REPORT OF THE
RAPPORTEURS GROUP TO THE DECEMBER MEETING OF
WORKING PARTY 2/3
________
Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide a text which
members of SG 3 Working Party 2 can use as a basis for their
continued work. It draws from the various contributions and
interventions at the May meeting and the subsequent comments on
the first and second drafts. It aims to represent the discussions
and contributions to date, it does not set out to propose a final
solution. A number of substantive issues have been raised in
contributions to the rapporteurs group which the Working Party
must consider before a solution can be developed. These issues,
together with a list of other points arising from this document
are set out in a further document which the Rapporteur will
submit to the Working Party meeting. .
Structure
1 The objective
2 The options and proposals
3 Discussion of options and emerging principles
4 Methodology issues
5 Transition issues
6 Data gathering, including case studies
7 Summary
1 The Objective
1.1 Need for reform
There was consensus at the May meeting that the current regime
had to be reformed or modified to meet the challenges which the
fast changing telecommunications environment was placing on it.
It is necessary for Study Group 3 to progress the reform as a
matter of urgency, but without destabilising the existing regime.
This need for reform and the supporting arguments were set
down in a number of contributions, e.g. #2 from Secretary
General, # 109 and 17 from UK, # 20 from the informal group of
experts, # 19 from Telia and delayed # 15 from Russia, #21 from
TINS, #24 from Korea and # 35 from Hong Kong Government.
It is clear that in he future there will not be one regime but
rather a menu of regimes with carriers agreeing to use which ever
regime, or regimes, which best suits a particular relationship.
The alternative regimes being considered by Working Party 2
should be considerd as supplementing the existing regimes.
In considering the potential reforms the following scenarios
were noted :
Between Liberalised and Liberalised
Between Liberalised and Non liberalised
Between Non liberalised and Non liberalised
In considering the liberalised to liberalised scenario
it was argued that market forces will apply and therefore the
role of the ITU will be very limited if existing at all. This
position was supported by Contributions # 20 from the Group of
Experts, # 17 from the UK, # 19 from Telia and delayed # 19 from
Sweden, #21 from TNZI, # 32 from New Zealand. However, the ITU
could usefully monitor the developments on these routes, in
particular the impact on accounting/settlement arrangements, and
communicate the developments to the ITU membership. (source:
proposal by Linda Yu, Hong Kong SAR Government)
Also, there would appear to be a useful role for the ITU where
a market is moving from a non- liberal to a liberal environment
to:
ensure governments are aware of the rapidly changing
environment and of how this is impacting on the traditional
settlements system
develop and maintain understanding of the range of
alternative systems that are likely to emerge in the new
environment, as a way of assisting transition to new
arrangements
make recommendations where appropriate to assist in the
transition and keep existing recommendations under review
against obsolescence.
(source: Philip Allnut, Government of Australia)
The other two scenarios liberalised to non-liberalised and
non-liberalised to non-liberalised, clearly require to be
addressed by Study Group 3.
1.2 The need for cost orientation
The contributions from, Brazil, Hong Kong, Canada, KDD, USA,
UK, Telia, Sweden, Mali, Russia, Australia, Korea, Japan, New
Zealand, Aseta, France and the informal Group of Experts all
endorsed the key objective of achieving cost orientation as set
down in Recommendation D 140, as did numerous interventions from
the floor. The point was made in May that if the current levels
of rates were at or very close to cost then there would not be
the pressures to reform the current accounting rate regime.
Contribution # 16, from the TSB, showed that the average
accounting rate has been reducing at 3% per annum since 1988, the
reduction in 1995 being 5%. If only those rates where changes
have been made are considered then the reduction is 19.12 %.
Compared with the reduction of 30% per annum in submarine cable
costs, as shown in Contribution #2 from the Secretary General and
the cost trend data assembled in the ITU/TeleGeography Inc.
Publication " Direction of Traffic," clearly there is a
long way to go if the target date of 2000 is to be achieved.
Recommendation D 140 said that cost orientation should be
achieved in 5 years; if taken from completion of the
Recommendation this is 1995 - 2000. The WTO have set the date of
2000 as the time when they will examine accounting rates. There
is therefore a key deadline for Study Group 3 to aim for. If the
ITU is to remain in control of the accounting rate regimes it is
necessary for it to be able to demonstrate to the WTO that it has
undertaken all the necessary reforms. If not, then, at least for
those countries which are party to the WTO agreement, the WTO
will establish the regime.
