International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience

Working Group 2 Recommendations

Risk Identification, Monitoring & Mitigation

	National, Regional[1] and Global Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration
1	Encourage governments to develop National level strategies based on data evidencing the risks: encourage relevant national authorities to collaborate with cable landing licensees to enhance visibility and oversight of submarine cable faults and vulnerabilities within and beyond their waters, taking into account considerations for storage, sharing, and security of such data.
2	Knowledge sharing between industry and government: Foster greater cooperation and improvements to knowledge sharing between industry and national governments, to ensure national policy frameworks include appropriate measures to help enhance resilience. To be coordinated via the International Cable Protection Committee (''ICPC'') and/or regional Cable Protection Committees (''CPC'') or other recognized industry organizations, and further supported by consultative bodies with submarine cables expertise to inform relevant governmental bodies on technical aspects of cables industry best practice (Ministries, National Regulatory Authorities, Marine & Environmental regulators, Customs, etc.
3	Encourage the development of a standard reporting mechanism for governments and ICPC/regional CPCs or recognized industry organizations to share, on a voluntary basis, anonymised information they collect on submarine cable delays, marine faults and other outages on a disassociated basis from cable systems with other governments and/or industry stakeholders.
	Cable Protection Legislation and Enforcement
4	Jurisdiction and Authority: Encourage national governments to establish clear legal and operational frameworks that are consistent with international law for the management of submarine cables in their waters, including critical national infrastructure designation where appropriate.
5	Treaty Obligations: Urge states to implement United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (''UNCLOS'') article 113 (to make the damaging of cables a punishable offence) and International Hydrographic Office (IHO) resolution 4/1967 (regarding certain activities within 0.25-mile on either side of submarine cables).
6	Enforcement legislation: Encourage governments to engage law enforcement agencies to assist with cable damage investigations (where the cause may be a third party), consistent with national laws and national sovereignty. Encourage real-time data sharing between industry and government agencies on cable fault localisation and identification of suspect vessels aided by enhanced enforcement of Automatic Identification System (AIS) regulations and the use of other applicable technologies. In developing legislation, clarify liability standards (intentionality, negligence) and penalty amounts.

	Co-existence with other Maritime Sectors
7	Include navigating in proximity to submarine cables within the standard syllabus for the Basic Safety Training mandated by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) under their International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
8	Require adequate stowage and securing of anchors on vessels to be inspected under the Flag State and regular Port State Control Inspection to avoid anchor dragging against submarine cables.
9	Recognize the spatial requirements of existing and future submarine cables, including their avoidance of manmade and natural hazards, chokepoints, and coexistence with regulated uses of (or protective measures for) the seabed and marine environment, consistent with the jurisdictional provisions of UNCLOS and customary international law.
10	Consider expanding the remit of nautical charting agencies to require them to regularly update the plotting of cables based on latest information from industry. Promote the maintenance of up-to-date cable system position records by cable owners, and encourage clear data flows where relevant from cable installers, owners and recovery companies to government and charting agencies to ensure accuracy, consistency and accountability.
	Strengthening Security & Resilience
11	Audits and Stress Tests: Encourage relevant entities to conduct routine stress tests to verify submarine cable system robustness, assess network risks from choke points and/or route congestion/clustered landings, and disaster response. Regularly audit cable resilience and maintenance provisions to ensure adequate spares, repair agreements, and test the robustness of cable station and digital access security.
12	Decommissioning and redundancy: Promote information sharing and/or notification regarding submarine cable decommissioning to address any resilience gaps, particularly for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) reliant upon few international links.
13	Enhance and expand industry guidance on hardening the security and surveillance of cable stations, fronthaul cables and outside plant and digital access portals (command and control systems).
14	Evaluate the benefit of higher upfront Investment to reduce the risk of future outages. Industry is encouraged to share detailed recommendations on survey, route planning, engineering and installation (including burial) to enhance cable protection.

[1] Any reference to "national" or "government" is understood to extend to Regional Economic Integration Organisations (REIOs) within their respective area of competence.