



## Competition: Good practices in India

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## Overview

- ◆ Background on Competition
- ◆ Competition: The Indian Story
  - Practical measures for anti-competitive behaviour
- ◆ Suggestions for Mongolia

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## Competition in Telecom

- ◆ Traditionally, Telecom was a government owned monopoly in most parts of the world;
  - More a part of Public Service rather than a business
- ◆ Paradigm Shift from Government Owned Monopoly to Private Sector Duopoly / Oligopoly / Open Competition

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## Why competition?

- Removing waiting list through increased investment;
  - Injection of fresh capital
- Improving efficiency of Service Providers;
- Introducing new technology in the country;
- Improving service quality and network performance;
- Meeting international commitments such as WTO;
- Reducing tariffs
- Cash income to reduce debt
- Roll out of network in unserved areas (Universal Service)

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## Is competition working worldwide?

- Teledensity increase
- Tariff decrease
- Investment increase
- Coverage of underserved areas


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## Rapid increase in Tele-density

Combine Mobile & fixed Teledensity more than doubled 10.6 (1995) to 28.3 (2000) while it increased from 6.6 to 10.6 between 1990 & 95

- ◆ Mainly on account of growth of Mobile Services




Source: ITU

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## Decrease in Tariffs




World Telephone tariffs		1995	2000	%age decrease
<b>Main Telephone lines</b>				
<b>Residential</b>				
Connection	n \$ US	141	86	39
Monthly subscription	n \$ US	7.1	6.3	11
<b>Business</b>				
Connection	n \$ US	245	113	54
Monthly subscription	n \$ US	11.8	9.8	17
Local call	n \$ US	0.08	0.07	13
<b>cellular Digital</b>				
Connection	n \$ US	112.6	75	33
Monthly subscription	n \$ US	31.5	16.6	47
3 minute local call	n \$ US	1.17	0.62	47

Source: ITU

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


## Investment increase



Source: ITU

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- ## International experience Emerging Models
- Privatisation with full competition
    - Chile, New Zealand
  - Privatisation with phased in competition
    - Privatisation of national carrier but exclusivity of operation for a certain period e.g. Japan, UK
  - Liberalisation without privatisation
    - e.g. Colombia, Finland, India
  - Private sector participation without privatisation or Liberalisation i.e., Franchisees, concessions
    - Thailand BOT, Pakistan (BLT), Indonesia (BOLT)
  - Competition without privatisation
    - China
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## Competition: India Case Study

**Good Practices**

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## Brief Overview



**As on 31.03.2003**

Size: 3287000 Sq. Kms.  
 Population: 1.027 Billion  
 Number of Fixed Lines: 41 Million  
 Teledensity Fixed & Mobile: 5  
 Number of Cellular : 12.68 Million  
 Number of Internet : 3.6 Million  
 Number of rural lines(Dec02):10.7 Million  
 Number of PCOs (Dec 02) 1.37 Million  
 %age villages covered 83%

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
## The competition story

- ◆ Introducing Competition
- ◆ Managing Competition
- ◆ Evaluating Competition

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## Phases of Policy reforms



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## Introducing Competition

### Introducing duopoly

- Duopoly in Cellular and Basic Sector in 1995 & 1997 respectively, through bidding
  - In Basic Services, one more operator other than the incumbent;
  - In Cellular, both the licenses for new entrants only
- Limited entry in Radio Paging and PMRTS
- Monopoly in International Long Distance and National Long Distance continued

### Characteristics

- Very high bids received creating viability issues;
- While Cellular licenses could be granted in most of the circles, only 6 out of 20 licenses could be granted in Basic Services
- Incumbent became a new entrant in Cellular after 6 years of private sector duopoly;
- Rural roll out obligations of new entrants largely unmet;
- Very small roll out of fixed services

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### Introducing Competition Duopoly to Open Competition

- Migration package to existing Service Provider
  - From bid amount to revenue share (8%, 10%, 12% depending on area);
  - Accept more competition
- In Cellular, incumbent became the third entrant, fourth cellular operator licenses auctioned through a multi layered bidding process;
- Open competition in all services including International Long Distance and National Long Distance services with fixed entry fees

### Characteristics

- Unlike 3G experience in UK, the operators in India were granted relief by government;
- Multi-layered bidding process turned out to be very successful;
- Except cellular, all other licenses available on first cum First served basis. Hence, reduced speculation
- With the new terms & conditions, India has 4 Cellular and 3 to 4 Basic Operators in each service area in addition to 4 NLDOs and 5 ILDOs
- Roll out obligations linked with points of presence and not villages
- JSO through an independent USO Fund
- Limited Mobility permitted to BSO

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## Good Practices

- ◆ Open entry with transparent entry conditions is the best approach ;
- ◆ In cases such as Cellular Mobile Multi-layered bidding successful;
- ◆ Assessment of size of the market important;
- ◆ Encouraging wireless improves roll out growth rate;
- ◆ Carrot and stick policy in Universal Service Obligation

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## Entry conditions

- Liberalised framework for Internet
  - No license fees
  - More than 400 ISPs licenses
  - More than 100 operational
- Infrastructure sharing has been permitted
- Internet Telephony has been permitted;
  - PC to PC and PC to Phone (outside India)
- Competition in International long distance with permission to use IP

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
## Managing Competition

Ease of entry at any point of time reduces the dominance level.  
However, there lies ahead several regulatory challenges