1.3 Governing Principles
Study Group 3 has to establish a set of principles which can
form the basis for moving forward to cost orientated rates.
Delayed contribution D 27 from Japan listed seven principles
related to cost orientated settlement which could be adopted as a
start point;
continuity and viability of international
telecommunications service
transparency
non-discrimination
cost-orientated tariffing
competition (compatibility with) (source: Neil Feinson, UK
government)
benefit to end-users as a result of reductions
(clarification)
ease of transition for developing countries
minimum of regulation necessary to achieve the goal.
The above embraces the principles contained in D 140 and the
principles of the WTO. They are also consistent with the
discussion of the May meeting.
Additionally, the new regime should be conducive to improved
efficiency and cost reduction and continue the current downward
trend in settlement rates (Source: Vivienne Lucas, BT)
2 Options/Proposals
2.1 Current Regime
The current accounting and settlement regimes are set out
primarily in the following ITU-T Recommendations ;
D 150
D 155
D 140.
and are underpinned by the International Telecommunications
Regulations ( ITRs ). The point was made during discussion that
the ITRs were approved in 1988 from work carried out in 1986/7.
Therefore, given the massive changes to the telecommunications
environment between their development and the present day the
applicability of them to todays telecommunications
environment must be questioned. Proposals have been made that the
ITRs should be revised but, given the long time scale for such a
process doubts were expressed that any revisions would be timely
enough to be of value. Nevertheless, once the nature of reform
has been agreed, the requirement for a revision should be
assessed jointly with Working Party 1/3. (Reflecting various
comments on this point).
2.2 Potential New Regimes
The following have been identified in contributions to Study
Group 3.
2.2.1 Termination charge.
Two approaches to termination charges emerged :
Approach (a) as advocated in Contributions #14 Hong
Kong Telecom International and #18 , St Vincent and Grenadines:
This would be one charge for all incoming traffic. The single
charge would include transmission and switching and be set
unilaterally by the destination at whatever level the destination
country decided appropriate. The level of charge would be
non-discriminatory and transparent. The rate would include any
subsidies (see section 2.3.4 below- source: Philip Allnutt) and
would be independent of routing i.e. the charge would be the same
whether the traffic had originated in the sending network or had
originated in a third country (Additional text to meet requests
for clarification).
Approach (b) As advocated in delayed contributions; #13
Mali, #15 Russia, #24 Korea, #35 Hong Kong Government:
An unbundled Termination Charge, which would be transparent,
cost based and broken down into the basic elements -
transmission, switching and national extension, using a
multilateraly agreed criteria for setting the levels. The
possibility of a fourth element, subsidy, was addressed in
contribution #4 from Brazil and D#23 from Australia. See section
2.3.4 below.
2.2.2 Settlement Rate
This would replace "revenue sharing" (i.e. a total
accounting rate divided into component shares) with a settlement
rate per minute (i.e. the level of payment to the destination )
which would be bilateraly agreed, cost orientated in accordance
with D 140 and could be unbundled into the basic elements -
transmission, switching and national extension. As cost
orientation is achieved, the present variation between the levels
of per minute receipts incoming to any ROA would be largely
removed. (Additional text to meet requests for clarification)
See contributions from; #9 France, # 17 UK, D#31 USA, D#23
Australia, D#24 Korea, D#35 Hong Kong Government.
2.2.3 Interconnection charge.
This regime would be most applicable in the liberalised to
liberalised scenario and would supplement other accounting
regimes.
In this regime the international ROA is provided with
interconnection at one or more points within the destination
ROAs national network. The destination ROA publishes a
charge for carrying the call from the point of interconnect to
the terminating point. Interconnection charges may be
regulated by the national regulatory authority. The charges will
be required to be cost based, transparent and non-discriminatory.
The charges will be set at the same level independent of call
origin, only varying according to the point of interconnection
The ROA originating the traffic would be responsible for all
switching and transmission costs up to the point of interconnect
.
(Source : Neil Feinson)
See contributions; #9 France, #17 UK, #10 Canada, #15 USA, #20
Group of Experts, D#23 Australia.
2.2.4 Leased Cost Routing and Hubbing
This is perhaps not an accounting regime but a result of the
market forces which are now a major factor in international
telecommunications. The ever growing number of new entrant
players in the telecommunications environment look to routings
and costs which best match their particular needs. Hubbing
attracts new players, which, for economic reasons, cannot open
direct relations with destination countries and must, to ensure
profitability, choose the least costly route. This in turn puts
pressure on incumbent operators to seek similar low cost options.
