africa Community Satellite. Special Section RES170/A6A had been created, containing information submitted under the special procedure described in Attachment 1 to Resolution **170 (Rev. WRC-23)**, and had been in use since 3 February 2026. The eight special sections subject to Resolution **170 (Rev. WRC-23)** had been published in BR IFIC 3064/03.02.2026, as summarized in Table 7-1.

3.6 In § 8, the Bureau reported on the suspension of the COURIER-3 satellite system, which the Administration of Germany had notified as having begun on 2 November 2024, when the KEPLER-6 and KEPLER-7 satellites had been deorbited. However, the Bureau had noted that the operational orbital parameters of the satellites had been differing considerably from the notified orbital parameters since 3 March 2024. Thus, in application of No. **13.6**, the Bureau had consulted the administration and they had agreed to use 3 March 2024 as the date of suspension instead, with the Bureau not penalizing the administration for late notification of suspension under No. **11.49**, as it considered that the administration had acted in good faith and on account of the fact that rules of procedure on tolerances for cases not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** remained under discussion.

Actions arising from the previous RRB meeting (§ 1 of Document RRB26-1/4)

3.7 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** confirmed that all actions arising from the previous meeting of the Board had been implemented in respect of terrestrial services.

3.8 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that all actions arising from the previous meeting of the Board had been implemented in respect of space services. With regard to § 3 k) of Table 1-1, the Administration of Luxembourg had contacted the Bureau in January 2026 to note that the harmful interference had ended and to request that the Administration of the Russian Federation establish a focal point to expedite the resolution of any future cases. The Bureau had contacted the Administration of the Russian Federation to facilitate a meeting but had not yet received a reply. Following a meeting with affected satellite operators, the Administration of France had indicated that no harmful interference had been reported since March 2025. While the Administrations of Sweden and the Russian Federation had successfully established focal points, allowing for smoother communication, the Administration of Sweden had informed the Bureau in February 2026 that harmful interference had continued to affect the Astra 4A satellite. The new channel of communication had nevertheless proved effective, it had said, in raising the issue with the Administration of the Russian Federation.

3.9 Responding to a question from **Ms Mannepalli**, he said that the Administration of Sweden had contacted the Administration of the Russian Federation through the General Radio Frequency Centre and had received prompt acknowledgement of the situation. The harmful interference remained ongoing as at 20 March 2026.

3.10 Regarding § 10.2 of Table 1-1, he said that the conclusions of the 100th Board meeting had been communicated to the Administrations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. As attested by Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/2, the harmful interference was ongoing and there had been no reply from the Administration of Ukraine. The Bureau would continue to contact the Administration of Ukraine, but, given that the two countries were officially at war, a response was unlikely.

3.11 The Board **noted** all action items under § 1 of Document RRB26-1/4 arising from the decisions of the 100th Board meeting.

Processing of filings for terrestrial and space systems (§ 2 of Document RRB26-1/4)

3.12 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** said that the information contained in the tables on the processing of notices to terrestrial services in § 2.1 of Document RRB24-2/4 was typical. In addition, no revisions of findings for frequency assignments to stations in terrestrial services had been made during the reporting period.

3.13 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** drew attention to the tables on the processing of space notices under § 2.2 of the same document. He said, that while the backlog in processing CR/Cs was slowly improving, it would not be eliminated without recruitment, which was itself not a quick process. As the Director had said, that process had at least resumed.

3.14 Responding to questions from **Mr Henri**, he said that three Professional-category staff were being recruited under the regular budget on a fixed-term basis alongside an additional, temporary Professional-category staff member who would be recruited under funds earmarked for implementation of WRC-23 decisions, as the backlog was linked to some of those decisions. Given the unique nature of the Bureau's work, any externally recruited staff would require extensive training. It was hoped that the backlog would be resolved within 9 to 12 months of the new staff assuming their duties, thus ideally before WRC-27. While

there was no official special task force for addressing the backlog, the Bureau was considering reassigning certain engineers on a short-term basis to assist with the backlog but wished to avoid consequential backlogs in the processing of other special sections. In addition, discussions would be held with colleagues in the Space Applications Software Division with a view to changing certain processes and fixing certain software bugs, some of which were long-term issues while others directly blocked processing and therefore needed to be resolved with greater urgency.

3.15 **Mr Henri** welcomed the Bureau's efforts in ensuring that space notices were broadly processed within the prescribed regulatory treatment time but expressed regret at the continuing, excessive backlog in the processing of CR/Cs. While the lifting of the freeze on recruitment was welcome, the recruitment process would still take time to yield results. In the meantime, the continuing, lengthy backlog risked leading to administrations and operators disregarding the Radio Regulations, imperilling the international rights derived therefrom.

3.16 **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Azzouz** expressed appreciation for the Bureau's efforts to eliminate the backlog and welcomed the timeline in that regard, as the delays were affecting the ability of Administrations and providers to plan ahead.

3.17 Responding to a question from **Mr Azzouz**, the **Director** said that the issue of the backlog had been raised at the Plenipotentiary Conference and at almost every recent Council session in order to sensitize the ITU membership to the situation that the Bureau and the Union as a whole were facing as a result of the reduced staffing levels. The fact that the budget had not been increased amounted to a reduction in real terms, due to inflation. Moreover, it meant that assigning additional resources to the Bureau would mean that fewer resources were available for the rest of the Union. Nevertheless, the Bureau had been allowed to recruit additional staff, as previously mentioned, and to pursue modernization of its software and processes; both measures would, however, be initially slow to show results.

3.18 He recalled that the Bureau had overcome a similar backlog caused by a massive increase in filings of "paper" geostationary-satellite orbit (GSO) satellites through the introduction of the cost recovery system, which had served as a suitable deterrent. Currently, there was no such disincentive to stem the rise in unrealistic submissions under non-GSO mega constellations. The cost recovery system was failing to deter wealthy players, as they could easily afford the payments and were in fierce competition with one another. At the end of 2025, the Bureau had received filings for 200 000 satellites from one administration, while another had promised even more. Obviously, not every satellite would be launched, but the filings still needed to be processed. Regardless of whether the satellites were submitted in one huge filing or many smaller ones, the Bureau would still be submerged and could not be restructured to accommodate such extreme actions. Despite the best efforts of the Bureau and its commitment to improvement, it would be extremely challenging to process such filings within the regulatory four-month period if the practice of unrealistic submissions continued unabated.

3.19 **Mr Azzouz** thanked the Director for his explanation but nevertheless expressed concern that countries might raise complaints at the Plenipotentiary Conference over the issue of filings not being processed on time.

3.20 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** drew attention to the new, additional breakdown of information under Tables 2-9 and 2-10, which provided separate tables, starting from January 2026, for the notifications for satellite networks under Article **11** that were or were not subject to coordination under Section II of Article **9**. The new layout helped to show the differences in treatment time and number of submissions. Those involving coordination inevitably took longer to process.

3.21 Responding to questions from **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Talib**, he said that, in Table 2-9, the marked increase in treatment time in December 2025 was an outlier and attributable to the fact that the Bureau had that month published only one BR IFIC, which had contained only API notifications that had been particularly difficult to process, due either to complexity or quality of submission. The data did not reflect normal processing, but it did show that some submissions were much more complicated than others, sometimes involving multiple exchanges of letters. He hoped that the revised version of Decision 482 (C01, last amended C25) might incentivize higher-quality submissions by imposing higher payments for submissions requiring lengthier treatment.

3.22 **Mr Henri**, **Ms Mannepalli**, **Mr Talib** and **Mr Azzouz** welcomed the Bureau's initiative in providing disaggregated data on processing of notifications for satellite networks both subject to and not subject to coordination under Section II of Article **9**.

3.23 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board noted § 2 of Document RRB26-1/4, on the processing of filings for terrestrial and space systems and encouraged the Bureau to continue to make all efforts to process such filings within the regulatory time-limits.

On the processing time for coordination requests related to space services, the Board noted that:

– the staff recruitment process was ongoing; and the current backlog of coordination requests could be expected to be reduced within 9–12 months once newly recruited staff had been installed and had completed the necessary training;

– that some submissions not subject to coordination had required additional work beyond the standard treatment process owing to complexity or low quality of submission;

– that methodology of cost recovery fees did not discourage submission of unrealistic non-GSO submissions with thousands of satellites."

3.24 It was so **agreed**.

Implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings (§ 3 of Document RRB26-1/4)

3.25 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, drawing attention to § 3.1 of Document RRB26-1/4, said that the two satellite network filings cancelled as a result of non-payment and listed in Table 3-2 were from the Administration of the United States of America, as was frequently the case.

3.26 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** drew attention to § 3.2 of Document RRB26-1/4, on Council activities. CWG-FHR had met twice since being tasked by the Council at its 2025 session with reviewing the indirect costs associated with the processing of satellite network filings and proposing a methodology for their recovery. At the most recent meeting in January 2026, the Chair of CWG-FHR had concluded in her report that it was very challenging to develop a methodology, providing a series of questions to be reviewed and addressed by the Council at its 2026 session (Council-26), and potentially by the Plenipotentiary Conference as well. Progress could not be made on the methodology as several Administrations had not agreed with the application of Resolution 91 (Rev. Guadalajara, 2010) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the key principle of which was the recovery of all costs. That represented a significant problem, as the secretariat was obliged to implement that resolution and thus develop a methodology aligned with it. The secretariat would present a new proposal at Council-26 which he hoped would resolve the outstanding issues.

3.27 Turning to the issue of deferred revenues as a result of the backlog, he explained that invoices related to satellite cost recovery were sent once the filing had been reviewed by the Bureau and deemed receivable. The invoice was then sent to the submitting entity for payment within six months. However, due to the applicable accounting rules, the payments, even if already received, could only be taken into account in the accounted revenues once the corresponding special sections had been published. Such pending income was referred to as deferred revenue. At the end of 2025, total deferred revenue stood at CHF 4 237 520. The money had been received but could not be included in the budget and could therefore not be spent. Furthermore, due to the backlog, some CHF 3 800 000 had not yet been invoiced for the processing of CR/Cs. The situation had been explained to the Financial Resources Management Department (FRMD) and had been one of the reasons for the lifting of the freeze on recruitment.

3.28 Responding to a question from **Ms Mannepalli**, he said that, while the procedure for handling deferred revenues might not appear to be the most efficient or logical approach, it was the result of the application of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), which provided for rules on the accounting of monies invoiced. Those rules had initially been discussed, including with the External Auditor, and adopted when ITU had adopted IPSAS in 2012. FRMD had come to appreciate that those rules were now an obstacle and had broached the subject with the current External Auditor to assess whether a different interpretation of the rules would allow for the payments to be taken into account on the invoice date. Such

a change would require the approval of the External Auditor and subsequently the Council to ensure transparency.

3.29 Responding to a question from **Mr Fianko**, he said that, while no specific input was needed from administrations, they could help by showing support for the change during the consideration of the External Auditor's report at Council-26.

3.30 The Board **noted** §§ 3.1 and 3.2 of Document RRB26-1/4, on late payments and Council activities, respectively, relating to the implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings.

Reports of harmful interference and/or infringements of the Radio Regulations (Article 15 of the Radio Regulations) (§ 4 of Document RRB26-1/4)

3.31 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)**, drawing attention to the tables in § 4 of Document RRB26-1/4, said that the Bureau had received 460 communications containing reports of harmful interference and/or infringements of the Radio Regulations in the reporting period.

3.32 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD),** drawing attention to Table 4-3, said that, apart from the interference cases reported in RNSS that would be discussed under agenda item 8.3, there was nothing noteworthy to report and the number of cases was within normal levels.

3.33 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered § 4 of Document RRB26-1/4, containing statistics on harmful interference and infringements of the Radio Regulations and requested the Bureau to highlight the issue of harmful interference to safety services in Tables 4-2 and 4-3."

3.34 It was so **agreed**.

Harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries (§ 4.1 of Document RRB26-1/4 and Document RRB26-1/4/(Add.1-6))

3.35 **Ms Ghazi (Head, TSD/BCD)**, introducing Addendum 1 to Document RRB26-1/4, said that, on 19 January 2026, the Director had written to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, requesting that all necessary measures be taken to eliminate harmful interference to FM sound broadcasting stations and forwarding copies of the relevant Board decisions. In its reply, the Digital, Connectivity and New Technologies Department of the Ministry of Enterprise and Made in Italy had informed the Bureau that the European Commission (EC) had initiated an infringement procedure, pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, against Italy in relation to the harmful interference. Like the Board, EC had called for action to eliminate the interference and ensure compliance with the Radio Regulations and the GE84 Plan. The Administration of Italy had said that it was striving to find a way forward and had submitted to EC a detailed action plan. The Bureau had not seen that plan.

3.36 In Addendum 3 to Document RRB26-1/4, the Administration of Italy provided an update to the Board, including on its use, apparently as an exceptional and interim measure, of the DAB blocks 7C and 7D; progress towards finalizing the Adriatic-Ionian agreement; and the EC infringement procedure. According to the administration, the compensation scheme aimed at encouraging the voluntary return of FM licences in respect of stations suspected of causing harmful interference had now been jettisoned. Instead, comprehensive and binding regulatory measures would be pursued to reduce interference on a more global scale, rather than on a case-by-case basis.

3.37 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** added that the Administration of Italy said that it was seeking the "fair and effective cooperation" of neighbouring administrations in regularizing its uncoordinated FM stations, which he feared might place the burden on other countries; and requested the Bureau's assistance regarding the registration and notification of Italian FM broadcasting stations.

3.38 In reply to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, **Ms Ghazi (Head, TSD/BCD)** said that, as far as she understood it, the Administration of Italy had pursued the voluntary compensation scheme owing to challenges associated with the country's legal framework and the courts. The involvement of the European

Union, of which Italy was a member State, seemed to have added a new dimension: the prospect of heavy fines if the administration did not comply with European Union rules and regulations. She recalled that EC had taken similar action on a previous interference-related issue. As a result, it seemed that the Italian regulator now had a more powerful argument for regulatory or legal change.

3.39 Responding to questions from **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Azzouz**, she explained that the harmful interference affected FM sound broadcasting stations only; no interference had been reported in respect of DAB stations. However, the Italian Administration had continued to use DAB frequency blocks 7C and 7D, which had not been allocated to any country under the GE06 Plan. Its neighbouring countries strongly objected to the uncoordinated use of those DAB blocks for two main reasons: first, they feared that the decades-long interference affecting FM stations might be repeated on DAB stations; second, some of those countries had wished to avail themselves of those unassigned DAB blocks during transitional periods. The Administration of Italy had, however, unilaterally decided to use those blocks without coordinating with other countries. The issue was one reason why the Adriatic-Ionian agreement had still not been finalized.

3.40 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)**, introducing the remaining addenda to Document RRB26-1/4, said that, in Addendum 2, the Administration of Croatia had confirmed that there had been no improvement in the interference situation, despite numerous meetings and the submission of some 11 700 interference reports over the years.

3.41 In Addendum 4, the Administration of France had provided information on the Bonifacio case; a new interference complaint relating to Corsica, for which a simultaneous measurement campaign had been proposed; and a methodology for compatibility analysis, which had been agreed by the French and Italian Administrations.

3.42 Addendum 5 was the update from the Administration of Slovenia, which reported no improvement in the situation. Addendum 6 contained a summary of the updates received from the Administrations of Malta and Switzerland. The former likewise reported that it had observed no improvements; the latter informed the Bureau that, although it had planned to switch off its FM transmitters by the end of 2026, it now intended to resume operation of some FM broadcasting stations, potentially leading to interference once again between Swiss and Italian FM broadcasting stations.

3.43 Responding to a comment from **Mr Azzouz**, he provided an overview of the EC infringement procedure e. It was a two-step procedure: first, EC sent a letter of formal notice requesting compliance with the relevant European Union rules and regulations; second, if EC did not consider that the measures proposed were satisfactory, it could proceed to litigation and the member State concerned could face significant financial penalties. In the case of Italy, EC had issued the formal notice in respect of the harmful interference to FM broadcasting stations only. In response, the Administration of Italy had sent an action plan, outlining the measures it would take to satisfy EC requirements.

3.44 **Ms Beaumier** said she noted that the response to the Director's letter had come not from the Minister to whom it had been addressed but from a lower-level authority, which was disappointing. While she was pleased that the Administration of Italy appeared to have put forward a serious plan to resolve the long-standing issue of harmful interference, she found it regrettable that it had taken so long for it to do so and only after pressure from EC. She wondered whether the administrations' "expectation of fair and effective cooperation from neighbouring countries" for the registration of their uncoordinated stations was realistic, given the impact of 20 years of harmful interference. Neighbouring countries cannot be expected to accept the registration of stations that caused harmful interference.

3.45 **Mr Fianko** said that the initiation of the EC infringement procedure was an interesting development in the case. It was to be hoped that the procedure might help to expedite a resolution of the long-standing issue. Given that the plan that the Administration of Italy had submitted to EC was expected to be binding in nature, it would be useful if the administration could share it with the Board. **Mr Cheng** and **Ms Mannepalli** agreed.

3.46 **Mr Cheng** added that, in its update to the Board, the Administration of Italy had indicated that it had devised a structural approach to addressing the issue of FM interference. The Board should therefore request detailed information, including on the specific measures being taken and the timeline for their implementation, for consideration at its next meeting.

3.47 **Mr Azzouz** said that he questioned the utility of requesting such information, since it had not been finalized. To his mind, the Administration of Italy had indicated what measures it would take, which included ending in the near future its use of the uncoordinated DAB blocks, which, according to the administration, it had decided to use at the behest of EC to resolve the interference issues.

3.48 **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Fianko** said that, although the EC infringement procedure was a separate process to that of the Board, detailed information on the approach that had been proposed by the Administration of Italy would be useful to the case.

3.49 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** pointed out that the administration's update to the Board, in Addendum 3, contained only general statements of intent; no specific measures had been described. The Board might therefore wish to request more information to aid in its decision-making.

3.50 **Ms Beaumier** said that she agreed with other speakers that a copy of the proposed plan would be useful, irrespective of whether it was the finalized version. While that plan was currently being assessed by EC, the Board might also have some comments that the administration might find useful. **Ms Mannepalli** agreed.

3.51 **Mr Fianko** added that the administration might also share details of its long-term plans for DAB broadcasting in VHF band III and a timeline for ending its use of the uncoordinated DAB blocks.

3.52 **Ms Beaumier** said that, notwithstanding the recent developments, she found it disappointing that no improvements in the harmful interference had been observed by the administrations affected. The Board should reiterate its previous conclusions and strongly urge the Administration of Italy to promptly take all necessary and effective measures to eliminate the interference to FM broadcasting stations; implement the recommendations from the 2025 multilateral coordination meeting; provide the complete technical data required by the neighbouring administrations to facilitate the process of mitigating cases of interference; and pursue its efforts to finalize the Adriatic-Ionian agreement.

3.53 **Mr Azzouz** said that since the neighbouring countries had reported no improvement in the interference experienced, the Board should request the Administration of Italy to cease the operation of all uncoordinated FM and DAB stations. All the administrations involved should be encouraged to continue their coordination efforts on the basis of mutual cooperation and goodwill.

