• RESOLUTION 9: Participation of countries, particularly developing countries, in spectrum management
    • Table of Contents
    • Executive summary
    • 0 Acknowledgements
      • 0.1 ITU collaborators
      • 0.2 Contributors
      • 0.3 Regional coordinators
      • 0.4 Reminder of terms of reference of Resolution 9
      • 0.5 Approach and structure of this document
    • Part I: Market mechanisms
      • 1 Introduction
        • 1.1 An evolving context
        • 1.2 Increasing recourse to market mechanisms
      • 2 Main definitions used
        • 2.1 Lotteries
        • 2.2 Comparative evaluation methods
        • 2.3 Auctions
        • 2.4 Secondary spectrum trading
      • 3 Institutional, legal and economic challenges
        • 3.1 Taking account of the institutional context
        • 3.2 Definition of utilization rights and property rights
        • 3.3 Economic valuation of the spectrum
      • 4 Guidelines for organizing spectrum auctions
        • 4.1 Applicability of auctions: advantages and disadvantages
        • 4.2 The different types of auction
          • 4.2.1 Open auction (public bids)/Closed auction (sealed bids)
          • 4.2.2 Single-round/multiple-round auction
          • 4.2.3 Single-object/multi-object auction
          • 4.2.4 Sequential/simultaneous open auction
          • 4.2.5 English (ascending) auction
          • 4.2.6 Dutch (descending) auction
          • 4.2.7 Single-round/ sealed bid/ first price auction
          • 4.2.8 Single-round/ sealed bid/ second price auction
          • 4.2.9 Simultaneous/ multiple-round/ ascending auction
          • 4.2.10 Clock auction
        • 4.3 Pre-auction requirements
        • 4.4 The auction design
          • 4.4.1 Qualification criteria
          • 4.4.2 Price determinants
        • 4.5 The risks: strategic tricks
        • 4.6 Key success factors
        • 4.7 Alternatives to auctions
        • 4.8 The lessons of international comparisons
          • 4.8.1 Limiting uncertainty
          • 4.8.2 Simplifying the auction design
          • 4.8.3 Careful regulatory preparation
          • 4.8.4 Introduce conditions for fair, non-discriminatory competition
      • 5 Guidelines for the establishment of secondary spectrum trading
        • 5.1 Operating principles
        • 5.2 Applicability of secondary spectrum trading: advantages and disadvantages
        • 5.3 Some cases of secondary spectrum trading
          • 5.3.1 Case of France
          • 5.3.2 Case of Australia
        • 5.4 The lessons of international comparisons
      • 6 Synopsis of market mechanisms
        • 6.1 Characteristics of market mechanisms
      • 7 Recommendations
        • 7.1 Main feedback on experiences
          • 7.1.1 Lotteries
          • 7.1.2 Auctions
          • 7.1.3 Secondary spectrum trading
      • 8 Conclusions
      • 9 References
    • Part II: Frequency allocation and spectrum refarming
      • 1 Introduction
      • 2 Importance of allocation tables
      • 3 Challenges of spectrum refarming
      • 4 Guidelines for establishing frequency allocation tables
        • 4.1 Principles of the frequency allocation table
          • 4.1.1 Radio Regulations allocation table
          • 4.1.2 National frequency allocation table
        • 4.2 Examples of frequency allocation tables
          • 4.2.1 Case of Bangladesh
          • 4.2.2 Case of Canada
          • 4.2.3 Case of Senegal
          • 4.2.4 Case of France
          • 4.2.5 Case of Hungary
        • 4.3 Regional harmonization
          • 4.3.1 Importance of regional harmonization
          • 4.3.2 Role of regional organizations
        • 4.4 Recommendations
      • 5 Guidelines for spectrum refarming
        • 5.1 Principles of spectrum refarming
          • 5.1.1 Stages of refarming
          • 5.1.2 Prospective studies of frequency values in the event of refarming
          • 5.1.3 Establishment of fund to finance refarming
        • 5.2 Cases
          • 5.2.1 Case of France
          • 5.2.2 Case of Japan
      • 6 Recommendations
      • 7 Conclusions
      • 8 References
    • Part III: Cost accounting in radiocommunications
      • 1 Introduction
      • 2 Challenges in the utilization of cost accounting for radiocommunications
      • 3 Guidelines for the introduction of cost accounting for radiocommunications
        • 3.1 Definitions of cost accounting
        • 3.2 Implementation methods
        • 3.3 Example: France
      • 4 Recommendations
      • 5 Conclusions
      • 6 References
    • Part IV: Methods of calculating spectrum fees
      • 1 Introduction
      • 2 Reminder of principles updated by the work under Resolution 9
      • 3 Changes in fee calculation methods
        • 3.1 Taking account of new networks and new technologies
        • 3.2 Migration to new-generation networks (NGNs)
      • 4 Recommendations
      • 5 Conclusions
      • 6 References
    • Annexes
      • Annex 1: OCDE Appendix DSTI.ICCP/TISP 12 (2000) Final: Auctions Theory
      • Annex 2: Auctions Case Studies
      • Annex 3: Example of allocations table: Bangladesh
      • Annexe 4: La valorisation des bandes de fréquences en cas de réaménagement du spectre
      • Annex 5: Case studies of methods of calculating spectrum fees
      • Annex 6: Setting the price of spectrum
      • Annex 7: Developing a National Spectrum Handbook: Colombia case
      • Annex 8: Contributions list (2010-2014 Study Period)
        • I. Meeting of the Joint Group on Resolution 9 (16 September 2010)
        • II. Meeting of Joint Group on Resolution 9 (6 and 7 June 2011)
        • III. Meeting of Joint Group on Resolution 9 (12 September 2011)
        • IV. Meeting of Joint Group on Resolution 9 (21 September 2012)
        • V. Meeting of the Joint Group on Resolution 9 (6 June 2013)
        • VI. Meeting of the Joint Group on Resolution 9 ( 16 September 2013)
        • VII. Resolution 9 Reports from the previous Study Period (2006-2010)