(Consensus was that this paragraph should be retained).
The Working Party noted that the TAS Group were developing
principles for the current practise and these may be suitable for
global adoption.
See contributions; #9 France, D#21 TNZI, D#32 New Zealand.
2.3 Related principles
A number of related principles were addressed in the
contributions to the May meeting :
2.3.1 Bilateral/ Multilateral requirement
There was emphasis in the majority of the contributions, and
during debate, that whatever solutions are adopted that they
should be based on bi or multilateral agreement and application.
The unilateral application of benchmarks whether for
outpayments or inpayments was not acceptable. (Source : Neil
Feinson)
There was however wide support for the possible development on
a multilateral basis of benchmarks/target rates/ minimum and
maximum ranges, and the establishment of related criteria.
See Contributions : # 4 Brazil, # 12 KDD, # 17 UK, # 19 Telia,
# 20 Group of Experts, D# 15 Russia, D# 24 Korea, D# 27 Japan, D#
32 New Zealand, D# 35 Hong Kong.
2.3.2 Transparency
There was general acceptance that the payment levels under any
new regime should be transparent (i.e. published), and the
component elements (i.e. transmission, switching and national
extension) making up the payment levels identified. In addition
the methodology used to establish the levels should be
identified.
In addition there was evidence of growing support that current
settlement rates should also be transparent.
See Contributions : # 4 Brazil, D# 13Mali, # 14 Hong Kong, #20
Group of experts, #15 USA, # 12 KDD, D# 32 New Zealand, and
interventions from Jamaica, Yemen and Bahrain.
2.3.3 Costing Methodology
A number of contributions addressed the question of costing
methodology. The ideal solution would be a full cost study.
However, it was accepted that the time scale for such a study
would be far too long to be of value to this exercise, in
addition the availability of data on a sufficiently global basis
was doubtful. For such a costing exercise it would be necessary
to identify a common base year, and given the time needed to
answer a questionnaire and process the replies, the results would
already be out of date before they were published.
Therefore, other possible methodologies have to be considered.
Existing models include the TAS D500 Supplement and D 140 Annex
A, for use on an individual basis. New proposals covered the use
of surrogate costs, best practice, and long run incremental
costs. See section 4.
See Contributions; # 17 UK, # 15 USA, # 19 Telia, D# 29 KDD.
2.3.4 Subsidy
A number of contributions and interventions addressed the
issue of subsidies.
Many delegations stressed the need for developing countries to
retain the high level of accounting rate as this generated the
financial resources necessary to fund the development of their
network and to help them meet their universal service obligation.
Several comparisons were made between the low level of telephone
penetration in developing countries when compared with developed
countries.
Whilst recognising this need for financial resources, the
counter argument was expressed that the accounting rate should be
the true incurred cost of terminating incoming traffic. Further,
to inflate accounting rates by such subsidies would only put
greater strain on the existing correspondent relationship since
new entrants would not be either prepared or able to pay these
high rates and would hence look to other methods of terminating
their traffic.
Comments were made that it is not acceptable to include these
subsidies within the accounting rate since this falsely inflates
the true cost of terminating a call. The point was also made that
accounting rate out payments should be considered as a
reimbursement of the costs of terminating incoming traffic and
not as a direct source of revenue.
There was clear support that if they do exist then there
should be total transparency of such subsidies: when a country
considers it is appropriate to build in an additional amount by
way of a subsidy - be it for network development, universal
service obligation, or other telecommunications requirements. -
then the amount should be clearly identified and bilateraly
agreed, including the time scale for phasing out the subsidy.
Contribution #4 from Brazil refers. (Additional text:
clarification requested by John Keselica, USA).
3 Discussion of Options and emerging principles
3.1 Termination Charges vs Settlement Charge
3.1.1 Basic principles which could apply to termination
charges are :
The termination charge would be paid to the ROA
terminating the call.
The origin and destination ROAs would share the cost of
international transmission, as now under D 150.
The termination charge would be independent of the origin
of the traffic. Exceptions could exist for frontier
relations.
The termination charge would be transparent and
non-discriminatory.
3.1.2 The arguments presented in favour of such a
system included:
It would provide a totally transparent and
non-discriminatory system.