3.54 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered in detail § 4.1 of, and Addenda 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to Document RRB26-1/4, on harmful interference to broadcasting stations in the VHF/UHF bands between Italy and its neighbouring countries. The Board noted the following points:

- The European Commission (EC) had initiated an infringement procedure against Italy on harmful interference in the FM band, which involved the need for Italy to adopt effective and binding measures to eliminate the interference;
- Italy had presented the EC with a detailed action plan aimed at the systematic elimination of harmful interference, as well as at the progressive regularization and notification of FM broadcasting stations with a view to their inclusion in the GE84 Plan;
- The compensation scheme to incentivize operators causing interference to stations in neighbouring countries to voluntarily return FM broadcasting station licences was no longer being pursued;
- With respect to DAB, there was no reported interference and the use by Italy of DAB blocks 7C and 7D was a provisional and exceptional measure;
- Work on finalizing the Adriatic-Ionian DAB Agreement had continued, with some issues remaining under discussion;
- The Administrations of Croatia, France, Malta, Slovenia and Switzerland had reiterated that, despite numerous meetings with the Italian Administration, there had been no improvement in the cases of harmful interference to their stations.

Having acknowledged the updated situation provided by the Italian Administration, the Board again strongly urged the Administration of Italy to promptly:

- take all necessary measures to eliminate harmful interference to the FM sound broadcasting stations of its neighbouring administrations;
- cease the operation of all uncoordinated FM and DAB stations and no longer license such stations;
- implement the recommendations from the 2025 multilateral coordination meeting;
- provide the Board with detailed information on the approach developed by Italy and reported to the EC with a view to addressing FM interference and regularizing FM stations, including the implementation timeline;
- expeditiously provide the complete technical data required by the neighbouring administrations to facilitate the process of mitigating cases of interference;
- pursue its efforts to finalize the Adriatic-Ionian agreement, in order to encourage the transition to the DAB platform and alleviate congestion in the FM band;
- participate in a collaborative measurement campaign with the administrations concerned, to allow for endorsement of the interference measurements.

Furthermore, the Board encouraged all concerned administrations to continue their coordination efforts with Italy in goodwill and to report on the progress achieved to the 102nd meeting of the Board.

The Board instructed the Bureau to:

- continue providing assistance to all administrations concerned;
- organize a multilateral coordination meeting between Italy and its neighbouring countries in the third quarter of 2026;
- continue reporting on progress on the matter to future Board meetings."

3.55 It was so **agreed**.

Implementation of Nos. 9.38.1, 11.44.1, 11.47, 11.48, 11.49, 13.6 and Resolution 49 (Rev.WRC-23) of the Radio Regulations (§ 5 of Document RRB26-1/4)

3.56 The Board **noted** § 5 of Document RRB26-1/4, on the implementation of Nos. **9.38.1, 11.44.1**, **11.47**, **11.48**, **11.49**, **13.6** and Resolution **49 (Rev.WRC-23)** of the Radio Regulations.

Implementation of Resolutions 35 (Rev.WRC-23) and 8 (WRC-23) (§ 6 of Document RRB26-1/4)

3.57 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** drew attention to the tables contained in § 6 reflecting implementation of Resolution **35 (Rev.WRC-23)**; the statistics on implementation of Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**, as had been referred to by the Director above (see § 3.4); and a new webpage on the ITU-R website providing up-to-date information on satellite networks subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**.

3.58 **Mr Henri** said that it was a little bit odd that *resolves* 6 of Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** had introduced new specifications, namely the observed distances to the apogee and perigee, which it had defined as the distance from the centre of the Earth to the deployed station at either the apogee or perigee, without having provided a value for the radius of the Earth. While 6 378.145 km, i.e. the maximum limit given by the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, was the value used for the Earth's radius in Recommendation ITU-R S.1503-4 (09/2023), no such value was defined in the Radio Regulations; No. **1.187** provided definitions for the altitude of the apogee and perigee but made no reference to the Earth's radius. He suggested that information be distributed on the specific value considered by the Bureau and possibly published in a formal ITU publication, such as the Radio Regulations, a recommendation or the Rules of Procedure. The Bureau's website contained very useful, important information but it was sometimes not easy to find.

3.59 Responding to the question from **Mr Henri**, **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that the issue of the Earth's radius had been raised soon after Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** had been approved, as satellite operators had realized that they used different values for the Earth's radius, differing by up to 20 km, which could have a

potentially meaningful impact on the distances to the apogee and perigee. The Bureau had created a webpage dedicated to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** and published guidance on determining distance to apogee and perigee, including minimum and maximum values for the Earth's radius as defined by the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics – 6 356.75 km and 6 378.14 km, respectively; they were considered the most widely accepted and scientifically based. Submissions had to use a value between those two values, and the same value had to be used when calculating the apogee and the perigee. Additionally, if the apogee and the perigee showed a circular orbit, that circularity should be reflected in the distances to the apogee and perigee. While technical feedback had shown that no orbit was perfectly circular, the Bureau had nevertheless continued that practice as the "circular" orbits had not been shown to become elliptical. The guidance had only been published in a BR IFIC after the resolution had come into force, as well as on the Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** webpage. It was for the Board to decide if it should be reflected in a rule of procedure or reported to a WRC.

3.60 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)**, responding to a question from **Mr Cheng** concerning the implementation of *resolves* 9 c) of **Resolution 35 (Rev.WRC-23)**, said that no major problems had been encountered with regard to the use of space stations associated with other satellite systems to meet milestone obligations. The resolution contained a certain number of rules, but they tended to concern whether a satellite could be reused for different filings rather than technical parameters, such as orbital characteristics. The Bureau had no proposals to clarify the Rules of Procedure in that regard, but the Board could act proactively if it so wished or deal with issues as and when they arose.

3.61 The Board **noted** § 6 of Document RRB26-1/4, on the implementation of Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)**.

Application of Resolution 170 (Rev.WRC-23) (§ 7 of Document RRB26-1/4)

3.62 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** recalled the introduction of § 7 of Document RRB26-1/4 made by the Director above (see § 3.5).

3.63 The Board **noted** § 7 of Document RRB26-1/4, on application of Resolution **170 (Rev.WRC-23)** by the Administration of Angola, acting as the notifying administration for the intergovernmental satellite organization Southern Africa Community Satellite (SCS).

Information about the suspension of the COURIER-3 satellite system (§ 8 of Document RRB26-1/4)

Information related to the bringing into use of the CENTISPACE-2 non-geostationary satellite system notified by the Administration of China (Document RRB26-1/4(Add.8))

3.64 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that both the case described in § 8 of Document RRB26-1/4 and the one described in Addendum 8 to the same document were consequences of the fact that no tolerances were specified in the Rules of Procedure for non-GSO satellite systems that were not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**. As proposals for rules of procedure in that regard had not been met with enthusiasm by Member States, the Bureau had suspended consideration of the issue until more detailed information could be provided by ITU-R study groups and working parties. Thus, the Bureau was seeking the Board's approval of the approach taken in relevant cases.

3.65 Turning to § 8 of the report, he recalled the introduction of the section made by the Director above (see § 3.6) and noted that the operational distance to perigee of the KEPLER-6 and KEPLER-7 satellites had begun to differ from the notified value by more than 100 km as at 3 March 2024. Once the Bureau and administration had agreed on that date as the effective date of suspension, the Bureau decided to allow the administration to benefit from the full regulatory suspension period of three years. Under a strict application of No. **11.49**, as the administration had notified the Bureau of the suspension of operation of the frequency assignments more than six months beyond the subsequently agreed effective date of suspension, the Bureau might have to reduce the three-year period by the amount of time that had elapsed between the end of the six-month notification period and the date on which the Bureau had been informed. However, considering that the administration had acted in good faith and had sent the notification of suspension within six months of what it had believed to be the effective date of suspension, and also noting that the administration had agreed to the Bureau's proposal without any challenge, the Bureau had deemed that application of such a

penalty would not be in line with the spirit of No. **11.49**, which was aimed more at attempts to withhold or conceal information.

3.66 **Ms Mannepalli** expressed support for the Bureau's treatment of the case.

3.67 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced the case described in Addendum 8, which concerned the CENTISPACE-2 non-GSO satellite system notified by the Administration of China, and said that the Bureau had been notified on 28 July 2025 of the system's bringing into use via the Weili Space-1 S3 satellite on 6 September 2022, well before the end of the seven-year regulatory time-limit (11 September 2025). Having noted that the frequency assignments, which were not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**, had been brought into use at an altitude of about 700 km, well below the notified altitude of 975 km, the Bureau, in application of No. **13.6**, had sent a letter to the Administration of China suggesting the cancellation of the frequency bands subject to coordination and the modification of the notified orbital altitude to around 700 km for the frequency bands not subject to coordination. On 4 December 2025, the administration had clarified that Weili Space-1 S3 had failed to reach its notified altitude of 975 km because of an unrecoverable propulsion system failure after launch. It further informed the Bureau that, on 13 January 2025, ten additional satellites had been launched into orbit at an altitude of 640 km, where they had undergone in-orbit testing for about six months. The satellites had then begun climbing towards the notified altitude at a maximum speed of 2 km per day, pausing at 730 km for network testing, before arriving within what the Bureau considered an acceptable tolerance of its notified orbital position, based on past practice, on 7 January 2026, i.e. beyond the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use. The satellites had since reached the notified altitude of 975 km (±10 km), where they were currently operating, meaning that the notified value recorded in the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR) was now consistent with operational parameters.

3.68 With there currently being no orbital tolerances specified for the radio services of the frequency assignments to the CENTISPACE-2 satellite system, the administration had requested that the Bureau consider the frequency assignments as having been brought into use. The challenge the Bureau had faced was to decide on the date of bringing into use, as the batch of ten satellites had only arrived within an acceptable tolerance, according to Bureau practice, of the notified altitude after the end of the regulatory time-limit (11 September 2025). No tolerances had yet been specified in the Rules of Procedure for cases not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** and the tolerances allowed by the Bureau based on past practice were stricter than those allowed for under that resolution. Requesting the Administration to modify the orbital parameters recorded in the MIFR to align with the altitude achieved by the Weili Space-1 S3 satellite and to suppress certain assignments based on where the satellites were operating before 11 September 2025 would be illogical and result in inconsistency between the MIFR and operational reality, as the subsequent batch of satellites were now operating in accordance with notified characteristics. The Bureau therefore suggested recording the launch date (13 January 2025) of the batch of ten satellites now operating in accordance with notified characteristics as the date of bringing into use of the frequency assignments to the CENTISPACE-2 satellite system. The Bureau considered that the Administration of China had acted in good faith throughout and had intended for its system to operate in line with notified characteristics, as it now was doing.

3.69 He further noted that the case demonstrated a clear need for corresponding rules of procedures on tolerances for certain orbital characteristics where Resolution **8 (WRC-23)** did not apply. During previous Board discussions, it had been agreed that, where frequency assignments were not subject to coordination, the administration should simply be asked to update the MIFR recordings with the characteristics at the time of bringing into use. In cases such as CENTISPACE-2, though, doing so would create inconsistencies with the subsequent operational situation.

3.70 Responding to questions from **Ms Beaumier**, he said that the case had not been submitted as a request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use because there had been no clear *force majeure* event or co-passenger delay, and because the Administration of China had been unsure of the tolerances that would be applied in cases not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**. When the Weili Space-1 S3 satellite had been launched, a change to the Rules of Procedure had been proposed but it had ultimately not been adopted, resulting in the continued application of the Bureau's more stringent practice. Even the batch of ten satellites could have been brought into use ahead of the regulatory time-limit if a different tolerance had been applied; thus, the Administration of China had transparently approached the Bureau from that perspective rather than manipulating the case into an extension request on the grounds of *force majeure*. In

the Bureau's view, the three possible dates that could serve as the date of bringing into use were: the date when the satellites had arrived within what the Bureau deemed, based on past practice, an acceptable tolerance of its notified altitude, i.e. 7 January 2026, which was beyond the regulatory time-limit; the end of the regulatory time-limit, i.e. 11 September 2025, when the satellites had still been far from their notified orbital parameters; or the launch date, i.e. 13 January 2025, when the satellites were even further from the parameters but which reflected the beginning of the bringing-into-use process.

3.71 **Ms Beaumier** said that, in principle, she supported consideration of the frequency assignments to the CENTISPACE-2 satellite system as having been validly brought into use. Leniency in the case was appropriate given the lack of relevant rules of procedure; however, she could not countenance using the launch date as the date of bringing into use, as doing so would send a signal contrary to many decisions previously taken by the Board with respect to requests for extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use. The Board had always stressed that orbit raising, however slow, should be calculated and reflected in timelines for the bringing into use of frequency assignments.

3.72 **Mr Henri** said that, as efforts to establish tolerances in the Rules of Procedure that would have been relevant to such cases had not yet been successful, the Board could allow for some flexibility in the Bureau's practice. He also could not agree to recording the launch date as the bringing-into-use date for much the same reasons as Ms Beaumier, noting that such a precedent would send the wrong message about the meaning of bringing into use or bringing back into use and would affect all cases, whether subject or not to Resolutions **35 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **8 (WRC-23)**, and all requests for extension of the regulatory time-limit, where the Board had repeatedly stressed the need for precise timelines and absence of contingency. In his view, it would be most appropriate to record the end of the regulatory time-limit, 11 September 2025, as the date of bringing into use, because the satellites were at least within a certain tolerance of the notified altitude. If possible, that date should be labelled in the MIFR as an administrative date given as the result of a Board decision.

3.73 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter of § 8 of Document RRB26-1/4 as follows:

"The Board noted the Bureau's action in respect of suspension of the frequency assignments to the COURIER-3 satellite system, as reported in § 8 of Document RRB26-1/4."

3.74 It was so **agreed**.

3.75 The **Chair** further proposed that the Board conclude on the matter of Addendum 8 to Document RRB26-1/4 as follows:

"The Board considered the information submitted in Addendum 8 to Document RRB26-1/4 related to the bringing into use of the CENTISPACE-2 non-geostationary satellite system notified by the Administration of China.

Noting that the satellites used to bring into use the CENTISPACE-2 satellite system had finally reached orbits consistent with the notified parameters, the detailed explanation given by the Administration of China and the fact that no tolerances were yet specified in the Rules of Procedure for cases not subject to Resolution **8 (WRC-23)**, the Board considered that the frequency assignments to the CENTISPACE-2 satellite system had been brought into use on 11 September 2025."

3.76 It was so **agreed**.

4 Rules of Procedure

4.1 List of proposed rules of procedure (Documents RRB26-1/1, and RRB24-1/1(Rev.6))

4.1.1 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, Chair of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, reported that the working group had met three times during the Board's 101st meeting. It had reviewed and updated the list of proposed rules of procedure set out in Document RRB26-1/1, taking into account the proposals by the Bureau for the addition of new rules on Nos. **11.28.1** and **21.16** of the Radio Regulations and on Resolution **679 (WRC-23)**. It had agreed to recommend to the Board that they be published and circulated to administrations for comments.

4.1.2 Regarding the rules concerning Resolution **1 (Rev.WRC.97)**, on notification of frequency assignments, the Bureau had provided an overview of administrations' comments that had been received in response to Circular Letter CCRR/70, as set out in Document RRB23-3/3. The working group would resume its discussions on the matter at its next meeting.

4.1.3 The working group had continued its review to identify additional rules that might be candidates for transfer to the Radio Regulations. It would consider proposed amendments to the relevant provisions at its next meeting.

4.1.4 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"Following a meeting of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, under the leadership of Mr A. LINHARES DE SOUZA FILHO, the Board:

- revised and approved the list of proposed rules of procedure contained in Document RRB26-1/1, taking into account the proposals by the Bureau for the revision of certain rules of procedure and the proposals for new rules of procedure;
- instructed the Bureau to publish the revised version of the document on the website and to prepare and circulate those draft rules of procedure well in advance of the 102nd Board meeting, to allow administrations enough time to comment;
- noted that, regarding Resolution **1 (Rev.WRC-97)**, the Bureau had presented suggestions for possible modifications to rules of procedure that took into account comments from Administrations on CCRR/70 contained in Document RRB23-3/3, which would be further discussed at the next meeting.

The working group had also continued its review of rules of procedure, identified additional rules that might be candidates for transfer to the Radio Regulations and considered proposed amendments to the relevant provisions."

4.1.5 It was so **agreed**.

4.2 Draft rules of procedure (Document CCRR/80)

Comments from administrations (Document RRB26-1/5)

4.2.1 **Mr Ryu (TSD/FMD)** introduced Circular Letter CCRR/80, containing draft modified rules of procedure on Section B6 of Part B of the rules, concerning criteria for applying the provisions of No. **9.36** to a frequency assignment in the terrestrial services, and Document RRB26-1/5, containing comments received on the subject from the Administration of the United States.

4.2.2 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, Chair of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure, reported that the working group had discussed in detail the draft modified rules of procedure circulated to administrations in Circular Letter CCRR/80, along with the comments that had been received from the Administration of the United States. The administration had proposed that mobile services should not be added as a protected service in Table 1, on the applicability of No. **9.21**, for Nos. **5.292**, **5.293**, **5.295**, **5.295A**, **5.296A**, **5.297**, **5.307A**, **5.308**, **5.308A**, **5.326**, **5.430A**, **5.431A**, **5.431B**, **5.432B** and **5.434A**, stating that No. **9.21** provided for the requirement to seek agreement with respect to services other than the service that was subject to

No. **9.21**. It had also argued that the primary mobile service allocation referred to in Nos. **5.296A**, **5.308A**, **5.430A**, **5.431A**, **5.432B** and **5.434A** was a consequence of the identification of the band for IMT, for which reason the applicability of No. **9.21** to the mobile service would be inappropriate. It had further proposed that, in § 3.8, the coordination trigger criterion should not be applied to the fixed and mobile services on the grounds that it had been developed specifically for the protection of fixed-satellite service (FSS) earth stations.

4.2.3 In its discussions, the working group had noted that the proposed addition of mobile, except aeronautical mobile, service to Table 1 had been based on § 2 of Appendix **5** of the Radio Regulations, according to which the agreement of an administration might be required with respect to frequency assignments pertaining to the same service or to another service to which the band was allocated with equal rights or a higher category of allocation. Regarding § 3.8 of Section B6 of Part B of the rules, it had further noted that, in 2012, the Board had agreed to apply the criterion that had been developed for the protection of FSS to the fixed service. In the proposed modifications set out in Circular Letter CCRR/80, it was now proposed to apply that same criterion for the protection of the mobile service in the same frequency band owing to an absence of specific criteria for that purpose in ITU-R and the fact that protection criteria for the fixed service and FSS were generally more stringent than for the mobile service. The working group therefore recommended that the proposed amendments to Section B6 of Part B, as set out in Circular Letter CCRR/80, be retained.

4.2.4 The Board, having considered the comments from the Administration of the United States, reviewed the draft modified rules of procedure set out in Circular Letter CCRR/80.

MOD rules concerning criteria for applying the provisions of No. 9.36 to a frequency assignment in the terrestrial services whose allocation or identification is governed by Nos. 5.292, 5.293, 5.295, 5.295A, 5.296A, 5.297, 5.307A, 5.308, 5.308A, 5.309, 5.323, 5.325, 5.326, 5.341A, 5.341C, 5.346, 5.346A, 5.429F, 5.430A, 5.431A, 5.431B, 5.432B, 5.434A, 5.457F, 5.480A and 5.553A

4.2.5 Approved.

4.2.6 The Chair proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board discussed in detail the draft rules of procedure circulated to administrations in Circular Letter CCRR/80, along with the comments received from the Administration of the United States, as contained in Document RRB26-1/5.

