International Law Enforcement Against Spam



Practical solutions for a difficult problem

Hugh Stevenson U.S. Federal Trade Commission

Nature of the problem

- Fraudulent and deceptive content
- Anonymity: Spammers can easily cross international borders and hide their identity
- Cost: Spam can be profitable

Practical solutions

Address spam as part of a broader challenge: cross-border fraud and computer crime

The FTC's Role

- Leading U.S. national agency on consumer protection (civil authority)
- Power to bring lawsuits against unfair and deceptive commercial practices
- FTC also has role implementing new U.S. CAN-SPAM Act
- Other U.S. agencies with spam enforcement authority:
 - Federal Communications Commission Wireless spam
 - Department of Justice Criminal /computer crimes enforcement

FTC Enforcement Against Spammers

- FTC has filed over 62 spam-related cases.
- Our spam-related cases have targeted:
 - "Spoofing" forging the sender's identity
 - "Phishing" spam used to engage in identity theft
 - Failure to honor a "remove me" claim
 - "Subject" lines and "From" lines that deceive recipients into opening a message they would have deleted
 - False claims offering anti-spam services and spam-related business opportunities.
- We have also worked with federal, state, and foreign law enforcement partners.

Can-Spam Act


- Prohibits false or materially misleading header information
- Prohibits subject headings that are likely to mislead
- Prohibits sending spam to those who have opted out
- Criminal penalties for certain activities including:
 - Sending over 2500 illegal spam in one day; 25,000 in a month; or 250,000 in a year
 - Committed an offense in furtherance of any federal or state felony
- Challenge is finding the wrong-doers who can send spam from anywhere in the world

An FTC perspective

- What we learned from:
 - Research
 - Business and consumer education
 - Investigating and bringing spam cases
- What we need for effective international enforcement


False Claims In Spam Study

- 66% of the spam contained signs of falsity in the from line, subject line, or text
- Only 16.5% of the spam did not sell an illegitimate product or service
- No Fortune 500 companies and only one Fortune 1000 company connected to the spam by hyperlink.




"Remove Me" Surf

- Tested 215 spam messages with "remove me" claims.
 - "Click here to be removed from mailing list."
 - "Reply to this message with 'unsubscribe' in the subject."
- 63% of links and reply options did not function.
- Opting out did not result in a greater volume of spam



Email Address Harvesting



Source: Northeast Netforce Investigators seeded 175 different locations on the Internet with 250 new, undercover email addresses and monitored the addresses for six weeks.

Spam Forum

- Three days of discussions with 87 panelists
 - Advocates and opponents, marketers, technologists, law enforcement, and international regulators
- Emphasis
 - ■How spam works: what we know
 - **■**Potential solutions

Operation Secure Your Server

- International effort to educate owners of open relays and open proxies how to protect their servers from abuse by spammers
- Spammers use these servers to send spam anonymously and avoid anti-spam filters
- 38 international government agencies from 28 countries have sponsored contacting tens of thousands open relay/proxy administrators

Operation Secure Your Server



Authentication

 Discussed in June 2004 FTC Report on feasibility of a "Do Not Email" registry

 Report concludes that, without some authentication, registry would not reduce spam;

- FTC plans Authentication Summit for Fall 2004
 - Effect of domain authentication on enforcement
 - Issue of industry standard

Investigating spam

1. Backwards

E-mail tracing

2. Forwards

- Website investigation
- Investigating addresses and phone numbers
- Following the money
 - How did the spammer pay for domain name registration(s)?
 - How did consumers pay for the product?

Backwards

Typical Spam Routing Headers

Return-Path: q0koco@aol.com

Received: from massen. 2-81-57-128-46.fbx.proxad.net ([81.57.128.46]) by lakemtai08.cox.net (InterMail vM.5.01.06.05 201-253-122-130-105-20030824) with SMTP id <20040115161857.JKJM5944.lakemtai0a.cox.net@massena-2-81-57-128-46.fbx.proxad.net>; Thu, 15 Jan 2004 11:18:57 -0500

Received: from [61.220.187.85] by massena-2-81-57-128-46. Sbx.proxad.net id N1tbyb9rILTH; Thu, 15 Jan 2004 13:13:56 -0300

Message-ID: oj\$73un7\$p\$al\$nx2617cbe0@wuy7.69oi.k2

From: "Chris Chamberlain" <q0koco@aol.com>

Reply-To Chris Chamberlain" <q0koco@aol.com>


To: dblumenthal@cox.net

Subject: Fwd:I need your help...


Date: Thu, 15 Jan 04 13:13:56 GMT

Possibly Forged

Backwards Multinational Path



Forwards - Investigating a Web site - Whois



Forwards – Following the money

Credit card records

Checks/Bank records

Postal money orders

SUBPOENA #1

Web host

IP Address



SUBPOENA #2

Subscriber info

ISP

SUBPOENA #3

Phone records

Phone Co.

CID Response: Registration Information for Free Web Page

Mickey Mouse FAKE

123 Disney Center FAKE

Orlando, FL 12345 FAKE

Scammer@realaccount.com REAL

Registered 4 AUG 2003 04:34:25 GMT


Set up IP 12.123.12.1 **REAL**

REAL

The Dominica Spam Case



The TLD CASE



The TLD Case

The OFT:

- helped FTC with serving process
- got an assurance of voluntary compliance from the defendants

The FTC:

- shut down the Web sites & froze assets
- reached a settlement with injunctive relief

The TLD Case

The challenge: consumer redress-get to the assets

OFT: no jurisdiction for recovering assets

Difficulties in recovering money held by third parties in foreign countries

The Westby Case




Amended complaint named Dutch individual and two Dutch corporations

The Westby Case - Tracing the money

- The link in the spam directed consumers to an adult page
- A couple of pages into the web site took consumers to a "payment page"
- The payment page identified the third party payment processor
- The source code on the page identified the "merchant" and affiliate of the merchant who were being paid by the payment processor

The Global Web Promotions Case



The Global Web Promotions Case

Violations of the FTC Act: Deceptive claims

- Violations of the CAN-SPAM Act
 - Spoofing
 - Failure to provide "opt out"
- Assistance from Australia and New Zealand Authorities

Global Web Promotions agreed to a preliminary injunction

Challenges for Cross-border enforcement

Around the world

Obtaining Evidence

Sharing Evidence

Moving fast



Stopping Misconduct

Recovering Assets

Cross-border enforcement cooperation

Important factors

- Build domestic enforcement capacity
- Look for common ground
- Coordinate between agencies with different functions
- Maximize benefits in case selection
- Information sharing

Cross-border enforcement cooperation


OECD: Guidelines on Protecting Consumers
 Across Borders From Fraud and Deception

- US: Proposed International Consumer Protection Act
 - Investigative assistance
 - Information sharing
 - Clarification of jurisdiction and redress authority
 - Authority to negotiate international agreements
- **EU: Proposed Enforcement Cooperation Regulation**

Gathering Information:



Information Gathering



Looking ahead

- Technology:
 - OECD Korea workshop, September 8-9, 2004

- Enforcement:
 - Meeting on spam enforcement cooperation,
 London, October 11, 2004

- Authentication
 - FTC Summit, Fall 2004

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FTC Staff presentation. Does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any individual Commissioner.