It would be independent of traffic balances, a factor
which has made reductions in accounting rate levels difficult
to achieve.
By not involving the division of a total accounting rate
i.e. 50/50 or some other ratio, it would be better able to
focus on the cost of delivery, tariff balance and service
development.
Termination charges would eliminate the scope for
arbitrage.
Termination Charges would be set by carriers according to
their own needs, and would take full account of delivery
fees, cross subsidies, network development and other criteria
seen as important by sovereign governments.
3.1.3 A number of contributions and interventions did however argue
against the introduction of a system of termination charges
where these were unilaterally set by the destination at one
level. Those arguments included :
With termination charges applying to all incoming traffic
there would be no motivation, or mechanism, to set the
charges at, or lower the charge to, cost based levels. This
is a serious problem if there are no agreed target levels or
criteria. (Source: Linda Yu)
The self determination of the level of a termination
charge could be considered as little different to the
unilateral imposition of benchmarked out payment levels,
Termination Charges being unilaterally set inpayments.
Certain items proposed to be covered in the charge were
considered not to be appropriate such as subsidies to cover
universal service obligations and network development costs ,
and other costs not strictly relevant to the provision of the
existing service. (Source Neil Feinson)
With a single charge, the impact of any reduction, which
would apply to all incoming traffic, would be so large as to
mitigate against making a reduction.
A single, non discriminatory rate would offer no incentive
for better network management, quality improvements or
capacity augmentation.
Transmission costs do vary by route therefore a single
rate could not be truly cost based.
3.2 Comparing Termination Charges and Settlement Charge :
Settlement rate could be described as a bilateraly agreed
termination charge.
Neither would necessarily be the same for each incoming
minute but if cost orientation achieved the difference should
be small.
The level does not have to be the same for each incoming
minute to remove the scope for arbitrage, just in a small
range reflecting cost differences.
Cost based termination charges/settlement rates are in
accordance with D 140.
Unbundled and transparent settlement rates appear to be
the same as unbundled termination charges.
Transition to either appears to call for some form of
multilateral guidelines addressing cost orientation of
levels.
The settlement rate would be unidirectional and therefore
there would be no division of a through accounting rate.
3.3 Bundled vs Unbundled Termination Charges
An advantage of unbundled charges is that the separation of
the international transmission, international switching and
national extension elements helps operators to identify their
costs more accurately. To impose the same bundled Termination
Charge for all sources of traffic would be inconsistent with the
principle of cost orientated charging in that international
transmission costs vary. Nevertheless, bundled charges may be
acceptable as the first step. (Source: Philip Allnut.) In fact,
if the charges are cost orientated, the issue of bundling or
unbundling is less of an issue. (Source: comments by Deoraj
Ramnarine, TSTT)
3.4 Conclusion
From the above, it could be concluded that bilateraly
agreed, cost orientated, transparent, [unbundled] settlement
rates would be an acceptable form of termination charges and a
natural evolution of the present accounting rate regime through
the application of D 140.
If this could be accepted, this leaves the key
issues of :
- methodology for achieving cost orientation,
- time scale and provisions for the transition.
One point which would have to be addressed in any cost
orientated regime is whether there should be different rates for
specific categories of traffic with higher delivery costs than
normal IDD e.g. traffic terminating on mobile terminals where
there are additional delivery interconnection costs. Delayed
contribution D 12 from Telecom Finland addressed this point.
4 Methodology
Existing methodologies are addressed in Recommendation D 140
Annexes A and C and in the TAS Recommendations. New proposals
were made in contributions D# 31 USA, #17 UK and D# 29 KDD.
Whilst unilateral benchmarking was not accepted there was
considerable support for studies to look at possible
global/regional benchmarks; target rates; ranges. For these
studies to be undertaken it will be necessary to obtain the base
data via a questionnaire.
Additional information in relation to examining methodologies,
and the impact of applying them, would come from case studies as
proposed by France in # 9. The ITU Council at its June
meeting agreed that a number of case studies should be undertaken
as preparation for the second world telecommunications policy
forum. These case studies will be jointly managed by ITU-T Study
Group 3 and ITU-D . The proposed format of these studies and call
for expression of interest in preparation of these studies can be
found on the ITU Home Page :
http/www.itu.int/intset/call_for/callmain.htm.