Regarding the proposed draft modified rules of procedure under Part B6, relating to the applicability of No. **9.21**, and § 3.8 thereof, the Board noted the following points:

- Concerning the addition of the mobile, except aeronautical mobile, service to Table 1 of the rules of procedure under Part B6 as the affected services, that addition had been based on § 2 of Appendix 5, stating that, for the application of No. **9.21**, agreement was required with respect to the frequency assignments pertaining to the same service or to another service to which the band was allocated with equal rights or a higher category of allocation.
- With respect to the applicability of the criterion contained in § 3.8 of the rules of procedure under Part B6, the Board at its 74th meeting had agreed to use the same criterion developed for protection of the fixed-satellite service for the fixed service.
- Similarly, it had been proposed in CCRR/80 to use the same criterion for protection of the mobile service in the same frequency band, since: i) there was no specific criterion available for protection of the mobile service in ITU-R; and ii) the protection criteria for the fixed-satellite and fixed services were usually more stringent than the one for protection of the mobile service.

Consequently, the Board approved the rules of procedure as published in Circular Letter CCRR/80 without further modifications, as contained in the Annex to this summary of decisions."

4.2.7 It was so **agreed**.

5 Request for the cancellation of the frequency assignments to satellite network under No. 13.6 of the Radio Regulations

5.1 Request for a decision by the Radio Regulations Board to cancel frequency assignments to the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network under No. 13.6 of the Radio Regulations (Document RRB26-1/9)

5.1.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)**, introducing Document RRB26-1/9, said that, as part of the Bureau's regular monitoring of the MIFR, it had noticed that the period of validity of the frequency assignments to the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network had expired on 22 March 2025. In line with Circular Letter CR/301 and in accordance with No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations, the Bureau had requested the Administration of Saudi Arabia to provide evidence of the continuous operation of the satellite network. In the absence of a response to that request and to two subsequent reminders sent in October and November 2025, the Bureau had informed the Administration of Saudi Arabia, on 16 January 2026, that it would ask the Board to cancel the frequency assignments to the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network.

5.1.2 Responding to a comment from **Ms Mannepalli**, he said that Circular Letter CR/301 of 1 May 2009 had been issued in response to the proliferation of "paper" satellites, most of which at that time had been GSO satellites. Subsequently, the Bureau had begun systematic application of No. **13.6** to GSO satellite networks and had gradually extended its application to non-GSO satellite networks as the latter had gained in prevalence.

5.1.3 **Ms Mannepalli**, **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Talib** and **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** all expressed their support for the Bureau's proposal to cancel the frequency assignments to the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network.

5.1.4 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the request made by the Bureau in Document RRB26-1/9 for decision on the cancellation of the frequency assignments to the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network under No. **13.6** of the Radio Regulations. The Board considered that the Bureau had acted in accordance with No. **13.6** in that it had requested the Administration of Saudi Arabia to provide evidence that the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network remained operational and to identify the actual satellite currently in operation, followed by two reminders, but had received no response. Consequently, the Board instructed the Bureau to cancel the frequency assignments to the KSU_CUBESAT satellite network in the Master International Frequency Register."

5.1.5 It was so **agreed**.

6 Requests to extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use/bring back into use the frequency assignments to satellite networks/systems

6.1 Submissions by the Administration of Japan requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system (Documents RRB26-1/3 and RRB26-1/6)

6.1.1 **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** introduced Document RRB26-1/3, submitted on 23 January 2026, in which the Administration of Japan requested a further extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system, which had expired on 31 January 2026, on the grounds of *force majeure*. The Board had previously agreed at its 98th meeting to extend the time-limit to 31 January 2026 following an earlier case of *force majeure*. In its decision, the Board had concluded that the two proposed satellites, QZS-5 and QZS-7, which had been scheduled to launch on different dates, had been identical and that only one had been required to bring into use the frequency assignments. In the present case, the launch of the QZS-5 satellite aboard the JAXA H3 F8 launch vehicle had failed on 22 December 2025, causing total loss of the satellite. While the QZS-7 satellite had still been available and had initially had a scheduled launch date, its launch had been postponed indefinitely to investigate the launch failure of H3 F8. The Administration of Japan had considered alternative launch vehicles, earlier launch opportunities and gap-

filler satellites but none of those options had been feasible. The administration had described how the launch failure of H3 F8 had satisfied all four conditions to qualify as a case of *force majeure* and had requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit on that basis. The document also contained a summary of the network's filings and a list of frequency bands, as well as correspondence from JAXA, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Electric, which contained corroborating information.

6.1.2 Introducing Document RRB26-1/6, he said that the administration had provided an earliest anticipated launch date of 1 July 2026 for the QZS-7 satellite. After adding 62 days as a launch window to account for weather uncertainties and another 15 days for orbit raising, the Administration of Japan had requested that the Board extend the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system to 15 September 2026. The document also included corroborating correspondence from JAXA, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Electric.

6.1.3 **Mr Henri** said that the information provided by the Administration of Japan allowed the Board to conclude that the launch failure had been a case of *force majeure*. **Ms Beaumier**, **Ms Mannepalli**, **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Talib**, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, **Mr Cheng**, **Mr Fianko** and **Mr Nurshabekov** agreed.

6.1.4 **Mr Henri**, noted the administration's efforts to identify alternative solutions to comply with the regulatory time-limit, including consideration of a gap-filler satellite, which the Board had previously recognized, and stressed that it would be a significant challenge for the system involved. He, however, expressed concerns regarding the length of the extension requested. It seemed to include an additional contingency to allow for uncertainties with the weather, something which the Board had always been reluctant to factor into length of extensions.

6.1.5 **Ms Beaumier** said that the administration should have more clearly formulated its requested length of extension based on a launch window, rather than on a specific date plus extra time for "uncertainties". While agreeing to the extension requested, she stressed that the Board should not be seen to be allowing for contingency: in its decision, the Board should clearly identify a two-month launch window from 1 July 2026, with a subsequent orbit-raising period until 15 September 2026. **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that he shared the same concerns but also agreed to the extension.

6.1.6 **Mr Fianko** noted the prompt, concrete steps taken by the administration to secure a replacement launch opportunity and minimize the delay, which had demonstrated due diligence and a commitment to the regulatory requirements. In his view, a scheduled launch of 1 July at the earliest, plus an additional 62 days, amounted to a reasonable launch window. He could accede to the request for extension of the regulatory time-limit to 15 September 2026 on that basis.

6.1.7 **Ms Mannepalli** agreed that a 62-day launch window was reasonable, noting that the purpose of launch windows was to account for factors such as weather conditions. She agreed that the Board should grant an extension of the regulatory time-limit to 15 September 2026, taking the two-month period from 1 July 2026 as the launch window.

6.1.8 **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Talib**, **Mr Cheng, Mr Nurshabekov** and **Mr Di Crescenzo** all agreed to the granting of an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system to 15 September 2026, based on a two-month launch window.

6.1.9 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the submissions from the Administration of Japan for a further extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system, as contained in Documents RRB26-1/3 and RRB26-1/6.

The Board noted the following points:

- The Board, at its 98th meeting, had extended the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system to 31 January 2026;
- The QZS-5 satellite had been launched aboard the H3 rocket on 22 December 2025 to bring into use the QZSS-A satellite system, but the launch had failed;

- The launch of the replacement QZS-7 satellite had been postponed owing to the need to investigate the cause of the H3 rocket launch failure;
- The launch had been rescheduled to 1 July 2026, with a two-month launch window up to 1 September 2026.

Based on the information provided, the Board concluded that all four conditions had been met for the situation to qualify as a case of force majeure, due to the launch failure of the H3 rocket on 22 December 2025. Considering the launch window and orbit-raising period for the QZS-7 satellite, the Board decided to accede to the request from the Administration of Japan by extending the regulatory time limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the QZSS-A satellite system to 15 September 2026."

6.1.10 It was so **agreed**.

6.2 Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite network (Document RRB26-1/8)

6.2.1 **Mr Tham (Head, SSD/USS)** introduced Document RRB26-1/8, in which the Administration of the Republic of Korea had provided additional information in support of its request, considered by the Board at its 100th meeting, for a further eight-month extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite network, from 28 February to 31 October 2026. The administration had provided a timeline of events, noting that the Board had already granted it several extensions, first for reasons of *force majeure* and then on the grounds of co-passenger delay. It explained that the launch of the KOMPSAT-6 satellite network on the VEGA-C launch vehicle had been postponed owing to delays in the preparation of the co-passenger, PLATINO-1. The annexes contained supporting information, including correspondence from the launch service provider, Arianespace, confirming the latest launch window as 1 August to 31 October 2026.

6.2.2 **Ms Beaumier** said that, at its 100th meeting, the Board had concluded that the situation qualified as a case of co-passenger delay but that sufficient information, such as the revised launch window, was needed to justify the length of extension requested. Arianespace had now confirmed a three-month launch window, from 1 August to 31 October 2026; a shorter launch slot was expected to be known by 1 April, which was usual procedure. It was a straightforward case: since the administration had provided the necessary clarifications, she was in favour of granting an extension to 31 October 2026. **Mr Henri**, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, **Mr Fianko** and **Mr Talib** concurred.

6.2.3 **Mr Azzouz**, summarizing the facts of the case, said that he, too, was in favour of granting an extension on the grounds of co-passenger delay. Given that Arianespace would be providing a more specific launch slot by 1 April, however, and as the Board did not provide for contingencies, he was minded to invite the administration to provide a further update to the Board at its next meeting, so that the length of the extension could better be determined, and to instruct the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments until the end of that meeting. **Mr Di Crescenzo**, **Mr Cheng** and **Mr Nurshabekov** agreed with that approach.

6.2.4 **Mr Cheng** said that the end of the launch window should not be given as the date of extension and thus the assumed date of bringing into use. The administration should also be invited to provide information on the specific post-launch operations, such as orbit raising or other manoeuvres, to enable the Board to calculate at its next meeting the length of extension required, taking into account the fact that, after launch, the satellite would need to arrive at least within what was considered to be an acceptable tolerance of the notified orbital position for bringing into use.

6.2.5 **Mr Henri** said that the point raised by Mr Cheng was an important one. In the case at hand, however, the Administration of the Republic of Korea had itself requested an extension to 31 October, thus suggesting that it had taken into account any post-launch procedures and other manoeuvres necessary to ensure bringing into use in line with notified parameters. The Bureau would in any case monitor the situation. If the satellite was deployed at an orbital slot close to the notified position, orbit raising could be completed on the same day as the launch; thus, in such a situation the same date could be recorded for both events, without implying that launch equated bringing into use.

6.2.6 **Ms Mannepalli** said that she had no strong views on whether the Board should grant a three-month extension to 31 October or, as Mr Azzouz had proposed, defer the decision to the next meeting. As the launch window was after the next meeting, the Board could ask the administration to provide the more precise launch slot, since it was expected to be announced on 1 April, so that a limited and qualified extension could be determined.

6.2.7 **Mr Fianko** said that a three-month launch window was reasonable and consistent with standard practice.

6.2.8 **Ms Beaumier** said that the Board did not usually wait for a narrower one-week slot before it made a decision; if it did, that would have a major impact on its workload. A launch window of three months was precise enough for the Board's requirements; in cases where the launch window was much longer, the Board tended to seek a more reasonable, time-limited and justified extension period. The launch slot to be announced on 1 April would still be within the 1 August–31 October launch window. Regarding the proposal to request information on the launch parameters, while it was true some time was generally needed after launch so that the satellite could reach the orbital altitude necessary to be considered for bringing into use, the Board should be guided by what the administration had specifically requested. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, it was the responsibility of administrations to ensure that any orbit-raising period or manoeuvres had been factored into their extension requests. As far as she was concerned, the Board had sufficient information to be able to grant the extension; she would have serious concerns about deferring the decision to ask for yet more information.

6.2.9 The **Chair** agreed that there was no compelling reason to defer the decision to the next meeting.

6.2.10 **Mr Cheng** said that he would not object to an extension to 31 October being granted at the current meeting.

6.2.11 **Mr Azzouz** said that he could support the majority view of Board members. His concern had been that the new launch slot might be earlier than 1 August, meaning that an extension to 31 October might have provided for contingencies.

6.2.12 Following informal discussions, the **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the submission from the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite system, to 31 October 2026, as contained in Document RRB26-1/8.

From the information provided, the Board noted the following points:

- At its 100th meeting, the Board had concluded that the delay in the launch of the KOMPSAT-6 satellite had qualified as a case of co-passenger delay, but that the length of extension requested had not been fully justified;
- The launch service provider had specified a three-month launch window from 1 August to 31 October 2026;
- The extension requested, from 28 February 2026 to 31 October 2026, was time-limited and justified.

Consequently, the Board reiterated the conclusion that it had reached at its 100th meeting, namely that the situation qualified as a case of co-passenger delay and, based on the supporting evidence provided, it decided to accede to the request from the Administration of the Republic of Korea by extending the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the KOMPSAT-6 satellite system to 31 October 2026."

6.2.13 It was so **agreed**.

6.3 Submission by the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite system (Document RRB26-1/10)

6.3.1 **Mr Tham (Head, SSD/USS)**, introducing Document RRB261/10, said that the Administration of the Republic of Korea had requested a further one-month extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite system to 31 May 2026, on the grounds of co-passenger delay. The Board had approved, at its 99th meeting, an extension of the regulatory time-limit from 30 January to 30 April 2026 on the basis of *force majeure*. In the interim, the planned launch of the CAS500-2 satellite had been affected by unforeseeable copassenger delays beyond the administration's control. The submission included an overview of the satellite project and an outline of the project milestones. The administration explained that, on 9 February, it had received notification from SpaceX informing it of a delay in launch owing to delays in the preparation of the co-passenger and proposing a revised launch window of 3–9 May 2026. It had provided supporting information, including a summary of the status of development of the CAS500-2 satellite and letters from SpaceX. --

6.3.2 **Mr Azzouz**, summarizing the Board's conclusions at its 99th meeting, said that, in view of the information provided, he was minded to accede to the request for a further extension but until 9 May 2026, which was the end of the launch window provided by SpaceX.

6.3.3 **Ms Mannepalli** said she noted that the letter of 9 February from SpaceX did not specifically mention co-passenger delay as the reason for the revised launch window. Like Mr Azzouz, she was of the view that the Board could grant an extension to 9 May; no information justifying an extension to 31 May had been provided.

6.3.4 **Mr Cheng** said that he agreed with previous speakers that an extension to 9 May could be granted on the basis of co-passenger delay. The Board did not generally provide for contingencies when granting extensions, and no reference had been made to any orbit-raising period. **Mr Talib** concurred.

6.3.5 In response to a question from **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, **Mr Tham (Head, SSD/USS)** explained that, in Annex 1 to Document RRB26-1/10, "LEOP", in the table on the development status of the CAS500-2 satellite, referred to launch and early orbit operations, which included the lift-off stage and when the satellite had reached its operational orbit.

6.3.6 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that the Board must consider the administration's specific request, which was an extension to 31 May on the basis of co-passenger delay. In his view, the administration had provided the information agreed at the 13th Plenary Meeting of WRC-23 (see § 13.4 of Document WRC23/528). As the length of extension requested was qualified and time limited, he would have no difficulty in granting an extension to 31 May.

6.3.7 **Ms Beaumier** said it was curious that the SpaceX letter referred to by the Administration of the Republic of Korea did not actually mention any co-passenger delay. In view of previous information in the case that had been submitted by the administration to the Board, namely that the CAS500-2 satellite had been ready for some time, that the launch service provider had had to find other passengers to complete the manifest and that the "cakeplatter" configuration was envisaged for the current mission, it was nevertheless reasonable to assume a co-passenger delay. As to the length of extension, although the table in Annex 1 to Document RRB26-1/10 referred to launch and early orbit operations, no clear explanation had been provided; moreover, the period for those operations seemed to extend beyond 31 May. The onus was on administrations to clearly articulate their needs. On that basis, she would support an extension to 9 May.

6.3.8 **Mr Fianko** said that he had initially been inclined to grant an extension to 9 May only, taking into account the notification from SpaceX indicating the launch slot. However, in view of the information regarding the project timelines, in particular the reference to a post-launch period for launch and early orbit operations, he agreed with Mr Linhares de Souza Filho that the extension requested to 31 May was qualified and of limited duration. Moreover, the Board's next meeting was not until the end of June; if an extension to 9 May proved to be inadequate, the administration would be unable to petition the Board again before the regulatory time-limit had lapsed. In the circumstances, the Board could take the pragmatic approach and grant an extension to 31 May. **Mr Nurshabekov** and **Mr Di Crescenzo** agreed with that suggestion.

6.3.9 **Mr Henri** and **Mr Fianko** both agreed with other speakers that the administration could have been more explicit about the time required for launch and early orbit operations.

6.3.10 **Mr Henri** said that the information that the Administration of the Republic of Korea had provided was nevertheless sufficient to infer that the change in launch window had been due to co-passenger delay. He was minded to grant an extension to 31 May on the basis that it was time limited and that the three weeks after launch were necessary for launch and early orbit operations. It was the most critical phase of the mission, during which spacecraft engineers took control of the satellite after its separation from the launch vehicle and guided it to towards its final orbit.

6.3.11 **Ms Mannepalli** and **Ms Beaumier** said that the Board should be sure to identify in its decision that the post-launch period included the time required for launch and early orbit operations.

6.3.12 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the submission from the Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting a further extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite network from 30 April 2026 to 31 May 2026, as contained in Document RRB26-1/10.

The Board noted the following points:

- The launch service provider had postponed the launch of the CAS500-2 satellite owing to co-passenger delay;
- The Administration of the Republic of Korea had been informed on 9 February 2026 that the new launch window for the CAS500-2 mission would be from 3 to 9 May 2026;
- The project schedule presented in the submission had identified a post launch period for the launch and early orbit operations (LEOP), which included the time required for the satellite to reach its intended orbit;
- The extension requested from 30 April 2026 to 31 May 2026 was limited and justified.

Consequently, the Board concluded that the situation qualified as a case of co-passenger delay and acceded to the request from the Administration of the Republic of Korea by extending the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the CAS500-2 satellite network to 31 May 2026."

6.3.13 It was so **agreed**.

6.4 Submission by the Administration of Spain requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network (Document RRB26-1/14)

6.4.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB26-1/14, in which the Administration of Spain had requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use frequency assignments to the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network in the UHF band on the grounds of a *force majeure* event. The SpainSat NG2 satellite, carrying, *inter alia*, payloads in the UHF frequency band, had been successfully launched on 24 October 2025 and, according to the administration, had been on schedule to arrive at its orbital position of 30°W when it had been struck by a high-energy space particle, causing critical damage to the satellite, confirmation of which had been provided, along with confirmation of launch and on-board frequency assignments, by the manufacturer, Airbus Defence and Space, in an attachment to the document. The submission included a detailed and substantiated justification for how that event satisfied the four conditions of *force majeure*. The current regulatory time-limit for the bringing into use of frequency assignments to the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network was 9 May 2026, and the administration was requesting an extension of four and a half years, to 9 November 2030, for both the bringing into use of the UHF frequency band and for the submission of the associated Resolution **49 (Rev. WRC-23)** information. Hisdesat, the satellite's operator, and the Spanish Ministry of Defence had already initiated a replacement plan but, given the recent nature of the incident, had not yet finalized the contracting process for the replacement SpainSat NG3 satellite. It had therefore substantiated its request on the basis of a preliminary replacement plan, which had been provided. The submission also contained in attachment a press release from the Ministry of Defence highlighting the

importance of the SATCOM-SpainSat NG programme and its military nature, as well as the Ministry's commitment to the construction and launch of the replacement satellite.

