Q&A: Making Space in Space

Making space in space: proposals for a more efficient use of the available frequency spectrum

For some time now, the demand for spectrum/orbit usage has been increasing dramatically, practically for all space communication services and in particular for fixed-satellite, broadcasting-satellite and mobile-satellite (whether geostationary or non-geostationary) services. In some regions, in the most popular satellite frequency bands, it is becoming increasingly difficult to coordinate satellite networks. Coordination negotiations are becoming long and difficult, and in some cases, satellites are being brought into use or re-positioned without proper coordination.

There are regions with rapidly developing telecommunication sectors where real conflicting situations are emerging due to the limited capacity of the spectrum/orbit resource and the increasing demand. Also, the number of filings as well as their complexity have been increasing due to the technological, operational and regulatory developments and the increased recognition (by the public and private sectors) of the economic value of the spectrum/orbit resources.

This has often led to a practice of overfiling or to the non observance of the Radio Regulations as well as an inefficient use of the spectrum. By the end of 1996, close to 2 200 space networks were in one of the phases of the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau transaction processing (either recorded in the MIFR, included in the coordination or the advance publication files, at various steps in the Plan modification procedures, etc.). The corresponding data volume is thus growing more quickly than the growth in the number of networks

The ITU Plenipotentiary Conference (Kyoto, 1994) therefore adopted a resolution requesting the Radiocommunication Bureau of the ITU to initiate review of the ITU's frequency coordination and planning framework for satellite networks. The final report is now submitted to WRC 97 for its consideration and adoption of measures aimed at easing the problems currently experienced in coordinating and planning satellite networks.

The main issues which are discussed in this document can essentially be grouped under three main headings.

In conformity with Resolution 18 of the Kyoto Plenipotentiary Conference (1994), several groups met to review the way international satellite networks are planned and coordinated. An initial document was prepared by the Radiocommunication Bureau of the ITU (BR) which, along contributions by administrations, served as a basis of the discussion of a Working Group of the Radiocommunication Advisory Group (RAG) to identify the possible issues to be included in the review. The list of issues identified by RAG was then used in the studies organized within the framework of the Resolution. The following groups took part in the review process: the Special Committee on Regulatory/Procedural Matters, ITU-R Study Groups, the Radiocommunication Advisory Group (RAG), the Radio Regulations Board (RRB) and the Radiocommunication Bureau. The report of the Director of BR consolidates all the input from the various groups. The present document is a summary of the main issues raised in this report which puts forward 17 Recommendations to facilitate the planning and coordination of international satellite networks. While this does not preclude administrations to submit, in their own name, proposals in relation to the issues raised, it does represent a cross-section of views.

In applying the coordination procedure in the most used bands, administrations find that the orbit seems to be congested. This is experienced through growing difficulties in coordination negotiations, causing serious problems in the management and allocation of the spectrum/orbit resources. However, as far as the theoretical capacity of the orbit and the spectrum is concerned, calculations indicate that the GSO has an overall capacity to support a higher number of transponders than are currently in orbit and that efficient use of the orbit and spectrum could be improved with the timely application of uniform orbit management principles.

The spectrum covered by the different space Plans is sometimes qualified by some as "unused" and thus it is claimed that the spectrum is inefficiently used. But it has to be recognized that ITU Member States found the answer to the difficult challenge of equitable access by the planning approach which consists of setting aside spectrum for future use by those who are at present not yet in a position to use the spectrum and orbit resources.

The capacity of the orbit is there but a more efficient use of the orbit/spectrum resource is badly needed to accommodate the growing number of demands made.

The inefficient use of the spectrum which leads to a shortage of the supply in relation to demand of orbit/spectrum resource is compounded by too long a time-frame required in the regular coordination process when such coordination involves rapid or temporary modifications.

Lack of adequate resources in the administrations to deal with the growing number of filings may also be one of the reasons of non-timely answers to requests for coordination which adversely influence the timely completion of the coordination process.