5 Transition Issues
The requirement for a transition from current rates to cost
orientated rates was raised in a number of contributions - # 4
Brazil, # 10 Canada, # 20 Group of Experts, D#25 USA, D# 27
Japan, D# 28 KDD, D23 Australia
Two particular points were raised. Firstly the need to provide
assistance in the form of expert training. Secondly was the need
to provide transitional support for developing countries. One
possibility was some form of partnership with external sources
e.g. the World Bank, may be prepared to co-operate in developing
systems which would protect developing countries from the sudden
financial impact of dropping to cost orientated accounting rates.
Developing countries may require time to adapt to changes in
view of the negative impact on settlement revenues which may
arise from accounting rate reform. A negotiated process should be
the way, not unilateral action ( Deoraj Ramnarine)
However, again, it is essential to have data on which to asses
the scale of impact of moving to cost orientated rates and hence
the size of the problem faced by individual developing countries.
The case studies referred to above will give some idea.
6 Data Gathering
Many contributions and interventions stressed the need to
obtain more data on the application of the existing D.150 regime,
together with the rate of progress with implementation of D 140.
At present the only information on levels of present accounting
rates was that published by a few countries, and the limited
information obtained via the TSB Questionnaire. There has been a
clear consensus that any new regime should be transparent and
non-discriminatory. Many interventions expressed the view that
for such a regime to be agreed and implemented, there would first
have to be greater transparency of the existing regime. In order
for targets or benchmarks to be established on a multilateral
basis and for transition arrangements and timescales to be
defined, there has to be a willingness on the part of ROAs to
provide data on current settlement rates. A minimum initial
requirement could be for each ROA to provide its highest, lowest
and mean per minute telephone receipt to enable an initial
analysis and first proposals by SG3. A draft model for data
gathering is attached at annex 1.
(Source: Based on comment from Vivienne Lucas).
7. Tasks and Timetable.
December 1997 White contribution from Rapporteur Group
debated;
Definitions agreed; Tasks and Timetable agreed including
data gathering requirements
May 1998 Draft recommendation(s) considered; data analysis
commenced; case study results addressed
December 1998 Draft recommendation and guidelines agreed for
transitional period
xxxx 1999 Recommendation adopted; implementation commenced.
1999- 2003 Implementation.
(Source: various)
THE NEXT STEP
For the development of the above document, members of the
rapporteurs group are invited to input to this document with the
objective of developing a set of recommendations to the December
meeting.
In addition, the group should :
Agree the tasks and timetable - section 7 refers.
Agree on a definition of a termination charge regime -
section 3 refers.
Consider the available and proposed methodologies for
achieving cost orientated rates with the aim of agreeing the
way forward - more contributions required.
Establish a questionnaire which would seek data to enable
the necessary studies to be undertaken - see draft attached.
They key to rapid reform will be the derivation of what any
termination charges, settlement rates, or interconnection charges
might be. It may be possible for a number of administrations/ROAs
to agree collectively to adopt a system between them which goes
some way towards reform in advance of seeing the results of
lengthy modelling. While national sovereignty needs to be
preserved, guidelines could be quickly developed which could be
incorporated into these agreements. These might include, average
inpayment or lowest inpayment.
Annex : 1
Annex 1
PROPOSED MODEL FOR DATA
GATHERING BY SG3
TO PROGRESS ACCOUNTING RATE REFORM
Country:.................................
ROA........................... .... Contact
Details....................................(name, position, tel,
fax,e-mail)
Data as at 1 January 1998
Number of IDD routes:................of which
.......are direct,...... are indirect
(please tick where applicable)
1. Information about your current settlement
rates*
- to the ITU Secretariat in confidence?
- to the ITU for inclusion in the www. pages?
- to ROAs who agree to provide the same?
- with origin disclosed/anonymously?
2. In one or more of the following forms:
a) actual settlement rate* route by route
(direct routes shown separately from indirect routes)
b) highest settlement rate*
- on direct routes
- on indirect routes
lowest settlement rate* - on direct routes
- on indirect routes
weighted average settlement rate*
- on direct routes
- on indirect routes
- all routes
(if full and reduced rates exist, supply both)
c) Actual settlement rate* for top 20 routes
and weighted average settlement rate all routes (if full and
reduced rates exist, supply both)
Percentage of traffic represented by top 20
routes
- incoming
- outgoing
(for latest 12 months available - specify), and
according to direction of account)
d) weighted average settlement rate incoming
- direct routes
- indirect routes
- all routes
weighted average settlement rate outgoing
- direct routes
- indirect routes
- all routes
* defined as the amount RECEIVED per minute of traffic ie
destination share.