6.4.2 Following requests for clarification from **Mr Azzouz**, he said that, while SpainSat NG2 had been carrying payloads in other frequency bands, the Administration of Spain was only requesting an extension for the frequency assignments in the UHF band. Other satellite networks were likely supporting the other frequency assignments. He also noted that, given the nature of the satellite, there would likely not have been other options available to the administration, except construction of a new satellite.

6.4.3 **Mr Azzouz** said that the administration could nevertheless have explained its efforts to explore other avenues to bring the frequency assignments into use with a view to either meeting the regulatory time-limit or significantly reducing any extension. **Ms Beaumier** agreed with the principle but said that the administration would have had no other option but to build a new satellite: there had been little time between the *force majeure* event and the end of the regulatory time-limit and there were few gap-filler options in the UHF band. **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Henri** concurred with that analysis.

6.4.4 **Mr Fianko** welcomed the concerted efforts taken by the administration to assess the situation and put forward a replacement strategy for the continuation of the project, demonstrating due diligence and a continued commitment to implementation.

6.4.5 **Ms Beaumier** said that the submission from the Administration of Spain had clearly explained how all the conditions of *force majeure* had been met. **Ms Mannepalli**, **Mr Henri**, **Mr Fianko**, **Mr Cheng**, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, **Mr Talib**, **Mr Azzouz** and **Mr Nurshabekov** agreed.

6.4.6 **Ms Beaumier**, turning to the length of the requested extension, said that the project was obviously still in its nascent stages and could rely only on a preliminary timeline at that point, but no details had been provided on how that preliminary timeline had been established. Furthermore, based on her calculations from that timeline, the satellite should be able to arrive at its orbital position some three months before the requested date of extension. Given that the preliminary timeline already contained contingencies as it had been presented in quarters, she would find it difficult to accept a date of extension that allowed for additional contingency. Thus, she could accede to granting an extension, but only to 9 August 2030, which would give the Administration more than four and a half years to design, build, launch and bring into use a replacement satellite under a project that had been under way since at least 15 January 2026, according to the press release from the Spanish Ministry of Defence. She also supported extending the time-limit for the submission of the Resolution **49 (Rev. WRC-23)** information to the same date.

6.4.7 **Ms Mannepalli** said that she shared similar concerns but could nevertheless accede to the request for an extension to 9 November 2030, on the understanding that the administration would update the Board as more details became available.

6.4.8 **Mr Henri** suggested holding the case in abeyance until the Board's 102nd or 103rd meeting, when the administration expected to have more detailed information. It was difficult to grant any length of extension while negotiations with the manufacturer remained pending. **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** and **Mr Nurshabekov** agreed, saying that the case should be held in abeyance until the 103rd meeting of the Board. **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** stressed that it would be premature to agree to a specific extension at the current meeting as the timeline appeared to contain many contingencies even if it was broadly in line with the length of time required for a new project.

6.4.9 **Mr Fianko** said that the presented timeline was indeed consistent with the typical amount of time needed to replace a satellite, but a key principle for the Board had always been that any extension should be limited to the minimum amount of time required and should not include unnecessary contingencies. The Board should invite the Administration of Spain to provide more precise information on project timelines as soon as it became available. **Mr Talib** agreed.

6.4.10 **Mr Cheng** said that, under No. **11.49** and § **4.1.3*bis*** of Appendices **30A** and **30B**, three years was the maximum length of extension of the regulatory time-limit that could be granted for failure of a launched satellite to reach its assigned orbital location. The Board should invite the administration to accelerate the replacement satellite project, provide an updated timeline to the following Board meeting and try to limit the requested extension to no more than three years. With respect to the submission of Resolution **49**

(Rev.WRC-23) information, he was in favour of granting an extension that matched the extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network, recalling the provisions established under the rules of procedure on No. **11.48**.

6.4.11 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** and **Ms Beaumier** said that the three-year limit on the length of extension should not apply to the case in question, given the complexity of the satellite. **Ms Beaumier** added that that limit had been intended for readily available commercial satellites rather than custom military ones.

6.4.12 **Mr Azzouz** agreed that the administration should be encouraged to accelerate its efforts and minimize the length of the extension, including through consideration of other solutions. The Board could not agree to a specific extension at the current meeting; rather, it should instruct the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments in the Master Register until the end of the 103rd meeting and invite the administration to submit a more precise schedule.

6.4.13 **Ms Beaumier** agreed that the administration should be encouraged to accelerate its efforts and minimize the length of extension and that the Board required more precise information to arrive at a decision on the length of extension.

6.4.14 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** recalled that, under the rules of procedure on No. **11.48**, an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use frequency assignments to a satellite network did not automatically imply an extension of the deadline for submission of Resolution **49 (Rev.WRC-23)** information. As that deadline had not yet expired for the case in question, he suggested that the Board invite the administration to submit the Resolution **49 (Rev.WRC-23)** information for the failed satellite and subsequently update that information once it became available for the replacement project. Such information about the planned frequency usage and coordination status would still be useful to other administrations.

6.4.15 **Mr Henri** said that he agreed with the proposed approach. Although it might be inherently strange to request information that was no longer valid, the approach did not derogate from the rules of procedure on No. **11.48** and the information had been true and correct at the time of launch.

6.4.16 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered Document RRB26-1/14, in which the Administration of Spain had requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use (BIU) the frequency assignments to the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network.

The Board noted the following points:

- The regulatory time-limit for the bringing into use of the UHF frequency band (290-320 MHz for the uplink and 240-270 MHz for the downlink) of the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network was 9 May 2026;
- The SpainSat NG2 satellite had been launched on 24 October 2025 to bring into use the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network but the satellite had been struck by a high-energy space particle on 29 November 2025, causing damage to the major subsystems;
- The Administration of Spain had provided detailed information to demonstrate that the case qualified as a case of *force majeure*;
- Based on a preliminary replacement plan outlining the key stages of the SpainSat NG3 space programme, an extension to the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use of the UHF frequency band of the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network had been requested until 9 November 2030;
- Discussions had begun with a manufacturer with a view to finalizing a contract in Q3 2026;
- The launch was estimated to occur in Q1 2030 with in-orbit testing to begin in Q3 2030;

The Board concluded that the situation qualified as a case of *force majeure*; however, given the early stage of the satellite replacement project, more details were needed to justify the length of the extension requested. Therefore, the Board was not in a position to accede to the request from the Administration of Spain at that time. The Board invited the Administration of Spain to submit additional information in sufficient details to justify the length of the extension requested, including supporting documentation (e.g. a

contract with a satellite manufacturer and the project milestones for the construction and launch of the satellite), to the 103rd meeting of the Board.

The Board also invited the Administration of Spain to provide additional information to describe all possible actions taken to minimize the length of the extension requested.

The Board also reminded the Administration of Spain to submit the Resolution **49 (Rev. WRC-23)** information based on the characteristics of the SpainSat NG2 satellite. In addition, the Board instructed the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments to the SECOMSAT-5-30W satellite network in the Master International Frequency Register until the end of the 103rd Board meeting."

6.4.17 It was so **agreed**.

6.5 Submission by the Administration of the Sultanate of Oman requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network (Document RRB26-1/15)

Submission by the Administration of Papua New Guinea relating to the submission by the Sultanate of Oman requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network (Document RRB26-1/18)

6.5.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** introduced Document RRB26-1/15, in which the Administration of Oman had provided additional information, at the invitation of the Board at its 100th meeting, in support of its request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT 73.5E satellite network to 17 April 2027. He explained that a contract with Airbus Defence and Space for the manufacture of the OMANSAT-1 telecommunication satellite had recently been signed; the implementation phase was now under way, with on-ground delivery planned for the third quarter of 2028, and preliminary discussions had commenced with SpaceX to deliver the OMANSAT-1 into orbit in 2029. In the interim, and to bring the frequency assignments into use within the time-limit, a gap-filler satellite, Orbit Guard-2 (OG2), would be deployed. The orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) provider, Epic Aerospace, had initially informed the orbit service provider, Infinite Orbits, that the launch window had been rescheduled from 20 January to 20 July 2026. Subsequently, in the absence of any further communication from Epic Aerospace or a launch manifest from SpaceX, Infinite Orbits had switched to a new OTV provider, Impulse Space, with launch of the OG2 on the Helios 1 OTV scheduled for 1 June to 1 December 2026. On 26 February, however, the administration had been informed that, owing to the assembly, integration and testing campaign status of Helios 1, a new launch window had been set for 1 January–1 May 2027 on a dedicated SpaceX Falcon-9 mission. The administration had provided supporting documentation, including the contracts with Airbus and Impulse Space and relevant correspondence, to back up its request.

6.5.2 In Document RRB26-1/18, the Administration of Papua New Guinea had informed the Board that the Administration of Oman had yet to complete coordination in respect of the former's satellite networks PACIFISAT-1 and PACIFISAT KA-75E, which were positioned at 75°E, just 1.5° from the OMANSAT 73.5E satellite network filing and for which frequency assignments had duly been recorded in the MIFR. The Administration of Papua New Guinea therefore requested that the Board, if it decided to grant the extension requested by the Administration of Oman, consider making such extension conditional on the completion of frequency coordination and prevention of harmful interference with the satellite networks of the Administration of Papua New Guinea.

6.5.3 **Ms Beaumier**, **Ms Mannepalli**, **Mr Fianko**, **Mr Nurshabekov** and **Mr Cheng** all noted that, at its 100th meeting, the Board had considered that the situation presented by the Administration of Oman might qualify as a case of co-passenger delay and had requested additional information in support of an extension to 20 July 2026. Based on the additional information received, however, the situation no longer seemed to qualify as a case of co-passenger delay. Moreover, it was unclear whether it would meet the threshold for *force majeure*.

6.5.4 **Mr Azzouz** said that the Administration of Oman had endeavoured to respond to the Board's request for additional information, including a more precise launch window, by seeking clarifications from Epic Aerospace, which had failed to reply. The administration had consequently made the decision to switch to a new OTV provider, notwithstanding the significant financial and other implications of doing so. Those unforeseen circumstances, which also included the assembly, integration and testing phase of the new OTV, had led to changes in the scheduled launch window. He was satisfied that it was a serious project and that the mission timeline tallied with the length of extension being requested. While the situation could no longer be considered a case of co-passenger delay, he was of the view that an extension to 19 April 2027 could be granted. **Mr Talib** concurred.

6.5.5 **Ms Beaumier** said that the failure of Epic Aerospace's CHIMERA GEO-1 mission, launched in February 2025, seemed to have affected the launch schedules of subsequent missions using the same OTV. While she appreciated the efforts of the Administration of Oman to make alternative arrangements, the Board could grant extensions on the basis of co-passenger delay or *force majeure* events only. The decision to rely on a new, unproven vehicle to carry a small gap-filler satellite had been high risk and within the operator's control. No information had been provided to suggest that the further delay in the launch window, apparently owing to the assembly, integration and testing phase of the new OTV, would qualify as a *force majeure* event.

6.5.6 She noted that the initial seven-month extension had turned into an almost two-year extension request for a gap-filler satellite to bring into use frequency assignments that would then be suspended for three years. It was not entirely clear, however, that the gap-filler satellite had the requisite capabilities to be able to bring the frequency assignments into use. In view of the recent developments in the case, and the fact that it no longer qualified as a case of co-passenger delay and did not seem to qualify as a case of *force majeure*, she was not in favour of the Board granting an extension. She could consider instructing the Bureau to maintain the frequency assignments until the end of WRC-27 in case the administration wished to submit its request for the conference's consideration. **Ms Mannepalli** agreed with that suggestion.

6.5.7 **Ms Mannepalli**, **Mr Fianko** and **Mr Nurshabekov** all said that the administration had made significant investments and efforts to bring the project to fruition. **Mr Cheng** added that the fact that Oman was a developing country should also be taken into account. **Mr Di Crescenzo** agreed, noting that the situation seemed to have been caused by a combination of several unfortunate events and a lack of experience.

6.5.8 **Mr Fianko** said that, while he had some sympathy for the administration's plight, he was not yet convinced that retaining the frequency assignments until the end of WRC-27 was the correct approach. Further reflection was needed.

6.5.9 **Mr Nurshabekov** said that he was minded to grant an extension but to 19 April 2027 rather than to the end of WRC-27.

6.5.10 **Mr Cheng** said that the gap-filler satellite had been ready since June 2024 and the manufacturing contract for the long-term satellite had been signed. The first mission of Epic Aerospace had unfortunately failed, and the administration had been forced to switch OTV provider. However, the administration had not invoked the application of *force majeure* in its extension request or provided sufficient information for such a determination. In view of the efforts made, he could go along with the proposal to instruct the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments until the end of WRC-27 and allow the conference to make a decision.

6.5.11 **Mr Di Crescenzo** said that he agreed with other speakers that the Board could instruct the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments until the end of WRC-27.

6.5.12 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that, since the Administration of Oman had not specifically requested that its frequency assignments be retained until the end of WRC-27, he was not inclined to pursue that course of action.

6.5.13 **Mr Henri** said that, notwithstanding the latest delay in the launch of the OG2 gap-filler satellite, it was not clear that the case would qualify as one of *force majeure*. At the current time, however, he was not in favour of instructing the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments until WRC-27; the Board still had

several meetings before the conference to try to resolve the case. He proposed that the Board consider the case in depth during that meeting to get a better understanding of the sequence of events.

6.5.14 **Ms Beaumier** said that the Board seemed to have agreed that the case was no longer one of co-passenger delay. It could conclude its consideration thereof on that basis; the administration could submit more information if it did not agree with the Board's decision. Alternatively, the Board could consider Mr Henri's suggestion to review the sequence of events informally before arriving at a decision.

6.5.15 Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Henri** said that the Bureau might be minded to help the Board assemble a timeline of events based on all the information that the administration had provided, including to the Board's previous meetings. The Board might then be in a better position to identify whether elements of *force majeure* might be at play. If so, it could defer its decision to the next meeting and request additional information from the administration; if not, the Board could further consider whether there might be grounds for retaining the frequency assignments until the end of WRC-27, although he was reluctant to retain such an approach.

6.5.16 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** agreed with that suggestion. The administration should be given another opportunity to provide the necessary information to the Board's next meeting. However, if the Board concluded that the case did not constitute a case of co-passenger delay or *force majeure*, he failed to see how there could be any grounds to retain the frequency assignments until the end of WRC-27. Moreover, the administration had not requested such action.

6.5.17 Turning to the request by the Administration of Papua New Guinea, **Mr Azzouz**, **Ms Beaumier** and **Ms Mannepalli** said they recalled that, in previous information to the Board, the Administration of Oman had reported on progress to finalize frequency coordination requests, which it had already completed with a number of administrations.

6.5.18 **Mr Azzouz** said that, while the Board could encourage further coordination between the two administrations and stress the need to prevent harmful interference, the completion of coordination requests was not a requirement for the Board to grant an extension. **Ms Beaumier** agreed that the Board did not grant conditional extensions.

6.5.19 **Ms Beaumier** said it was understandable that some coordination requests might still be pending by the Administration of Oman. All administrations were expected to complete the necessary coordination before launch and to operate in a manner that would not cause harmful interference to other networks with frequency assignments recorded in the MIFR. She would therefore not be in favour of having the Board, in its decision, encourage the Administration of Oman to complete the coordination request; there was nothing to suggest that the administration had no intention of meeting its obligations on that score. **Ms Mannepalli** agreed, adding that she saw no need for the Board to intervene in that regard.

6.5.20 **Mr Nurshabekov** said that the onus was on the administrations to work bilaterally to address any coordination issues; it was not necessary for the Board to intercede.

6.5.21 **Mr Talib** and **Mr Cheng** said that the Board could simply encourage the Administration of Oman to carry out the necessary coordination with all the affected satellite networks of other administrations, including the Administration of Papua New Guinea.

6.5.22 **Mr Azzouz** stressed that such encouragement should be directed at both administrations.

6.5.23 **Mr Henri** agreed that the Board should remain neutral regarding the coordination process, which was a requirement under the Radio Regulations. An extension of the regulatory time-limit did not change anything on that front; it was "business as usual" as far as the Board was concerned.

6.5.24 Following informal discussions on whether the situation presented by the Administration of Oman might contain elements of *force majeure* and whether to request further information, the **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered in detail Document RRB26-1/15, in which the Administration of Oman had requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network.

The Board noted the following points:

- A contract had been signed with a satellite manufacturer for the OMANSAT-1 satellite with its on-ground delivery planned for Q3 2028;
- A launch service provider had been contracted to deliver the OMANSAT-1 satellite into orbit during Q2 2029;
- The administration had secured a gap-filler mission that involved the launch of the OG-2 satellite using an EPIC orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) (Chimera-Geo-2) to bring into use the frequency assignments to its satellite network by 13 December 2025;
- The administration had been unable to provide the additional information from the OTV and launch service providers that the Board had requested at its 100th meeting to support an additional extension to 20 July 2026 due to co-passenger delay;
- In the absence of a response from both the OTV and launch service providers, arrangements had been made with a different OTV provider, and the launch of the OG2 satellite had been rescheduled, with a launch window from 1 January to 1 May 2027;
- The administration had requested that the regulatory time-limit be further extended from 13 December 2025 to 19 April 2027.

From the information provided, the Board concluded that the situation was no longer a case of co-passenger delay but that there might be elements of force majeure present in the case. Consequently, the Board was not in a position to accede to the request for extension at that meeting and invited the Administration of Oman to submit to the 102nd meeting of the Board the information, evidence and supporting documentation in line with the decision of WRC-23 (see the rules concerning the extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use satellite assignments, under Part A1 of the Rules of Procedure). The Board also instructed the Bureau to retain the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network until the end of the 102nd Board meeting."

6.5.25 It was so **agreed**.

6.5.26 Regarding the submission by the Administration of Papua New Guinea, the **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered Document RRB26-1/18, in which the Administration of Papua New Guinea presented its views on aspects of frequency coordination relating to the submission by the Administration of Oman requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network.

The Board noted the following points:

- The coordination of the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network in the 17.7-21.2 GHz and 27.5-31.0 GHz frequency ranges with respect to the PACIFISAT-1 and PACIFISAT KA-75E satellite network filings at 75° E had not been completed;
- The Administration of Papua New Guinea requested that any extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network be granted on the condition that the Administration of Oman complete the frequency coordination and ensure that its satellite operations protect the satellite operations of the Administration of Papua New Guinea from harmful interference.

The Board further emphasized that the Administration of Oman would need to continue and complete the coordination process of the frequency assignments to the OMANSAT-73.5E satellite network with affected satellite networks of other administrations, including Papua New Guinea, in compliance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations. The Board encouraged both administrations to continue their coordination efforts in goodwill to ensure that the above satellite networks operate free from harmful interference."

6.5.27 It was so **agreed**.

6.6 Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network (Document RRB26-1/21)

6.6.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** presented Document RRB26-1/21, in which the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had submitted additional information to supplement its request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network. At is 100th meeting, the Board had concluded that most conditions of *force majeure* had been satisfied to justify the initial 18-month extension requested in its previous submissions but that no information had been provided to demonstrate that the conditions had been satisfied to justify the additional 18-month extension sought. In its latest submission, the administration announced that it was no longer seeking the additional 18-month period. The Board had requested, in particular, project milestones and the status of the satellite network construction before and after the events of June and September 2025 and also clarification on any other avenues that had been pursued to avoid being affected by the sanctions resulting from the Russian Federation-Ukraine crisis. The administration had pointed out that the correct timeline for the satellite launch had been Revised Schedule #3, with satellite TRR scheduled for August 2025 and launch in March 2026. It had also stressed that the total impact of the Russian Federation-Ukraine crisis had not been foreseeable; it had not been possible to take informed, definitive action at the outset. Rather, the situation had unfolded gradually, escalating over the course of the project and requiring continuous reassessment. The administration had argued that pursuing other courses of action, such as switching manufacturer, would have been financially unviable and would still have resulted in delays that would have pushed the project beyond the regulatory time-limit. Furthermore, it had explained that, since the 100th meeting of the Board, technical personnel had been able to resume work on the project, while financial arrangements had also since been concluded, leading to a successful launch on 12 February 2026. The satellite had been expected to reach its orbital position at 34°E by 3 March 2026, which fell within the requested 18-month extension.