Also, the end of public service monopolies, the trends towards liberalization and globalization of the telecommunication markets, all influence the relation between parties that are competing. But the current regulatory framework is still based on goodwill and mutual cooperation.

As a result, there are growing cases of satellites launched before the coordination process is properly concluded, or even initiated. Also, a number of satellites have been re-positioned without re-coordination.

While present regulations cover this problem, no sanctions are presently envisaged and actual interference problems can be very difficult to solve through bilateral negotiations between administrations when faced with a "fait accompli".

Overfiling is often referred to as "paper-satellites" because capacity (orbital position with associated frequencies) is reserved without actual use. When assessing the orbit capacity and coordination difficulties, one of the major problems is the existence of systems under coordination which do not represent real communication requirements.

It is now a well acknowledged fact that some administrations tend to initiate the coordination procedure for more orbital positions and/or more spectrum than needed, expecting that some of these positions will not survive by the end of the coordination process. These "overfilings" can also be attributed to orbit "slot reservations" for potential future applications and, in some cases, for slots to be used for commercial arrangements or for later distribution in the domestic or international market under re-sale, leasing or other arrangements to the highest bidder.

With the still increasing tendency towards overfiling or overprotection of networks by notifying broader characteristics, and the resulting multiplication of the networks with which coordination is required, the administrative and technical burden for the administrations involved in more and increasingly complex coordination negotiations is growing considerably.

Thus, the reliable assessment of the level of actual congestion of the spectrum/orbit becomes more and more difficult. There is a growing challenge for administrations to determine which of the "filed" networks will be actually put into operation and which of them are "paper-satellites" with which administrations may feel that it is not worth coordinating.

In the present environment of growing competition, this can lead to an interest in "staking claims" to orbit and spectrum resources. There is a growing awareness of the economic value of these resources while their reservation (by making submissions in the coordination – plan modification procedures) is currently free of charge. In addition, there is no penalty or risk incurred, only benefits, by making "overfilings". Hence the tendency of overfiling.

To discourage the reservation of capacity without actual use (paper satellites), it is proposed to develop an approach whereby each administration would be required to provide specific evidence demonstrating its serious intent to establish a satellite system to which the regulatory procedures are being applied. This approach is also coined "due diligence". Two different types of due diligence are put forward:

As far as the transfer of orbit/spectrum resources is concerned (slot reservation for future use by third parties through resale, leasing or other arrangements), the lack of a careful definition of the precise scope of the problem and the need not to restrict commercial flexibility, led to the decision not to put forward any recommendation.

Administrative due diligence consists in regular disclosure of implementation data. Some take the view that this information should be made mandatory and be submitted to the ITU; others were of the opinion that this information should be submitted by the operator only to its notifying administration. Administrations would only need to advise the ITU in cases where the information is incomplete.

The consequence of not applying the due diligence procedures would be that the satellite network in question would lose its rights obtained by commencing the coordination or notification procedure and would no longer be taken into account when applying the coordination and recording procedures by other networks. Another consequence would be the loss of right to obtain an extension of the regulatory period between the submission of the Advance Publication and the date of bringing into use would not be applicable.

The information would include the name of the spacecraft manufacturer, the name of the satellite operator, the contractual date of delivery and the number of satellites procured, the name of the launch vehicle provider, the name of the customer and the contractual launch date.

The due diligence approach should apply to any satellite network being coordinated as well as to any satellite network already notified and recorded in the MIFR but not yet brought into use.

Although there is general agreement on administrative due diligence, there are differing views concerning what services, what frequency bands and what orbits (GSO or non-GSO) the principle of due diligence should apply.