Notes: all rates to be shown in SDRs. To
convert gold francs to SDRs use 3.061 gfcs = 1 SDR, to convert $
into gold francs use the 1/12/97 rate of ......
Annex 2
Source : Chairman Working Party 2/3
Subject : ACCOUNTING RATE REFORM - ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
Given the range of views which have been expressed in relation
to accounting rate reform it is clear that if real progress is to
be made at the December meeting of Working Party 2/3 then it will
be necessary for all sides to agree on various compromise
positions. Failure to reach compromise, and recognising the time
scales for developing and agreeing a Recommendation, it will not
be possible to adopt a Recommendation before the end of 1999.
The key areas the issues which need to be addressed are listed
below. A number of them can be considered whilst considering the
working definitions of Termination Charge and Settlement Rate:
1. Working definition of TERMINATION CHARGE:
This is a charge, i.e. price per minute of traffic, for the
termination of traffic. The price covers three components :
a) The international circuit section (half circuit) provided
by the destination administration.
b) The use of the international exchange ( gateway switch).
c) The national extension ( switches and transmission
facilities up to and including the local loop ).
The issues which need to be addressed are :
1.1 Are the three components combined into one single charge,
"bundled" or charged individually,
"unbundled"? A further alternative is where the
national extension and international exchange are aggregated into
a single charge, with the international circuit section charged
separately.
1.2 Is the charge set unilaterally by the destination, using
its own criteria or, by using multilateraly agreed criteria?
1.3 Is the level of the charge the same in all relations i.e.
independent of the call origin or does it vary with differences
in cost? In particular, does the international circuit element
vary in relation to distance, medium i.e. satellite or cable?
1.4 Is the level of charge independent of call routing i.e.
the same whether the call had originated in the country from
which the call is received or whether originated in a third
country?
1.5 Taking account of the principles listed in 1.3 of the
Rapporteur group report to Working Part 2, a definition of a
termination charge could therefore be :
A charge established by the destination using multilateraly
agreed criteria, to ensure cost orientation, applied on a
non-discriminatory basis and fully transparent.
The charge may be unbundled. The charge covering the
international exchange could be bundled with the charge for the
national extension to form a single charge applied in all
relations, given that neither component would vary with call
origin.
The charge for the international circuit could vary
dependant on call origin, to take account of the differences in
transmission costs.
2. SETTLEMENT RATE (CHARGE)
The settlement rate could be defined as for the termination
charge above except that the rate would be bilateraly negotiated.
3. INTERNATIONAL INTERCONNECTION
In this regime, the origin international operator is provided
with interconnection at one or more points within the destination
operators network. The costs involved in accessing the
interconnection point, or point of presence, are covered by the
originating operator. International Interconnect is only an
option where it is in accordance with the regulatory regimes
applying both in the origin and destination countries.
A cost-based charge is set for the termination of traffic from
the point of interconnect to the terminal point. This charge will
vary depending on the point of interconnect in the destination
network. The charge is independent of the call origin. The charge
may be set by individual operators or by the appropriate national
body, in accordance with an agreed costing methodology.
Interconnection charges are transparent and non-discriminatory.
4. Transparency and non-discriminatory are key to any new
accounting regime, possible definitions could be:
4.1 TRANSPARENCY
In the context of international accounting, transparency is
taken to be the availability of, or access to, an ROAs
termination charges or settlement rates for all its international
relations. The methodology applied in developing these
"charges" should also be available but the actual
underlying cost details do not have to be disclosed.
4.2 NON-DISCRIMINATORY
Carriers shall apply similar conditions in similar
circumstances to carriers in other countries providing similar
services. e.g.The same price is charged independent of
call orientation or routing, unless variation in costs justify a
different price.
5. SETTING MULTILATERAL CRITERIA AND BENCHMARKS
Is there agreement that a "best practice"approach is
the most practical solution? How would best practice be defined?
6. WTO
To what extent does the WTO activities have to be reflected in
any new or revised Recommendation?
7. SUBSIDIES
How should the issue of "subsidies" be handled? How
should they be defined?
8. ITRs
Revision of the International Telecommunications Regulations,
the need to revise the ITRs is a topic for Working Party 1 taking
account of the work of Working Party 2.
9. TRANSITION REQUIREMENTS
Recognising the need for transitional support for developing
countries, what form should this take, and over what time scale?
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