6.6.2 Responding to a question from **Mr Azzouz**, he said that, according to publicly available information, as at 24 March 2026, the satellite was at its orbital position of 34°E. The Bureau estimated that the satellite would have arrived at 34°E on 9 March. It might, however, have arrived by 3 March, with there being a 72-hour window where it was difficult to identify with total precision that a satellite had arrived at its orbital slot, and bearing in mind that a satellite was deemed to have arrived at its position when within a tolerance of 0.5°. Thus, the Board might wish to bear those margins in mind when deciding on the length of extension to avoid the risk of the administration returning with a further request if the frequency assignments had actually been brought into use on a slightly different date. He recalled the decision of the Board at its 100th meeting concerning the request from the Administration of India for the extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INSAT-KUP-FSS (93.5°E) satellite network. In that case, the Board had approved an extension to the end of the 100th meeting to allow for the imprecision in determining when the satellite had arrived at its position.

6.6.3 **Mr Cheng** said he was satisfied that the administration had provided the information requested by the Board and had demonstrated that it had considered other means of meeting the regulatory time-limit. With the satellite launched, the administration had expected that the frequency assignments would have been brought into use on 3 March, but he supported granting an extension, based on the Bureau's assessment, to 9 March, which was within the initial 18-month extension requested. **Mr Azzouz** and **Ms Mannepalli** agreed, but both were also open to allowing for a further margin in the Bureau's assessment.

6.6.4 **Mr Henri** said that the timeline across the original and three revised schedules, affected first by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, then the Russian Federation-Ukraine crisis and subsequently international sanctions, had demonstrated that construction of the satellite had been progressing in a timely manner and that the regulatory deadline could have been met even with initial, moderate delays. Subsequent delays attributed to the Russian Federation-Ukraine crisis and international sanctions had affected implementation of the critical design and test readiness reviews. Those delays, in his view, were a consequence of what could be qualified as *force majeure*, and the Board could thus accede to the administration's request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit. With the satellite already considered to be at 34°E, the administration would be in a position to duly inform the Bureau of the bringing into use of the frequency assignments in accordance with Nos. **11.44** and **11.44B** at a date within the requested 18-

month extension period. He therefore proposed that the Board grant an extension of the full 18 months to 4 April 2026 and allow the administration to notify the precise bringing-into-use date in due course.

6.6.5 **Ms Beaumier** also agreed that sufficient information had been provided to qualify the case as one of *force majeure*. While extensions should as a rule be limited to the minimum amount of time required, the Board and Bureau were currently simply awaiting confirmation from the administration as to when precisely the satellite had arrived at its orbital position. Thus, in her view, the Board could agree to an extension of the regulatory time-limit to either 9 March or 4 April.

6.6.6 **Mr Talib**, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, **Mr Di Crescenzo** and **Mr Nurshabekov** all agreed that the additional information provided by the administration allowed the case to be qualified as one of *force majeure*, and they supported the granting of an extension of the regulatory time-limit to 4 April 2026.

6.6.7 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network, as contained in Document RRB26-1/21.

The Board thanked the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran for providing additional information and supporting documentation and noted the following points:

- The administration limited its request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network to the initially sought 18-month period only;
- All previously requested information by the Board in relation to the initial 18-month extension requested in its previous submissions had been submitted to demonstrate that all four conditions of force majeure had been satisfied and to justify the length of the extension requested;
- The satellite to implement the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network had been successfully launched on 12 February 2026.

Consequently, based on the information received at the previous and current Board meetings, the Board concluded that the situation qualified as a case of force majeure. The Board decided to accede to the request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran by extending the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network from 4 October 2024 to 4 April 2026, taking into account the orbit-raising period."

6.6.8 It was so **agreed**.

6.7 Submission by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network (Document RRB26-1/20)

6.7.1 **Mr Wang (Head, SSD/SPS)** presented document RRB26-1/20, in which the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had requested a further extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network on the grounds of *force majeure*. As the administration was using the same platform to bring into use the frequency assignments to both the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network and the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network, the same rationale for the extension had been used and the same new regulatory time-limit of 4 April 2026 requested for both networks (see §§ 6.6.1–6.6.8 above).

6.7.2 In addition, he drew the attention of the meeting to the fact that the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network was intended to provide space operation functions (telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C)). However, Article 2A of Appendices **30** and **30A**, to which the assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network were subject, required an associated network having assignments subject to a Plan in the broadcasting-satellite service (BSS) in the frequency bands covered by Appendices **30** and **30A**, and that was not the case for the IRN-TTC-34 as the Bureau so far has not received notification for the associated assignments.

6.7.3 Responding to a question from **Mr Henri**, he said that the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran did have filings for frequency assignments in the BSS bands under Appendices **30** and **30A** at 34°E.Thus, if it wanted to use the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network to provide TT&C, it had to be associated with one of them or entries in the Plans.

6.7.4 Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, he said that the Bureau had already published the Part A information for an Iranian satellite network under Appendices **30** and **30A** at 34°E in a BR IFIC. It had not yet received the Part B or notification information and the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use of this network was far into the future. There were no issues with that network, nor any reason to ask for additional information yet in that regard. The Bureau was awaiting the Board's decision on the extension request for IRN-TTC-34 satellite network before it could request clarification regarding the assignments associated with the IRN-TTC-34 network.

6.7.5 **Mr Azzouz**, **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Talib**, **Mr Di Crescenzo** and **Mr Nurshabekov** said that the Board could accede to the request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to extend the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network to 4 April 2026, in line with its decision on the requested extension of the regulatory time-limit for the assignments to the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network (see § 6.6.7 above), as both networks were using the same platform.

6.7.6 **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Henri** suggested deferring approval of the extension for the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network until the Board's next meeting and asking the administration to submit information on the intended use of the frequency assignments, with a view to ensuring that they would be used in conjunction with Appendix **30**/**30A** frequency bands.

6.7.7 **Mr Cheng** said that the request for extension was separate from the intended use of the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network and the issue of how they should be recorded in the MIFR.

6.7.8 **Ms Beaumier** agreed and said that the Bureau could proceed with its examination and consider that latter issue once the Board had approved the extension. Based on the Bureau's clarifications, it was evidently necessary for the administration to identify the associated BSS band if a corresponding payload had not been on the same platform. In her understanding of the situation, the payload might be left unused until such time as the associated frequency assignments in the Appendix **30**/**30A** bands had been brought into use. While such an approach would be unusual, the provisions of the Radio Regulations did not appear to preclude it.

6.7.9 **Ms Mannepalli** and Mr **Henri** agreed that there was no need for the Board to request information from the administration on the future use of the assignments at that stage and that the Board could accede to the administration's request to extend the regulatory time-limit for the bringing into use of the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network.

6.7.10 Responding to a question from **Mr Di Crescenzo**, **Mr Wang (Chief, SSD/SPS)** said that a number of countries had been identified as potentially affected by the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network. The administration had begun, and in some cases completed, coordination with those countries. The simplest solution for the administration to have assignments under Appendices **30** and **30A** associated with the IRN-TTC-34 network would be to associate the IRN-TTC-34 with its BSS assignments subject to a Plan. The assignments being in the Plan, there would be no need for coordination; the administration could proceed directly to the notification stage and have the assignments recorded. The administration's intentions were, however, unclear as the document under discussion did not address the matter. He confirmed that, if the Board acceded to the request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Bureau would contact the administration for clarification on the BSS network associated with the IRN-TTC-34 network. It would then either record the assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 network or cancel them based on the information provided.

6.7.11 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the request submitted by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network, as contained in Document RRB26-1/20.

The Board expressed its appreciation to the administration for providing additional information and supporting documentation and noted the following points:

- The request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit had been due to force majeure events that had delayed the construction of the Ka-band payload associated with the IRANDBS4-KA-G2 satellite network, which was using the same satellite platform as the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network;
- The administration had limited its request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network to three months from the initially sought 21-month period;
- The satellite to implement the IRAN-TTC-34 satellite network had been successfully launched on 12 February 2026.

Consequently, based on the information received at the previous and current Board meetings, the Board concluded that the situation qualified as a case of force majeure. The Board decided to accede to the request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran by extending the regulatory time-limit for bringing into use the frequency assignments to the IRN-TTC-34 satellite network from 9 January 2026 to 4 April 2026."

6.7.12 It was so **agreed**.

6.8 Submission by the Administration of Italy requesting an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks (Document RRB26-1/23)

6.8.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** presented document RRB26-1/23, which contained a request from the Administration of Italy for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks of the SICRAL-3 programme on the grounds of *force majeure*. The current regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks was 15 September 2027. The two complementary satellites SICRAL-3A and SICRAL-3B, also under the SICRAL-3 programme, were still under construction; they would not be launched until March 2027, with an orbit-raising period of approximately eight months, and December 2027, with a subsequent orbit-raising period of approximately seven months, respectively. Thus, the administration had secured a commercial gap-filler mission that had involved the launch of the SIGMASAT-1 satellite to bring back into use the frequency assignments to its satellite networks by 15 September 2027. The SIGMASAT-1 satellite had been successfully launched on 26 February 2025. No anomalies had been identified with the EPIC CHIMERA-GEO-1 OTV prior to launch, and it had demonstrated full readiness for launch and its intended operation, with confirmation to that effect attached to the administration's submission. Following its deployment on 26 February 2025, however, it had not been possible to establish an uplink with the OTV and upload telecommands in the critical 72-hour window in which the OTV had been required to perform the necessary manoeuvres, despite initial contact having been established and the beacon correctly received. Thus, the OTV had begun to drift into deep space. The document outlined efforts made by the administration to correct the course and complete orbit raising, but they had all been in vain. Mission failure had been formally declared on 29 September 2025. The document also provided a detailed rationale for how that failure met all four conditions of *force majeure*. The administration was requesting an extension from 15 September to 30 November 2027 for the SHF and EHF assignments of the SICRAL-3A satellite and to 31 July 2028 for the UHF assignments of the SICRAL-3B satellite. The requested dates had been based strictly on the contractual arrangements for the completion of the SICRAL-3A and SICRAL-3B satellites and included no provision for contingency.

6.8.2 Responding to questions from **Ms Mannepalli** and **Ms Beaumier**, he said that there were many frequency bands associated with the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks in the 252 - 293 MHz, 99 MHz, 308 – 308.26, 2 GHz, 7 GHz, 20.2 GHz, 21.2 GHz, 43.5 GHz and 44.5 GHz frequency ranges, and noted that the S-band frequency assignments had been notified for the space operation service only. The case had previously been brought before the Board at its 93rd meeting, when the administration had requested an extension on the grounds of *force majeure* on account of delays to the SICRAL-3 programme attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic. The SICRAL-3 system had been developed to replace SICRAL-1 well in advance of the latter's anticipated end of lifetime (2025) and ensure continuity of service at the orbital position.

Unfortunately, SICRAL-1 had developed critical faults in early 2021. The administration had disposed of the satellite in compliance with international guidelines and to ensure safety and non-proliferation of debris in orbit, even though SICRAL-1 could have remained operational until its end of lifetime. The early failure of SICRAL-1 had had implications for the SICRAL-3 replacement project, which had been progressing until the COVID-19 pandemic and the strict response measures adopted by the Italian Government, which had caused severe delays. The Board had not acceded to the administration's request, and the administration had pursued other arrangements. The frequency assignments of SICRAL-2A and 3A had remained unchanged from the previous submissions. The SICRAL-2A assignments had been first brought into use in three groups, the first on 31 October 2000 and the latter two in 2002 and 2007. They had been first suspended on 27 May 2013 and brought back into use on 15 December 2015, suspended again between May 2021 and January 2024 and then suspended for the final time on 15 September 2024. The SICRAL-3A assignments had been brought into use on 31 January 2009 and then suspended in May 2021 and brought back into use in May 2024, before the final suspension also on 15 September 2024. The Administration of Italy had invoked Article 48 of the ITU Constitution for both networks and had reiterated that invocation when the Administration of Germany had requested that the Bureau examine the bringing back into use of the networks in 2024.

6.8.3 **Mr Henri** recalled a related case, in which the Administration of United Kingdom had submitted a request to the Board's 100th meeting for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring into use the frequency assignments to the GANTS-2 and GANTS-3 satellite networks on the basis of the same *force majeure* event involving the EPIC OTV. In that case, the Board had concluded that the event did not qualify as a case of *force majeure*, pointing out that "*the decision to use an unproven vehicle to launch a satellite came with a higher risk that it would not complete its mission that was known and accepted by the satellite operator, and that could not be considered unforeseeable, inevitable or beyond the operator's control*". He noted that the submission from the Administration of Italy referred to delays in the delivery schedule of the SICRAL-3A and SICRAL-3B satellites but had not expanded on the reasons for that delay or provided supporting material; thus, it was not possible to consider that event as a case of *force majeure* either. In addition, Attachment 1 to the document identified a broad launch window of 1 February to 31 August 2027, yet the document elsewhere referred to the launch being scheduled for March, and that had served as the basis for the length of extension; thus, more specific information in that regard would also be desirable. Given that the regulatory time-limit was not until 15 September 2027, the administration had the opportunity to submit more thorough information to a subsequent meeting.

6.8.4 **Ms Beaumier** agreed that the submission was missing a significant amount of meaningful material, including but not limited to the timeline for the satellite's arrival at 16°E to ensure delivery before the time-limit, the frequency assignments on board the satellite and confirmation that such a small satellite could transmit and receive all such assignments. There was little supporting evidence to demonstrate the readiness of the OTV and its absence of anomalies. The submission alluded to independent, unidentified, erratic malfunctions at different ground stations and major space weather events as possible causes of loss of communication with the OTV, but again no supporting evidence had been provided. In her view, the most likely cause of failure had been an issue with the resilience of the radio-frequency component on board the OTV. Moreover, she agreed that the OTV arrangement had been inherently risky and that the administration had knowingly assumed that risk. She also agreed that there were also no grounds to consider the reported delays in the construction of the SICRAL-3A and SICRAL-3B satellites but suggested that the administration might be invited to submit further information in that regard.

6.8.5 **Ms Mannepalli** agreed with previous speakers' analysis of the information provided and missing, adding that much of the Board's knowledge of the case had been derived from other cases involving the SIGMASAT-1 satellite, concerning which the submission contained no details at all. The administration had not demonstrated that the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks would have been brought into use at 16.2°E ahead of the time-limit if not for the purported *force majeure* event.

6.8.6 **Mr Cheng** also said that there was a substantial amount of missing information, including but not limited to: confirmation that the gap-filler satellite could fulfil the bringing-into-use requirements under No. **11.44B** for all notified frequency assignments; and evidence of contracts between Epic Aerospace and the Italian Administration for the successful bringing back into use of the assignments ahead of the regulatory

time-limit. The administration had also failed to provide details to demonstrate that it had explored all other avenues to meet the regulatory deadline and that it had made every effort to limit the extension period.

6.8.7 **Mr Azzouz** said that the requested length of extension appeared to include contingency, as only an approximate timeline had been described in the submission. The administration should be invited to submit a more precise timeline, along with other missing information identified by other speakers to demonstrate that the case fulfilled the four conditions of *force majeure*.

6.8.8 **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Talib** also pointed to imprecision and inconsistency in the administration's determination of the length of extension, which should be kept to the minimum possible.

6.8.9 **Mr Fianko** expressed sympathy for the Administration of Italy, acknowledging that the project was genuine and that the administration had gone to great lengths to replace the SICRAL-1 programme, which had failed in 2021, but he agreed that the submission was missing a substantial amount of detail. The administration should be invited to submit a watertight case to the next meeting of the Board. **Mr Talib**, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** and **Mr Nurshabekov** agreed.

6.8.10 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the request of the Administration of Italy for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks, as contained in Document RRB26-1/23.

The Board noted the following points:

- The current regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks was 15 September 2027;
- Under the SICRAL-3 programme, two complementary satellites SICRAL-3A and SICRAL-3B were under construction and scheduled to be launched, respectively, in March 2027, with an orbit-raising period of approximately eight months, and in December 2027, with a subsequent orbit-raising period of approximately seven months;
- The administration had secured a commercial gap-filler mission that involved the launch of the SIGMASAT-1 satellite to bring back into use the frequency assignments to its satellite networks by 15 September 2027;
- No details had been provided to demonstrate that the satellite had the capability to operate in all the required frequency bands and that it would have reached the 16.2°E orbital position in time given the plans by other administrations to use the same satellite to bring into use different frequency assignments at very different orbital locations;
- The SIGMASAT-1 satellite had been successfully launched on 26 February 2025, but the EPIC orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) (Chimera-Geo-1) had been unable to execute the correction manoeuvre to direct the satellite towards the geostationary orbit owing to radio-frequency communication issues;
- While no anomalies with the transfer vehicle had been identified prior to the launch, it had been a new low-cost vehicle that had never been used in space;
- The decision to use an unproven vehicle to launch a satellite came with a higher risk that it would not complete its mission, a risk which had been known and accepted by the satellite operator and which could not be considered unforeseeable, inevitable or beyond the operator's control;
- No information had been provided to explain why the administration had opted for that solution over all the other options at its disposal;
- An extension of the regulatory time-limits to bring back into use the SICRAL-2A and SICRAL-3A satellite networks at 16.2°E had been requested until 30 November 2027 and 31 July 2028, respectively.

Based on the information provided, the Board concluded that the situation did not qualify as a case of force majeure. However, recognizing the efforts undertaken by Italy to replace its satellites that had failed prematurely in 2021 and to the extent that the delays to the satellite delivery schedule of the SICRAL-3 satellites could be the result of force majeure events, the Board invited the Administration of Italy to provide

the information, with supporting documentation outlined in the rules concerning the extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use satellite assignments, under Part A1 of the Rules of Procedure, for consideration at a future meeting."

6.8.11 It was so **agreed**.

6.9 Submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland providing additional information supporting its request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network (Document RRB26-1/24(Rev.1))

6.9.1 **Mr Loo (Head, SSD/CSS)** said that, in Document RRB26-1/24(Rev.1), dated 2 March 2026, the Administration of the United Kingdom had provided additional information in support of its request, previously submitted to the Board at its 99th meeting, for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network. As background information, he explained that the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network had been suspended on 17 December 2022; the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use the associated frequency assignments was 17 December 2025.

6.9.2 In the document, the Administration of the United Kingdom had provided a chronology of events, which included the launch of the INMARSAT-6 F2 satellite on 18 February 2023 and the loss of that satellite on 14 August. It also listed the various alternative options that it had explored to avoid missing the regulatory time-limit and to limit the extension requested. Those options had included relocating existing Viasat satellites, using another Viasat satellite currently in construction and leasing a satellite from another operator. Ultimately, none of those options had been deemed viable. A direct replacement of the INMARSAT-6 F2 satellite, with its bespoke design and the multiple frequency bands it had supported, would have necessitated significant investment and development time. For that reason, Viasat had decided to limit its requirements to the Ka-band. With that reduced mission scope, the INMARSAT GX-7 satellite had been identified as the best option for bringing the frequency assignments into use at the earliest opportunity. Supporting documentation in the submission included letters from Airbus Defence and Space, confirming the on-ground delivery schedule for the INMARSAT GX-7 satellite and the estimated electric orbit-raising period of 140 days, and SpaceX, indicating a launch window of 15 April–15 July 2027. The administration was now requesting an extension to 2 September 2027.

