

**ITU Kaleidoscope 2016**  
*ICTs for a Sustainable World*

# **UNIVERSAL SERVICE, QUALITY CAPS AND NET NEUTRALITY**

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**Bangkok, Thailand**  
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# Outline

- **Motivation**
- **The proposal strategy**
  - Main question
  - Proposal : Universal Service Internet
  - The model
- **Results**
  - Regulatory considerations
- **Conclusion**



# SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

17 GOALS TO TRANSFORM OUR WORLD

## REGULATORS


Bandwidth delimitation



## UNIVERSAL SERVICE



CPs




ISPs

Players participation




17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS



# Proposal strategy

## Main Question

Which strategy should we adopt to include the concept of quality in terms of bandwidth as part of the Universal Service policy?



**Rent shifting between ISPs and CP**  
Based on: Greenstein et al. (2016)

# Proposal strategy

## Main Question


Which strategy should we adopt to include the concept of quality in terms of bandwidth as part of the Universal Service policy?

## Proposal

- Regulator proposes to ISP a Universal Service Internet;
- A limited (bandwidth) Internet service;
- Subscription price is financed by subventions or by a very small price;
- Due to the low stream bandwidth of this network, high bandwidth demand CPs have the option to be viewed via the payment of a termination fee (t) for access to the fast lane network bitstream.



# Universal Service Internet proposal



# The model

## Model Approach

Industrial organization model of strategic interaction of CPs and ISPs under a zero price rate condition.

## Scenarios studied

- Monopoly ISP
- Duopoly ISP
  - Symmetric ISP behavior
  - Universal service Internet in an exclusivity ISP
- Possible effects on the implementation of subscription contracts.
- In other version of this paper: established a scenario with a income disparity within the population.

# Results

## Regulatory considerations

- Limited Internet service price has to be calculated and fixed by regulations, taking into account:
  - Technical components of the service, not the possible loss of benefits or opportunity costs for ISP,
  - Renegotiation in Internet regulated price has to be determined always equal or inferior to net cost of provide the service.
- Network neutrality policy has to be imposed to ISP in terms of termination fee (t) over the different CPs.
  - Contract renegotiations will be granted between ISP termination fee and CP to recalibrate market equilibrium.



# Results

## Regulatory considerations

- Universal service Internet in duopoly competition has a positive impact on end users' welfare:
  - Universal Internet Service could be proposed as an open regulated policy with defined specifications for any ISPs.
  - The long-run marginal cost define the price of termination fee, in a perfect competition scenario  $t \approx 0$ .
  - If this policy is to be proposed by the regulation authority, it has to be considered in a competition market structure.

# Conclusions

- There is a positive effect to propose a Universal Service Internet in terms of access due to the reduction of subscription price.
- The expansion of this policy provides benefits in terms of participation of indirect financing of universal service.
- Defining a limited Internet service as a policy to increase Internet penetration, the benefits merit less concern about the competitive effects, specially in regions where a large income difference between their population is present.

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**Thank you for your attention!!**

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