The rationale for a filing fee is that the user of the services who benefits should pay for the costs incurred. This fee might be either a fixed amount for each submission or proportional to the amount of the submitted data (e.g. proportional to the number of assignments involved, the number of earth stations in the space network, or the number of pages of the notice form, etc. or some other proxy of the workload in treating the submission). The ITU Council, the annual governing body of the Union, decided to adopt the principle of full recovery of processing costs for certain tasks relating to satellite notification processing (production of Special Sections of the Weekly Circular for space radiocommunication services concerning advance publications, requests for coordination or agreement and requests for modification of the BSS and FSS space service Plans)

As far as the registration fee aspect is concerned, two variations have been proposed to date: i) a registration fee combined with a refundable deposit, whereby an annual registration fee would be payable after the deposit is returned, and would be required to be paid as long as the network is recorded in the MIFR; and ii) if the deposit approach is not utilized, an annual registration fee which would be payable at the start of coordination and for as long as the network is in coordination or recorded in the MIFR.

A financial deposit system has also been proposed as a means to discourage paper satellite networks commencing coordination by imposing a deposit returnable only if and when the satellite in question is actually launched. It has been suggested that: i) a properly designed and calculated deposit system would discourage the filing of excess and/or speculative filings; ii) administrations would not submit requests for coordination until the availability of the deposit funds from the proposed system operator is assured; and iii) because of this financial commitment, the operating entity would more carefully scrutinize the proposed filings. It has also been suggested that the amount of the deposit could be calculated at a level sufficient to discourage paper satellites, but not so high as to deter genuine proposed systems.

There was however no consensus on the financial due diligence concept. It is therefore proposed to ascertain the effectiveness of the administrative due diligence, if adopted by the Conference, and to consider the introduction of financial due diligence in 1999 should the administrative due diligence alone not produce satisfactory results.

The total regulatory time-frame between the starting point of the application of the procedures and the bringing into operation of the satellite is currently 9 years. This period is composed of a 6-year period plus, upon request, a 3 year extension. This period is generally felt to be too long given present technological developments and current time-frames for construction and launch of satellite networks. While it is recognized that reducing this period will not necessarily eliminate paper satellites, a shorter period may persuade system proponents to be more realistic. In addition, it was felt that the extension of the time period should be allowed only under specific circumstances.

It is proposed that the initial period between the advance publication and the date of bringing into use should be reduced by one year, from six to five, and the present extension period should similarly be reduced by one year, from three to two, resulting in a total period of not more than seven years.

In addition, the extension should be limited to specific reasons and decided upon within a well defined procedure. Examples of reasons for being granted the extension would be launch failure, launch delays, delays caused by design problems in the satellite or by modifications intended to reach agreement during coordination, other specific narrow circumstances to be defined and "force majeure". Rules of procedures would be developed by the Radio Regulations Board on which to base the decision to grant or not the extension in a transparent manner.

The advance publication phase is currently a mandatory part of the procedure, defining two important milestones in the procedure. The submission of the Advance Publication information under Articles 11/13 starts the regulatory "clock". There was agreement to keep the present regulatory role of the advance publication but to simplify its contents in terms of the information published under that procedure. Complete consensus on these points was, nevertheless, not achieved: while several administrations felt that it was insufficient to only simplify the contents of the information published under that procedure and would prefer to keep both the advance publication and the coordination phases, some others would favour merging them into one combined procedure.

It is therefore recommended that the advance publication stage be retained but simplified and streamlined, and its regulatory status ("starting the clock") preserved. In addition, the Advance publication should be followed by coordination information within 24 months of the date of receipt of the Advance publication information. Failure to do so would result in the deletion of the Advance publication. It is also recommended to further consider the possible merger of the advance publication and coordination phases into one combined procedure.

Several measures have been identified to streamline the coordination stage mainly with a view to reducing the number of coordinations required. Coordinations refer to the number of administrations which are affected by the proposed system (or modification to a system). Among them is the redefinition of the trigger for coordination and the reduction of the amount of information to be processed by the Radiocommunication Bureau.

The concept of an arc within which coordination would be necessary for the FSS in the congested bands has been proposed. Under this concept, a proposed new GSO satellite network would need to coordinate only with those networks within a pre-determined arc of its proposed position. This approach would provide a greater incentive to have more orbit efficient GSO satellite characteristics.