6.9.3 On 27 October 2025, however, the Bureau had sent a letter reminding the administration that the regulatory deadline for bringing those frequency assignments back into use was approaching. The administration had not submitted any additional information to the Board at its 100th meeting, held from 10 to 14 November. On 26 November, the Bureau had received a letter from the administration confirming that the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network would not be brought back into use before the 17 December deadline and acknowledging that, in accordance with the Radio Regulations, the Bureau would proceed to remove them from the MIFR, which the Bureau subsequently did in January 2026. The relevant information had been published in BR IFIC 3063/20.01.2026.

6.9.4 Following questions from the **Chair** and **Mr Henri**, he explained that, since January, when the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network had been removed from the MIFR, the Bureau had examined a significant number of coordination requests without taking those frequency assignments into account. Should the Board decide to accede to the extension request, those coordination requests would have to be re-examined. He further explained that, when the Administration of the United Kingdom had notified the Bureau that it would be submitting a request to the current Board meeting, it had been informed that the frequency assignments had been suppressed in accordance with the reminder sent in October 2025 and following the administration's letter of acknowledgement in November 2025.

6.9.5 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that, at the Board's 99th meeting, the Administration of Norway had submitted an identical extension request for its SE-KA-28W satellite network, which had been intended to support the lost INMARSAT-6 F2 satellite. However, that administration had subsequently informed the Bureau, in writing, that it would no longer be pursuing the extension request and that the frequency assignments to the SE-KA-28W satellite network could be suppressed. In that context, the acknowledgement

letter that had subsequently been received from the Administration of the United Kingdom seemed to put a logical and definitive end to the matter.

6.9.6 Responding to a question from the **Chair**, he provided an explanation of the process of reinstating suppressed frequency assignments. The process included re-examining all coordination requests that had been reviewed between the date of suppression and the date of reinstatement and publishing modifications thereto. He added that, as all administrations had been aware of the suppression of the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network since mid-January, they might have made plans, decisions or investments on the basis that coordination with that network was not necessary.

6.9.7 **Ms Beaumier** said that, while the situation was an unfortunate one, the Bureau had clearly reminded the Administration of the United Kingdom of the need to bring the frequency assignments back into use before the regulatory time-limit ended on 17 December 2025 otherwise the assignments would be suppressed. For its part, the administration had confirmed that the assignments would not be brought back into use in time and acknowledged their consequent cancellation. In its submission to the Board, however, the administration had not mentioned any of those developments. Given that the Bureau had not suppressed the assignments until early January 2026, there had been sufficient time for the administration to inform the Bureau of its intention to pursue an extension request. In her view, whether the case met the four *force majeure* conditions was now irrelevant; the frequency assignments had already been cancelled. The Board could not now discuss the merits of the case and consider the extension request. The **Chair**, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, **Mr Fianko**, **Mr Cheng**, **Mr Henri** and **Mr Azzouz** all concurred with that assessment.

6.9.8 **Mr Fianko** added that there was no basis on which the Board could consider an extension request as the frequency assignments had already been cancelled; there was no regulatory time-limit to extend.

6.9.9 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** noted that the administration had not seized the opportunity to make a submission to the Board's 100th meeting, in November 2025, which had been held before the end of the regulatory time-limit.

6.9.10 **Mr Henri** emphasized that the Bureau had taken all necessary steps to inform the administration that, without appropriate action on its part, the frequency assignments would be suppressed. Reinstatement of those frequency assignments would have an impact on not only the current backlog in cases but also the plans and current and future filings of other administrations. He found it surprising that the Administration of the United Kingdom had not addressed the situation in its submission.

6.9.11 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** pointed out that the administration had requested an extension of the regulatory time-limit rather than a reinstatement of the cancelled frequency assignments.

6.9.12 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the submission from the Administration of the United Kingdom providing additional information supporting its request for an extension of the regulatory time-limit to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network, as contained in Revision 1 to Document RRB26-1/24.

However, the Board had been informed by the Bureau that, following an exchange of correspondence with the Administration of the United Kingdom reminding the latter of the need to bring back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W by 17 December 2025, the Administration of the United Kingdom had agreed to the cancellation of the filing. All frequency assignments to the satellite network had thus been suppressed, and the information had been published in BR IFIC 3063/20.01.2026.

The Board noted that the Administration of the United Kingdom had had the opportunity to submit its request to the 100th meeting of the Board or to inform the Bureau of its intention to seek an extension prior to the actual suppression of the network and that the Administration of the United Kingdom had not submitted a request for the reinstatement of the Ka-band frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network to either the Bureau or the Board.

The Board concluded that it was not in a position to reinstate the frequency assignments and that the request of the Administration of the United Kingdom for an extension of the regulatory time-limit for bringing back into use the frequency assignments to the INMARSAT-6-28W satellite network could not be considered since the network had already been suppressed, with the acknowledgement of the notifying Administration."

6.9.13 It was so **agreed**.

7 Issues regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Submissions by the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in its territory (Documents RRB26-1/2 and RRB26-1/7)

Submission by the Administration of the United States regarding the provision of Starlink satellite services in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Document RRB26-1/22)

7.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD**), introducing the item, said that, as geopolitical developments had shown, the situation had worsened considerably between the parties, although the submissions preceded more recent events. Arguments under the Radio Regulations seemed to have been exhausted; issues were now being raised that were beyond the Board's scope. In Document RRB26-1/2, dated 13 January 2026, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran argued that the use of unauthorized Starlink terminals within the country's territory had contributed to what it described as "terrorist operations". It requested that the Board take immediate and concrete action to resolve the issue. In Document RRB26-1/7, dated 25 February 2026, the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided new measurement data showing that the Starlink service remained operational and accessible within its territory. Regarding its obligations under *resolves* 3 i) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**, it restated the issues it faced in identifying and deactivating unauthorized Starlink terminals, including a lack of necessary equipment, the small size and portability of terminals, and the country's challenging geography. The most logical solution, it said, was for the satellite operator to deactivate the terminals, as had been done elsewhere. It asserted that the operator and notifying administration were in breach of the provisions of Article **18** of the Radio Regulations and Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)**. It concluded by, among other things, urging the Board to adopt a resolution initiating the suspension of the satellite operator's filings on the grounds of non-compliance.

7.2 In Document RRB26-1/22, the Administration of the United States asserted that, under Article 14 of the ITU Constitution, the Board's mandate was limited to matters related to radio frequencies and did not include rewriting the results of world radiocommunication conferences. It disagreed with the Board's interpretation of No. 96 of the Constitution and contended that the Board had overstepped its mandate and usurped the right of Member States to set the rules. It argued that Article **18** and Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** had purposefully been narrowly drafted by Member States and did not contain the elements that the Board was seeking to establish. Although some Member States were seeking to impose new requirements, it said, the existence of agenda item 1.5 of WRC-27 was proof that such requirements had not been agreed by Member States and nor were they implied in the Radio Regulations or WRC resolutions. The remainder of the document referred to the protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Internet and telecommunication shutdown in that country; much of that information seemed to be beyond the Board's remit. He added that, according to news reports, the Iranian Administration had been jamming reception of the Starlink service within its territory, which, strictly speaking, was not prohibited by international law.

7.3 Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier** regarding implementation of *invites administrations* 3 of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23**), according to which administrations were invited, when requested by the Bureau or another administration, to cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with assistance in identifying unauthorized earth stations, with monitoring or geolocation services, he explained that the provision was generally used in cases where a satellite operator was providing an in-country service that unlicensed or unauthorized terminals had accessed. In such cases, the Bureau did not usually have to

intervene: one administration would contact another, with the Bureau in copy, and request such cooperation. Everyone involved – from the satellite operator, which faced losing money and damage to its reputation, to the national administration, which would be trying to comply with its regulatory commitments – would have an interest in stopping the unauthorized uplink transmissions. In the current case, the Bureau had not explicitly requested administrations, including the notifying administration, to provide assistance in identifying unauthorized earth stations, with monitoring or geolocation. However, the Board, in its previous decisions, had concluded that the satellite operator had the capability to geolocate and disable terminals remotely; thus, the request was implicit. Given the current geopolitical situation, an explicit request of that nature might now be futile. As far as he knew, no other administration had needed help to locate unauthorized transmitters in a country where no genuine service existed.

7.4 **Ms Beaumier** emphasized that, under No. 96 of the Constitution, the Board was mandated to consider any other matter that could not be resolved through the application of the Rules of Procedure. **Mr Cheng**, **Mr Henri**, **Mr Fianko** and **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** agreed, stressing that the Board should reiterate that it had acted and continued to act in accordance with its mandate and that it stood by its interpretations of Article **18** of the Radio Regulations and Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)**.

7.5 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that he failed to understand how the Administration of the United States had arrived at the conclusion that the Board had overstepped its mandate when it had simply called for the notifying administration to take appropriate action and urged compliance with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and Article **18** of the Radio Regulations.

7.6 **Ms Beaumier** said that since the case had first been presented, in March 2023, the Board had carefully considered the provisions of the Radio Regulations and the relevant WRC decisions that had led to their adoption, in particular in relation to Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**, which sought to prevent or limit the operation of transmitting earth stations within the territory of an administration that had not granted landing rights for the provision of satellite services by a given satellite operator. Under *resolves* 3 ii), the notifying administration of the satellite network or system was required to cooperate with the reporting administration, to the maximum extent possible, in order to resolve the matter in a satisfactory and timely manner if the reporting administration was unable to stop the unauthorized transmissions; under *invites administrations* 3, administrations were invited, when requested by the Bureau or another administration, to cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with assistance in identifying unauthorized earth stations, with monitoring or geolocation services. The notifying administration had not shown willingness to cooperate to the maximum extent possible, even though it and the satellite operator clearly had the geolocation capacity to identify and disable terminals to resolve the matter in a timely manner. It was therefore not in compliance with the obligations set out in Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**. Regarding the request of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the satellite operator's frequency assignments to be suspended, the Board did not have the authority to take such action as there were no provisions in the Radio Regulations that supported such a course of action.

7.7 In its decision, the Board should also note with regret the continued unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals in the territory of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It should note that the Administration of the United States considered that the Board had overstepped its mandate and made decisions that it said were inconsistent with WRC intent. The Board should also request the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to take measures, to the extent possible, to identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals in its territory.

7.8 Replying to questions from **Mr Cheng**, **Ms Beaumier** and **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** clarified that the Administration of Norway had previously been the sole notifying administration and the Administration of the United States had been the associated administration. The latter had now become a notifying administration, as some of its frequency assignments to the USASAT-NGSO-3D satellite system had been brought into use and supported the Starlink operations.

7.9 **Mr Cheng** said that, as there were now two notifying administrations, the Board should call on the Administrations of both Norway and the United States to comply with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and Article **18** of the Radio Regulations and to take all appropriate actions at their disposal to have the operator of the Starlink system immediately disable unauthorized transmissions of its terminals

within the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Henri**, **Mr Fianko** and **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** agreed with that suggestion.

7.10 **Mr Azzouz** said that he agreed with **Ms Beaumier**'s assessment. Publicly available information showed that Starlink had the capacity to deactivate illegal or unauthorized terminals operating in several countries, and yet neither it nor the notifying administration had taken action to deactivate the unauthorized terminals operating in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the Starlink service remained operational and accessible. He did not agree with the assertions of the Administration of the United States regarding the Board's interpretation of Article **18** of the Radio Regulations and Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** or the point of agenda item 1.5 of WRC-27. In addition to reiterating its previous decision, he wondered whether the Board, the Bureau or a study group might be able to develop recommendations on a way forward in the long-standing issue for consideration by WRC-27.

7.11 **Mr Fianko** said that, at its 100th meeting, the Board had decided to publish the webpage on the matter under *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference. The Board had exhausted the tools at its disposal and did not have an enforcement mandate. It must now report the matter to WRC-27.

7.12 **Ms Beaumier** said that the Board had already decided to include the issue of unauthorized transmissions under *resolves* 2 and 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** in its report to WRC-27 under Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**, which would include recommendations for the consideration of WRC-27. She noted that some administrations had also taken note of the difficulties encountered in the application of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** and had made proposals, under agenda item 1.5 of WRC-27, to amend that resolution, not because they believed the Board had exceeded its mandate or made decisions that were not consistent with the Radio Regulations or the intent of WRC decisions, but rather in recognition of the need to specify explicitly what was expected of notifying administrations.

7.13 **Mr Cheng**, noting that the Board had discussed the case at every meeting since its 92nd meeting, said that the Iranian Administration had endeavoured to meet its obligations under *resolves* 3 i) but the equipment necessary to identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals throughout its territory was not available. He doubted that many countries had such technology. He did not agree with the assertions of the Administration of the United States regarding agenda item 1.5 of WRC-27, on Resolution **14 (WRC-23)**. According to *recognizing d)* of that resolution, unauthorized use of non-GSO FSS and MSS earth stations was prohibited – it was therefore not a "purported requirement", as the administration contended, but a current requirement under the Radio Regulations and WRC resolutions. Starlink should therefore not be allowing unauthorized earth station terminals to access its services.

7.14 **Mr Henri** said that, at least, the Administration of the United States had recognized that agenda item 1.5 of WRC-27 might provide some insight on the application of Article **18** of the Radio Regulations. In the circumstances, and avoiding matters far beyond the Board's role, the Board should as a matter of consistency reiterate its previous decision.

7.15 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that, in its decision, the Board should emphasize that Member States were bound by Article 6 of the Constitution to abide by the provisions of the Constitution, the Convention and the Administrative Regulations, which included the Radio Regulations, and to impose observance of those provisions upon operating agencies authorized by them to establish and operate telecommunications and which engaged in international services. Starlink was an operating agency authorized by the administrations of Norway and the United States and engaged in providing international services using radio frequencies. Making that reference would send the message that the Board was clear about its mandate and that the administrations were not complying with their obligations. **Mr Cheng** agreed with that suggestion.

7.16 **Ms Mannepalli** noted that Article 6 of the Constitution referred to the operation of stations capable of causing harmful interference to the radio services of other countries, which did not apply in the current case. The reference to "international services", however, might indeed be applicable.

7.17 **Mr Alkahtani** said that the lack of progress was disappointing, as was the fact that the Board could do little more than reiterate its previous decisions. In the Board's conclusions, he was in favour of informing

the administrations involved that the Board would proceed to include the matter in its report to WRC-27 on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**, along with recommendations.

7.18 The **Chair** said that the Board must do both: reiterate its decision and report to WRC-27.

7.19 **Ms Beaumier** and **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that, based on the discussion, the Board was not simply reiterating its previous decision; several new elements had also been raised.

7.20 The **Director** said that he understood the Board's frustration. As the custodian of the Radio Regulations, the Board's duty was to highlight any infringements thereof. Even if it seemed repetitive or futile at times, the Board must remain constant: it must keep calling attention to the issues and urging the administrations concerned to comply with their obligations until the matter was resolved. If no progress was made, it must report the issue to WRC-27. Administrations might have different interpretations of the rules, but they must still abide by them.

7.21 **Mr Henri** said that he strongly agreed with the Director.

7.22 **Ms Beaumier** said that some cases on the Board's agenda were long-standing items because the issues were not easy to resolve. The Board must remain consistent, continue to make the necessary requests and stand by its previous decisions; to do otherwise would not send the right message. Notwithstanding the fact that the Board would include the issue in its report to WRC-27 on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**, the administrations concerned should still abide by their obligations in the interim.

7.23 Subsequently, **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that the Board should, in its decision, also reiterate the administrations' obligations pursuant to *resolves* 2 of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**, according to which a notifying administration must, to the extent practicable, limit the operation of transmitting earth stations on the territory of an administration on which they were located and operated to only those that were licensed or authorized by that administration. **Mr Cheng** concurred.

7.24 **Ms Beaumier** said that, while she was not against the suggestion, the notifying administrations maintained that they were in compliance with *resolves* 2, claiming that the presence of satellite terminals in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran was due to smuggling rather than any active attempt by the satellite operator to provide licensed services. For that reason, the Board had emphasized the obligation of the notifying administrations to cooperate with the reporting administration, to the maximum extent possible, to resolve the matter. Nevertheless, the Board could reiterate its previous conclusion that compliance with *resolves* 2 or 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** could involve geolocating and deactivating terminals remotely, if those capabilities were available to the satellite system operator.

7.25 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** added that, irrespective of the notifying administrations' assertions, the Board did not agree that they were in compliance with *resolves* 2 or 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**. Moreover, according to other information, the unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals was not related solely to the smuggling of terminals into Iranian territory.

7.26 The Chair proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board carefully considered Documents RRB26-1/2 and RRB26-1/7 from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Document RRB26-1/22 from the Administration of the United States, on the provision of Starlink satellite transmissions in Iranian territory.

The Board noted with grave concern the following points:

- The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had again reported the continuing unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals within its territory;
- The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had indicated that there was no equipment available to identify and locate all unauthorized Starlink terminals throughout its entire territory;
- No response had been received from the Administration of Norway;
- The Administration of the United States was of the view that the Board was exceeding its mandate under Article 14 of the ITU Constitution and that decisions went beyond the spirit and intent of the Radio Regulations and the World Radiocommunication Conference;

- The issue of unauthorized operation of Starlink terminals within the territory of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been under consideration by the Board since its 92nd meeting (20–24 March 2023) without any progress.

The Board further noted the following:

- Pursuant to No. 96 of the Constitution, the Board was to consider any other matter that could not be resolved through the application of the rules of procedure;
- The Administration of the United States, as notifying administration of the Starlink satellite system, had also brought into use frequency assignments to satellite systems that support the Starlink system,
- The notifying administrations of satellite systems had an obligation under Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)** to cooperate to the maximum extent of their capabilities to resolve the matter of unauthorized transmissions (as per *resolves* 3 ii) and *invites administrations* 3);
- Compliance with *resolves* 2 and 3 ii) of Resolution **22 (Rev. WRC-23)** could involve geolocating and deactivating terminals remotely, if those capabilities were available to the satellite system operator;
- The administrations were bound to abide by the provisions of Article 6 of the Constitution.
- The Starlink system was capable of geolocating terminals and disabling them remotely.

The Board also noted with thanks that the Bureau had published as requested the webpage on the matter under *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest, 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference.

The Board reiterated that it had been acting within its mandate under Article 14, No. 96 of the Constitution and concluded as follows:

- The actions of the Administration of Norway were not compliant with the obligations set out in Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**, **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and Article **18** of the Radio Regulations;
- The Board did not have the authority to suspend frequency assignments to satellite systems for non-compliance of the notifying administration with Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23).**

Consequently, the Board decided to:

- continue to request the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pursue its efforts, to the extent possible, to identify and deactivate unauthorized STARLINK terminals in its territory, in accordance with *resolves* 3 i) of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**;
- continue to request the Administration of Norway and the Administration of the United States to comply with Resolutions **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**, **25 (Rev.WRC-23)** and Article **18** of the Radio Regulations;
- strongly urge the Administrations of Norway and the United States to take all appropriate actions at their disposal to have the operator of the STARLINK system immediately disable unauthorized transmissions of its terminals within the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
- to include the issue of unauthorized transmissions from earth stations in its report to WRC-27 on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)**, with a view to discussing, *inter alia*, the difficulties encountered with the application of Resolution **22 (Rev.WRC-23)**."

