The impact of unequal access to ICT infrastructure on the Geography of COVID-19 Diffusion
29 July 2020

C3SA

Cybersecurity Capacity Centre for Southern Africa

(Cyber) Security aspects of digital exclusion

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Infodemic

Online Violence



Cybercrime

Privacy violation

Infodemic

- Is a factor compromising Africa's COVID-19 response?

Table 9: Breakdown of time spent on different online activities by age group

	15–24 YEARS	25–34 YEARS	35–44 YEARS	45–54 YEARS	55+
Work	3%	18%	25%	40%	23%
Educational	30%	15%	14%	14%	23%
Social media	60%	57%	48%	32%	37%
News	4%	4%	4%	6%	6%
Entertainment	2%	3%	2%	3%	1%
Other	1%	3%	7%	5%	10%



Figure 18: Internet use in the African countries surveyed
Source: RIA After Access Survey data, 2017

Online Violence

- Impact of COVID-19 on Women and Girls

Source: UN Women, 2020

What about Privacy?

Contact tracing identifies and supports in quarantine the contacts of those who have tested positive for COVID-19.

How contact tracing works

Testing
Contact tracing begins with those who have tested positive for COVID-19. The method is most effective when integrally linked to widespread testing.

Identification
Contacts are identified and listed: those who have had meaningful exposure to the diagnosed individual during the period of potential transmission, which begins before the onset of symptoms.



Notification
Contacts are notified of their status, and informed of implications and next steps, such as how to find care. Depending on local public health guidance, quarantine or isolation could be required for high-risk contacts.

Follow-up, monitoring, and support
Contacts are monitored regularly for symptoms and tested for infection. Results of monitoring help determine the most appropriate intervention, including quarantine.

Source: McKinsey & Company, 2020

COVID-19 Cybercrime



Source: Naidoo, R. 2020

Are SADC countries ready to tackle these challenges?



SADC COUNTRIES	CMM ASSESSMENT	POLICY / STRATEGY	LEGAL FRAMEWORK	CSERT / CIRT	INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT
ANGOLA					
BOTSWANA					
COMOROS				None	
DRC CONGO				None	
ESWATINI				None	
LESOTHO				None	
MADAGASCAR					
MALAWI					
MAURITIUS					
MOZAMBIQUE				MoRENET (academia)	
NAMIBIA		ICT Strategic Plan 2017-2022 (mentions cybercrime)			
SEYCHELLES					
SOUTH AFRICA					
TANZANIA					
ZAMBIA					
ZIMBABWE		National Policy for ICT from 2016 (Recognised by ITU as an NCS		None	

Source: Calandro, Berglund. 2019

Conclusions

- Research challenges
- Balancing human rights
- Security as a shared responsibility