Studies are under way in the ITU-R sector to determine the size of the arc so as not to exclude satellites outside the arc that could suffer or cause interference, particularly in an non-homogeneous environment.

Studies are also also underway to determine any possible self-regulatory effects of the implementation of this concept.

This subject is a sensitive one as there are differences of opinion on how best to guarantee, in practice, the principle of equitable access to the orbit/spectrum resources. The objective is to preserve the capacity of nations, particularly small or developing, to access the orbit/spectrum resource when the need will arise while keeping the flexibility needed to allow the maximum use of the same resource by countries having high requirements now.

The method adopted to date by the ITU is a priori planning. In such plans, most administrations have guaranteed access to specified orbit positions or orbital arcs for national coverage. This access, however, does not necessarily lead to economical multiservice satellites. For smaller countries especially, it may not be economically viable to consider systems for only national coverage. Often for such countries, regional systems are the most practical way of accessing the spectrum and orbit resources. Forthcoming planning Conferences should take account of new advanced technologies, technically more flexible plans, changes in the markets for various types of satellite services and facilitated use by groups of nations.

It is proposed to maintain the principle of guaranteed equitable access for all. At the same time, the burden should be shared. The use of "a priori" planning should be critically examined in each case, balancing carefully the pros and cons.

Space technology is changing very quickly and will probably continue to change. The use of advanced technologies in the design, manufacture and implementation of space systems, in both the planned and the non-planned frequency bands, improves the efficient use of the orbit and frequency spectrum and facilitates sharing. While system operators make use of such advanced technologies whenever these technologies result in improvements in the satellite’s "productivity", the existing infrastructure of space networks and the incomplete amortization of earlier investments are elements which may hinder timely implementation of advanced technologies.

To improve the efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resources, it is recommended to use the latest technologies for space and earth stations and revise the sharing criteria between satellite systems to allow the re -use of the same frequency bands and orbital positions by a greater number of satellites.

While provisions already exist in the Radio Regulations for general review by the Radiocommunication Bureau of the actual use of recorded assignments, appropriate measures could be envisaged to give it the means to enforce current regulations. Experience however shows that the use of monitoring results in any part of the procedures or technical examinations often gives rise to controversy.

It is therefore proposed that the ITU, without performing the monitoring itself, use the international monitoring system for space applications. It would be used to identify those records in the database that do not represent the real situation and to improve the data reliability. Administrations would indicate those stations that can participate in the monitoring system. Discrepancies between the Bureau databases and monitored data would be clarified by the Radiocommunication Bureau with the assistance of the administration(s) involved. Continuing discrepancies would be reported to competent ITU bodies (Radio Regulations Board, WRC, etc.)

Under the current procedures, administrations can submit multiple submissions (filings) for, say, 10 orbital positions although they may intend to launch, for example, only one satellite. This creates an excessive burden both on administrations and on the Bureau and adds to the complexity of coordination. In some cases, it makes it impossible to complete the coordination process. It also "blocks" orbit/spectrum resources for the duration of the coordination process which extends from between 6 to 9 years.

In order to present a more realistic picture of actual intentions, a proposal has been made according to which administrations would be required to submit a single filing with specific alternative positions (perhaps in order of preference) for each satellite, to relinquish all but 2 or 3 alternative positions for each satellite, say, two years prior to launch and to relinquish, upon launch, the orbital positions not selected for actual use. This approach would probably better relate the filed orbital positions with the number of orbital positions actually required, and free up the number of "excess" orbital positions before the 6 (or 9 years) period is over.

However, a number of other administrations had concerns with this approach, in that it might lead to administrations always filing for multiple positions where they normally would have only filed for one position. These administrations were also of the view that the due diligence procedures alone would be a better way of dealing with this situation. Given the lack of unanimity, no specific recommendations have been tabled in this respect to WRC 97.