7.27 It was so **agreed**.

8 Cases of harmful interference

8.1 Submission by the Administration of France regarding harmful interference to its satellite network at the orbital position 70.5°E (Documents RRB26-1/12 and RRB26-1/DELAYED/3)

8.1.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** introduced the item, explaining that, in Document RRB26-1/12, the Administration of France had reported harmful interference to its EUTELSAT 70B satellite located at the 70.5°E orbital position and requested the Board's assistance in resolving the matter. The form of interference involved was piracy, whereby companies transmitted information illicitly through satellites. They did so by monitoring spectrum downlinks and uploading their transmissions through gaps in the uplink, thereby causing interference to the genuine adjacent carriers. The Administration of France had geolocated the source to a location in the territory of Iraq and had been able to identify and demodulate the interfering carrier, proving that the interference was not intended to be of the nature described in No. **15.1** of the Radio Regulations. It had contacted the Administration of Iraq for support in addressing the issue but had received no reply. In Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/3, the Administration of France had informed the Board that the interference had ceased, as of 27 February 2026, following action by the Administration of Iraq. As a result, there was no further request to the Board. The case served as an example of how cooperation between administrations, under Article **15** of the Radio Regulations, was vital in resolving cases of harmful interference

8.1.2 **Mr Azzouz** commended the two administrations on their cooperation and their efforts to eliminate the case of harmful interference in a timely manner.

8.1.3 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"Having considered in detail the submission of the Administration of France regarding harmful interference to its satellite network at the orbital position 70.5°E, as contained in Document RRB26-1/12, and noted Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/3 from the same administration for information, the Board noted the following points:

- The Administration of France had reported a case of harmful interference affecting the F-SAT-N3-70.5E satellite network, originating from an earth station on the territory of Iraq;
- The Administration of France had not received any response or acknowledgement of receipt under RR No. **15.35** to its interference reports from the Administration of Iraq;
- Subsequently, the Administration of France had reported that the case of harmful interference had ceased since 27 February 2026 and had thanked the Administration of Iraq for eliminating the harmful interference.

The Board thanked the Administration of Iraq for the actions taken to cease the harmful interference to frequency assignments of the F-SAT-N3-70.5E satellite network.

The Board further noted that cooperation between administrations was the cornerstone of Article **15** and thanked both administrations for having cooperated in a spirit of goodwill in solving the cases of harmful interference."

8.1.4 It was so **agreed**.

8.2 Issues regarding harmful interference to emissions of high-frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article 12

Submission by the Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding harmful interference to emissions of its high-frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article 12 (Document RRB26-1/13)

Submission by the Administration of China (People's Republic of) on its frequency monitoring in response to the submissions received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding harmful interference to emissions of its high-frequency broadcasting stations published in accordance with RR Article 12 (Documents RRB26-1/19 and RRB26-1/DELAYED/1)

8.2.1 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** presented Document RRB26-1/13, in which the Administration of the United Kingdom had provided the Board with an update on the ongoing harmful interference affecting emissions of its high-frequency broadcasting stations. Recalling the Board's decisions at its 100th meeting, in which it had invited the administrations concerned to exchange technical and administrative information and, if necessary, to convene a bilateral meeting, the Administration of the United Kingdom stressed that it had supplied technical data clearly identifying the source of the interference as being within the territory of the Administration of China. However, during multilateral or bilateral discussions over several years, the Administration of China had not acknowledged that the interference had originated from its territory, despite the monitoring data that had been provided. In the view of the Administration of the United Kingdom, without such prior acknowledgement, there was no basis for further bilateral discussions on the issue. Instead, the Administration of the United Kingdom wished to pursue an independent international monitoring campaign and sought clarification from the Board on whether such a campaign would depend on the number of frequencies affected or the scale of impact. The frequency concerned, 15 295 kHz, would again be used in the upcoming seasonal schedule, and the expected recurring interference could affect thousands of radio listeners.

8.2.2 He further presented Documents RRB26-1/19 and RRB26-1/DELAYED/1, which had been submitted by the Administration of China. In the former, the administration reported the outcomes of monitoring that it had conducted on the frequencies 11 830 kHz, 15 295 kHz and 17 825 kHz, which had been the subject of complaints from the Administration of the United Kingdom. The monitoring exercise had detected no signals other than those of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). It included in attachment the results of the exercise and figures triangulating the detected signals to BBC stations in Madagascar and Oman.

8.2.3 In its delayed submission responding to the content of Document RRB26-1/13, the Administration of China reported that it had transmitted detailed technical information on the outcomes of its monitoring to the Administration of the United Kingdom. The Administration of China further stated that, while it had been proactive in its efforts to resolve the complaints raised by the Administration of the United Kingdom, the latter would need to facilitate that process by providing audio recordings and technical data, such as affected area, type of harmful interference signal, the time, duration and spectrum diagram of the interference and details of the monitoring station, in accordance with No. **15.27**, which stipulated that full particulars should, where possible, be given in the form indicated in Appendix **10**.

8.2.4 Moreover, the Administration of China considered that the outcomes of an international monitoring campaign conducted in 2021, referred to by the Administration of the United Kingdom in Document RRB26-1/13, were irrelevant to the latter's most recent complaint of harmful interference, as that campaign had involved different frequencies that were no longer in use. Until all the necessary technical and administrative information had been shared, any further monitoring campaign would be a waste of international resources and fail to resolve the issues at hand. Bilateral negotiations remained the most effective means of arriving at a suitable resolution. The rationale for a bilateral meeting, complemented with exchange of technical information, should be the resolution of issues of common concern; however, such a meeting should not be subject to preconditions. In the view of the Administration of China, there was not sufficient evidence to confirm that the latest case of interference had originated from Chinese territory.

8.2.5 Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, he said that the frequency 15 295 kHz was the only frequency subject of the most recent report of an infringement interference, which had identified the affected frequency but had omitted some technical details. The BBC would be transmitting on that frequency from March to October 2026.

8.2.6 Responding to a comment from **Mr Talib**, he explained that, in his view, the Administration of China had triangulated the origin of the BBC signals to Madagascar and Oman by using monitoring stations in different parts of the country to determine the direction towards the source of interference. Where the lines of direction from each station intersected was the origin of the signal.

8.2.7 Responding to questions from the **Chair** and **Ms Beaumier**, he said that the Bureau was not at that point proposing an international monitoring campaign and that the Administration of the United Kingdom had not requested one in its submission; rather, it had sought clarity on the conditions for conducting one. There were no strict criteria in terms of number of frequency assignments or level of impact; the decision to conduct a campaign tended to rely on experience, past practice and general considerations. The international monitoring system was a valuable asset and would not be used casually. An international monitoring campaign required at least three stations, preferably in different regions, monitoring frequencies at the precise same time for a period of three weeks. The campaign in 2021 had had approximately a 70 per cent success rate in identifying interference on the monitored frequencies; thus, when monitoring on a single frequency, there was a fairly large chance of detecting nothing and stations might be wary of dedicating resources to a campaign with such a narrow scope.

8.2.8 **Ms Beaumier** said that international monitoring campaigns were indeed time-consuming and difficult; however, administrations should not be left with the impression that a specific number of frequencies were required for an international monitoring campaign to be conducted and that interference on a single frequency would be treated less seriously and allowed to persist without such a campaign. Nevertheless, while campaigns had been performed previously in similar cases of conflicting reports of interference, it had only been after all other avenues had been exhausted. In the current case, it was not clear if all the latest necessary information had been shared, while there appeared to have been a lack of cooperation outside the exchange of reports through the Board.

8.2.9 **Mr Talib** said that a new international monitoring campaign should be an act of last resort. The clarifications provided by the Administration of the United Kingdom and the measures reported by the Administration of China were welcome; however, more technical information could and should be shared. He proposed that the Bureau organize a meeting between the two administrations with a view to the exchange of further clarification of the reported interference and the potential definition of measures to identify and eliminate that interference.

8.2.10 **Ms Mannepalli** noted that the reported interference had occurred on frequencies different to the target frequencies of the 2021 international monitoring campaign and recalled that a significant amount of technical information, along with figures demonstrating geolocation of interference through triangulation, had been submitted to the 100th meeting of the Board in Documents RRB25-3/4 and RRB25-3/10, albeit in the form of Appendix **9** information rather than Appendix **10** information.

8.2.11 **Ms Beaumier** said that the administrations appeared to have submitted conflicting reports, but they had not conducted their monitoring exercises at the same times. Results could understandably vary as the interference might be intermittent. The administrations should be encouraged to cooperate and share the latest necessary information. She expressed support for the convening of a bilateral meeting to facilitate more direct cooperation and sharing of findings and suggested that the Board, having qualified its previous decision with “if necessary”, might encourage the holding of a meeting more strongly in its decision at the current meeting.

8.2.12 **Mr Azzouz** welcomed the update provided by the administrations and noted the measures taken by the Administration of China in an attempt to identify the source of interference. In his view, the case could be resolved through bilateral cooperation, with sharing of the most up-to-date technical and administrative information, as results could vary at different times. The Board should invite the administrations to actively pursue cooperation in the spirit of utmost goodwill and instruct the Bureau to provide assistance to that end.

8.2.13 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered in detail Document RRB26-1/13 from the Administration of the United Kingdom and Document RRB26-1/19 from the Administration of China, and noted Document RRB26-1/DELAYED/1 from the Administration of China for information.

The Board noted the following points:

- The Administration of the United Kingdom had questioned the rationale for a bilateral meeting, recommended by the Board at its 100th meeting, in the absence of confirmation from the Administration of China of the existence and source of the interference;
- The Administration of China had proactively conducted monitoring on frequencies such as 11 830 kHz, 15 295 kHz and 17 825 kHz, which had been the subject of complaints from the Administration of the United Kingdom since 2025. During that period no interference signals had been detected;
- The Administration of China had requested the Administration of the United Kingdom once again to provide additional technical information of the type of harmful interference signals, their time of occurrence and duration, spectrum diagram and location in accordance with RR No. **15.27**;
- The Administration of China believed that bilateral meetings, along with the necessary exchanges of information, continued to be the most effective means of addressing the issues in question.

The Board recognized the conflicting reports provided by the two administrations and urged them both to cooperate with the utmost goodwill to resolve all interference cases.

The Board therefore instructed the Bureau to:

- invite the Administration of the United Kingdom to provide more information regarding technical and administrative information and monitoring details;
- invite the administrations concerned to exchange the necessary technical and administrative information to support the resolution of the cases of harmful interference;
- continue to provide support to the administrations concerned and convene, if necessary, a bilateral meeting on the harmful interference problem;
- report on progress to the 102nd meeting of the Board."

8.2.14 It was so **agreed**.

8.3 Submission by the Administrations of Estonia (Republic of), Latvia (Republic of) and Lithuania (Republic of) concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite and mobile services (Documents RRB26-1/16 and RRB26-1/4(Add.7))

8.3.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that, in Document RRB26-1/16, dated 2 March 2026, the Administrations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania provided an update on the harmful interference affecting RNSS systems and now mobile services in their territories. The scope, intensity and persistence of the harmful interference had further increased; no remedial action had been taken by the Administration of the Russian Federation, despite repeated reporting of the issue and requests for cessation. The Administration of Latvia said that it had received no response to its interference reports from the Administration of the Russian Federation. All three administrations affected reported that the interference occurred daily, that it included jamming and spoofing and that it was now regularly observed not only at high altitudes but also at low altitudes and ground level. In some areas, spoofing constituted half of all interference; International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) services were also increasingly affected. The three administrations had geolocated the source to the territory of the Russian Federation and had concluded that, given the interference's nature and continuity, it was a systematic and deliberate act.

8.3.2 Addendum 7 to Document RRB26-1/4 reported on the outcome of a meeting, held online on 12 March 2026, between the Administrations of the Russian Federation and Lithuania, with the participation of the Bureau. At that meeting, the Administration of Lithuania had provided an overview of the harmful

interference and indicated that the source was located in the Kaliningrad region. For its part, the Administration of the Russian Federation had reported that the interference cases, which it had duly investigated, were the result not of deliberate measures to disrupt services in neighbouring countries but rather of necessary measures to protect its nuclear power stations and other infrastructures from external threats facilitated by the use of RNSS data. It had explained that emissions from military installations operated for national defence purposes, in accordance with Article 48 of the ITU Constitution, might be the cause of the interference, notwithstanding the measures taken to minimize their impact. The Lithuanian delegation had pointed out that, pursuant to No. 203 of the Constitution, administrations were not exempted from the obligation to prevent harmful interference. The Administration of the Russian Federation had emphasized that resolving the harmful interference was inextricably linked to eliminating the external threats it faced. A separate authority was responsible for deciding the interfering signals' power levels and duration; interministerial discussions on measures to improve the situation were therefore required, it said, and were likely to take between three and six months. Both administrations had agreed to continue their cooperation, with the support of the Board and the Bureau.

8.3.3 In conclusion, he said that, while the source of the harmful interference had not been disputed, it was a complex issue that likely required high-level discussions between the governments of all four administrations.

8.3.4 **Mr Azzouz** said that the situation had deteriorated and that no effective action had been taken to resolve the matter. The harmful interference, which was seemingly deliberate and included jamming and spoofing, had been geolocated to the territory of the Administration of the Russian Federation; it now affected not only civil aviation operations but also maritime communications and navigation, civil drone operations, and IMT systems operating on various frequency bands. It posed a serious risk to safety-of-life services, as well as to transport operations, public communications and economic activities across the region. The Board should reiterate its previous decision, urging the Administration of the Russian Federation to take all possible action to cease immediately any harmful interference affecting RNSS and safety services. The administrations involved should be invited to convene bilateral or multilateral meetings, with the support of the Bureau, and to cooperate in goodwill with a view to resolving the long-standing problem. Lastly, the Board should instruct the Bureau to publish relevant information on the websites of the Bureau and the Board, in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest 2022) of the Plenipotentiary Conference.

8.3.5 **Ms Mannepalli** said that the meeting between the Administrations of Lithuania and the Russian Federation had been a positive development. The latter administration had confirmed that the harmful interference originated from within its territory and that it had been caused by installations – albeit managed by a separate authority – used to protect infrastructure from certain threats. However, the interference had only increased and now affected a broader range of services, including in the territories of Estonia and Latvia. The Board should urge the Administration of the Russian Federation to take all measures to prevent harmful interference to neighbouring countries. It should encourage continued dialogue between the Administrations of Lithuania and the Russian Federation; bilateral meetings between the Administration of the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and the Administrations of Estonia and Latvia, on the other, were also needed. Lastly, regarding Mr Azzouz's suggestion, she recalled that, while the Bureau had created and would likely update a webpage on its website concerning harmful interference to RNSS, none of the administrations had requested the Board, in accordance with *resolves to instruct the Radio Regulations Board* 2 of Resolution 119 (Rev. Bucharest 2022), to publish relevant information on its own website.

8.3.6 **Mr Cheng** said that the situation was worrying: the scope, intensity and persistence of the harmful interference had only increased. The Board should reiterate the obligation of the Administration of the Russian Federation to comply with the relevant provisions of the ITU Constitution and the Radio Regulations. Given that safety-of-life services were affected, and that interministerial discussions within the Administration of the Russian Federation were estimated to take up to six months, a letter from the Bureau to a relevant higher-level authority within the Administration of the Russian Federation, with the other three administrations in copy, might contribute to accelerating the process.

8.3.7 **Mr Fianko** and **Mr Azzouz** agreed with that suggestion, adding that interference affecting safety-of-life services must urgently be addressed.

8.3.8 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered in detail the request from the Administrations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania concerning harmful interference to receivers in the radionavigation-satellite (RNSS) and mobile services, as contained in Document RRB26-1/16.

The Board noted the following points:

- The Administrations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had reported that harmful interference had initially affected the RNSS; however, the interference was now observed not only at high altitudes; there had been an increase of interference to IMT services in some areas, with the interference originating from the territory of the Russian Federation;
- The Latvian Administration had not received any response to its interference reports from the Administration of the Russian Federation;
- The coordination meeting between the Administrations of the Russian Federation and of Lithuania on harmful interference to receivers in the RNSS had been held in March 2026, as reported on by the Bureau in Addendum 7 to Document RRB26-1/4;
- The current interference situation had severely impacted on safety of life services and a solution was urgently required.

The Board strongly urged the Administration of the Russian Federation to:

- comply with all the relevant provisions of Articles 45 and 47 of the ITU Constitution and RR Nos. **4.10**, **15.1**, **15.28** and **15.37**;
- take the necessary actions to respond to the communications from the administrations reporting harmful interference to their RNSS and IMT services;
- immediately solve cases of harmful interference to RNSS receivers affecting safety services, civil aviation and maritime and IMT services that originated from its territory.

The Board invited the concerned Administrations to conduct bilateral or multilateral meetings, especially between the Administration of the Russian Federation and the Administration of Estonia and Latvia, to resolve the cases of harmful interference to RNSS receivers and prevent their reoccurrence.

The Board instructed the Bureau to:

- invite all the administrations concerned to cooperate in goodwill to solve the cases of harmful interference;
- to report on progress on the matter to the 102nd meeting of the Board."

8.3.9 It was so **agreed**.

9 Submission by the Administration of Canada requesting an additional extension of the first milestone period (M1) for the MULTUS satellite system (Document RRB26-1/11)

9.1 **Mr Ciccorossi (Head, SSD/SSS)** presented Document RRB26-1/11, which contained a further request from the Administration of Canada for the extension of the regulatory time-limit of the first milestone period (M1) for the MULTUS satellite system to 11 January 2026. At its 100th meeting, the Board had extended the regulatory time-limit from 28 June 2025 to 6 January 2026 on the grounds of *force majeure* and based on an expected launch date of 5 January 2026. The ten AETHER satellites due to be launched had been delivered to the launch provider's facilities on 24 November 2025, with confirmation thereof attached to the document. On 4 December , the launch provider had informed the operator that the launch would be delayed from 5 January to 11 January 2026. The administration confirmed in the document that the satellites had been duly launched and deployed on 11 January 2026 and noted that two of the ten satellites had been sufficient for the MULTUS satellite system to fulfil its M1 target. The administration also provided a detailed rationale for how the latest delay satisfied the conditions of *force majeure* and explained that there had been no feasible means to accelerate the launch and meet the regulatory time-limit given the short window between being informed of the delay and the launch of the satellites.

9.2 **Mr Azzouz** noted that the satellites had been delivered to the launch provider in good time and would have met the regulatory time-limit had they been launched on schedule and said that the administration had demonstrated that that delay satisfied the conditions of *force majeure*. Moreover, the requested length of extension was both very short and limited and the satellites had already been launched. Thus, in his view, the Board could accede to the request from the Administration of Canada for the extension of the M1 regulatory time-limit for the MULTUS satellite system to 11 January 2026.

9.3 **Ms Mannepalli** agreed, noting that the administration had demonstrated that, following announcement of the delay, there had been no available means of still meeting the regulatory time-limit.

9.4 **Mr Henri** said that the administration had qualified the additional five-day delay in launch as a case of *force majeure*; however, it had failed to provide any information supporting such a qualification. It had provided neither the communication from the launch provider nor given any explanation as to the reason for the delay. The satellites had clearly already been launched and the delay had only been a matter of days, but the Board needed to be extremely precise in its decision-making and qualification for agreeing on the extension, taking account of the precedents that each decision set.

