

# 3G case studies overview

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### Issues

- Licensing strategies
  - ⇒ Auction, beauty contest, mixed
- Licensing conditions
- Spectrum allocation
- Transition to 3G
- Market prospects



## Licensing strategies

- Auction
  - ⇒ Venezuela, Chile?
- Beauty contest
  - ⇒ Japan, Sweden, China?
- Mixed
  - **⇒** Hong Kong SAR



## **Auction and mixed**

#### Hong Kong

- ⇒ Pre-qualification process
- ⇒ Royalty-based mechanism: licensee pays a percentage of 3G revenues over time
- ⇒ First 5 years they pay a fixed minimum

#### Venezuela

- Demanded by legislation
- ⇒ Auction revenues for Internet development

#### Chile

□ Undecided. Requires changes in law



## Auction implications

- Governments: revenues
- Incumbents: no choice
- New entrants: an opportunity
- Other operators: high risk
- Users: might bring higher prices
- Society: efficient allocation of resources



## Beauty contest

#### Sweden

- ⇒ Telecom Bill auction not to be used when licensing spectrum
- ⇒ Licensing to be based on "grounds of fact"
- ⇒ Pre-qualification and beauty contest
- ⇒ Pace of roll out and geographic coverage
- ⇒ A leader in hardware and service development

#### China

Operators to pay for spectrumn [benchmarked]



## Beauty contest implications

- Subjective, unreliable, non-measurable, inefficient allocation of resources
  - ⇒ Sweden [paper]
- Transparent, measurable, fast, cheap, quick net and service roll out, no damage on operator's investment capabilities, auction or lottery considered nonobjective criteria
  - ⇒ Sweden [case study]



## Licensing conditions / requirements

- Competition
  - ⇒ A license for a new entrant (?)
- Ownership
  - ⇒ No cross ownership
- MVNOs
  - ⇒ Enforced or market driven
- Market / geographic coverage
- Cost sharing
- Standards
- Timing



## Expanding competition

- 3G licensing seen as an opportunity to expand effective competition
- Likelihood according to market structure and current conditions
  - ⇒ Venezuela = likely

  - ⇒ Japan = through open network access (?)
  - ⇒ Sweden = likely
  - ⇒ HK = through open network access (?)



## Reserving for new entrants

- Sweden
  - **⇒** No reservation, yet entry of 2 new operators
- Japan
  - No reservation, no new entrants. Three local incumbents. No foreign carriers [vodaphone]
- Venezuela
  - **⇒** Four licenses, one reserved for a new entrant
- Chile
  - **⇒** Four licenses, reservation not decided



## Controlling ownership

- Sweden
  - Control of more than 20% of shares in any of the other applying operators/consortiums
- No such requirement on
  - ⇒ Japan
  - ⇒ Hong Kong
  - ⇒ Venezuela and Chile



## **Enforcing VMNOs?**

#### Hong Kong

- □ Up to 30% of network capacity should be opened for VMNOs
- Operators asked for 20% to avoid competitor's access to more than 100% capacity due to aggregation
- Wholesale prices for VMNOs by commercial negotiations, but subjet to NRA intervention
- Sweden: allowed 30 in Feb 2001
- Chile and Venezuela
  - □ Left to commercial negotiations



## Licensees

- ⇒Japan (3)
- ⇒Sweden (4)
- ⇒ Hong Kong (4)
- ⇒ Venezuela (4)
- **⇔ Chile (4)**
- ⇒China (?)
- ⇒Ghana (?)



## Coverage

#### Japan

⇒ 50% of population in the first five years
[DoCoMo to cover 97% of pop. by March 2004]

#### Sweden

⇒ 30% of population by each carrier – remaining 70% can be covered through roaming agreements with other operators

#### Hong Kong

⇒ Set by regulator, linked to performance bonds backed by bank guarranty



## Cost sharing


- Sweden
  - Yes to increase pace and reduce cost of rollout
  - Carriers will have to reach agreements [infrastructure roaming]
  - ⇒ Alliances in the months following the licensing
- Collusion: threat to effective competition
  - ⇒ An issue for the telecom regulator?



### **Standards**

- - Huawei 97 patents CDMA
  - ZTE (cdma2000) and Datang (TD-SCDMA) gov support
- ➡ Hong Kong: any standard if compatible among each other and with backward compatibility existing 2G systems
- **⇒ Japan: WCDMA and cdma2000**

## Market share evolution of Chinese domestic vendors



Source: Ministry of Information Industry, China



## Timing of licensing

- ⇒ Japan (done)
- ⇒Sweden (done)
- ⇒Hong Kong (Q4 01)
- ⇒ Venezuela (Q1 02)
- **⇒ Chile (Q2 02)**
- **⇒China (???)**
- ⇒Ghana (?)



## Spectrum allocation

#### Chile

- ⇒ Core IMT 2000 bands occupied by PCS
- ⇒ Then 1710-1850Mhz up & 2110-2170Mhz
- ⇒ Waiting for regional trends and USA

#### Venezuela

- ⇒ Core IMT2000 bands vacant
- ⇒ No contraints on timing due to spectrum allocation
- For small markets spectrum allocation is related to economies of scale
  - ⇒ potential bidders
  - ⇒ availability and cost of hardware
  - ⇒ services, applications, and content



## Transition to 3G

#### China

- ⇒ WAP 2% of mobile subscribers per minute charge
- Monternet great success move to packet switching – January 2001 GPRS
- ⇒ SMS: 56 m/M in Q1 00 to 192 m/M in Q4 00

#### Venezuela and Chile

- ⇒ Gov. & operators
- ⇒ Demand for mobile [voice vs. data] different in each country

#### Japan



## Business case for 3G

- High income economies
  - ⇒ Japan, Sweden, HK: a natural transition demand driven
- Profitability
  - □ Took 10 years for GSM in Sweden to become profitable
- Developing countries
  - ➡ Ghana, Chile, Venezuela, China: not so clear [individual users of broadband mobile services]. Supply playing an important role



## Charging for services

- Charging schemes
  - ⇒ Per minute, per packet, per service, flate rate, per access time
- Emerging approaches
  - ⇒ Japan: per packet
  - **⇒** Sweden: range of pricing arrangements
- WAP
- Always on packet switched
  - Lower rates, but charges by packet not transparent, difficult to monitor by user



## Cost of terminals

- Cost of terminals
  - ⇒ Sweden: US\$ 400 sales price
  - ⇒ Availability? The vicious cycle.
  - **⇒** Equipment supplier financing
- Subsidizing terminals
  - Some operators in Sweden have decided that they will not subsidize 3G terminals
  - ⇒ The Chilean experience



## **Summary**

- Chile
  - ⇒ Spectrum dilemma
- China
  - ⇒ Standards industrial policy
- Ghana
  - ⇒ Market size and purchasing power
- Japan
  - **⇒** Services and prices
- Sweden
  - ⇒ Market structure and service strategies
- Venezuela
  - ⇒ Timing and design of license



## THANK YOU!