

ST, a.s. views on the Universal Service Regime

for the fully liberalized telecom market

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- 2 Determination of affordable prices
- 3 Comparison Slovakia EU
- 4 Tariff Re-balancing
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Definition:

Universal Service is

- a minimum set of services
- available for the public
- within the entire national territory
- at an affordable price



- US as a minimum set of services
 - \rightarrow Access as part of USO: Only basic PSTN services to be included
 - \rightarrow Payphones: less demand as mobile penetration grows
- US as an affordable service
 - \rightarrow Affordability depends on household income
 - \rightarrow Only needy people as USO-beneficiaries



			Slovakia	EU
•	Income per employee		≅ 500 €	Ø ≅ 2200 €
•	Ø Residential monthly telecom expense			
	\rightarrow \rightarrow	access line rental call conveyance	<5€ <5€	Ø ≅ 15 € Ø ≅ 27 €



Slovakia EU

- Split rural / urban
- Bratislava:
- $\rightarrow 50\%$ of revenue
- $\rightarrow 25\%$ of access lines
- \rightarrow 2 % of territory
- telephone penetration (% of population)
 - \rightarrow fixed
 - \rightarrow mobile

32 % 29 % (Nov. 2001)

Germany: 45 %



The role of MNOs

- Rapid growth of mobile penetration
 - \rightarrow October 2000: 20 % of Slovak population
 - \rightarrow November 2001: 29 % of Slovak population
- Revenues from mobile services
 - > Revenues from fixed voice telephony in 2002
- Pre-paid = fasted growing segment
- Substitution of fixed access by mobile access



- Danger:
 - \rightarrow Extension of USO burden by politics, ...
 - \rightarrow ... de facto exclusively at the cost of profitable ST customers
- Requirement: Affordability to be periodically reviewed
 - \rightarrow Upward trend in household income



- Typical initial incumbent situation:
 - \rightarrow Access lines cross-subsidized at cost of call conveyance
 - \rightarrow Economic pressure on ST to re-balance tariffs
- But: Scope for raising access line rentals politically restricted



- Also economic restrictions:
 - \rightarrow Substitution of fixed access lines by pre-paid mobiles
 - \rightarrow MNOs make money on fixed-to-mobile call termination
 - \rightarrow Access network subject to economies of scale
 - \rightarrow Per unit cost of serving remaining fixed access customers raised



Universal Service Deficit

- \rightarrow Definition: incremental revenue ./. incremental cost
- \rightarrow Incremental revenue from also includes:
 - revenues from incoming calls on access lines
 - Intangible benefits (marketing advantages etc.)
- \rightarrow relates only to "unprofitable customers"

Access Deficit

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- \rightarrow only revenues from access line rentals considered
- \rightarrow relates to the Access Network in total



ST's access deficit significant

- Slovak access line rentals much lower than EU standards
- Indirect revenues from access line provision practically zero
 - \rightarrow Incoming calls on residential access lines negligible
 - \rightarrow Only Top-10 residential customers attractive for ST competitors
 - \rightarrow Intangible benefits irrelevant in the mass market



ST's access deficit significant

- Labour is cheaper than in Western EU countries
- But: Access network is CAPEX-intensive
 - \rightarrow Thus lower labour costs do not pay off significantly
 - \rightarrow In turn, cost of capital higher than in Western EU countries



Slovak Telecommunications Act:

 \rightarrow Only operators with less than 80% market share qualify for USO funding

No way to justify the "80 %"-rule!

- (1) Rule designed to impose USO burden exclusively on ST
- (2) But mobile telephony is a huge cash generator



No way to justify the "80 %"-rule!

- (3) ST's revenue stream is highly vulnerable
 - \rightarrow Only business segment + top-10 residentials economically interesting
 - \rightarrow less than 10% of customers generate more than 50 % of revenue
 - \rightarrow ST competitors lobby intensively for Local Loop Unbundling
- (4) USO as a "doom loop" for ST?





Overview on funding methodologies:

- \rightarrow Governmental funding
- \rightarrow Universal service fund
- → Surcharges on interconnect call rates ("Access Deficit Contributions")



Governmental Funding

- Society, and not dedicate groups would pay
 - \rightarrow appropriate, as USO is element of public social policy
- Competitive neutrality assured
 - $\rightarrow~$ no cost burden imposed on specific carrier
- Right incentives to politics provided

 \rightarrow politics internalise cost of extending USO obligations

• But: Is it also realistic?



Universal Service Fund

- Financial burden shared within industry
 - \rightarrow Only profitable telecom customers bear USO cost
- EU regulation: Individual levies dependant on market shares
 - \rightarrow Guideline: No distortion of competition by USO-levies
 - \rightarrow Thus: USO levies to be related to ability to pay
 - \rightarrow Problem: How to define the relevant market?



• Possible solution: Scoring of customers

- \rightarrow Score according to customer's economic attractiveness / profitability
- \rightarrow Profitability can be approximated by revenue per customer
- \rightarrow USO levy shall be dependent on score
- Advantages:
 - \rightarrow Undertaking's contribution depends on its ability to pay
 - \rightarrow Ability to pay = accepted principle in income taxation
 - \rightarrow Minimal distortion of competition (given US-fund is prevailing)



Access Deficit Contribution

- ADC = surcharge on IC call rates
- Rejecting ADC on grounds of new Universal Service Directive?
 - \rightarrow Slovak Telecommunications Act to be amended
 - \rightarrow Ministry refused to take new EU framework into account
 - \rightarrow Argument presented: Effectiveness of new framework not before 2003
 - \rightarrow ST favoured legislation on grounds of EU framework
 - \rightarrow Why than denying ADC on grounds of new EU framework?



• ST recognizes economic arguments against ADC

- \rightarrow Distortion of make-or-buy decisions etc.
- \rightarrow ST would be main-payer even under ADC-regime
- ST regards ADC as possible interim solution
 - \rightarrow Establishment of scoring system will take some time
 - \rightarrow ADC-payments related to demand for IC-calls
 - \rightarrow But demand for IC-calls not related to profitability of customer-base