9.5 **Mr Cheng** said that the Board had concluded at its 100th meeting that the case had qualified as one of *force majeure* and agreed to an extension of the regulatory time-limit to 6 January 2026. That date had been based on a letter provided by the administration which had indicated that the launch would occur "no earlier than 5 January 2026" and thus implied the possibility of a longer launch window. He suggested that the Board consider the additional extension as part of that launch window, as it had allowed no room for contingency in its previous decision, even if it was quite common for launches to be delayed by several days.

9.6 **Mr Fianko** agreed, adding that it was standard industry practice to provide a window rather than a single date for a satellite launch. He saw no issue in the Board agreeing to the additional extension on that basis. However, the administration should have included in its submission the communication from the launch provider notifying it of the delay.

9.7 **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho** said that the request for the additional extension should be considered against the backdrop of the original case of *force majeure*, on which the Board had already decided favourably. The additional days now requested by the administration were in part a product of the Board's principle that extensions should be as short as possible and the fact that the Board's initial decision had been based on a single day rather than a window. **Mr Di Crescenzo** agreed.

9.8 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered Document RRB26-1/11, in which the Administration of Canada had requested a further extension of the first milestone period (M1) for the MULTUS satellite system.

The Board noted the following points:

- Due to a force majeure event, the Board had granted an extension, from 28 June 2025 to 6 January 2026, to the M1 milestone associated with the MULTUS satellite system at its previous meeting;
- The extension had been granted based on a planned launch date as opposed to a launch window;
- The 10 satellites had been delivered to the launch service provider's facilities on time on 24 November 2025 and had been undergoing launch campaign processing; however, the launch schedule had been changed by the launch service provider;
- The launch schedule suffered delays beyond the control of the Canadian Administration and the 10 satellites had only been launched on 11 January 2026;

Consequently, the Board decided to accede to the request from the Administration of Canada by extending the regulatory time-limit of the M1 milestone for the MULTUS satellite system to 11 January 2026."

9.9 It was so **agreed**.

10 Submission by the Administration of Armenia regarding recognition of its comments and objections with respect to modifications of GE84 and GE06 Plans published in Special Sections GE06/233, GE84/353, GE84/354 and GE84/355 (Document RRB26-1/17)

10.1 In accordance with the working methods of the Board, the discussion of the agenda item was presided over by the Vice-Chair.

10.2 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** introduced Document RRB26-1/17, in which the Administration of Armenia reported that its comments and objections with respect to proposed modifications of the GE84 and GE06 Plans published in various BR IFIC special sections had not been received by the Bureau between October 2025 and February 2026, despite the administration having submitted those comments and objections from the same e-mail address that it had used successfully for more than 20 years and despite receiving delivery receipts from its e-mail provider. The administration noted that it had stopped receiving acknowledgements of receipt from the Bureau in October 2025 but had not followed up as to why until February 2026, assuming that it might have been because of a change in Bureau policy or processing or because of the end-of-year period. Once contacted by the administration, the Bureau had realized that the comments and objections had been delivered to the quarantine folder of the brmail@itu.int account by the Microsoft spam filtering system, which had erroneously flagged the administration's account. E-mails in the quarantine folder were deleted every seven days and were subsequently unrecoverable; thus, the administration's messages had never been seen.

10.3 The administration confirmed that there had been no changes in any settings or servers linked to its e-mail account and provided evidence that the e-mails had been sent within the regulatory deadlines. It thus requested that the comments and objections be considered as having been submitted within the regulatory time-limit and therefore taken into account in the coordination of frequency assignments concerned.

10.4 Replying to a question from **Ms Mannepalli**, he said that, as the regulatory time-limit for the submission of comments had passed, the Bureau could not accede to the request of the administration without the approval of the Board. Regarding the use of electronic submission platforms similar to those used by the Space Services Department (SSD), he said that there were the eTerrestrial and myAdmin platforms, which administrations could use for submission of communications and follow-up; however, those platforms existed only as a tool to assist administrations; their use was not compulsory. For its part, the administration had expressed a preference for e-mail, noting that it was a small administration and had always taken that approach.

10.5 Responding to questions from **Mr Azzouz** and **Mr Linhares de Souza Filho**, he said that the administrations should not consider delivery receipts from an e-mail provider as equivalent to an acknowledgement of receipt from the Bureau, as delivery receipts were triggered even if the messages had been delivered to a quarantine folder. While there were means for administrations to track the handling of their communications, he stressed, however, that there was no regulatory obligation on administrations to confirm receipt by the Bureau. Acknowledgements of receipt were a practice rather than a regulatory provision. To his knowledge, there were no Plenipotentiary Conference or WRC resolutions which governed such communications.

10.6 **Ms Ghazi (Head, TSD/BCD)**, responding to questions from **Mr Azzouz**, **Mr Di Crescenzo** and **Mr Nurshabekov**, said that there had been a similar case involving Bahrain and the Islamic Republic of Iran, albeit involving telefaxes rather than e-mailed communication. That case had prompted the establishment of myAdmin, which allowed administrations to track processing of submissions and automatically forwarded decisions and objections to administrations concerned. However, myAdmin was an optional tool and was not an official source of information in the way that a BR IFIC was; a project was nevertheless under way to establish a new platform through which administrations could directly enter objections or agreements, thereby avoiding the risk of similar cases and reducing the Bureau's workload. Since the Administration of Armenia had raised the issue, the Bureau had been regularly monitoring its quarantine folder and had discovered that communications from the Administrations of Iraq and Tunisia had also been delivered there. The Bureau had been able to resolve the issue with those administrations in a timely manner. Responding to a question from **Mr Fianko**, she said that, while administrations had to designate users for access to myAdmin, there was no limit on the number of such users.

10.7 Responding to questions from **Mr Talib** and **Mr Fianko**, she said that, notwithstanding the failure to take into account the objections of the Administration of Armenia, the relevant frequency assignments had not been recorded in the MIFR because other administrations had also raised objections. Nevertheless, if those other administrations were to arrive at an agreement on those assignments, the Administration of Armenia, which regularly raised objections to the frequency assignments of the Administrations of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, risked having its rights under the Radio Regulations and regional agreements infringed.

10.8 **Mr Fianko** said that failure to take into account the objections of the Administration of Armenia also might affect its bargaining position vis-à-vis other priorities; administrations frequently raised objections as a negotiating tactic to ensure that other interests were taken into account by counterpart administrations. Moreover, if the other administrations concerned arrived at an agreement among themselves, there would be no obligation to coordinate those assignments with the Administration of Armenia. In his view, the details provided by the administration and the clarifications provided by the Bureau demonstrated that the Administration of Armenia had diligently made its submissions within the regulatory deadlines and that those submissions had not been received by the Bureau for reasons beyond the administration's control; it should thus not have its rights infringed. The Board could accede to the request. **Mr Linhares De Souza Filho** and **Mr Azzouz** agreed.

10.9 **Ms Mannepalli** said that the Administration of Armenia had followed up on the matter within three months. Given the time of year, it was reasonable to attribute the lack of acknowledgement of receipt as a simple delay. Moreover, it was under no obligation to use myAdmin and had received proof of delivery. She thus supported acceding to the request and considering the comments and objections as having been received within the regulatory time-limits and urged the Bureau to ensure that no other administrations' communications were being delivered to the quarantine folder. **Ms Beaumier** agreed, stating that the date on which the comments and objections had been originally submitted should be recorded as the date of their receipt.

10.10 **Mr Azzouz** agreed that the Bureau could take the objections and comments of the Administration of Armenia into account and said that the decision that the Board made in the current case should be applied to any similar cases that might arise.

10.11 **Mr Talib** said, however, that any similar cases should be handled on a case-by-case basis. **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** said that that was a sensible approach.

10.12 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** responding to questions from **Mr Talib**, **Mr Nurshabekov** and **Mr Azzouz** on the steps that the Bureau had taken to prevent similar cases, said that the Information Services Department had unflagged the e-mail address of the Administration of Armenia; e-mails were now being received in the inbox folder as normal. In addition, the quarantine folder was now being checked on a routine basis. Consequently, even if communications were delivered to the quarantine folder, the Bureau was confident that they would still be processed in a timely manner. Additionally, the planned new platform, once implemented, would eliminate the possibility of such situations arising again.

10.13 The **Vice-Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the submission from the Administration of Armenia, as contained in Document RRB26-1/17, regarding its comments and objections to the modifications to the GE84 and GE06 plans published in Special Sections GE06/233, GE84/353, GE84/354 and GE84/355.

Based on the details contained in the document and the information provided by the Bureau, the Board noted the following points:

- The Administration of Armenia had sent its comments on and objections to the frequency assignments published in the above-mentioned Special Sections by e-mail within the regulatory time-limits;
- Since October 2025, the e-mail address ether@web.am had been blocked by the spam filtering system and the messages had been forwarded to the quarantine folder of the Bureau's e-mail address;

- E-mails in the quarantine folder of the Bureau's e-mail address had been kept for only seven days and had been permanently deleted before the Bureau could take them into account in the corresponding coordination procedures;
- The Administration of Armenia had acted diligently, within the deadlines established under the GE84 and GE06 Agreements, and the above situation had been outside its control.

Consequently, the Board decided to accede to the request from the Administration of Armenia to accept the comments and objections sent for Special Sections GE06/233, GE84/353, GE84/354 and GE84/355 as having been submitted within the regulatory time-limits.

The Board instructed the Bureau to update the relevant databases and publications accordingly; and to check the quarantine folder of the Bureau's official e-mail address brmail@itu.int on a regular basis to prevent such a situation reoccurring in the future."

10.14 It was so **agreed**.

11 Consideration of issues related to Resolution 80 (Rev.WRC-07)

11.1 Following a meeting of the Working Group on the Report on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)** to WRC-27 under the chairship of **Ms Beaumier**, the Board **confirmed** the list of issues to be included in its report on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)** to WRC-27 based on the cases considered and decisions made since WRC-23. A first draft of the report would be developed and considered at the next meeting of the Board.

12 RRB participation in the Plenipotentiary Conference 2026 (PP-26) and the World Radiocommunication Seminar 2026 (WRS-26)

12.1 The Board, considering No. 141A of the ITU Convention, decided that Ms S. HASANOVA and Ms C. BEAUMIER would represent the Board at the 2026 Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-26).

12.2 **Mr Talib**, who had also figured in discussions for nomination to represent the Board at PP-26, welcomed the selection of Ms Beaumier, noting her wealth of experience and expertise.

12.3 The Board also decided that the Board would be represented at World Radiocommunication Seminar 2026 (WRS-26) by Ms S. HASANOVA.

13 Confirmation of the next meeting for 2026 and indicative dates for future meetings

13.1 The Board confirmed the dates for the 102nd meeting as 29 June–3 July 2026 (Room L).

13.2 The Board further tentatively confirmed the dates for its subsequent meetings in 2026, as follows:

- 103rd meeting: 26–30 October 2026 (Room L);

and in 2027, as follows:

- 104th meeting: 15–19 February 2027 (Room L);
- 105th meeting: 24 May–1 June 2027 (Room L);
- 106th meeting: 20–24 September 2027 (Room L).

14 Other business

14.1 Request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to treat all cases, as of 28 February 2026, where the administration is identified as potentially affected by the submissions of frequency assignments and allotments of other administrations

14.1.1 **Mr Vassiliev (Chief, TSD)** said that the Bureau had, on 20 March 2026, received an e-mailed communication from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran explaining that, due to current circumstances, the administration was not in a position to respond in a timely manner to BR IFIC publications. Thus, the administration requested that the Bureau, as of 28 February 2026 and until further notice, automatically insert objections to all publications where the Islamic Republic of Iran had been identified as potentially affected. At its 89th meeting, the Board had agreed to a similar request from the Administration of Ukraine, on behalf of whom the Bureau continued to insert objections to all publications where Ukraine had been identified as potentially affected.

14.1.2 **Mr Beaumier** said that the case was similar to that of Ukraine, with the Islamic Republic of Iran having limited ability to raise objections to publications within the regulatory time-limits and protect its assignments and allotments. She suggested that the Board accede to the request of the administration and then reassess the situation at the next meeting. **Ms Mannepalli** and **Mr Azzouz** agreed.

14.1.3 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"With reference to the request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran received by the Bureau by e-mail on 20 March 2026, the Board expressed its understanding of the situation that the administration was experiencing. The Board recognized at that time the limited ability of the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran to carry out the regulatory procedures to protect its frequency assignments and allotments. The Board furthermore considered that the case qualified as a situation of force majeure.

Consequently, the Board decided to:

- accede to the request from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran and instruct the Bureau to treat all cases, as of 28 February 2026, where the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been identified as potentially affected by the submissions of frequency assignments and allotments of another administration as having received an objection from the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
- consider the issue at the 102nd meeting of the Board."

14.1.4 It was so **agreed**.

14.2 Webpage on the Board's website to provide guidance to administrations on requests for the extension of regulatory time-limits

14.2.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** said that, as requests for the extension of regulatory time-limits were an increasingly large part of the Board's agenda and information was frequently found missing, the Bureau proposed to develop a webpage on the Board's website that would provide guidance on what supporting material should be submitted with the requests. The Bureau would not create content; rather, it would gather together in one place all relevant details from the Rules of Procedure and past WRC decisions. If the Board agreed in principle, the Bureau would develop a draft webpage and share it by e-mail with Board members, who could agree to its publication by correspondence or consider it further at its next meeting.

14.2.2 **Mr Azzouz**, **Ms Mannepalli**, **Ms Beaumier**, **Mr Fianko**, **Mr Talib** and **Mr Cheng** all welcomed the initiative of the Bureau and said that the website would provide a useful resource for administrations in the preparation of submissions. **Ms Beaumier** and **Mr Cheng** said that the Board's report to WRC-23 on Resolution **80 (Rev.WRC-07)** also contained useful information and clarifications that could be included on the webpage, while **Mr Fianko** stressed the importance of including the *Opinion of the ITU Legal Adviser on force majeure* and an explanation that extensions could not currently be granted on the grounds of a country's status as a developing country. **Mr Talib** suggested including illustrative decisions from past meetings of the Board.

14.2.3 **Ms Mannepalli** said that the Board could approve the webpage by correspondence. **Mr Fianko** agreed but said that members should review and approve the webpage before it was published.

14.2.4 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Board considered the Bureau's proposal to create a specific webpage providing guidance to administrations concerning requests for the extension of regulatory time-limits. The webpage would contain information found in the Rules of Procedure and the Board's report on Resolution **80** submitted to WRC-23, as well as the Opinion of the Legal Adviser on *force majeure*."

14.2.5 It was so **agreed**.

14.3 Case related to the recording of frequency assignments to the HIBLEO-2 satellite system in the aeronautical mobile-satellite (route) service (AMS(R)S) in the frequency band 1 616.0045-1 626.4955 MHz

14.3.1 **Mr Vallet (Chief, SSD)** presented a case related to the recording of frequency assignments of the Administration of the United States to the HIBLEO-2 satellite system in the aeronautical mobile-satellite (route) service (AMS(R)S) in the frequency band 1 616.0045-1 626.4955 MHz, which were currently operational and provided safety-of-life services through the Iridium system but had not been recorded in the MIFR. A notice for the recording of the assignments had been returned to the administration under No. **11.38** in August 2019. While the Bureau had subsequently sent a reminder to the administration of the approaching end of the six-month period provided for under No. **11.46** for the resubmission of notices under No. **11.41**, it had no reply on record and had thus never entered the assignments in the MIFR. Consequently, when the United States Administration had submitted its notice beyond the end of that six-month period, the Bureau had returned it, explaining that the regulatory time-limit had lapsed. Owing in part to the challenges of communication and travel during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bureau and the administration had had no further contact on the matter until CPM-23, at which point the administration had come to realize the chronology of the case and that some communications had gone missing, while the assignments had remained in use. Although years beyond the end of the regulatory time-limit under No. **11.46**, there were clear extenuating circumstances that the Board might wish to consider. Ultimately, the assignments had not been recorded because of administrative error. Given the sensitivities over such a long delay and also over the nature of the service, the Bureau was only informally presenting the matter to the Board and seeking members' input on the case before it developed a plan in cooperation with the administration for consideration at the Board's next meeting.

14.3.2 Responding to a question from **Ms Beaumier**, he said that, in normal circumstances, if administrations resubmitted a notice under No. **11.41** outside of the time-limit stipulated in No. **11.46**, the Bureau would return the notice and consider the matter closed. Given the extenuating circumstances of the case at hand, the Bureau's intention was to identify an appropriate means for the administration to resubmit its notice without having to begin the process again, noting that the seven-year regulatory period since initial publication of the CR/C notice had also long since lapsed. Any such solution should carry the necessary caveats to account for the lateness of resubmission and should ensure that no other administration's rights were infringed.

14.3.3 In response to questions from **Mr Cheng**, he said that all frequency assignments, whether MSS or AMS(R)S, under the Iridium system HIBLEO-2 were contained in the HIBLEO-2 filing. No other filings supported the service links of the Iridium system.

14.3.4 In response to a comment from **Ms Beaumier**, he concurred that the administration's priority was recognition of the frequency assignments as AMS(R)S only, as such recordings tended to be required, including by the International Civil Aviation Organization, for recognition of safety-of-life service providers. The Bureau supported allowing resubmission as there was complete overlap with the recorded MSS assignments of HIBLEO-2, which should simplify completion of coordination even if coordination of AMS(R)S assignments in the frequency bands concerned was subject to No. **9.21**.

14.3.5 The **Chair** noted that coordination of the AMS(R)S assignments had begun but had not been completed, while **Ms Beaumier** said that some administrations might have agreed to the completion of coordination on the basis of an MSS service rather than an AMS(R)S one, which would require a different level of protection. She expressed support for the Bureau's proposed approach, noting that it would be important first to assess the impact of a reinstatement.

14.3.6 Responding to a request from **Mr Cheng**, **Mr Vallet** said that the Bureau could provide a list of frequency assignments that would be potentially affected by the resubmission of the AMS(R)S frequency assignments and their recording in the MIFR. He invited Board members to provide any further input to the Bureau on the matter after the meeting.

14.3.7 The **Chair** proposed that the Board conclude on the matter as follows:

"The Bureau presented a case related to the recording of frequency assignments to the HIBLEO-2 satellite system in the aeronautical mobile-satellite (route) service (AMS(R)S) in the frequency band 1 616.0045-1 626.4955 MHz. The Board noted the particulars of the case, providing feedback to the Bureau on items to take into account in processing the case and requested the Bureau to present a complete analysis of the case to the following Board meeting."

14.3.8 It was so **agreed**.

15 Approval of the summary of decisions (Document RRB26-1/25)

15.1 The Board **approved** the summary of decisions as contained in Document RRB26-1/25.

16 Closure of the meeting

16.1 The **Chair** thanked Board members for their cooperation, teamwork and assistance to her, which had led to the successful completion of a lengthy agenda. She also thanked the Vice-Chair and chairs of the working groups for their efforts, as well as the Director for his assistance and Bureau staff for their support.

16.2 Board members took the floor to thank the Chair for her excellent leadership and efficiency. They also thanked the Vice-Chair, chairs of the working groups, the Director and all secretariat staff for their valuable contributions.

16.3 The **Director** congratulated the Board on the successful conclusion of its 101st meeting and commended members on their continued neutrality and equanimity in the Board's deliberations and decision-making. In the face of rising geopolitical tensions, evident even in the submissions to the meeting, such neutrality was crucial to upholding the virtues of the Board, ITU and the broader multilateral system.

16.4 The **Chair** thanked members for their kind words and closed the meeting at 1700 hours on 27 March 2026.

The Executive Secretary:
M. MANIEWICZ

The Chair:
S. HASANOVA