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## Regulatory Issues addressed by TRAI



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## Key Challenges

### ■ Managing the legacy

- Attitudinal preparedness
  - General perception among incumbent to throttle competition;
  - Micro management by the regulator necessary;
  - The issue became less relevant as Cellular Service Providers rolled out and the incumbent was corporatised;
  - Another option used by countries is to break the incumbent in smaller units; e.g. Brazil, Japan

### ■ Technical preparedness

- Legacy network not ready to provide new services or to carry inter-operator billing;
- Upgradation of network to support services such as CDR based billing, CCS 7 signalling or IN platform interworking could act as a bottleneck;
- Non availability of CDR based billing delayed Carrier Selection by one year in India

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## Interconnection

### ◆ Interconnection

- TRAI specified the Port charges, revenue sharing mechanism, location and number of Points of Interconnect,
- Mandated Operators with significant market power to publish a Reference Interconnection Offer;
- An interconnection usage charge regime in place;
- Migrated from Mobile Party Pays to Calling Party Pays after 3 years of consultation;
  - Low tariff difference between Basic and Cellular has reduced the resistance to migration;

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## Regulating Tariffs

- ◆ Through an open consultation process TRAI established TTO'99; 26 amendments issued
  - Reduction in leased lines tariffs
- ◆ All operators required to report the tariffs to TRAI within 7 days of implementation (Services in which TRAI has forbore) / 5 days before implementation in case of Basic Services (which is regulated)
- ◆ To provide greater flexibility, Cellular Mobile Tariffs have now been deregulated but a close watch is still maintained to protect consumer interest;
- ◆ Roaming charges rationalized

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## Tariffs & Dominance

### ◆ Tariffs

- What to regulate and when to deregulate?
  - Level of competition is the key deciding factor
  - In India, the competition in Cellular and NLDO is so intense that the tariffs remained at a level below the TRAI specified ceiling set for a long time
- ### ◆ Issues linked with dominance
- Accounting Separation is a must to ascertain costs related to a specific service;
  - Consolidated and vertically integrated firms creating serious barriers for standalone operators in terms of tariffs

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## Ability of firms having nationwide footprint to survive competition

Service Area	Name of nationwide Service Provider	Loss in market share (Dec '00 – Mar 03)	Name of standalone Service Provider	Loss in market share (Dec'00 – Mar 03)
1	A	45% ~ 39%	D	54% ~ 36%
2	B	46% ~ 40%	E	53% ~ 20%
3	C	46% ~ 44%	F	53% ~ 23%
4	A nationwide operator took over another standalone operator, which had 27% share while another nationwide operator had 72% in 2000. Today, both the nationwide operators have 36%.			

In cases where the standalone entities did not merge and the consolidated entities entered the market as new entrants, there has been huge market loss by standalone entities

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## How to check dominance?

- Dominance normally reflects itself in interconnection service or tariff package
  - Non availability of ports
  - Bundling of packages
  - Foreclosure
- Closer look at tariffs to prevent Predatory tactics / foreclosure;
  - E.g. Prevent subsidy across two different licenses that have discriminatory effect;(BSO / NLDO);
- Check through consolidation / licensing terms;
  - E.g. In India, one licensee cannot merge with another in the same service area;
- Mandating an RIO is an effective tool

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## Universal Service: Equal Opportunity

- Universal Access / Provision of Information Kiosks and lines in high cost areas subsidized through a Universal Service Fund in a transparent manner (Bidding); The fund is created out of a portio of license fees;
- Compensation through a well defined Access Deficit Charge for keeping Rural and fixed line tariffs below cost;
- Well laid out rural / semi urban roll out obligation in Basic Service license

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## Good Practices

- ◆ Long terms preparedness to handle technical upgradations a must;
- ◆ Lay down the interconnection rules as fine as possible but rules should accommodate flexibility and mutual agreement;
- ◆ Equal opportunity to earn back any subsidy from Universal Service Fund;
- ◆ Dominance to be checked through lose look at tariffs and interconnection policy

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## Implementation of Policy Regime

- Sequencing of Policy important
  - Whether regulatory policies should follow a particular sequence keeping in mind the strong links between them;
    - E.g USO, Interconnection and Tariffs
- Identifying issues that need
  - continuous attention
    - Tariffs,
    - QOS,
    - Customer Complaints
    - Availability of interconnect resources
- Specific but intermittent attention
  - Interconnection & Infrastructure sharing
  - Spectrum allocation

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
## Evaluating Competition

- Growth
- Tariff decrease
- Fulfilment of Universal Service Objectives
- Foreign investment
- Number of Service Providers

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
## Subscriber Growth fixed & mobile



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

## Tariff Decrease



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## Fulfilment of Universal Service Objectives




VPT is Village Public Telephone and is the first telephone in a village. Mostly provided by the incumbent

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## Pro investment climate


Large increase in FDI since 2001 i.e., after open competition was announced



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## Increase in private sector licenses (Basic, Cellular, NLD & ILD)



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## Suggestions for Mongolia

- Introduce competition early together with safeguards (dominance rules);
- Define interconnection rules as clearly and minutely as possible;
- Consider mandating an RIO;
- Prepare technically for future services;
- Plan in advance (2 ~ 3 years)
- Clear competition rules and size of the market, the main drivers for competition
- Enforce roll out by making rural areas attractive

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Thank You

