RESOLUTION 9: Participation of countries, particularly developing countries, in spectrum management
Table of Contents
Executive summary
0 Acknowledgements
0.1 ITU collaborators
0.2 Contributors
0.3 Regional coordinators
0.4 Reminder of terms of reference of Resolution 9
0.5 Approach and structure of this document
Part I: Market mechanisms
1 Introduction
1.1 An evolving context
1.2 Increasing recourse to market mechanisms
2 Main definitions used
2.1 Lotteries
2.2 Comparative evaluation methods
2.3 Auctions
2.4 Secondary spectrum trading
3 Institutional, legal and economic challenges
3.1 Taking account of the institutional context
3.2 Definition of utilization rights and property rights
3.3 Economic valuation of the spectrum
4 Guidelines for organizing spectrum auctions
4.1 Applicability of auctions: advantages and disadvantages
4.2 The different types of auction
4.2.1 Open auction (public bids)/Closed auction (sealed bids)
4.2.2 Single-round/multiple-round auction
4.2.3 Single-object/multi-object auction
4.2.4 Sequential/simultaneous open auction
4.2.5 English (ascending) auction
4.2.6 Dutch (descending) auction
4.2.7 Single-round/ sealed bid/ first price auction
4.2.8 Single-round/ sealed bid/ second price auction
4.2.9 Simultaneous/ multiple-round/ ascending auction
4.2.10 Clock auction
4.3 Pre-auction requirements
4.4 The auction design
4.4.1 Qualification criteria
4.4.2 Price determinants
4.5 The risks: strategic tricks
4.6 Key success factors
4.7 Alternatives to auctions
4.8 The lessons of international comparisons
4.8.1 Limiting uncertainty
4.8.2 Simplifying the auction design
4.8.3 Careful regulatory preparation
4.8.4 Introduce conditions for fair, non-discriminatory competition
5 Guidelines for the establishment of secondary spectrum trading
5.1 Operating principles
5.2 Applicability of secondary spectrum trading: advantages and disadvantages
5.3 Some cases of secondary spectrum trading
5.3.1 Case of France
5.3.2 Case of Australia
5.4 The lessons of international comparisons
6 Synopsis of market mechanisms
6.1 Characteristics of market mechanisms
7 Recommendations
7.1 Main feedback on experiences
7.1.1 Lotteries
7.1.2 Auctions
7.1.3 Secondary spectrum trading
8 Conclusions
9 References
Part II: Frequency allocation and spectrum refarming
1 Introduction
2 Importance of allocation tables
3 Challenges of spectrum refarming
4 Guidelines for establishing frequency allocation tables
4.1 Principles of the frequency allocation table
4.1.1 Radio Regulations allocation table
4.1.2 National frequency allocation table
4.2 Examples of frequency allocation tables
4.2.1 Case of Bangladesh
4.2.2 Case of Canada
4.2.3 Case of Senegal
4.2.4 Case of France
4.2.5 Case of Hungary
4.3 Regional harmonization
4.3.1 Importance of regional harmonization
4.3.2 Role of regional organizations
4.4 Recommendations
5 Guidelines for spectrum refarming
5.1 Principles of spectrum refarming
5.1.1 Stages of refarming
5.1.2 Prospective studies of frequency values in the event of refarming
5.1.3 Establishment of fund to finance refarming
5.2 Cases
5.2.1 Case of France
5.2.2 Case of Japan
6 Recommendations
7 Conclusions
8 References
Part III: Cost accounting in radiocommunications
1 Introduction
2 Challenges in the utilization of cost accounting for radiocommunications
3 Guidelines for the introduction of cost accounting for radiocommunications
3.1 Definitions of cost accounting
3.2 Implementation methods
3.3 Example: France
4 Recommendations
5 Conclusions
6 References
Part IV: Methods of calculating spectrum fees
1 Introduction
2 Reminder of principles updated by the work under Resolution 9
3 Changes in fee calculation methods
3.1 Taking account of new networks and new technologies
3.2 Migration to new-generation networks (NGNs)
4 Recommendations
5 Conclusions
6 References
Annexes
Annex 1: OCDE Appendix DSTI.ICCP/TISP 12 (2000) Final: Auctions Theory
Annex 2: Auctions Case Studies
Annex 3: Example of allocations table: Bangladesh
Annexe 4: La valorisation des bandes de fréquences en cas de réaménagement du spectre
Annex 5: Case studies of methods of calculating spectrum fees
Annex 6: Setting the price of spectrum
Annex 7: Developing a National Spectrum Handbook: Colombia case
Annex 8: Contributions list (2010-2014 Study Period)
I. Meeting of the Joint Group on Resolution 9 (16 September 2010)
II. Meeting of Joint Group on Resolution 9 (6 and 7 June 2011)
III. Meeting of Joint Group on Resolution 9 (12 September 2011)
IV. Meeting of Joint Group on Resolution 9 (21 September 2012)
V. Meeting of the Joint Group on Resolution 9 (6 June 2013)
VI. Meeting of the Joint Group on Resolution 9 ( 16 September 2013)
VII. Resolution 9 Reports from the previous Study Period (2006-2010)