Conflicting views have been expressed on the Direct-to-Home use of Fixed Satellite Service bands for television/sound "broadcasting" purposes. Some advocate that such use should be completely avoided or at least be subjected to the prior agreement of countries which would be receiving the signals of the satellite as provided for in provision N° 2674 of the Radio Regulations.

Others argue that most of the "broadcasting" by satellite today is done using the FSS bands with the BSS planned bands largely unused. One major reason for this would appear to be that the economical viability of a broadcasting service increases with the size of the service area and the bandwidth available, which is more difficult to achieve through the BSS Plans modification procedures.

At the time when the BSS and FSS services were first defined as separate services, there were considerable differences in the technical and operational standards for the two services. Today, such difference has mostly disappeared and the question of whether two separate allocations should continue to be made to two separate services was raised.

It is however proposed to maintain the distinction between the two services. While from a technical viewpoint, the BSS and FSS are often difficult to be distinguished, administrations generally have different regulatory provisions for these services. But, it is emphasized that in no case should Direct-to-Home (DTH) in the FSS bands be used with the objective of bypassing the regulatory provisions relating to prior agreement.

While, in general, the Bureau's functions should be kept to the minimum necessary in bilateral coordinations, this may possibly conflict with the other objective which has been gradually reinforced by recent Conferences, to better assist administrations in the practical resolution of intersystem coordination disagreements. Some consider that the current "Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes relating to the Constitution and the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union and to the Administrative Regulations" was sufficient and that no other formal and binding dispute settlement procedures were required.

Others are of the opinion that arbitration is a practice that exists in many other international and inter-governmental institutions, and that its potential applicability at the ITU should be considered.

Today’s ITU’s regulatory procedures are based on the long-standing practice of cooperation and the practical resolution of problems that may arise between administrations. But in a global competitive environment, this practice is increasingly challenged.

The issue of dispute settlement may concern two different types of procedures: conciliation and arbitration.

It is proposed to consider to empower the ITU to settle disputes arising from unsuccessful satellite coordination exercises and to introduce in the Constitution, Convention and the Radio Regulations appropriate provisions to be observed.

It is proposed that necessary action on the recommendations contained in the report be taken by WRC 97 with the aim of improving the regulatory procedures as rapidly as possible, taking into account any required transitional arrangements. It is also considered essential that the recommended changes be effective as soon as possible, that is, as from the date of their adoption by WRC 97.

Recommendations A (administrative "due diligence"), C (regulatory life-time), D (simplified advance publication), P (implementation), Q (transitional issues/date of entry into force) and to a certain extent F (monitoring) may be implemented either with immediate effect (through a Resolution) or with a specific date of entry into force to be decided by the Conference taking into account any transitional arrangements that may be required.

As far as the processing cost recovery fee is concerned, the ITU Council has decided to take specific measures at its 1998 session for implementation of this measure, initially with limited scope. The two other aspects of the financial "due diligence" approach (i.e. the registration fee and deposit system covered in Recommendation B) are proposed by most parties in the review for consideration when sufficient experience is gained on the effects of the other Recommendations and in particular Recommendation A (i.e., at the earliest in 1999).

Other Recommendations are either of a general nature not needing any specific implementation date (Recommendations G, H, M, N) or require further studies by the Member States and ITU-R Sector Members (Recommendations E, I, J, K, L, O and partially F). Their possible further implementation depends on the results of these studies.

Administrative due diligence	A
Financial due diligence	B
Regulatory time-frame	C
Simplification of the Advance Publication	D
Operational lifetime (acquired rights)	E
Space monitoring	F
Equitable access	G
Direct-to-Home use of FSS	H
Use of advance technologies	I
New coordination method/concept	J, K, L
Status quo in the statutory role of the different players	M
Increased role of systems operators in the coordination process	N
ITU’s role in dispute settlement	O
Need for an early implementation of the decisions taken by WRC 97 in respect of the 17 recommendations made in response to Resolution 18	P
Application of due diligence to networks already being processed t hat would be eligible to the reduced regulatory time-limit as proposed under recommendation C	Q